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Vol.  XI  September-December,  1923  Nos.  3  and  4 


BOARD  OF  EDITORS 

ERNEST  L.  BOGART  JOHN  A.  FAIRLIE 

LAURENCE  M.  LARSON 


PUBLISHED  BY  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS 

UNDER  THE  AUSPICES  OF  THE  GRADUATE  SCHOOL 

URBANA,  ILLINOIS 


COPYRIGHT,  1924 
BY  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS 


THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION 

IN  THE  RELATIONS  OF  ENGLAND, 

FRANCE,  AND  RUSSIA,  1832-1841 


BY 


FREDERICK  STANLEY  RODKEY 


PUBLISHED  BY  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS 
URBANA 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

Introduction 9 

I.  The  Three  Great  Powers  and  the  Problem  of  the  Near 

East  in  1832-1833 13 

II.  Evolution  in  Near  Eastern  Relations,  1834-1838 36 

III.  The  Question  of  Constantinople  versus  the  Question  of 

Alexandria 75 

IV.  The  Negotiation  of  the  Treaty  of  July  15,  1840 120 

V.  The  Isolation  of  France 164 

VI.  The  Turco-Egyptian  Question  Concluded:    France  and 

the  Four  Powers  Reconciled 195 

Appendix  A.  The  French  Bourse,  January,  1840,  to 
August,  1841 233 

Appendix  B.  France  and  the  Eastern  Question:  An  Ex- 
tract from  an  Article  which  was  Published  in  The 
Examiner,  August  23,  1840 234 

Appendix  C.    Extracts  from  the  Conclusions  drawn  by 

Commodore  Napier  in  his  War  in  Syria 236 

Appendix  D.  Extracts  from  the  Information  and  Opin- 
ions of  American  Diplomatic  Agents  Relative  to  the 
Turco-Egyptian  Question 237 

Appendix  E.    Bibliographical  Notes 255 


PREFACE 

A  number  of  special  works,  in  addition  to  general  histories, 
which  treat  more  or  less  extensively  certain  phases  of  the  Turco- 
Egyptian  question  during  the  period  1832-1841,  have  been  pub- 
lished heretofore,  and  a  few  of  these  perhaps  deserve  special 
mention.  Sergi  Goriainow's  valuable  little  volume  on  Le  Bosphore 
et  les  Dardanelles,  based  almost  exclusively  upon  archival  ma- 
terial found  at  Petrograd,  touches  upon  the  question  briefly,  from 
the  Russian  point  of  view,  in  so  far  as  it  concerned  the  status  of 
the  Straits.  Major  John  Hall's  England  and  the  Orleans  Monarchy, 
based  largely  upon  similar  material  found  at  London  and  Paris, 
deals  with  the  question  primarily  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
relations  of  England  and  France.  Adolf  Hasenclever's  careful 
study  on  Die  Orientalische  Frage  in  den  Jahren  1838-1841,  which 
has  been  based  to  a  considerable  extent  upon  official  records  found 
at  Berlin  and  Vienna,  but  also  to  some  extent  upon  numerous 
published  sources,  treats  the  question  during  the  most  critical 
part  of  the  period  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  relations  of  all 
the  great  European  Powers.  Furthermore,  Vicomte  de  Guichen's 
La  Crise  de  Orient  de  1839  a  1841  et  V Europe,  which  like  Hall's 
work  has  been  based  largely  upon  archival  material  found  at  Paris 
and  London,  treats,  as  does  Hasenclever's,  the  question  during  its 
later  critical  stage  primarily  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  rela- 
tions of  the  Powers.  However,  no  work  has  heretofore  appeared 
which  deals  exclusively  with  the  Turco-Egyptian  question  in  its 
entirety.  It  has  been  with  the  idea  that  the  question  to  be  best 
understood  must  be  so  presented — at  least  in  its  entirety  so  far 
as  it  affected  the  three  great  Powers  most  vitally  concerned — that 
this  monograph  has  been  prepared. 

The  author  is  indebted  to  several  members  of  the  History  De- 
partment of  the  University  of  Illinois  for  valuable  suggestions  and 
criticisms.  He  is  indebted  particularly  to  Professor  A.  H.  Lybyer 
at  whose  suggestion  the  study  was  undertaken  and  under  whose 
careful  guidance  and  direction  the  whole  of  it  has  been  carried  to 
completion.  The  author,  himself,  is  of  course  responsible  for  all 
errors,  both  in  presentation  and  in  interpretation  of  the  facts. 

FREDERICK  STANLEY  RODKEY 


INTRODUCTION 

During  the  past  century  the  question  of  the  Near  East,  which 
has  been  primarily  that  of  the  disposition  of  the  territories  form- 
erly belonging  to  the  Turkish  Empire,  has  proved  particularly 
troublesome  to  European  statesmen.  It  has  been  so  first,  because 
of  the  ambitions  of  certain  Powers  to  gain  control  of  the  whole 
or  of  part  of  Turkey,  while  other  Powers  have  worked  to  preserve 
its  independence  and  its  integrity;  and  secondly,  because  of  the 
existence  throughout  the  Ottoman  dominions  of  what  has  been 
one  of  the  most  complex  racial  situations  which  has  ever  existed 
anywhere.  Undoubtedly  no  question  in  European  diplomacy  in 
recent  times  has  been  more  directly  and  more  continuously  at 
the  root  of  the  rivalries  of  the  great  Powers  than  this  one  of  the 
Near  East.  On  two  occasions,  notably — in  1854  and  again  in 
1914 — it  certainly  played  a  major  role  in  bringing  about  conflicts 
most  disastrous  in  their  consequences,  the  last  of  which  today 
even  threatens  the  existence  of  European  civilization.  On  other 
occasions,  while  not  bringing  on  actual  hostilities,  it  has  come 
dangerously  near  to  doing  so  and  has  at  least  profoundly  affected 
the  great  Powers  in  their  diplomatic  relations  with  each  other. 
Such  was  the  case  in  the  period  between  1832  and  1841,  when, 
perhaps,  the  question  as  we  understand  it  today  had  its  origin. 

In  the  period  just  preceding  1832  the  three  Powers,  England, 
France,  and  Russia,  were  in  alliance  to  further  the  cause  of  Greek 
independence.  Their  general  policies  in  regard  to  Near  Eastern 
affairs,  however,  were  by  no  means  identical.  Russia,  since  the 
time  of  Peter  the  Great,  had  been  the  traditional  enemy  of 
Turkey.  Her  rulers  had  acquired  extensive  territories  and  special 
political  privileges  at  the  expense  of  the  Ottoman  Porte,  and  it 
was  well  known  that  they  entertained  the  hope  of  falling  heir 
some  day  to  the  whole  region  of  the  Straits.  France,  on  the  other 
hand,  since  the  time  of  Francis  I  had  been  the  traditional  friend 
of  Turkey.  She  had  quite  uniformly  shown  sympathy  and  had  on 
some  occasions  given  active  aid  to  the  latter  in  her  struggles  with 
Russia  and  Austria.  But,  it  must  be  remembered,  she  too  had  her 
own  ambitions  in  the  Mediterranean  by  1832.  Her  occupation  of 
Algiers  was  under  way  and  her  interest  in  Egypt,  where  the  noted 

[9] 


IO  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [336 

Albanian,  Mehemet  Ali,  with  the  aid  of  French  experts1  had  made 
himself  virtually  independent  of  the  Sultan,  dated  back  to  the  time 
of  Napoleon.  Many  Frenchmen,  it  may  be  ventured,  were  be- 
ginning to  look  forward  to  the  day  when  France  would  become 
"mistress  of  the  whole  south  and  east  coast  of  the  Mediterranean, 
from  Ceuta  to  where  the  Taurus  dips  into  the  sea."2  England, 
like  France,  had  at  times  befriended  Turkey.  However,  her  inter- 
ests in  the  Near  East  had  never  been  paramount.  It  was  before 
the  day  when  oil  counted  for  much  in  the  diplomatic  affairs  of 
nations,  and  the  commercial  route  to  India  was  still  by  way  of 
the  Cape  of  Good  Hope. 

The  period  between  1832  and  1841  saw  many  important  de- 
velopments both  in  the  direct  affairs  of  the  Near  East  itself  and 
in  the  resulting  relations  of  the  great  Powers.  It  was  the  period 
when  the  forces  of  Mehemet  Ali  on  two  occasions  threatened  to 

*A  number  of  French  experts  were  in  the  employ  of  Mehemet  Ali.  Note  the 
following  extract  from  a  footnote  found  in  Vicomte  de  Guichen,  La  crise  d'Orient 
de  1839  a  184.1  et  I'Europe,  pp.  3-4:  "Parmi  les  Frangais  qui  etaient  alors  a  son 
service,  nous  citerons  le  colonel  Varin,  directeur  de  1'Ecole  de  cavalerie,  Bruneau, 
sous-directeur  de  1'Ecole  d'artillerie,  d'Armagnac,  chef  d'escadrons  du  regiment 
de  cuirassiers,  Mary,  chef  d'etat-major  de  1'armee  d'Arabie,  le  commandant 
Haragly,  chef  de  la  comptabilite  du  ministere  de  la  Guerre.  Dans  les  autres 
services  du  gouvernement  egyptien,  on  remarquait  Monget,  ingenieur  des  Ponts- 
et-Chaussees,  Henry,  directeur  des  Constructions  maritimes,  Houssard,  capitaine 
de  vaisseau,  Koenig,  directeur  de  1'Ecole  des  Princes,  Em-Bey,  directeur  des 
Fabriques  de  produits  chimiques,  Linant,  ingenieur  en  chef  pour  les  travaux  de 
canalisation,  Lambert,  sous-directeur  de  1'Ecole  Polytechnique,  le  Dr.  Clot-Bey, 
fondateur  de  1'Ecole  de  me~decine,  inspecteur  general  du  service  medical,  le  Dr. 
Perron,  directeur  de  1'Ecole  de  medecine  veterinaire,  Hamont,  directeur  des 
Haras,  Prince,  directeur  de  1'Ecole  de  medecine  veterinaire,  Chedufan,  medecin  en 
chef  de  1'armee  d'Arabie,  Bonfort  administrates  des  immenses  proprietes  d'lbra- 
him  Pacha,  1'ingenieur  de  Cerisy,  cr£ateur  de  1'arsenal  d'Alexandrie;  enfin  Besson- 
Bey,  vice-amiral  de  la  marine  eegyptienne  et  Jumel  qui  avait  enrichi  1'Egypte 
de  la  culture  du  coton."  Other  Frenchmen  in  the  employ  of  Mehemet  Ali  were: 
Colonel  Seves  (Suleiman  Pasha),  chief  military  adviser  of  the  Pasha,  Leroux, 
de  Toron,  and  Baladin,  under-officers  in  the  Syrian  army,  and  Galise  and 
Mimaust,  engineers.  Other  Europeans  in  the  employ  of  Mehemet  Ali  were: 
Cherubini,  probably  an  Italian,  physician  to  the  Pasha,  Colonel  Schultz,  a  Polish 
officer  in  command  of  St.  Jean  d'Acre,  and  Pacysci,  another  Polish  officer  in  the 
employ  of  the  Pasha. 

See  Marshal  Marmont,  The  Present  State  of  the  Turkish  Empire,  p.  265. 
The  Times,  Dec.  I,  1840,  Feb.  6,  March  4,  April  9,  1841. 

"See  Appendix  B. 


33?]  INTRODUCTION  11 

destroy  completely  the  Ottoman  Empire;  when  Russia  modified 
temporarily  her  policy  with  regard  to  Turkey  from  one  of  open 
hostility  to  one  of  professed  friendship  and  peaceful  penetration; 
when  France  continued  to  oppose  Russia  and  to  reveal  more 
markedly  her  favoritism  for  Mehemet  Ali;  and  finally,  when 
England,  awakening  to  a  realization  that  through  the  development 
of  steam  navigation  the  Near  East  might  furnish  half-way  stations 
on  the  road  to  India,  stepped  forward  to  oppose  actively  both  the 
designs  of  Russia  at  Constantinople  and  those  of  France  at 
Alexandria.  Indeed,  it  was  the  period  during  which  for  the  first 
time  there  was  serious  danger  of  a  general  European  war  as  a 
result  solely  of  the  rivalries  of  the  great  Powers  in  the  Near  East. 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  THREE  GREAT  POWERS  AND  THE  PROBLEM 
OF  THE  NEAR  EAST  IN  1832-1833 

The  Sultan  Mahmoud  II,  from  the  beginning  of  his  reign  (1808), 
directed  his  policy  toward  "crushing  the  various  forces  within  the 
[Ottoman]  empire,  whether  the  Janissaries  or  too  powerful  Vice- 
roys, which  hampered  the  omnipotence  of  the  central  power.''1 
One  of  the  greatest  obstacles  to  the  success  of  such  a  policy  was 
to  be  found  in  the  rapidly  increasing  strength  of  Mehemet  AH, 
Pasha  of  Egypt.  Under  the  circumstances  a  clash  between  the 
Porte  and  its  powerful  vassal  was  inevitable.  Mehemet  Ali,  well 
aware  of  the  feelings  of  his  overlord,2  and  dissatisfied  with  the 
meager  reward3  he  had  received  in  return  for  the  important  role 
played  by  his  army  and  navy  which  had  assisted  the  Ottoman 
forces  in  their  attempts  to  subdue  the  Greek  insurgents,4  de- 
termined to  strike  the  first  blow.  Consequently,  in  November,  1831, 
after  a  period  of  deliberate  and  formidable  preparation,5  a  com- 
bined land  and  naval  force  under  the  command  of  Ibrahim  Pasha 
was  sent  forth  to  lay  siege  to  the  fortress  of  St.  Jean  d'Acre. 

Mehemet  was  anxious  to  conceal  his  real  motives,  and  to  the 
commissioner  of  the  Porte  who  remonstrated  with  him  for  thus 
invading  a  neighboring  pashalic,  without  the  permission  of  the 
Sultan,  he  loudly  protested  the  loyalty  of  his  intentions,  declaring 
that  the  presumptuous  Governor  of  Acre,  Abdallah  Pasha,  had 
"  'insulted  his  beard  whitened  in  the  service  of  his  sovereign,'  and, 
in  the  interest  of  the  Porte,  he  now  proposed  to  chastise  his  ar- 
rogance." The  Sultan  and  his  ministers  placed  little  faith  in  these 

^Cambridge  Modern  History,  X,  p.  548. 

3C.  C.  Frankland,  Travels  to  and  from  Constantinople,  in  the  Years  1827 
and  1828,  II,  pp.  146-149. 

The  governorship  of  the  Island  of  Crete.  According  to  the  Sultan's  original 
promises,  "The  reward  of  his  [Mehemet  Ali's]  assistance  was  to  be  the  Pashalik 
of  Crete,  while  his  stepson  Ibrahim  was  to  govern,  in  the  Sultan's  name,  the 
reconquered  Morea." — J.  A.  R.  Marriott,  The  Eastern  Question,  p.  188. 

4A.  Cahuet,  La  question  d'Orient  dans  I'histoire  contem-poraine,  p.  78. 

"Barker  to  Abbott,  Alexandria,  June  2,  1831:  "'There  is  now  no  manner  of 
doubt  that  the  formidable  expeditions  in  Alexandria  and  Cairo  are  destined  to 
besiege  Acre.' " — J.  Barker,  Syria  and  Egypt  under  the  Last  Five  Sultans  of 
Turkey,  II,  p.  176. 

[13] 


14  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [340 

assurances.  They  had  no  doubts  that  the  Pasha  was  launched 
upon  a  career  of  conquest.6  Significant  of  this  belief  on  the  part  of 
the  Ottoman  authorities  is  the  fact  that  repeated  advances  were 
made  by  them  to  the  British  Ambassador,  Sir  Stratford  Canning,7 
both  before  and  after  the  fall  of  Acre,  to  secure  a  close  and  in- 
timate connection  between  Turkey  and  England.8  Furthermore, 
M.  Maurojeni,  the  Turkish  charge  d'affaires  at  Vienna,  was  or- 
dered to  proceed  to  London  to  sound  out  the  British  government 
upon  the  subject.9  When  it  became  known  in  Constantinople  that 
practically  every  important  position  south  of  the  Taurus  moun- 
tains had  fallen  before  the  victorious  Egyptians,  the  alarm  of  the 
Sultan  and  his  ministers  became  so  great  that  Namic  Pasha,  a 
major-general  of  the  Imperial  Guard,  was  despatched  to  England 
"with  a  letter  from  His  Highness  to  King  William  IV,  praying  for 
naval  assistance  on  the  coast  of  Syria."10  His  Britannic  Majesty's 
government,  preoccupied  with  other  affairs  and  underestimating 
the  seriousness  of  the  situation  in  the  Orient,  refused  to  grant  the 
assistance  desired.11  It  will  be  remembered  that  at  that  time  the 

T.  O.  Turkey  213,  Mandeville  to  Palmerston,  Jan.  26,  1832,  cited  by  J. 
Hall,  England  and  the  Orleans  Monarchy,  p.  150. 

7In  Nov.,  1831,  Canning  had  been  sent  to  Constantinople  on  a  special 
mission  to  secure  the  consent  of  the  Porte  to  the  conditions  under  which  it  was 
proposed  that  Greece  should  be  separated  from  Turkey. 

8F.  O.  Turkey  211,  212,  Canning  to  Palmerston,  May  17,  Aug.  7,  1832,  cited 
by  Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  153.  Cambridge  History  of  British  Foreign  Policy,  II,  p.  164. 
Canning  gave  Mahmoud  to  understand  that  Great  Britain  might  support  the 
Sultan,  and  at  the  same  time  urged  Palmerston  to  send  a  naval  force  to  the 
Levant.  Ibid,  [footnote].  See  also  a  "Memorandum  on  the  Turkish  Question 
sent  by  Stratford  Canning  to  Lord  Palmerston."  F.  O.  Turkey  211,  Dec.  19, 
1832,  quoted  in  ibid.,  p.  638. 

'Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  153.   Parliamentary  Debates,  XXII,  pp.  320-321. 

10F.  O.  Turkey  213,  Mandeville  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  18,  1832,  cited  by  Hall, 
op.  cit.,  p.  153.  A  similar  unsuccessful  appeal  was  made  to  France  at  about  the 
same  time.  See  P.  Thureau-Dangin,  Histoire  de  la  monarchie  de  juillet,  II,  p. 
364.  Cambridge  History  of  British  Foreign  Policy,  II,  p.  164. 

"On  July  n,  1833,  Lord  Palmerston  admitted  in  the  House  of  Commons 
that  the  British  government  had  not  thought  it  fit  to  afford  assistance  to  the 
Porte  at  the  particular  time  when  it  had  been  requested.  "No  doubt,"  he  added, 
"if  England  had  thought  fit  to  interfere,  the  progress  of  the  invading  army 
would  have  been  stopped,  .  .  .  ;  but  although  it  was  easy  to  say,  after  events 
had  happened,  that  they  were  to  be  expected,  yet  certainly  no  one  could 
anticipate  the  rapidity  with  which  they  had  succeeded  each  other  in  the  East." 
Parl.  Deb.,  XIX,  p.  579.  See  also  ibid.,  XXII,  p.  320. 


34 1  ]  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE   NEAR  EAST  IN    1832-1833  15 

question  of  Parliamentary  reform  was  still  of  major  importance 
in  British  politics.  Moreover,  as  Lord  Palmerston  pointed  out 
upon  a  later  occasion,  when  the  English  "were  embarking  in  naval 
operations  in  the  North  Sea,  and  on  the  coast  of  Holland,  and 
were  under  the  necessity  of  keeping  up  another  naval  force  on  the 
coast  of  Portugal,  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  have  sent  to 
the  Mediterranean  such  a  squadron  as  would  have  served  the  pur- 
pose of  the  Porte,  and  at  the  same  time  have  comported  with  the 
naval  dignity"  of  Great  Britain.12 

Likewise  in  France  where,  it  is  true,  public  opinion  was  sympa- 
thetic to  Mehemet  Ali,  almost  no  alarm  seems  to  have  been 
occasioned  by  the  advance  of  the  Egyptian  forces  through  Syria.13 
Even  as  late  as  January  15,  1833,  the  Journal  des  Debats,  leading 
organ  of  the  Doctrinaires,  argued  that  it  would  probably  be  im- 
possible for  Ibrahim  to  make  a  successful  advance  into  Asia 
Minor.  After  pointing  out  the  difficulties  to  be  encountered  in 
such  an  undertaking,  it  concluded  with  the  remark  that  the 
question  was  still  far  from  appearing  to  be  decided  in  favor  of 
Egypt.14 

Of  a  far  different  character,  however,  was  the  attitude  of  Russia. 
At  St.  Petersburg  the  developments  in  the  Near  East  were  re- 
garded in  a  serious  light.  "  'The  Emperor,' "  Nesselrode  declared 
on  November  9,  1832,  in  a  despatch  to  Boutenieff,  the  Minister  of 

Russia  at  the  Porte,  "  ' s'est  penetre  de  I'idee  of  putting  an 

end  to  the  insurrection  in  the  Orient;  with  this  in  view  he  has  re- 
solved to  exert  all  of  his  moral  influence  upon  the  Viceroy  of 
Egypt.'  "15  In  order  to  promote  a  reconciliation  between  the 
contending  forces  Lieutenant  General  Muravieff  was  sent  im- 
mediately on  a  special  mission  to  Constantinople  and  Alexandria. 

™Parl.  Deb.,  XX,  p.  900. 

13"To  judge  from  the  absence  of  French  and  British  Ambassadors  at  the 
Porte,  and  from  the  official  silence  maintained  on  the  subject  by  the  Govern- 
ments connected  with  the  Mediterranean,  one  would  have  supposed  that  the  de- 
cisive battle  of  Koniah  was  the  first  event  of  the  war,  and  that  this  denouement 
of  an  extraordinary  drama  came  upon  Western  Europe  with  all  the  surprise  of 
novelty." — The  Times,  May  7,  1833.  This  comment,  found  in  the  most  prom- 
inent journal  of  the  opposition  party  in  England,  is  possibly  overdrawn,  but  it  is 
nevertheless  significant.  See  another  editorial  in  The  Times,  April  30,  1833. 

"Journal  des  Debats,  Jan.  15,   1833. 

18S.  Goriainow,  Le  Bosphore  et  les  Dardanelles,  p.  29. 


l6  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [342 

The  Russian  government,  guided  by  the  theory  that  no  Power 
can  have  a  better  neighbor  than  a  weak  state,16  wished  to  main- 
tain without  strengthening  the  Turkish  dominion.17  If  Mehemet 
Ali  should  succeed  in  destroying  the  feeble  regime  of  the  Porte,  he 
would  most  certainly  build  up  in  its  place  a  strong  and  vigorous 
government  of  his  own.  Moreover,  it  was  believed  that  the  tri- 
umph of  the  Viceroy  of  Egypt  would  carry  with  it  an  augmenta- 
tion of  the  influence  of  France.18  Accordingly,  Russia  regarded 
the  situation  as  one  of  real  and  immediate  concern.  Unwilling  to 
rely  entirely  upon  the  remonstrances  which  her  representatives 
had  been  directed  to  make  to  Mehemet  and  Ibrahim,  she  de- 
termined that  steps  should  be  taken  in  preparation  for  an  active 
intervention.  With  this  in  view  Admiral  Greigh  was  ordered  to 
equip  the  Black  Sea  fleet  and  to  place  it  in  readiness  to  sail  to 
Constantinople  upon  the  first  appeal  of  the  Sultan.18 

The  Russian  Cabinet  must  have  realized  that  the  execution  of 
such  a  policy  as  it  had  adopted  would  occasion  jealousy  and  alarm 
on  the  part  of  certain  other  great  Powers — especially  England  and 
France.  It  is  not  at  all  improbable  that  the  explanatory  note,19 
forwarded  on  November  15,  1832,  by  Nesselrode  to  the  Prince  de 
Lieven,  Russian  Ambassador  at  London,  was  prepared  with  the 
deliberate  intention  of  counteracting  such  feelings  at  the  Court  of 
St.  James.  In  that  document  the  Emperor's  chief  Minister,  after 
pointing  out  that  the  seriousness  of  the  insurrection  of  Egypt  had 
led  his  august  master  to  tender  the  moral  aid  of  Russia  to  the 
support  of  the  Grand  Seignior,  and  after  explaining  the  motives 
back  of  the  Muravieff  mission,  hinted  that  the  Tsar's  government 
would  favor  the  granting  by  England  of  naval  assistance  upon  the 
coast  of  Syria  as  requested  by  the  Porte. 

Meanwhile,  affairs  were  undergoing  a  rapid  development  in  the 
Near  East.  The  Turks,  many  of  whom  had  lost  all  hopes  of  suc- 
cess even  before  the  battle  of  Koniah,20  were  panic  stricken  when 

"Ibid.,  IX,  pp.  25-27,  47-50. 

"Guizot,  Memoires  pour  servir  a  I'lristoire  de  mon  temps,  IV,  pp.  43-44. 

18Goriainow,  op.  at.,  p.  30. 

"G.  F.  Martens,  Nouveau  supplement  au  recueil  de  traites,  III,  pp.  642-643. 
See  statement  made  by  Palmerston  in  the  House  of  Commons,  Aug.  29,  1833. 
Parl.  Deb.,  XX,  p.  900. 

""Letter  from  Constantinople,  Dec.  10,  1832,  Journal  des  Debats,  Jan.  io: 
1833- 


343]  THE   PROBLEM  OF  THE   NEAR  EAST  IN    1832-1833  \J 

the  results  of  that  decisive  engagement  became  known.  Nothing, 
it  seemed,  could  prevent  the  victorious  Egyptians  from  marching 
directly  upon  Constantinople.21  It  was  at  this  critical  moment  that 
General  Muravieff,  the  Russian  Envoy  Extraordinary,  arrived  in 
the  Ottoman  capital.  Mandeville  and  Varennes,  the  British  and 
French  charges  d'affaires,  were  soon  convinced  that  he  brought 
from  his  court  an  offer  of  military  assis'tance  to  the  Porte.22  In 
fact  M.  de  Varennes  became  so  alarmed  at  the  possibility  of  a 
Russian  armed  intervention  that  with  the  aid  of  some  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Divan,  he  proceeded  to  exert  his  influence  to  prevent 
it.23  The  suspicions  of  the  British  and  French  representatives  un- 
doubtedly were  correct.  It  is  certain  that  on  December  23,  only 
three  days  after  the  arrival  of  Muravieff,  the  Tsar's  Ambassador, 
M.  de  Boutenieff,  definitely  offered  in  the  presence  of  both  the 
Seraskier  and  the  Reis  Effendi24  to  place  the  Black  Sea  fleet  at 
the  disposal  of  the  Sultan.  This  generous  offer  was  received  with 
profuse  expressions  of  gratitude.25  Nevertheless  the  Porte  hesi- 
tated when  it  came  to  accepting  the  aid  of  its  traditional  enemy. 
After  a  brief  delay  the  Ottoman  authorities  determined  upon  an 
attempt  at  a  direct  agreement  with  Mehemet  Ali.  As  a  result, 
early  in  the  month  of  January,  1833.  the  former  Capitan-Pasha, 
Halil,  and  the  Ametchi  Effendi,  Reschid,  were  despatched  to 
Egypt  empowered  to  conclude  an  arrangement  with  the  rebellious 

MP.  Mouriez,  Histoire  de  Mehemet-Ali,  III,  p.  213. 

"F.  0.  Turkey  212,  222,  Mandeville  to  Palmerston,  Dec.  31,  1832,  Jan.  8, 
1833.  F.  0.  France  463,  Granville  to  Palmerston,  Jan.  21,  28,  1833,  cited  by 
Hall,  op  cit.,  pp.  I54-I55- 

**Mouriez,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  p.  219.  L.  Blanc,  Histoire  de  dix  ans,  1830-1840,  IV, 
pp.  145-146.  Commodore  Porter,  the  American  representative  in  Turkey,  wrote 
to  Secretary  of  State  Livingston,  March  25,  1833:  "There  appears  to  be  two 
parties  in  the  Government,  one  for,  the  other  against  accepting  of  the  aid  of  the 
Russians.  At  the  head  of  this  latter,  it  is  said,  is  the  Seraskier  Pacha,  whose 
hostility  to  Mohamed  Alii  has  caused  all  the  troubles  between  him  and  the 
Sultan.  The  Ulemas  and  most  of  the  officers  of  the  Divan  are  said  to  be  of  his 
party.  The  mass  of  the  people  are  in  favor  of  Mohamed  Alii,  and  if  it  depended 
on  them  the  Capital  would  be  delivered  to  him  without  opposition." — U.  S. 
Department  of  State  Archives,  Turkey,  Vol.  II,  Porter  to  Livingston,  No.  100, 
March  25,  1833. 

"The  Seraskier  was  the  Minister  of  War  and  the  Commander  in  Chief  of 
the  armies.  The  Reis  Effendi  was  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

"Goriainow,  op.  cit.,  pp.  30-31. 


l8  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [344 

vassal.26  General  Muravieff,  who  must  have  realized  that  much 
would  depend  upon  the  success  of  the  projected  negotiations,  set 
out  immediately  upon  his  mission  to  Mehemet  AH.27 

Though  the  chief  center  of  diplomatic  activity  was  thus  trans- 
ferred from  the  Bosphorus  to  the  Nile,  at  Constantinople,  Mande- 
ville  and  Varennes  continued  their  endeavors  to  secure  peace  and 
prevent  an  armed  intervention  from  the  north.  On  January  9, 
1833,  M.  de  Varennes  forwarded  a  letter  to  Ibrahim  urging  him 
not  to  persist  in  the  march  of  his  army  upon  Constantinople.28 
Later,  when  it  became  evident  that  his  first  appeal  had  gone  un- 
heeded,29 a  second  was  prepared  and  despatched  to  the  Viceroy 
himself,  as  well  as  to  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  army  in 
Asia  Minor.30 

Meanwhile,  the  Egyptian  army  had  broken  up  camp  at  Koniah 
and  had  begun  to  advance  in  the  direction  of  Constantinople. 
That  movement,  added  to  the  uncompromising  attitude  of  Ibra- 
him,29 so  alarmed  the  Sultan  that  he  lost  hope  in  the  pending 
negotiations  and  determined  to  avail  himself  of  the  aid  which  had 
been  offered  by  the  representative  of  Russia.  Consequently,  a 
direct  application  for  the  assistance  of  both  land  and  naval  forces 
was  made  to  M.  de  Boutenieff  by  the  Reis  Effendi.31  £oth  Mande- 
ville  and  Varennes,  who  opposed  such  a  move  on  the  part  of  the 
Porte,  exerted  themselves  in  vain  to  induce  it  to  withdraw  its  de- 
mand. "  'A  drowning  man',"  the  Ottoman  Minister  of  Foreign 

*E.  de  Cadalvene  et  E.  Barrault,  Histoire  de  la  guerre  de  Mehemed-Ali 
contre  la  Porte  Ottomane,  pp.  343-344.  Mouriez,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  p.  220.  The  Turkish 
representatives  arriving  in  Egypt  on  Jan.  21,  were  received  by  the  Viceroy 
"with  the  greatest  marks  of  distinction."  However,  as  they  were  instructed  to 
offer  him  only  the  districts  of  Acre,  Naplous,  Jerusalem,  and  Tripoli,  he  was  un- 
willing to  conclude  a  definite  settlement  with  them.  See  Barker,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp. 

193-195- 

"Goriainow,  op.  cit.,  p.  31. 

"Cadalvene  et  Barrault,  op.  cit.,  pp.  343-344. 

"F.  O.  Turkey  222,  Mandeville  to  Palmerston,  Jan.  13,  26,  1833,  cited  by 
Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  157. 

*°Cadalvene  et  Barrault,  op.  cit.,  pp.  348-349.   Mouriez,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  p.  221. 

"Goriainow,  op.  cit.,  p.  31.  According  to  press  reports,  this  application  for 
aid  was  made  on  Feb.  2.  See  Journal  des  Debats,  April  22,  1833.  Letter 
from  St.  Petersburg,  The  Times,  March  30,  1833. 


345]  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE   NEAR  EAST  IN   1832-1833  19 

Affairs  informed  them,  "  'will  clutch  at  a  serpent.'  "32  Nevertheless 
they  did  not  abandon  all  hope  immediately.  A  few  days  after  the 
Sultan's  request  for  aid  had  been  communicated  to  the  Russian 
Ambassador,  Muravieff  returned  from  Egypt  announcing  that 
Mehemet  AH  had  promised  to  refrain  from  further  hostilities 
against  his  overlord.33  Also,  Varennes  received  assurances  from 
Ibrahim  Pasha  dated  February  3,  to  the  effect  that  the  Egyp- 
tian forces  would  not  advance,  for  the  present  at  least,  beyond 
the  positions  they  had  just  occupied  at  Kutayah.34  Thereupon 
the  British  and  French  charges  d'affaires  renewed  their  activities, 
again  endeavoring  to  persuade  the  Porte  to  ask  that  the  despatch 
of  the  Russian  succor  might  be  delayed.35  On  this  occasion  it 
seems  their  efforts  were  rewarded  by  a  slight  degree  of  success.  At 
any  rate,  at  a  conference  between  the  Russian  and  Ottoman  min- 
isters in  Constantinople  on  February  8,  the  Reis  Effendi,  sup- 
ported by  certain  other  members  of  the  Sultan's  Cabinet,  suggested 
that  since  the  immediate  danger  which  threatened  the  Turkish 
capital  had  disappeared,  the  arrival  of  the  Tsar's  fleet  should  be 
countermanded.  Boutenieff  replied  that  such  a  step  could  be 
taken  only  when  the  Sultan  was  willing  to  make  a  formal  declar- 
ation in  writing  to  that  effect,  and  after  he  had  placed  at  the 


12F.  0.  Turkey  222,  Mandeville  to  Palmerston,  Feb.  3,  4,  15,  1833,  cited  by 
Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  157.  Porter,  the  American  representative,  wrote  on  January  2, 
1833:  "Great  consternation  prevails  among  the  higher  authorities  of  this  Govern- 
ment. Their  days  are  employed  in  labors  to  avert  the  impending  evils  which 
threaten  the  Empire,  and  their  nights  in  consultations, — discontents  prevail  in 
the  Army,  the  Navy  and  among  the  Mass  of  the  people, — great  indeed  must  be 
their  terror  when  they  can  be  induced  to  resort  to  the  expedient  of  introducing 
foreign  troops  to  quell  their  domestic  enemies,  and  those  troops  Russians, — the 
future  appears  not  to  be  thought  of  in  the  danger  which  now  threatens." — State 
Dept.  Turkey,  II,  Porter  to  Livingston,  No.  85,  Jan.  2,  1833. 

"Goriainow,  op.  cit.,  p.  31.  Muravieff  arrived  at  Constantinople  on  Feb. 
6.  Note — Most  of  the  dates  given  by  Goriainow  are  taken  from  the  Russian 
calendar.  Twelve  days  must  be  added  to  his  dates  to  avoid  confusion. 

"Cadalvene  et  Barrault,  op.  cit.,  p.  352. 

35F.  O.  Turkey  222,  Mandeville  to  Palmerston,  Feb.  II,  23,  1833,  cited  by 
Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  158.  See  also  Metternich  to  Apponyi,  Feb.  21,  1833,  Aus  Met- 
ternich's  Nachgelassenen  Papieren,  V,  p.  444. 


2O  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [346 

disposal  of  the  Russian  legation  a  steamboat  or  a  "batiment  leger" 
to  convey  his  counter  request  to  the  proper  authorities.36 

Meanwhile,  the  French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  the  Due  de 
Broglie,  had  learned  that  offers  of  assistance  had  been  made  to 
the  Sultan  by  Boutenieff,  and,  on  January  21,  forwarded  to  M.  de 
Talleyrand,  the  representative  of  France  in  London,  a  despatch 
directing  that  the  question  of  joint  intervention  in  the  Near  East 
should  be  proposed  to  the  British  government.37  It  was  soon 
apparent  that  the  Court  of  St.  James  refused  to  entertain  such 
a  suggestion  and  therefore  Broglie,  who  was  not  willing  to  act 
alone,  was  forced  to  abandon  the  project.  At  the  same  time,  in 
order  to  protect  French  influence  in  Ottoman  affairs,  he  sent 
Admiral  Roussin  with  the  rank  of  an  ambassador  to  Constan- 
tinople.87 

It  so  happened  that  on  February  17,  the  precise  date  when 
Admiral  Roussin  arrived  at  his  destination,  the  Ottoman  authori- 
ties presented  a  memorandum  to  M.  de  Boutenieff  requesting 
that  if  possible  the  sailing  of  the  Tsar's  squadron  should  be  pre- 
vented.38 Just  why  the  request  was  made  at  that  particular  time 
has  never  been  clearly  demonstrated.  According  to  an  account 
written  by  a  correspondent  of  the  Journal  des  Debats,  it  was  due 
to  the  prompt  and  energetic  remonstrances  of  the  new  French 
Ambassador.39  However,  as  it  is  difficult  to  believe  that  Roussin 
could  have  exercised  so  great  and  immediate  an  influence  with  the 
Porte,  such  an  explanation  cannot  be  accepted  without  reserve. 
In  answer  to  the  French  assertions  the  Journal  de  Saint  Peters- 
bourg  contended  that  the  Sultan's  request  was  no  more  than  the 
natural  result  of  the  stand  taken  by  Boutenieff  at  the  conference 
held  on  February  8,  between  the  Russian  and  Turkish  diplomats.38 

Regardless  of  what  may  have  been  the  true  explanation  of  the 
origin  of  the  Sultan's  memorandum,  it  is  certain  that  it  was 
issued  too  late  to  accomplish  its  purpose.  For,  on  February  20, 
after  the  lapse  of  only  eighteen  days  from  the  time  that  the 

3GExtracts  from  the  Journal  de  Saint-Petersbourg,  copied  in  the  Journal  des 
Debats,  April  22,  1833.  Goriainow,  op.  cit.,  p.  32. 

"Thureau-Dangin,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  366.   See  also  Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  156. 

""Extracts  from  the  Journal  de  Saint-Petersbourg,  copied  in  the  Journal  des 
Debats,  April  22,  1833. 

^Letter  from  Constantinople,  Feb.  25,  1833,  Journal  des  Debats,  March 
17,  1833.  A  translation  of  this  letter  appeared  in  The  Times,  March  19,  1833. 


34?]  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE   NEAR  EAST  IN   1832-1833  21 

Turkish  request  for  assistance  had  been  made,  a  Muscovite  squad- 
ron under  command  of  Rear-Admiral  Lazareff  made  its  appear- 
ance in  the  Bosphorus  and  anchored  before  Bujukdere.  When 
Roussin  learned  of  the  arrival  of  the  Russians  he  immediately 
instructed  his  dragoman  to  warn  the  Porte  that,  in  case  Admiral 
Lazareff  was  not  promptly  requested  to  depart  he  would  consider 
his  mission  at  an  end.40  At  the  same  time  he  attempted  to  induce 
the  British  Minister  to  make  a  similar  representation.  This 
Mandeville  refused  to  do.  The  English  Cabinet,  its  charge 
d'affaires  declared,  had  given  him  no  authority  "  'to  hold  language 
of  so  high  and  energetic  a  character.'  "41  After  having  had  time  for 
reflection  Admiral  Roussin  must  have  realized  that  a  withdrawal 
would  not  secure  the  result  which  he  wished  to  attain.  At  any 
rate  he  decided  to  modify  his  tactics  and  on  February  21  con- 
cluded with  the  Ministers  of  the  Sultan  an  arrangement  which 
made  him  responsible  for  the  return  of  the  Egyptian  army  and 
the  conclusion  of  peace  on  the  conditions  already  offered  to 
Mehmet  AH  by  Halil  Pasha.  When  the  French  Ambassador  had 
thus  bound  himself  to  secure  a  settlement  the  Ottoman  repre- 
sentatives in  turn  promised  to  make  a  request  that  the  Russian 
fleet  should  depart  from  the  Bosphorus.42  Yet  Mahmoud,  it  ap- 
pears, was  still  unwilling  to  depend  entirely  upon  the  efforts  of 
Roussin  to  conclude  for  him  a  satisfactory  peace  with  his  re- 
bellious vassal.  According  to  the  Journal  des  Debats,  he  did 
actually  present  a  note  to  the  Russian  legation,  February  23, 
1833,  requesting  that  their  ships  of  war  "should  return  with  the 
first  favorable  wind."43  Nevertheless,  his  attitude  was  vacillating 
and  uncertain.  Lazareff's  fleet  withdrew  as  far  as  the  harbor  of 
Sizopol,  a  little  to  the  north  of  Constantinople,  but  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Tsar  never  gave  serious  consideration  to  the 
question  of  quitting  the  Bosphorus.44 

"Ibid.,  Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  158. 

"Ibid. 

*2"La  sublime  Porte,  de  son  cote,  s'engage  a  declarer  et  annoncer  qu'elle 
renonce  a  toute  espece  d'assistance  etrangere  qu'elle  se  trouverait  avoir  demandee 
en  raison  des  circonstances." — Journal  des  Debats,  April  30,  1833.  Annual  Regis- 
ter, 1833,  p.  [290].  Bitter  rivalry  resulted  between  the  French  and  Russian  rep- 
resentatives at  the  Porte.  See  accounts  from  Constantinople,  March  7,  8,  1833, 
The  Times,  April  6,  1833,  and  Journal  des  Debats,  April  4,  1833. 

**  Journal  des  Debats,  April  30,  1833. 

"Goriainow,  op.  cit.,  p.  32. 


22  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [348 

On  the  day  after  the  conclusion  of  the  arrangement  with  the 
Sultan,  Admiral  Roussin  despatched  an  officer,  Monsieur  Olivier, 
to  the  Viceroy  to  warn  him  that  in  case  he  did  not  consent 
immediately  to  terms  on  the  basis  of  the  four  pashalics  of  Syria 
he  would  most  certainly  incur  the  hostility  of  France.45  Mehemet 
AH,  however,  was  too  shrewd  to  allow  himself  to  be  frightened 
thus.  He  had  taken  considerable  care  to  keep  himself  informed  as 
to  the  attitude  of  the  Powers,46  and  must  have  known  that  there 
was  little  danger  of  any  one  of  them  attempting  by  force  of  arms 
to  compel  him  to  withdraw  from  the  territories  already  occupied 
by  his  troops.  As  a  result  he  remained  unshaken  in  his  resolve 
to  extend  his  rule  over  the  pashalics  of  Adana  and  Itcheli,  includ- 
ing the  seaports  of  Selefkeh  and  Alaya,  as  well  as  the  whole  of 
Syria.47  In  answer  to  the  representations  of  Roussin  he  returned 
a  prompt  and  scornful  rejection.48  At  the  same  time  he  sent  word 

"Note  the  following  extract  from  a  letter  written  by  Roussin  to  Mehemet 
Ali,  Feb.  22,  1833:  ".  .  .  Persister  dans  les  pretentions  que  vous  avez  soulevees, 
ce  serait  appeler  sur  votre  tete  des  consequences  desastreuses,  qui,  je  n'en  doute 
pas,  eveilleront  vos  craintes.  .  .  .  II  ne  me  reste  plus  qu'a  esperer  que  vous  ne 
nous  forcerez  pas  a  la  cruelle  necessite  d'attaquer  une  puissance,  en  partie,  notre 
ouvrage,  et  de  ternir  une  gloire  dont  je  suis  1'admirateur  sincere,  c'est  mon 
premier  aide-de-camp  qui  aura  1'honneur  de  remettre  ces  depeches  a  Votre 
Hautesse." — Journal  des  Debats,  April  19,  1833.  See  also,  Cadalvene  et  Barrault, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  372-373,  and  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  46. 

""The  Viceroy  had  given  commissions  to  merchants  at  Leghorn  and  at  Mar- 
seilles to  charter  vessels  for  the  sole  purpose  of  conveying  to  him  at  Alexandria 
any  declaration  in  his  favour  by  England  and  France  (which  he  awaited  with  the 
greatest  anxiety;  the  instant  it  could  be  known  in  those  ports." — Barker,  op.  cit., 
II,  p.  I9S- 

"Mandeville  to  Palmerston,  March  31,  1833,  British  and  Foreign  State 
Papers,  XXII,  p.  145. 

"Mehemet  Ali  to  Roussin,  March  8,  1833,  quoted  by  Cadalvene  et  Barrault, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  375-377.  Annual  Register,  1833,  pp.  [29o]-[29i].  Gliddon,  the 
American  consular  agent  at  Alexandria,  wrote  to  Porter,  March  8:  "His  High- 
ness [Mehemet  Ali]  is  said  to  have  given  a  direct  negative  to  the  demands;  and 
to  have  expressed  surprise,  that  the  French  Government  had  changed  its  tone, 
adding  that  he  was  'not  a  plaything.' 

"Much  solicitude  appears  to  be  felt  for  the  arrival  of  the  new  English 
Diplomatic  Agent,  Col.  Campbell;  as  it  seems  to  be  expected,  that  the  British 
Cabinet  will  conduct  its  mediation  with  more  steadiness  and  candor  than  have 
been  displayed  by  the  Power  hitherto  the  most  prominent  in  His  Highnesse's 
favor.  It  is  even  said  that  Mon.  Mimaut  (to  whose  ill  judged  complaisence  is 
ascribed  much  of  the  Pasha's  now  baffled  expectations  of  support  from  France) 
was  this  morning  refused  an  audience." — State  Dept.  Turkey  II,  Gliddon  to 
Porter,  March  8,  1833. 


349]  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE   NEAR  EAST  IN    1832-1833  23 

to  the  Sultan  that  he  had  directed  his  son  Ibrahim,  into  whose 
hands  he  had  put  the  negotiations,  that  if  what  he  had  asked  was 
not  granted  immediately,  the  Egyptian  army  should  be  marched 
upon  Constantinople.49  This  intelligence,  arriving  at  the  Turkish 
capital  on  March  23,50  so  alarmed  the  Sublime  Porte  that  the 
Reis  Effendi  was  directed  to  confer  with  the  representatives  of  the 
three  great  Powers,  "in  order  to  ascertain  from  them  their  private 
opinions  with  respect  to  the  best  means  of  averting  the  dangers" 
which  threatened  with  ruin  the  Ottoman  Empire.51  On  its  part 
the  Porte  announced,  through  its  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  that 
it  was  willing  to  add  to  the  concessions  already  granted  to  the 
Viceroy  the  governments  of  Aleppo  and  Damascus.  It  appears 
that  the  foreign  envoys  were  so  perplexed  by  the  situation  of 
affairs  that  they  were  not  able  to  suggest  a  better  alternative. 
After  a  brief  delay  it  was  decided  that  a  Turkish  plenipotentiary 
should  proceed  to  the  Egyptian  headquarters  in  Asia  Minor  with 
authority  to  offer  the  additional  concession  which  had  been  de- 
termined upon  by  the  Porte.52  In  order  to  facilitate  the  step 
about  to  be  taken,  Admiral  Roussin  directed  M.  de  Varennes  to 
accompany  the  Ottoman  representative  on  his  mission,  and  to 
inform  Ibrahim  Pasha  that  he  could  never  expect  France  to 
acquiesce  in  the  cession  of  the  pashalics  of  Adana  and  Itcheli.52 
Also  with  the  aim  of  inducing  Ibrahim  to  conclude  peace  upon 
the  new  conditions  offered  by  the  Sultan,  Mandeville  forwarded  a 
letter  to  His  Highness  in  which  he  pointed  out  that  with  respect  to 
Great  Britain,  the  sentiments  of  His  Majesty's  government  were 
already  too  well  known  to  leave  any  doubt  of  the  sensation  which 
a  refusal  of  the  Ottoman  terms  would  cause  to  the  British  govern- 
ment, "and  of  the  consequences  which  would  inevitably  ensue 
from  it."53 

Regardless  of  the  pressure  which  was  thus  brought  to  bear 
upon  him,  Ibrahim  refused  to  entertain  the  idea  of  a  settlement 
unless  it  embraced  the  cession  of  Adana  as  well  as  that  of  all 
Syria.  Finding  their  efforts  to  be  in  vain,  Varennes  and  the 

^Mandeville  to  Palmerston,  March  31,   1833,  State  Papers,  XXII,  p.  145. 
""Mouriez,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  p.  231. 

"Mandeville  to  Palmerston,  March  31,  1833,  State  Papers,  XXII,  p.  144. 
"Mandeville  to  Palmerston,  March  31,  1833,  ibid.,  pp.  146-147. 
"Mandeville  to  Ibrahim,  March  29,   1833,  ibid.,  p.  147. 


24  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [350 

Forte's  representative  at  length  determined  to  yield  and  to 
promise  the  granting  of  the  Egyptian  terms.54  Accordingly,  on 
that  basis,  the  well-known  preliminaries  of  Kutayah  were  agreed 
upon,  April  8,  1833.  Ibrahim  Pasha,  having  added  a  diplomatic 
triumph  to  his  string  of  military  successes,  was  then  ready  to 
prepare  for  the  retreat  of  his  army  to  Syria.55  However,  when 
the  Sultan's  list,56  designating  the  different  persons  on  whom  the 
governments  of  the  Empire  were  to  be  bestowed  for  the  following 
year,  was  published  on  April  15,  it  was  seen  that  Mahmoud 
had  omitted  the  Pashalic  of  Adana  when  he  named  the  territories 
to  be  held  by  Mehemet  and  Ibrahim.  Thereupon  the  retrograde 
movement  of  the  Egyptian  forces  was  promptly  arrested.57  It  is 
possible  that  the  Sultan  did  intend  to  ignore  the  arrangement 
which  had  just  been  concluded.  Be  that  as  it  may,  the  situation 
at  Constantinople  was  too  serious  to  permit  him  to  delay  a  settle- 
ment for  any  considerable  length  of  time.57  Finally  on  May  3,  he 
decided  to  take  notice  of  his  former  omission  and  graciously  to 
concede  the  administration  of  the  pashalic  in  question  to  Ibrahim 
Pasha.58 

In  the  meantime  the  Tsar  Nicholas,  becoming  alarmed  at  the 
activities  of  the  French  representatives  in  Turkey,  had  despatched 
Count  Orloff  on  a  special  mission  to  Constantinople.  M.  de 
Boutenieff  was  too  moderate  and  of  "too  weak  a  character"  to 
please  the  Tsar  who  was  eager  to  be  represented  by  an  ambas- 
sador who  would  act  with  energy  and  resolution.59  The  instruc- 

"Mandeville  to  Palmerston,  April  14,  1833,  ibid.,  p.  148.  Hall's  story  of  the 
conclusion  of  the  preliminaries  of  Kutayeh  (see  Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  160)  would  lead 
one  to  believe  that  the  Sultan  himself  decided  to  yield  and  that  he  gave  his 
approval  before  the  step  was  taken.  Some  evidence  which  has  been  found  tends 
to  indicate  that  that  was  not  the  case.  See  Journal  des  Debats,  May  i,  5,  7,  10, 

1833- 

"Mandeville  to  Palmerston,  April  15,  1833,  State  Papers,  XXII,  p.  148. 

MG.  F.  Martens,  Nouveau  recueil  de  traites,  XVI,  pp.  18-20.  The  list  given 
in  Staff  Papers,  XXII,  pp.  148-149,  is  not  complete. 

WF.  O.  Turkey  223,  Mandeville  to  Palmerston,  April  23,  May  4,  1833,  cited 
by  Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  161. 

^Mandeville  to  Palmerston,  May  4,  1833,  State  Papers,  XXII,  p.  149.  This 
appears  to  be  an  extract  of  one  of  the  despatches  cited  by  Hall.  See  above,  note 
57.  The  firman  granting  Adana  to  Ibrahim  was  not  proclaimed  until  May  6, 
1833.  For  a  copy  of  it  see  Journal  des  Debats,  May  28,  1833. 

"Goriainow,  op.  cit.,  p.  33. 


35  I  ]  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE   NEAR  EAST  IN    1832-1833  25 

tions  given  to  Orloff,  drawn  up  in  that  spirit,  directed  him  to  in- 
duce the  Porte  to  confide  absolutely  in  the  support  of  Russia,  to 
keep  the  Russian  forces  at  Constantinople60  until  the  conclusion  of 
peace  between  Turkey  and  Mehemet  Ali,  and,  above  all,  to  con- 
vince Mahmoud  that  in  the  support  of  the  Tsar's  government 
lay  his  only  hope  of  salvation.61  Upon  the  arrival  of  Count  Orloff 
at  the  Turkish  capital,  May  5,  1833,  Russian  influence  with  the 
Sultqn  and  his  ministers  seems  to  have  become  supreme.  The 
British  Ambassador  to  Turkey,  Lord  Ponsonby,  who  had  arrived 
at  his  post  on  May  I,  was  not  long  in  coming  to  that  conclusion.62 
Admiral  Roussin,  true  to  his  former  policy,  exerted  himself  in  vain 
to  destroy  it.  It  was  at  this  time  that  he  tried  every  means  to  se- 
cure for  the  French  military  flag  access  to  the  Dardanelles.  After 
he  found  that  the  Porte  persisted  in  its  refusal  to  permit  such  a 
movement,  an  attempt  was  actually  made  by  the  warship 
Mesange,63  to  force  a  passage  through  the  narrows  leading  to 
Constantinople.  Although  a  few  cannon  shots  from  the  forts  lo- 
cated at  the  mouth  of  the  Straits  were  enough  to  induce  the 
French  to  abandon  the  project,  Count  Orloff  was  sufficiently 
alarmed  by  the  incident  to  declare  that  if  foreign  ships  of  war 
entered  the  Dardanelles,  he  would  be  obliged  to  take  every 
possible  measure  to  defend  the  capital.64  In  fact  the  rivalry  at 
Constantinople  between  the  representatives  of  Louis  Philippe  and 
the  Emperor  Nicholas  soon  became  so  acute  that  those  repre- 


""In  order  to  reenforce  the  squadron  under  Admiral  Lazareff,  two  additional 
detachments  of  the  Russian  Black  Sea  fleet  had  arrived  in  the  Bosphorus  on 
April  6  and  22  respectively.  A  camp  was  formed  on  the  Asiatic  shore  at 
Unkiar  Skelessi  and  several  detachments  of  Muscovite  troops  were  landed.  For 
a  contemporary  explanation  of  the  reasons  for  this  move  see  extracts  from  the 
Journal  de  Saint-Petersbourg,  copied  in  the  Journal  des  Debats,  April  22,  May 
14,  1833. 

"See  extracts  from  OrlofPs  instructions  and  from  a  letter  written  by  the 
Tsar  to  the  Sultan  quoted  by  Goriainow,  op.  cit.,  pp.  33-35. 

"Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  162.  In  addition  see  an  article  copied  from  the  Austrian 
Observer,  and  editorial  comment  thereon,  in  The  Times,  May  24,  1833. 

"This  incident  occurred  on  May  14,  1833. 

"Goriainow,  op.  cit.,  p.  36.  Letter  from  Constantinople,  May  23,  1833, 
Journal  des  Debats,  June  16,  1833. 


26  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-1841  [352 

sentatives  would  undoubtedly   have  welcomed  a  resort  to  bel- 
ligerent measures.65 

As  might  be  expected,  when  relations  of  such  a  marked  char- 
acter were  developing  in  the  Near  East,  lively  reactions  were  oc- 
casioned elsewhere.  It  has  already  been  noted  that  when  Broglie, 
alarmed  by  Boutenieff's  offer  of  Russian  aid  to  the  Sultan,  sug- 
gested a  joint  Anglo-French  intervention  in  the  Turco-Egyptian 
question,  his  proposal  had  been  rejected  by  the  British  govern- 
ment. Although  the  English  Cabinet  thus  appeared  to  commit 
itself  to  inactivity,  and  although  Lord  Palmerston  later  declared 
in  the  House  of  Commons  that  "Great  Britain  did  not  complain 
of  the  assistance  which  Russia  had  afforded  to  Turkey,  but  on  the 
contrary,  was  glad  that  Turkey  had  been  able  to  obtain  effectual 
relief  from  any  quarter,"66  it  is  obvious  that  the  British  ministers 
viewed  the  advances  of  Russia  in  the  Orient  with  considerable  ap- 
prehension. A  glance  at  Palmerston's  private  correspondence  will 
reveal  that  his  attitude  was  not  always  in  strict  harmony  with 
some  of  the  arguments  he  advanced  in  the  halls  of  Parliament 
when  he  was  defending  the  past  policy  of  the  administration. 
Significant  in  this  respect  is  the  following  extract  from  a  letter 
written  on  March  21,  1833,  by  the  Foreign  Secretary  to  his 
brother,  Sir  William  Temple :  "  'Roussin  has  settled  capitally  the 
Turkish  dispute  with  the  Egyptian,  and  has  done  well  in  sending 
back  the  Russian  admiral  with  a  flea  in  his  ear.67  The  Russians 


650rloff  to  Nicholas,  May  25/June  6,  1833.  "Nous  n'avons  qu'un  seul  regret 
ici,  c'est  de  partir  sans  nous  mesurer  avec  la  flotte  franchise;"  quoted  by  T. 
Schiemann,  Geschichte  Russlands  unter  Kaiser  Nikolaus  I.,  Ill,  p.  432.  See  also, 
an  extract  copied  from  a  despatch,  Orloff  to  Nesselrode,  May  17/29,  1833,  in 
Goriainow,  op.  cit.,  p.  137,  and  letters  from  Constantinople — May  25,  1833,  The 
Times,  June  22,  1833,  and  May  23,  1833,  Journal  des  Debats,  June  15,  1833. 

"Talmerston  continued:  ".  .  .  .  Our  government  reposed  perfect  confidence 
in  the  assurances  it  had  received  from  the  Russian  Government,  that  when  the 
force  so  sent  had  effected  the  object  for  which  it  was  despatched  ...  it  would 
retire  to  the  Russian  dominions."  These  statements  were  made  on  March  17, 
1834.  Parl.  Deb.,  XXII,  p.  322.  See  also  similar  statements  made  on  other  oc- 
casions. Pad.  Deb.,  XIX,  p.  578;  XX,  p.  875. 

67It  appears  to  have  been  believed  in  London  at  that  date  that  the  Russian 
fleet  which  had  arrived  at  Constantinople  on  Feb.  20  would  be  forced  to 
return  immediately  to  Sevastopol.  See  T.  Raikes,  Journal,  I,  p.  168;  also  The 
Times,  March  19,  1833. 


353]  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE   NEAR  EAST  IN    1832-1833  27 

will  no  doubt  be  very  angry,  but  that  will  not  signify.'  "68  Also 
worthy  of  note  is  the  fact  that  the  British  Cabinet  was  at  last 
ready  to  send  a  considerable  fleet  to  the  Near  East.  Early  in  May, 
1833,  Palmerston  announced  that  they  were  going  to  send  Sir 
Pulteney  Malcolm  to  the  Mediterranean  with  "  'two  three-deckers, 
two  large  74*5,  and  two  5O-gun  frigates,  equal  to  74/8,  and  be- 
sides a  large  armed  steam-vessel' "  carrying  "  'four  heavy  32- 
pounders.'  "69 

At  the  same  time,  the  French  government  did  not  fail  to  retain 
its  interest  in  Turco-Egyptian  affairs.  Regardless  of  the  vigorous 
protests  made  by  Count  Pozzo  di  Borgo,  the  Tsar's  Ambassador 
in  Paris,  who  was  warmly  supported  by  his  colleagues  from 
Austria  and  Prussia,  the  conduct  of  Admiral  Roussin  at  Constan- 
tinople received  the  approval  of  his  government.70  The  alarm 
against  Russian  aggression  in  the  Near  East  was  proclaimed  in 
the  Chamber  of  Deputies,71  and  even  by  the  Doctrinaire  press.72 
In  fact,  for  a  brief  period  a  war  between  Russia  and  France  was 
considered  by  some  observers  to  be  altogether  possible.73  How- 
ever, it  was  soon  apparent  that  neither  the  Cabinet  of  Louis 
Philippe  nor  that  of  the  Emperor  Nicholas  had  any  desire  to 


"Palmerston  to  Temple,  March  21,  1833,  H.  L.  Bulwer,  The  Life  of  Henry 
John  Temple,  Viscount  Palmerston,  II,  p.  144. 

"Palmerston  to  Temple,  May  7,  1833,  ibid.,  p.  158.  A  French  fleet  also, 
under  Admiral  Hugon,  had  been  sent  to  the  Mediterranean.  The  two  fleets  were 
in  each  other's  company  for  a  considerable  part  of  the  summer  of  1833.  See 
The  Times,  June  17,  July  25,  Aug.  5,  1833.  Journal  des  Debats,  June  16,  1833. 

™F.  0.  France  464,  Granville  to  Palmerston,  March  18,  22,  29,  1833,  cited  by 
Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  160.  Raikes,  Journal,  I,  p.  173.  Letter  from  Constantinople, 
April  16,  1833,  Journal  des  Debats,  May  10,  1833. 

™ Archives  Parlementaires  de  1787  a,  1860.  Second  Series,  LXXXIV,  pp.  31- 
33>  36-37,  95-98.  Similar  sentiments  were  expressed  in  the  Chamber  of  Peers. 
See  ibid.,  p.  676. 

"Journal  des  Debats,  March  23,  1833. 

"Letters  from  Paris,  March  23,  April  28,  1833,  in  The  Times,  March  25, 
May  3,  1833.  According  to  Thureau-Dangin,  the  Emperor  Nicholas  would 
undoubtedly  have  welcomed  an  opportunity  to  lead  a  crusade  of  the  European 
Powers  against  the  new  regime  in  France.  Nevertheless  he  was  not  willing  that 
Russia  alone  should  undertake  such  a  project.  See  Thureau-Dangin.  op.  cit., 
II,  pp.  373  ff- 


28  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [354 

provoke  an  immediate  outbreak  of  hostilities.74  When  the  French 
King's  message  at  the  closing  of  the  legislative  Chambers  ap- 
peared on  April  25,  it  was  found  to  be  of  a  very  peaceful  char- 
acter,75 and  promptly  thereafter  it  was  reported  from  Paris  that 
M.  Pozzo  di  Borgo  had  lately  held  frequent  conferences  with  the 
Due  de  Broglie,  "the  alleged  object  of  which  was  to  convince  the 
French  Government  of  the  disinterestedness  of  the  motives  of  his 
court  in  sending  an  expedition  to  Constantinople."76 

Although  it  is  obvious  that  the  Russian  government  was  not 
eager  to  enter  into  an  armed  conflict,  it  is  equally  apparent  that 
it  was  determined  to  profit  by  the  situation  in  the  Near  East  and 
to  make  its  influence  predominant  in  Turkey.  Having  received 
reports  from  both  Count  Orloff  and  M.  de  Boutenieff  to  the  effect 
that  the  Grand  Seignior  was  anxious  to  enter  into  an  intimate 
agreement  with  the  Emperor  Nicholas,77  Nesselrode,  on  May  20, 
1833,  forwarded  to  Orloff  a  despatch  in  which  he  instructed  the 
Tsar's  representatives  at  the  Porte  to  conclude  a  defensive  alliance 
to  protect  Turkey  and  the  southern  coast  of  Russia.78  Mention 
was  made  at  that  early  date  of  a  secret  clause  which  should  specify 
the  part  to  be  fulfilled  by  the  Porte  in  consideration  of  Russia's 
promised  services.  At  first,  some  of  the  Ottoman  Ministers,  who 
were  unaware  that  advances  had  been  made  to  the  Russians  by 
the  Sultan,  objected  to  the  acceptance  of  such  an  arrangement 
with  the  traditional  enemy  of  their  native  land.  Nevertheless, 
when  the  English  fleet  suddenly  appeared  at  the  isle  of  Tenedos, 
and  it  was  feared  that  it  might  attempt  to  force  a  passage  through 
the  Dardanelles,  their  opposition  faded  away.79  A  message  was 
sent  promptly  to  Orloff  inviting  him  to  join  in  a  conference  for 
the  discussion  of  the  proposed  alliance,  and  an  agreement  as  to 
terms  was  reached  at  a  meeting  between  the  Russian  and  Turkish 

74See  editorial  comment  in  The  Times,  April  30,  May  7,  1833,  and  C.  C. 
Greville,  The  Greville  Memoirs;  (Stoddard  edition),  p.  256. 

Archives  Pad.,  LXXXIII,  p.  131. 

"The  Times,  May  6,  1833. 

"See  extracts  from  Orloff  to  Nesselrode,  May  17/29,  1833,  and  Boutenieff 
to  Nesselrode,  April  12/25,  1833,  quoted  by  Goriainow,  op.  cit.,  pp.  37-38. 

"See  ibid.,  pp.  38-40. 

79See  ibid.,  pp.  40-41. 


355]  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  NEAR  EAST  IN   1832-1833  29 

plenipotentiaries  which  resulted  on  June  26.80  Almost  immediately 
thereafter  the  Tsar's  Ambassador  was  able  to  declare:  "  ...  la 
presque  conclusion  of  the  defensive  treaty  ...  is  a  reponse  sans 
replique  to  Russian  influence  at  Constantinople."81  The  terms  of 
an  arrangement  having  thus  been  agreed  upon,  were  promptly 
embodied  into  a  definite  convention  which  was  signed  on  July  8, 
i833.82  This  Convention  of  Unkiar  Skelessi,  as  it  was  popularly 
called,  was  destined  to  play  "a  great  part  in  the  political  vicis- 
situdes of  the  Eastern  Question."83  Its  first  public  article  pro- 
claimed the  existence  of  peace  and  friendship  between  the  two 
Emperors  and  provided  that  their  Majesties  engaged  to  come  to 
an  unreserved  understanding  with  each  other  upon  all  the  mat- 
ters which  concerned  their  respective  tranquillity  and  safety.  They 
would  "afford  to  each  other  mutually  for  this  purpose  substantial 
aid,  and  the  most  efficacious  assistance."  The  real  significance 
of  the  treaty,  however,  was  contained  in  a  secret  article  which 
released  the  Sultan  from  any  obligation  to  render  such  assistance 
to  the  Tsar  and  provided  that  Turkey  should  "confine  its  action 
in  favor  of  the  Imperial  Court  of  Russia  to  closing  the  Strait  of 
the  Dardanelles,  that  is  to  say,  to  not  allowing  any  Foreign 
Vessels  of  War  to  enter  therein  under  any  pretext  whatsoever."84 
As  the  Egyptian  forces  had,  in  the  meantime,  finally  completed 
their  evacuation  of  Asia  Minor,  the  Russian  troops  in  Turkey 
were  re-embarked  and  on  the  second  day  following  the  conclusion 

mlbid.,  op.  cit.,  p.  41. 

81Orloff  to  Nicholas  I,  June  19/July  I,  1833,  quoted  by  Schiemann,  op.  cit., 
Ill,  p.  433. 

82G.  Noradounghian,  Recueil  d'actes  internationaux  de  I'Empire  Ottoman, 
II,  pp.  229-231.  E.  Hertslet,  The  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty,  II,  pp.  925-927. 
Martens,  N.  R.,  pp.  655  ff.  State  Papers,  XX,  pp.  1176  ff. 

83C.  Phillipson  and  N.  Buxton,  The  Question  of  the  Bosphorus  and  Dar- 
danelles, p.  62. 

"Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  926,  928.  The  precise  meaning  of  the  stipulation 
in  the  secret  article  has  been  the  subject  of  repeated  controversy.  As  it  was 
interpreted  by  Nesselrode  it  "legalized  the  armed  intervention  of  Russia"  in 
Turkey.  According  to  a  recent  historian  it  did  more.  "It  guaranteed  to  Russia  a 
free  passage  for  her  warships  through  the  straits,  and  it  closed  the  door  into  the 
Black  Sea  to  every  other  Power." — Marriott,  op.  cit.,  p.  210.  See  also,  Marmont, 
op.  cit.,  p.  53. 


3O  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [356 

of  the  famous  treaty  of  alliance,  sailed  out  of  the  Bosphorus  on 
their  way  to  Sevastopol.85 

During  the  course  of  the  Russo-Turkish  negotiations,  especially 
when  the  results  began  to  be  foreseen,  the  French  Ambassador  at 
Constantinople  was  tempted  to  announce  to  the  Porte  that,  if  it 
thus  delivered  itself  into  the  hands  of  Russia,  it  would  inevitably 
incur  the  hostility  of  France.  It  was  only  through  the  efforts  of 
his  colleague,  Lord  Ponsonby,  it  appears,  that  he  was  finally  dis- 
suaded from  taking  such  a  decided  stand.86  The  latter  was  in- 
tensely hostile  to  Russia  but  he  believed  the  policy  suggested  by 
Roussin  would  only  provoke  a  contest  which  they  were  not  then 
in  a  position  to  sustain.87 

When  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Unkiar  Skelessi  became  known 
in  western  Europe,  the  French  and  English  Cabinets  resolved  to 
instruct  their  representatives  to  urge  the  Sultan  not  to  ratify  the 
treaty.  If  the  latter  should  disregard  their  advice  and  confirm  the 
signatures  of  his  plenipotentiaries,  they  were  to  warn  him  that 
France  and  Great  Britain  were  resolved,  in  the  event  of  an  armed 
intervention  of  Russia  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Turkey,  to  act  as 
the  circumstances  might  appear  to  require,  "  'equally  as  if  the 
treaty  above  mentioned  were  not  in  existence.'  "88 

Great  Britain,  it  seems,  was  particularly  aroused  by  the  famous 
arrangement.  The  Times,  in  commenting  on  the  subject,  declared 
that  it  was  quite  evident,  that  such  a  convention  could  never  be 
sanctioned  by  the  great  Powers  of  Europe.  The  mutual  guarantee 
of  the  tranquillity  and  possessions  of  the  respective  parties  was  a 
mere  pretext  for  the  invasion  of  Turkey  "whenever  the  Autocrat 
should  deem  the  season  favorable."  "Both  this  article,"  the 
editorial  writer  of  the  journal  pointed  out  in  conclusion,  "and  the 
supplementary  provision  for  shutting  the  Dardanelles  contain 
such  barefaced  and  impudent  pretensions  that  they  must  be 
scouted  with  contempt,  or  resisted  with  vigour,  or  be  ordered  to  be 

ME.  Driault,  La  question  d'Orient  depuis  ses  ongvn.es  jusqu'A  nos  jours,  p. 
143.  Cadalvene  et  Barrault,  op.  cit.,  pp.  405-406. 

"Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  pp.  49-50. 

"Ibid.,  p.  50. 

88F.  O.  Turkey  221,  Palmerston  to  Ponsonby,  Aug.  27,  1833,  cited  by  Hall, 
op.  cit.,  p.  165. 


35?]  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE   NEAR  EAST  IN    1832-1833  3! 

formally  cancelled."89  Although  Palmerston,  upon  being  ques- 
tioned about  the  treaty  in  the  House  of  Commons,  had  refused  to 
make  any  statements  divulging  the  attitude  of  the  British  Cabinet 
upon  the  subject,90  the  King's  speech,  when  it  was  read  at  the 
closing  of  Parliament  on  August  29,  1833,  was  found  to  contain 
the  following  significant  declaration:  "The  hostilities  which  had 
disturbed  the  peace  of  Turkey  have  been  terminated;  and  you 
may  be  assured  that  my  attention  will  be  carefully  directed  to  any 
events  which  may  affect  the  present  state  or  the  future  independ- 
ence of  that  Empire."91  Moreover,  Palmerston  in  a  letter  written 
to  his  brother,  William,  five  days  after  the  final  message  had  been 
delivered  to  the  two  Houses  declared  that  "  'The  King  spoke  the 
passage  about  Turkey  with  emphasis,  and  looked  round  at  Lieven 
to  see  how  he  took  it.'  "92  Then  turning  to  the  question  of  the 
attitude  of  Austria  upon  the  Eastern  question  the  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  continued,  "  'Metternich  is  delighted  with  the  Rus- 
sian treaty  with  the  Sultan:  He  is  easily  pleased!'"93 

At  the  same  time,  events  destined  to  have  an  important  in- 
fluence upon  the  attitude  of  England  and  France  were  develop- 
ing in  another  part  of  Europe.  Early  in  August  the  crowned  heads 
of  Austria  and  Prussia  had  held,  near  Teplitz  in  northern  Bo- 
hemia, a  meeting  which  was  regarded  with  considerable  suspicion 
by  both  of  the  western  Powers.94  It  was  only  a  month  later  when 
the  famous  Miinchengratz  conference  between  the  Tsar  of  Russia, 
the  Emperor  of  Austria,  and  the  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia  was 
assembled.  The  chief  outcome  of  the  latter  meeting  was  the  sign- 
ing of  a  convention  the  aim  of  which  was  to  provide  for  effective 

**The  Times,  Oct.  16,  1833.  The  editorial  quoted  is  typical  of  the  attitude 
this  journal  had  been  maintaining  for  some  time.  See  ibid.,  Jan.  26,  29,  July  12, 
Sept.  5,  1833.  See  also,  The  Poor  Man's  Guardian,  Aug.  31,  1833,  in  A  very  Rare 
and  Valuable  Collection  of  Radical,  Revolutionary,  and  Seditious  Publications, 
pp.  279-280. 

The  reference  is  to  Palmerston's  reply  to  questions  asked  on  Aug.  24,  1833. 
Pad.  Deb.,  XX,  p.  875. 

" 1 'bid.,  p.  903. 

B2Lieven  was  Russia's  Ambassador  to  England. 

"Palmerston  to  Temple,  Sept.  3,  1833,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  165. 

"Metternich  to  Hugel,  Aug.  16,  1833,  Metternich,  op.  cit.,  V,  p.  458.  See 
also,  ibid.,  p.  429. 


32  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [358 

opposition  to  the  principle  of  non-intervention.95  That  agreement, 
signed  on  September  18,  1833,  included  secret  articles  touching 
upon  the  question  of  the  Near  East.  Thereby  the  contracting 
parties  mutually  pledged  themselves  to  maintain  the  existence  of 
the  Ottoman  Empire  under  the  reigning  dynasty;  to  oppose  any 
combination  which  should  menace  the  independence  of  the 
sovereign  authority  in  Turkey,  whether  by  the  establishment  of  a 
temporary  regency,  or  a  complete  change  of  dynasty;  and  finally, 
should  their  efforts  to  prevent  dissolution  fail,  they  would  them- 
selves act  in  accord  in  everything  concerning  the  establishment  of 
the  new  order  of  things.96 

Such  an  arrangement  was  of  particular  value  to  Austria. 
Alarmed  by  the  spread  of  revolutionary  ideas  in  Europe,  the 
Cabinet  of  the  Emperor  Francis  was  eager  to  maintain  a  close 
alliance  with  the  Court  of  St.  Petersburg.  At  the  same  time  it 
was  also  eager  to  preserve  the  independence  and  integrity  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire.  According  to  a  statement  made  by  Palmerston 
on  October  8,  1833,  Metternich  had  even  gone  so  far,  six  months 
before,  as  to  declare  to  him  through  the  medium  of  a  charge 
d'affaires,  "  'that  if  Russia  attempted  to  appropriate  to  herself  one 
inch  of  Turkish  territory,  it  would  be  war  with  Austria.'  "9T 
Indeed,  the  positions  of  England  and  Austria  on  the  Turco-Egyp- 
tian  question  were  in  many  respects  identical.98  As  a  prominent 
statesman  of  the  period  has  pointed  out,  they  had  a  simple  and 
fixed  idea;  they  were  anxious  only  to  support  the  Ottoman 
Empire,  and  to  defend  it  against  its  enemies.99  The  fact  that  they 

''The  convention  drawn  up  on  Sept.  18,  1833,  did  not  receive  the  sig- 
nature of  Prussia.  After  the  conference  of  Miinchengratz  had  broken  up,  Counts 
Nesselrode  and  Ficquelmont  received  instructions  from  their  respective  Emperors 
to  proceed  to  Berlin  with  the  aim  of  persuading  King  Frederick  William  III  to 
join  in  the  said  arrangement.  According  to  Metternich,  it  was  only  after  the 
most  arduous  labors,  extending  over  more  than  three  weeks,  that  they  finally 
succeeded  in  effecting  their  object.  By  the  resulting  Treaty  of  Berlin,  signed  on 
Oct.  15,  1833,  the  Prussian  Cabinet  accepted  with  a  slight  change  in  form  the 
convention  which  had  originated  at  Miinchengratz.  See  Metternich  to  Hiigel, 
Oct.  22,  1833,  ibid.,  pp.  520-526.  Also  a  copy  of  the  treaty  of  Berlin,  ibid.,  pp. 
526-528. 

"Ibid.,  p.  526,  [footnote].    Goriainow,  op.  cit.,  pp.  51-52. 

"Palmerston  to  Temple,  Oct.  8,  1833,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  170. 

''Metternich  to  Neumann,  Feb.  15,  1833,  Metternich,  op.  cit.,  V,  p.  476. 

"Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  43. 


359]  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE   NEAR  EAST  IN   1832-1833  33 

did  not  agree  in  their  respective  stands  taken  towards  the  develop- 
ments in  the  Orient  in  1833  was  due,  to  a  large  extent  at  least,  to 
their  differing  attitudes  concerning  Russia.  Austria  was  willing  to 
accept  at  their  face  value  the  explanations  offered  by  her  Imperial 
neighbor;100  England  was  not.  With  respect  to  Russia,  the  latter 
in  1833  was  following  a  policy  similar  to  that  of  France. 

Hence  it  is  natural  that  the  secret  deliberations  at  Miinchen- 
gratz  tended  only  to  increase  the  apprehensions  of  the  British  gov- 
ernment. Palmerston  believed  even  that  an  eventual  partition  of 
Turkey  between  Austria  and  Russia  had  probably  been  one  of  the 
topics  of  discussion.  "  'It  is  needless  to  say,'  "  he  declared  in  com- 
menting upon  the  question,  "  'that  England  and  France  would 
oppose  this  to  the  utmost  of  their  means.'  "101  In  order  to  support 
the  British  position,  it  was  determined  immediately  that  the 
protest  which  had  been  made  at  Constantinople  should  be  re- 
peated at  St.  Petersburg  and  that  re-enforcements  should  be  sent 
to  the  fleet  of  Admiral  Malcolm  in  the  Mediterranean.102  Although 
no  authorization  was  given  to  the  commander  of  the  fleet  to  pass 
the  Dardanelles,  Palmerston  announced  it  as  his  opinion  that  if 
Turkey  were  again  threatened  by  Russian  intervention,  the  com- 
bined English  and  French  squadrons  ought  to  proceed  to  Con- 
stantinople and  defend  the  Bosphorus.  "  'I  think,' "  he  con- 
cluded, "  'that  when  we  have  seven  liners  and  the  French  six,  the 
eleven  or  twelve  Russians  will  never  venture  to  face  us,  with  a 
host  of  transports  besides  in  their  train;  indeed,  the  English  fleet 
alone  would  be  enough  to  stop  them.'  "103 

The  government  of  France  was  also  aroused  by  the  proceedings 
at  Teplitz'  and  Miinchengratz104  and,  although  it  was  anxious  not 
to  take  a  step  that  might  lead  to  war,105  was  quite  willing  to  join 
with  England  in  repeating  to  the  Russian  Cabinet  the  protest 
which  the  two  Powers  had  recently  made  to  the  Sublime  Porte. 

100See  Metternich,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  455-447,  477,  486-494.  See  also,  Mtmoires 
inedits  de  M.  de  Sainte-Aulaire,  quoted  by  Thureau-Dangin,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  372- 
373  [footnote],  and,  Raikes,  Journal,  I,  pp.  176-177. 

101Palmerston  to  Temple,  Oct.  8,  1833,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  169. 

™Ibid.,  p.  170. 

™Ibid.,  p.  171. 

lMThureau-Dangin,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  380-382.  See  also  comment  in  Revue 
des  Deux  Mondes,  Oct.  i,  1833,  XII,  p.  108. 

1MDriault,  op.  cit.,  p.  143. 


34  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [360 

Accordingly,  in  the  month  of  October,  1833,  the  British  and 
French  charges  d'affaires  at  St.  Petersburg,  Mr.  Bligh  and  M.  de 
Lagrene,  were  instructed  from  their  respective  capitals  to  com- 
municate to  Count  Nesselrode  notes  almost  identical  in  language 
to  those  presented  at  Constantinople  by  Roussin  and  Ponsonby  to 
the  Reis  Effendi.106 

In  reply  to  the  representations  of  the  western  Powers,  the 
Russian  Chancellor  professed  that  he  could  not  understand  the 
deep  regret  which  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty  of  July  8,  1833, 
had  caused  the  British  and  French  governments.  That  arrange- 
ment was  purely  defensive.  It  had  been  concluded  between  two 
independent  Powers,  exercising  the  plenitude  of  their  rights,  and 
it  did  no  prejudice  to  the  interests  of  any  state  whatever.  It  did, 
he  admitted,  change  the  nature  of  the  relations  between  Russia 
and  the  Porte.  It  established  relations  of  intimacy  and  confidence 
wherein  the  Turkish  government  would  henceforth  find  a  guar- 
antee of  stability,  and,  if  need  be,  means  of  defense  calculated  to 
ensure  its  preservation.  In  concluding  his  remarks,  Nesselrode 
warned  the  western  Powers  that  the  Emperor  was  resolved  on 
faithfully  fulfilling,  should  the  occasion  present  itself,  the  obliga- 
tions which  the  treaty  of  July  8,  imposed  upon  him:  "acting  as 
if  the  declaration  contained  in  the  note  of  M.  Lagrene  [and  Mr. 
Bligh]  did  not  exist."107 

Regardless  of  the  fact  that  her  chief  Minister  dared  to  use 
such  highsounding  terms  in  answer  to  the  equally  bold  communi- 
cations made  to  him  by  the  representatives  of  England  and 
France,  Russia  was  not  eager  to  engage  in  a  test  of  armed 
strength  with  her  rivals  in  the  Orient.  A  famine  which  existed  in 
the  southern  provinces  of  the  Tsar's  Empire  rendered  the  pos- 
sibility of  successful  campaigning  in  those  parts  very  doubtful.108 

**State  Papers,  XXIV,  pp.  1290,  1292. 

1<nState  Papers,  XXIV,  pp.  1291-1292,  1292-1293. 

108Palmerston  to  Temple,  Dec.  3,  1833,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  176.  Letters 
from  Constantinople,  Oct.  10,  18,  1833.  The  Times,  Nov.  n,  26,  1833.  Clay,  the 
American  representative  at  St.  Petersburg,  wrote  to  Secy,  of  State  McLane, 
Dec.  9,  1833:  "The  southern  Governments  of  the  Empire  are  in  a  most  unfor- 
tunate state.  The  failure  of  the  harvest  has  deprived  the  peasants  of  the  means 
of  supporting  life,  and  estates  which,  during  other  years,  yielded  an  ample 
revenue  to  their  proprietors  are  now,  not  only  unprofitable,  but  in  most  instances 
a  heavy  burden  to  the  owners.  A  Prince  Dolgorouki  informed  me,  that  his 


j6l]  THE  PROBLEM  OF   THE   NEAR  EAST  IN    1832-1833  35 

Realizing  that  fact,  Palmerston  was  able  to  write  on  December  3, 
1833  :  "I  trust  we  shall  be  able  to  keep  the  peace  .  .  .  Turkey 
is  the  most  likely  cause  of  collision;  though  I  think  they  [the 
Russians]  will  hardly  pursue  their  schemes  of  aggrandizement 
there  at  present.'  "109  Thus  at  the  end  of  the  year  1833,  although 
the  status  of  the  relations  between  England,  France,  and  Russia 
resulting  from  the  Turco-Egyptian  affair  was  still  far  from  re- 
assuring, it  was  becoming  apparent  that  the  Treaty  of  Unkiar 
Skelessi  would  probably  not  occasion  an  immediate  outbreak  of 
hostilities  among  the  great  Powers. 


peasants  usually  payed  him  20  Roubles  each  per  annum;  but  this  year  he  had 
been  obliged  to  remit  fifty  thousand  Roubles  to  buy  bread  for  them.  The  Govern- 
ments most  afflicted  are  Voronetz,  Penza,  and  Tambov,  though  the  inhabitants 
of  many  others  in  the  south  are  nearly  as  necessitous.  Want  has  driven  the 
peasants  of  Voronetz  to  commit  acts  which  even  the  oppression  of  their  masters 
has  never  excited.  The  roads  are  infested  with  armed  bands  of  slaves  who 
commit  the  greatest  excesses.  News  of  this  was  brought  by  Courier  to  St. 
Petersburg  on  Thursday  last,  and  in  less  than  three  hours  afterwards  the 
Emperor  had  left  the  city,  in  order  to  restore  tranquillity  by  his  presence  and 
punish  the  offenders." — State  Dept.  Russia,  XII,  Clay  to  McLane,  No.  12, 
Dec.  9,  1833. 

109Palmerston  to  Temple,  Dec.  3,  1833,  Bulwer,  op.  at.,  II,  p.  176.   See  also, 
letter  from  Paris,  Jan.  14,  1834,  The  Times,  Jan.  16,  1834. 


CHAPTER  II 

EVOLUTION  IN  NEAR  EASTERN  RELATIONS 

1834-1838 

Although  England  and  France  were  able  to  unite  in  objecting 
to  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Unkiar  Skelessi  they  were  by  no 
means  agreed  upon  all  that  appertained  to  the  question  of  the 
Near  East.  Especially  did  they  differ  in  their  respective  attitudes 
toward  the  developing  power  of  Mehemet  Ali.  It  was  natural,  as 
a  contemporary  writer  has  pointed  out,  that  France,  whose  protege 
and  pupil  the  Viceroy  loved  to  call  himself,  should  see  in  him  only 
"un  continuateur"  of  the  work  begun  on  the  banks  of  the  Nile  by 
Napoleon.1  It  was  also  natural  that  she  should  seek  to  consolidate 
her  influence  at  Cairo  and  Alexandria,  in  order  to  extend  along  the 
southern  shores  of  the  Mediterranean  that  new  sovereignty  whose 
starting  point  and  center  had  just  been  fixed  by  the  taking  of 
Algiers.2  Truly,  Admiral  Roussin,  in  February,  1833,  had  pro- 
tested vigorously  against  Mehemet  Ali's  pretensions.  Neverthe- 
less, his  attitude  at  that  time  was  due  to  a  fear  that  if  peace  were 
not  promptly  concluded  between  the  contending  parties,  Russia 
would  profit  by  the  situation  in  furthering  her  aggressive  schemes 
against  Turkey.3  After  he  had  learned  that  the  Viceroy  refused  to 


c,  op.  at.,  IV,  p.  128. 

The  conquest  of  Algiers  had  been  begun  by  the  government  of  Charles  X 
in  1830.  For  a  time  negotiations  to  secure  the  cooperation  of  Mehemet  Ali  were 
carried  on  by  Polignac.  See  ibid.,  I,  pp.  141-159.  Cahuet,  op.  cit.,  p.  77. 
L.  Brehier,  L'Egypte  de  1798  a  1900,  p.  137.  A.  de  V  aulabelle  ,  Histoire  moderne 
de  I'Egypte,  1801  a  1833,  II,  p.  410.  The  British  government  protested  vigorously 
against  the  projected  conquest.  See  a  note  dated  June  3,  1830,  which  was  pre- 
sented to  the  Prince  de  Polignac  by  Lord  Stuart  de  Rothesay,  British  Parlia- 
mentary Papers,  1839,  L,  Papers  relating  to  the  Occupation  of  Algiers  by  the 
French,  pp.  13-14. 

"Note  the  following  extract  from  a  letter  which  it  was  claimed  Roussin  wrote 
to  Mehemet  Ali,  May  8,  1833:  "'I  feel  satisfaction  in  being  one  of  the  first  to 
announce  to  you  the  happy  conclusion  of  peace  between  the  Grand  Seignior  and 
your  Highness,  on  conditions  equally  advantageous  and  honourable  to  Egypt.  .  .  . 

'Your  Highness  will  be  just  enough  to  recognize  to  which  side  France  has 
constantly  been  inclined;  attentive  to  the  events  of  the  East,  she  has  felt  that 
the  immediate  termination  of  war  between  the  Mussulmans  was  the  condition 
of  their  safety.  She  has  desired  this  peace  sincerely  and  ardently.  Such  was  the 
object  of  the  steps  taken  by  me  on  the  23rd  of  February,  in  proposing  terms 

[36] 


363]  EVOLUTION  IN  NEAR  EASTERN  RELATIONS,  1834-1838  37 

comply  with  his  demands  he  turned  to  the  opposite  extreme  and 
counselled  a  complete  surrender  on  the  part  of  the  Porte.4  Like- 
wise, the  Consul-General  of  France  at  Alexandria,  Monsieur 
Mimaut,  as  well  as  practically  all  of  those  who  belonged  to  the 
"French  Colony  in  Egypt,"  were  very  decided  in  their  favoritism 
for  the  cause  of  the  Sultan's  ambitious  vassal.5 

In  the  French  Chamber  of  Deputies,  Mehemet  Ali  was  de- 
fended repeatedly,  one  speaker  even  going  so  far  as  to  declare  that 
it  would,  perhaps,  be  fortunate  if  the  Egyptian  army  should  take 
possession  of  Constantinople.  The  Arab  race,  he  pointed  out, 
better  disposed  towards  civilization,  more  active,  and  more  in- 
telligent than  the  "Tartar  race,  would  be  able  to  rejuvenate  that 
Empire,  worn  out  and  languishing,  that  Empire  upon  which  even 
the  spirit  of  innovation  has  exerted  in  vain  its  electric  virtue." 
Then  too,  he  maintained,  a  powerful  barrier  would  be  formed 
against  Russia  if  Mehemet  Ali  should  establish  his  power  through- 
out Turkey.6  The  Due  de  Broglie  was  more  cautious,  and  in  his 
utterances  took  the  position  that  the  policy  of  France  should  be  to 
maintain  the  Ottoman  Empire  as  long  as  providence  would  permit 
it  to  exist.7  At  the  same  time,  however,  he  carefully  avoided 
making  any  remarks  which  might  be  interpreted  as  being  hostile 
to  the  cause  of  the  Viceroy  and  he  admitted  that  if  it  were  "written 

which  circumstances  rendered  at  that  time  suitable,  and  which  your  Highness 
from  principle  might  have  adopted,  fully  persuaded  that  France  would  not  have 
withheld  her  endeavours  to  ameliorate  them. . . . 

'What  is  passing  in  the  Bosphorus  [Russian  intervention]  has  convinced  her 
[France]  of  the  necessity  of  strengthening  Egypt  still  more;  she  has  obtained 
for  Egypt  the  whole  of  Syria,  and  can  say  that  in  that  she  has  done  for  your 
Highness  more  than  any  other  power. . . .'  " — The  Westminster  Review,  XXXV, 
Jan.  1841,  pp.  203-204.  It  is  apparent  that  Roussin  was  pleased  greatly  when 
the  Sultan  finally  consented  to  grant  the  terms  demanded  by  Mehemet  Ali. 
See  letters  from  Constantinople,  May  7,  II,  1833,  Journal  des  Debats,  May  30, 
June  6,  1833.  The  attitude  of  many  in  France  was  quite  similar  to  that  of  the 
Ambassador.  See  ibid.,  May  13,  Aug.  I,  1833;  Thureau-Dangin,  op.  cit.,  II,  p. 
370.  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  pp.  44-45. 

4Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  160.  Letters  from  Constantinople,  April  16,  1833,  Journal 
des  Debats,  May  9,  10,  1833. 

5Barker,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  191. 

"Extract  from  speech  delivered  by  M.  Jay,  May  21,  1833.  Archives  Parl., 
LXXXIV,  p.  92.  See  also,  ibid.,  pp.  87-91,  160;  LXXX,  pp.  14,  219. 

'Ibid.,  LXXXIII,  p.  780. 


38  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [364 

in  the  designs  of  God  that  that  Empire  [Turkey]  should  some 
day  succumb,"  it  would  then  be  the  aim  of  France  to  further  the 
establishment  out  of  the  Ottoman  territories  of  independent  states 
which  would  take  "naturellement"  their  place  in  the  political  bal- 
ance of  Europe.8 

On  the  other  hand,  in  Great  Britain,  the  ambitious  policy  of 
Mehemet  AH  was  regarded  with  considerable  suspicion.  Indeed, 
the  British  government  made  so  vigorous  a  protest  at  Alexandria, 
through  its  Consul-General,  Colonel  Campbell,  that  the  rebellious 
Pasha  was  on  the  point  of  withdrawing  his  demands  in  regard 
to  the  district  of  Adana  when  the  Sultan  finally  consented  to 
invest  Ibrahim  with  the  administration  of  the  territory  in  dispute.9 
It  cannot  be  doubted  that  Lord  Palmerston  entertained  a  decided 
opinion  on  the  question.  On  March  21,  1833,  ne  wrote:  "'  .  .  . 
[Mehemet  All's]  real  design  is  to  establish  an  Arabian  kingdom, 
including  all  the  countries  in  which  Arabic  is  the  language.  There 
might  be  no  harm  in  such  a  thing  in  itself;  but  as  it  would 
necessarily  imply  the  dismemberment  of  Turkey,  we  could  not 
agree  to  it.  Besides,  Turkey  is  as  good  an  occupier  of  the  road  to 
India  as  an  active  Arabian  sovereign  would  be.'  "10 

When  the  British  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  referred  to  the 
question  of  "the  road  to  India"  he  was  calling  attention  to  a 
phase  of  the  problem  which  was  of  vital  importance  to  Great 
Britain.  The  successful  application  of  steam  power  to  transpor- 
tation by  sea  had  opened  up  a  vast  store  of  possibilities  for  the 
future.  Among  the  numerous  projects  which  had  received  im- 
mediate attention  was  that  of  a  direct  line  of  communication,  to 
be  operated  by  means  of  steamers,  between  England  and  India. 

6 Archives  Parl.,  LXXXIII,  p.  781.  Thiers,  who  was  then  minister  of  com- 
merce and  industry,  made  the  following  declaration  in  the  Chamber  of  Peers, 
June  8,  1833:  "Quelle  devait  etre  la  direction  de  nos  efforts?  C'etait  d'empecher 
que  les  grands  voisins  qui  entourent  I'Empire  turc  ne  s'agrandissent  a  ses  depens; 
c'etait  d'empecher  que  1'equilibre  de  1'Europe  fut  trouble  dans  1'Orient,  de  faire 
(ce  qui  etait  bon  pour  1'humanite  et  bon  pour  la  France)  que  de  nouveaux 
Etats  independants  et  commergants  s'etablissent  dans  la  Mediterranee."  Ibid., 
LXXXIV,  p.  678.  See  also,  ibid.,  LXXXV,  pp.  525-526. 

*F.  0.  Turkey  228,  Campbell  to  Palmerston,  May  2,  3,  7,  9,  13,  15,  1833, 
cited  by  Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  162.  Journal  des  Debats,  June  28,  1833.  Parl.  Deb., 
XXI,  p.  24. 

"Palmerston  to  Temple,  March  21,  1833,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  145. 


365]  EVOLUTION  IN  NEAR  EASTERN  RELATIONS,  1834-1838  39 

The  idea  was  suggested  as  early  as  1823,"  but  it  did  not  receive 
serious  consideration  from  the  British  government  until  some  ten 
years  later.  One  of  the  earliest  prominent  supporters  of  the  pro- 
ject was  Lord  William  Bentinck  who  was  Governor-General  of 
India  from  1828  to  1835.  A  statement  which  he  made  in  India 
on  the  eve  of  his  departure  for  England  is  of  sufficient  value  to 
warrant  its  being  quoted  in  full.  It  was  as  follows:  "I  have 
been  a  zealous  supporter  of  the  cause  of  steam  communication 
with  Europe,  from  the  strongest  conviction,  confirmed  by  every 
day's  further  reflection,  of  its  vast  importance  to  innumerable  in- 
terests, both  national  and  commercial.  I  cannot  command  the  op- 
portunity of  forwarding  its  future  success;  but,  if  within  my  reach, 
you  may  depend  upon  my  most  earnest  efforts  to  promote  its 
progress,  and  to  obtain  for  India  an  advantage  so  great  in  all 
its  direct  and  indirect  consequences,  that  in  my  opinion  it  would 
be  cheaply  bought  at  any  price."12  Another  Englishman  of  note 
who  was  interested  in  establishing  a  direct  line  of  communication 
between  Great  Britain  and  her  possessions  in  the  Orient,  was 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Francis  Chesney.  Chesney  had  travelled  ex- 
tensively in  the  Near  East  and  in  1832,  when  he  returned  to  Eng- 
land, was  convinced  that  the  projected  steam  route  was  entirely 
practicable.13  At  that  time  two  possible  lines  of  communication 
were  being  considered — one  by  way  of  the  Isthmus  of  Suez  and 
the  Red  Sea,  the  other  by  way  of  the  Euphrates  river  and  the 
Persian  Gulf.  Chesney  was  interested  particularly  in  the  latter. 
He  was  anxious  that  the  British  government  should  test  out  its 
practicability  and  soon  succeeded  in  interesting  in  the  project  a 
number  of  prominent  individuals  including  Lord  Palmerston  and 
other  members  of  the  Cabinet  then  in  office.14  After  some  delay 
the  matter  was  presented  to  Parliament,  on  June  3,  1834,  and  a 
select  committee  was  appointed  "to  inquire  into  the  best  means  of 

"See  a  series  of  letters  dating  from  May  31,  1823,  to  Oct.  23,  1832,  urging 
that  measures  be  taken  by  the  government  to  facilitate  steam  communication 
with  India.  Pad.  Papers,  1831-1832,  X,  Part  2,  pp.  675-766. 

"Part.  Papers,  1839,  XXXIX,  Representations  from  the  Presidencies  as  to 
Steam  Communication,  p.  3. 

"F.  R.  Chesney,  Narrative  of  the  Euphrates  Expedition,  pp.  142-143. 

"Ibid.,  p.  143.  The  interest  of  King  William  IV  was  aroused.  See  ibid.,  pp. 
145-146.  See  also  the  account  given  in  S.  Lane-Poole  (Editor),  The  Life  of  the 
late  General  F.  R.  Chesney,  by  his  wife  and  daughter. 


4O  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [366 

promoting  the  communication  with  India  by  steam."18  The  com- 
mittee made  a  detailed  investigation  of  the  problems  involved  and 
on  July  14,  1834,  presented  in  the  House  of  Commons  twelve 
resolutions  which  embodied  their  conclusions  and  recommenda- 
tions.16 With  respect  to  the  Egyptian  route,  they  stated  in  those 
resolutions  that  experiments  made  for  five  successive  seasons  by 
the  Indian  government  had  completely  established  the  practicabil- 
ity of  that  line  of  communication  during  at  least  eight  months  in 
the  year.  Therefore,  the  committee  suggested  that  measures 
should  be  taken  to  establish  the  route  by  the  Red  Sea,  and  they 
proposed  that  the  expense  incurred  thereby  should  be  divided 
equally  between  India  and  Great  Britain.  As  to  the  Euphrates 
route,  sufficient  experiments  to  really  test  its  value  had  not  been 
made.  There  appeared  to  be  no  physical  obstacles  for  eight 
months  of  the  year,  but  during  the  other  four  months,  when  the 
river  was  low,  it  was  not  certain  that  the  line  was  practicable.  As 
the  East  India  Company  had  expended  between  60,000  and 
70,000  Pounds  on  the  communication  by  way  of  Egypt,  it  was 
recommended  that  the  expense  of  ascertaining  the  practicability 
of  the  route  through  Syria  and  Mesopotamia,  which  was  esti- 
mated at  20,000  Pounds,  should  be  defrayed  by  the  Home  govern- 
ment.17 The  suggestions  of  the  select  committee  were  well  re- 
ceived by  the  House  and  a  resolution  for  the  granting  of  the  sum 
stated  was  promptly  passed.18 

The  fact  that  a  wide  difference  existed  between  the  respective 
interests  of  England  and  France  in  the  Near  East  was  by  no 
means  unknown  at  the  time.  On  February  15,  1833,  Metternich 
wrote  significantly  to  Baron  Neumann,  the  Austrian  charge 
d'affaires  at  London :  "Egypt  has  been  for  a  long  time  considered 
by  those  different  [French]  governments  as  la  conquete  assuree  de 
la  France.  .  .  .  But  the  English  Ministers  have  nothing  to  learn 
from  us  on  this  subject  that  they  do  not  know  better  already.  If 

"Parl.  Deb.,  XXIV,  p.  142. 

KIbid.,  XXV,  p.  930.  Parl.  Papers,  1834,  XIV,  Report  of  Select  Committee 
on  Steam  Navigation  to  India  (234  pages). 

"At  that  date  some  attention  was  given  to  the  possibility  of  digging  a  canal 
to  connect  the  waters  of  the  Mediterranean  with  those  of  the  Red  Sea.  See, 
Parl.  Papers,  1834,  XIV,  Report  of  Select  Committee  on  Steam  Navigation  to 
India,  pp.  28-34.  Archives  Parl.,  LXXXII,  p.  277. 

"Parl.  Deb.,  XXIV,  p.  932. 


367]  EVOLUTION  IN  NEAR  EASTERN  RELATIONS,  1 834-! 838  4! 

the  question  of  Egypt  is  an  Austrian  question,  it  is  undoubtedly 
in  a  still  greater  degree  an  English  question."19  As  Metternich 
must  have  known,  there  had  long  been  a  disposition  in  England 
to  regard  French  relations  with  Egypt  with  considerable  suspi- 
cion.20 During  the  course  of  Ibrahim's  campaign  in  Syria,  both 
Sir  Stratford  Canning  and  Mandeville  had  looked  disapprovingly 
"upon  Varennes'  efforts  to  persuade  the  Porte  to  allow  France  to 
mediate  between  the  Sultan  and  the  Pasha."21  In  Parliament 
attention  was  called  to  the  activities  of  the  French  in  Egypt  and 
also  in  Algiers  and  it  was  intimated  that  the  administration  ought 
not  to  maintain  too  close  an  alliance  with  the  government  of  Louis 
Philippe.22 

Regardless  of  the  fact  that  differences  did  exist  between  the 
interests  of  England  and  France  relative  to  certain  aspects  of  the 
Eastern  question,  the  Cabinets  of  both  those  countries  were 
particularly  anxious  to  prevent  such  differences  from  becoming 
evident.  As  The  Times  pointed  out,  the  July  Monarchy  instinc- 
tively believed  that  since  its  rising,  there  had  been  formed  a 
northern  coalition  for  its  destruction23  and  that  an  intimate  un- 
derstanding with  England  was  essential  to  guarantee  its  safety. 
On  May  20,  1833,  M.  Guizot,  who  was  then  the  Minister  of 
Public  Instruction,  declared  that  the  English  alliance  was  "une 
fait  important"  in  the  French  political  situation.  "That  alliance," 
he  continued,  "is  fortunate,  favorable  to  the  progress,  to  the  good 
order,  to  the  prosperity  of  the  two  countries."24  At  the  same  time, 
the  British  government,  alarmed  by  the  menace  of  Russian  aggres- 
sion towards  Turkey  and  India,  believed  it  was  necessary,  for  the 

"Metternich  to  Neumann,  Feb.  15,  1833,  Metternich,  op.  cit.,  V,  p.  478. 
For  further  comment  on  the  policy  of  France,  see  Metternich  to  Prokesch,  Feb. 
23»  J833,  ibid.,  p.  483. 

"Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  155.  Note  the  following:  "The  French  Government  would 
have  wished  to  have  seen  Meh'med  Ali  at  Constantinople;  but  the  Russians  were 
so  quickly  at  the  Bosphorus  that  of  two  evils  the  French  chose  the  least,  and 
supported  the  Sultan  against  their  will." — Barker,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  191.  See  also, 
The  Times,  Dec.  6,  1833,  Journal  des  Debats,  Apr.  15,  1833. 

21F.  O.  Turkey  211  and  212,  Canning  to  Palmerston,  May  17,  22,  1832, 
F.  0.  Turkey  213,  Mandeville  to  Palmerston,  Sept.  26,  Oct.  26,  1832,  cited  by 
Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  155. 

"Parl.  Deb.,  XVIII,  pp.  1026-1029;  XXI,  107;  XXII,  pp.  339-340. 

23  The  Times,  Dec.  6,  1833. 

"Archives  Part.,  LXXXIV,  p.  42. 


42  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [368 

sake  of  self-defense,  to  secure  the  support  of  France.25  These 
facts  reveal  the  main  reason  why,  during  the  Tur co-Egyptian 
crisis  of  1833,  the  two  western  Powers  were  so  anxious  to  make  it 
appear  that  they  were  in  perfect  accord  concerning  all  questions 
of  foreign  policy.  Before  an  open  break  between  them  could 
result  from  their  rival  interests  in  the  Near  East,  it  was  necessary 
that  radical  changes  should  be  evolved  in  their  respective  relations 
with  Austria,  Prussia,  and  Russia — especially  with  Russia. 

In  the  beginning  of  the  year  1834  the  prospect  for  such  a  change 
did  not  appear  to  be  very  promising.  At  Constantinople  the 
representatives  of  the  Emperor  Nicholas  were  endeavoring  ac- 
tively to  conserve  the  preponderant  influence  which  their  master 
had  so  recently  gained  in  the  councils  of  the  Sublime  Porte,26  and 
at  St.  Petersburg  a  new  arrangement  between  Russia  and  Turkey, 
relative  to  the  execution  of  the  Treaty  of  Adrianople,  which  had 
been  concluded  in  1829,  was  on  the  point  of  being  signed  by 
Achmet  Pasha  and  Count  Nesselrode.27  Those  developments  were 
naturally  looked  upon  by  the  western  Powers  as  conclusive  evi- 
dence confirming  their  apprehensions  in  regard  to  the  secret  aim 
of  Russia  to  profit  at  the  expense  of  the  helpless  Porte.28  Indeed, 


"The  Times,  Dec.  6,  1833.  Raikes,  Journal,  I,  pp.  218-219.  Note  the  follow- 
ing statement  made  by  Palmerston  on  March  17,  1834:  "...  when  two  such  states 
[as  England  and  France]  were  bound  together  by  the  ties  of  interest,  and  the 
bonds  of  integrity,  confidence,  and  honour,  the  House  might  well  consider  that 
they  must  form  in  Europe  a  power  of  no  mean  importance." — Parl.  Deb.,  XXII, 

P-  327- 

"See  a  series  of  letters  from  Constantinople,  Dec.  10,  1833,  Jan.  28,  Feb. 
25,  March  5,  19,  April  i,  15,  July  i,  8,  29,  1834,  in  The  Times,  Jan.  13,  Feb.  27, 
March  26,  April  10,  18,  28,  May  13,  July  28,  Aug.  2,  25,  1834. 

"By  the  treaty  of  Jan.  29,  1834,  the  Tsar  gave  up  all  but  4,000,000  ducats 
of  what  remained  to  be  paid  of  the  indemnities  provided  for  in  the  Treaty  of 
Adrianople,  and  in  turn  the  Porte  ceded  to  Russia  a  tract  of  country,  from  the 
Pashalic  of  Akhiskha,  on  its  northeastern  frontier.  Turkey  was  to  pay  that 
portion  of  the  indemnity  which  was  not  relinquished  in  annual  payments  of 
500,000  ducats  each,  and  until  it  was  paid  the  important  post  of  Silistria  was  to 
remain  as  a  pledge  in  the  hands  of  the  Russians.  See,  State  Papers,  XXVI, 
pp.  1245-1248. 

^C.  C.  Greville,  The  Greville  Memoirs.  A  Journal  of  the  Reigns  of  King 
George  IV  and  King  William  IV  (Reeve  edition),  III,  pp.  69-70.  Letter  from 
Paris,  Dec.  31,  1833,  The  Times,  Jan.  3,  1834. 


369]  EVOLUTION  IN  NEAR  EASTERN  RELATIONS,  1834-1838  43 

the  strained  relations  of  England  and  France  with  the  government 
of  the  Tsar  were  destined  to  continue  for  some  time.29 

On  April  21,  1834,  Palmerston  gave  an  excellent  summary  of 
the  British  Cabinet's  attitude,  relative  to  the  Turkish  problem,  in 
a  letter  to  his  brother,  William  Temple.  "  'With  Russia,' "  he 
wrote,  "  'we  are  just  as  we  were,  snarling  at  each  other,  hating 
each  other,  but  neither  wishing  for  war.  Their  last  communication 
on  Eastern  affairs  is  anything  but  satisfactory.  However,  there 
is  nothing  at  present  done  by  us,  because  there  is  no  danger  of 
anything  being  done  by  them.  They  cannot  return  to  Turkey  un- 
less invited  by  the  Sultan,  and  the  Sultan  will  not  invite  them 
unless  he  is  again  attacked  by  Mehemet  Ali;  but  Mehemet  AH  will 
not  stir  as  long  as  we  beg  him  not  to  do  so,  because  he  knows 
that  our  fleet  could  effectually  prevent  him.  .  .  .  Our  policy  as  to 
the  Levant  is  to  remain  quiet,  but  remain  prepared;  time  may 
enable  the  Turks  to  reorganize  their  resources,  and  the  chapter  of 
accidents  is  fertile  in  events.'  "30  The  Viceroy,  realizing  the  possi- 
bilities which  such  a  condition  of  affairs  might  offer  to  him,  ven- 
tured to  suggest  to  the  representatives  of  the  western  Powers  at 
Alexandria  that  their  respective  courts  should  recognize  his  inde- 
pendence in  return  for  the  cooperation  of  his  army  and  navy  in  a 
crusade  against  Russia.31  His  offer  was  promptly  rejected,  but  the 
situation  was  still  further  complicated  by  a  revolt  in  Syria  against 
the  regime  he  had  so  recently  established  there  under  the  author- 

**It  was  during  the  period  of  these  strained  relations  in  1834,  when  the 
famous  "Portfolio  Papers,"  professing  to  reveal  a  Machiavellian  policy  on  the 
part  of  Russia,  first  appeared  in  England.  See,  The  Portfolio;  or  a  Collection  of 
State  Papers,  etc.,  edited  by  D.  Urquhart.  Series  I  (5  vols.).  See  also,  L.  C. 
Sanders,  Life  of  Viscount  Palmerston,  p.  76.  C.  C.  Greville,  The  Greville 
Memoirs.  A  Journal  of  the  Reign  of  Queen  Victoria  from  1837  to  1852,  I,  pp. 
102-104,  J39- 

*°Palmerston  to  Temple,  April  21,  1834,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  182-183. 
Soon  afterwards  the  Emperor  Nicholas  decided  to  recall  his  ambassador,  Prince 
Lieven,  from  London  and  to  appoint  only  a  charge  d'affaires  in  his  place.  See, 
Palmerston  to  Temple,  June  27,  1834,  ibid.,  p.  199.  The  Times,  May  23,  1834. 

MBlanc,  op.  cit.,  V,  p.  404.  F.  0.  Turkey  246,  Campbell  to  Palmerston, 
Sept.  4,  5,  1834,  cited  by  Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  220.  Letter  from  Constantinople, 
Nov.  25,  1833,  The  Times,  Dec.  28,  1833. 


44  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,  1832-184!  [j/O 

ity  of  his  son  Ibrahim.32  In  1832  the  Syrians  had  welcomed  the 
Egyptians  as  their  deliverers,  but  they  soon  found  the  overlord- 
ship  of  the  Pasha  to  be  even  more  distasteful  than  that  of  the 
Porte  which  had  preceded  it.33  The  Sultan,  anxious  to  add  to 
the  difficulties  which  confronted  his  hated  vassal,  did  what  he 
could  to  encourage  the  insurgents.34  He  even  dreamed  of  recover- 
ing the  dominions  which  he  had  lost  the  preceding  year  and,  in 
order  to  avail  himself  to  the  utmost  of  any  opportunity  which 
might  occur,  sent  considerable  reenforcements  to  the  army  of 
Reschid  Pasha  in  Asia  Minor.35  A  correspondent  of  The  Times 


KA.  A.  Paton,  A  History  of  the  Egyptian  Revolution,  II,  pp.  116-117.  An- 
nual Register,  1834,  p.  [465].  Although  the  Viceroy's  proposal  was  rejected  by 
the  French  Ministers,  sympathy  for  the  cause  of  Mehemet  Ali  still  existed  in 
France.  Note  the  following:  ". . .  tout  le  monde  sait  que  les  Turcs,  livres  a  eux- 
memes,  sont  incapables  de  resister  aux  forces  regulieres  d'Ibrahim;  le  Sultan 
invoquera  encore  une  fois  la  protection  des  Russes.  D'un  autre  cote,  que  repre- 
sente  le  pacha  d'Egypte,  si  ce  n'est  1'Angleterre  et  la  France?  Ces  deux 
puissances  prendront  parti  pour  leur  allie;  de  la  le  conflit  qui  parait  inevitable. 
Ce  sera  une  guerre  sous  un  autre  pavilion.  Nous  sommes  bien  loin  encore  du 
desarmement." — Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  June  14,  1834,  XIV,  p.  732.  It  appears 
that  many  believed  at  the  time  that  England,  as  well  as  France,  was  favorably 
inclined  towards  Mehemet  Ali.  An  American,  W.  H.  Hodgson,  wrote  in  a  long 
report  on  Egypt,  March  2,  1835,  addressed  to  the  State  Department:  "In  the 
political  and  commercial  relations  of  Great  Britain  with  her  East-Indian  posses- 
sions, Egypt  constitutes  a  link  of  primary  importance.  Every  consideration  of 
interest  prompts  her  to  desire  the  independence  of  Mohammed  Ali.  .  .  .  She 
desires  the  establishment  of  a  strong  Government  on  the  Red  Sea,  and  upon  the 
Euphrates,  to  give  security  to  commerce,  and  to  control  the  uncivilized  lawless 
tribes,  existing  on  the  lines  of  intercourse,  between  the  Mediterranean  and  the 
Indian  Ocean. 

"France  regards  Egypt  as  a  quasi  colony,  and  aspires  to  its  possession.  Egypt 
looks  to  France,  for  science  and  art,  and  France  anticipates  a  predominance 
in  her  councils,  in  the  contingency  of  future  wars  in  Europe  or  Asia. 

"Russia  secretly  encourages  the  extension  of  Mohammed  Ali's  dominions,  by 
which  the  Sultan's  power  may  be  reduced,  and  Turkey  become  an  easier  prey  to 
herself." — State  Dept.  Turkey  VI,  Hodgson's  Report  on  Egypt,  March  2,  1835. 

"The  major  part  of  the  dissatisfaction  was  due  to  the  attempts  of  Mehemet 
Ali  and  Ibrahim  to  introduce  Egyptian  systems  of  taxation  and  conscription 
into  Syria.  See,  Paton,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  121-122.  Barker,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  204-206. 
Annual  Register,  1834,  p.  [465]. 

"Nugent,  Lands,  Classical  and  Sacred,  II,  pp.  279-280. 

"Annual  Register,  1834,  p.  [465]. 


371  ]  EVOLUTION  IN  NEAR  EASTERN  RELATIONS,  1834-1838  45 

wrote  from  Constantinople  on  May  27,  1834:  "A  rupture  between 
the  Porte  and  Egypt  appears  inevitable.  .  .  .  What  elements  for 
Russia  to  act  upon!  .  .  .  the  circumstances  of  February  last  are 
reproduced  under,  if  possible,  aggravated  difficulties;  the  crisis 
is  momentous,  and  here  [at  Constantinople]  our  only  hope  is  in 
the  alliance  of  France  and  England."38 

At  the  same  time,  the  great  Powers  were  all  determined  to 
prevent  a  renewal  of  the  conflict  in  the  Orient.37  Russia  particu- 
larly, it  appears,  was  anxious  that  the  peace  should  not  be  broken. 
Baron  Ruckmann,  the  Tsar's  charge  d'affaires  at  the  Turkish  cap- 
ital, declared  in  a  note  to  the  Porte  that  although  his  master 
would,  true  to  his  sacred  engagements,  hold  himself  bound  to 
place  at  the  Sultan's  disposal  any  assistance  he  might  demand 
for  defense  against  an  aggressor,  he  could  not  comply  with  his 
"best  ally's"  request  in  a  case  in  which  the  latter  engaged  in 
hostilities  of  his  own  seeking.38  The  Russian  government  had  be- 
come aroused  by  the  reactions  which  its  Turkish  policy  had  pro- 
duced in  western  Europe  and  it  must  have  realized  that  the  Cabi- 
nets of  England  and  France  would  never  peacefully  submit  to  a 
second  active  intervention,  on  the  part  of  its  army  and  navy,  in 
the  internal  affairs  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Consequently,  the 
Sultan  was  forced  to  refrain  from  the  immediate  execution  of  his 
hostile  intentions. 

Before  the  close  of  the  year  1834,  a  governmental  change 
destined  to  be  of  importance  in  connection  with  the  relations  of 
the  great  Powers  in  the  Near  East,  occurred  in  Great  Britain.  The 
Whig  administration,  having  lost  the  support  of  the  House  of 
Commons,  resigned  and  was  replaced  in  office  by  a  Tory  regime 
under  the  leadership  of  Sir  Robert  Peel.  That  was  exactly  what 
the  Russians  had  been  looking  forward  to  for  a  considerable 


^Letter  from  Constantinople,  May  23,  1834,  The  Times,  June  24,  1834.  See 
also,  Annual  Register,  1834,  p.  [465]. 

"Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  220. 

"Letter  from  Constantinople,  Aug.  26,  1834,  The  Times,  Sept.  20,  1834. 
Annual  Register,  1834,  p.  [466]. 


46  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [372 

period  of  time.39  They  were  alarmed  especially,  it  seems,  by  the 
alliance  which  the  Whig  ministers  had  formed  with  the  French,40 
and  they  hoped  that  the  Tories,  led  by  the  Duke  of  Wellington, 
could  be  won  over  to  the  cause  of  legitimacy.  In  a  conversation 
with  Thomas  Raikes,  at  Paris  on  November  13,  1833,  Count  Pozzo 
di  Borgo  declared:  "Your  union  with  France  will  produce  no 
benefit  to  England;  they  will  make  no  treaty  of  commerce,  they 
will  only  use  you  for  their  own  purposes.  Russia  is  your  old  ally, 
and  under  the  Duke's  government,  convinced  as  we  are  of  the 
rectitude  of  his  intentions,  there  are  no  facilities  to  commerce,  no 
sacrifices,  that  we  would  not  make  to  cement  that  alliance;  but 
under  your  present  rulers  we  are  everywhere  held  up  to  odium 
and  suspicion,  as  if  the  conviction  that  you  have  unjustly  deserted 
an  old  friend  only  made  you  more  anxious  to  injure  and  traduce 
her  for  your  own  satisfaction."41  Indeed,  when  Wellington  did 
become  Foreign  Secretary  in  Peel's  Cabinet,  Anglo-Russian  rela- 
tions were  improved  perceptibly.  The  Duke  proposed  to  restore 
normal  diplomatic  relations  with  Russia  by  the  despatch  of  an 
ambassador  to  St.  Petersburg  and,  believing  that  the  evil  which 
arose  from  the  passage  of  Russian  ships  from  the  Black  Sea  to 
the  Mediterranean  would  not  be  diminished  by  the  opening  of 
the  Dardanelles  to  the  fleets  of  the  Powers,  maintained  that 

"Note  the  following  statements  recorded  in  the  Journal  of  Thomas  Raikes, 
under  the  date  of  Oct.  8,  1833:  "I  called  on  Count  Pozzo  di  Borgo...  all  his 
questions  seemed  to  tend  to  what  means  could  overthrow  the  Whig  government 

in  England.  He  desired  C ,  who  was  with  him  during  my  visit,  and  who  is 

going  to  England,  to  tell  the  Duke  [of  Wellington]  that,  if  ever  he  returned  to 
office,  all  the  Four  Powers  [Russia,  Austria,  Prussia,  and  Holland]  were  unan- 
imous to  abide  in  everything  by  her  [England's]  instructions; . . .  but,  added  he, 
'if  she  is  still  to  be  governed  by  her  present  rulers,  let  her  beware  of  the  con- 
sequences. Our  plans  are  laid.  We  shall  attack  her  in  her  most  vulnerable 
point, — in  her  commerce.  We  have  means  in  our  power  to  destroy  her;  we  will 
prohibit  every  species  of  manufacture  or  produce  that  can  in  the  slightest  degree 
affect  her  interests;  we  will  shut  up  the  Sound  against  her;  we  will  offer  such 
advantages  to  America,  her  rival,  that  the  whole  carrying  trade  of  Europe,  shall 
come  into  her  hands;  and  we  will  do  everything  to  accelerate  that  ruin  which 
her  own  mad  rulers  are  already  eventually  bringing  on  her  head.' " — Raikes, 
Journal,  I,  pp.  189-191.  See  also,  Metteraich,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  561,  567. 

"See  a  memoir  presented  to  the  Cabinet  of  St.  Petersburg  in  April,  1834, 
Martens,  N.  S.  Ill,  p.  743  ff.  Also  a  letter  from  Constantinople,  June  4,  1834, 
The  Times,  July  2,  1834. 

41Raikes,  Journal,  I,  pp.  193-195. 


373]  EVOLUTION  IN  NEAR  EASTERN  RELATIONS,  1834-1838  47 

England  and  France  should  endeavor  to  effect  the  closure  of  the 
Straits  to  the  warships  of  all  nations.42  Although  his  stay  in  office 
was  too  short  to  permit  him  to  realize  the  complete  triumph  of 
his  policy,  when  he  was  succeeded  by  Palmerston,  in  the  spring 
of  1835,  he  had  the  satisfaction  to  see  that  the  latter  was  im- 
pressed by  the  soundness  of  his  opinion  upon  the  question  of  the 
Dardanelles.43  Moreover,  the  Whigs  also  took  over  the  idea  of 
sending  an  ambassador  to  St.  Petersburg.  To  fill  that  post  they 
chose  Lord  Durham,  a  diplomat  who  in  1832,  while  on  a  special 
mission  to  Russia  relative  to  both  Belgian  and  Oriental  affairs, 
had  succeeded  in  winning  the  favor  of  the  Tsar.44 

Durham,  in  1835,  anxious  to  place  the  relations  of  the  two  courts 
upon  as  cordial  a  basis  as  was  possible,  determined  to  become 
acquainted  personally  with  Anglo-Russian  rivalry  in  the  Near 
East.45  Consequently,  when  he  proceeded  to  the  seat  of  his  new 
position,  he  followed  a  circuitous  route  by  way  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean and  the  Black  Seas,  stopping  long  enough  in  Turkey  to  en- 
joy a  visit  with  Lord  Ponsonby  and  to  obtain  an  interview  with 
His  Highness,  Mahmoud  II.46  When  he  traveled  through  the 
southern  provinces  of  Russia  he  saw  no  symptoms  of  any 
preparations  for  war  and  he  became  convinced  that  the  Tsar  did 
not  have  the  power,  even  if  he  had  the  will,  to  call  suddenly  into 
action  a  sufficient  force  to  take  Constantinople.47 

Arriving  at  St.  Petersburg  in  the  autumn  of  1835,  the  British 
Ambassador  found  the  Russian  statesmen  inclined  to  say  that 
they  had  enough  to  do  at  home.  The  possession  of  the  Turkish 
capital  by  their  country,  they  professed  to  believe,  would  be  a 
calamity  instead  of  an  advantage.48  The  reply  made  by  Durham 

^Greville,  Journals  (Reeve  edition),  (Series  i),  III,  pp.  183,  225-229.  Hall, 
op.  cit.,  p.  222-223. 

"F.  0.  Turkey  271,  Palmerston  to  Ponsonby,  June  20,  1836,  cited  by  Hall, 
op.  cit.,  p.  223.  Bourqueney  to  Soult,  July  12,  1839,  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  510. 

"Palmerston  to  Durham,  June  23,  1832,  S.  J.  Reid,  Life  and  Letters  of  the 
First  Earl  of  Durham,  I,  pp.  301-303.  Grey  to  the  Princess  Lieven,  July  31, 
1832,  Nesselrode,  Lettres  et  papiers  du  chancelier  comte  de  Nesselrode,  VII,  pp. 
232-234. 

"Reid,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  16. 

"See  a  letter  from  Constantinople,  Nov.  18,  1835,  The  Times,  Dec.  15,  1835. 
See  also  No.  10,  Appendix  D. 

47Reid,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  17. 

"Ibid.,  p.  16. 


48  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [374 

to  their  declarations  was  friendly  but,  at  the  same  time,  firm. 
"I  do  not  believe,"  he  stated,  "[that]  you  entertain  the  designs 
attributed  to  you  because  you  are  too  wise  and  too  clever  to 
attempt  impossibilities.  The  retention,  nay,  the  occupation  of 
Constantinople  is  an  impossibility.  We  never  could  and  never 
would  permit  it,  while  there  was  a  shilling  in  our  treasury,  or  a 
drop  of  blood  in  British  veins."49 

Early  in  the  year  1836,  in  response  to  a  request  made  by 
Palmerston  for  an  exact  account  of  the  political  situation  at  St. 
Petersburg,  Durham  prepared  his  "luminous  and  remarkable 
'Report  on  the  state  of  Russia.'  "60  That  document  signified  "an 
attempt  to  unravel  a  political  problem  which  directly  concerned 
the  interests  of  England  and  the  peace  of  Europe,  namely, 
whether  Russia  was  likely  to  make  a  hostile  movement  for  her 
own  security  or  for  territorial  expansion."50  Russia  recognized, 
the  British  representative  contended,  that  a  fresh  and  formidable 
change  had  come  over  the  Eastern  question.  She  knew  that  it  was 
no  longer  possible  for  her  to  measure  swords  with  Turkey  alone 
and  that  any  hostile  movement  on  her  part  against  the  Ottoman 
Empire  would  occasion  a  war  with  the  English,  who  would  prob- 
ably be  supported  by  both  the  French  and  the  Austrians.  But 
this,  after  all,  was  only  one  side  of  the  question.  Although  the 
external  difficulties  of  Russia  were  great,  they  did  not  stand  alone. 
An  analysis  of  the  Empire's  population,  its  military  and  naval 
resources,  and  its  financial  condition  proved  that  there  was  not  a 
single  element  of  strength  which  was  not  counterbalanced  by  a 
corresponding  degree  of  weakness.51  "In  these  circumstances  and 
with  the  evidence  of  these  facts  before  me,"  Durham  pointed  out 
in  conclusion,  "I  humbly  conceive  that  I  am  justified  in  reporting 
to  his  Majesty  and  to  the  Government  my  conviction  that  the 
peace  of  Europe  is  not  likely  to  be  disturbed  by  any  ambitious 
or  hostile  enterprises  on  the  part  of  Russia,  for  which  she  has 
neither  the  inclination  nor  the  means."52 

While  Durham  was  thus  occupied  at  St.  Petersburg,  important 

*Ibid.,  pp.  16-17. 
"Ibid.,  p.  29. 
nlbid.,  pp.  30-35. 

nlbid.,  p.  36.   Others  who  were  acquainted  with  conditions  in  Russia  were 
of  similar  opinion.   See  Guichen,  op.  at.,  p.  95,  particularly  footnote  2. 


375]  EVOLUTION  IN  NEAR  EASTERN  RELATIONS,  1834-1838  49 

developments,  tending  to  increase  Great  Britain's  interest  in  the 
Near  East,  were  taking  place.  It  will  be  remembered  that  in  July, 

1834,  the  British  Parliament  had  granted  a  sum  of  20,000  Pounds 
which  was  to  provide  the  money  for  an  experiment  to  test  the 
practicability  of  a  steam  route  to  India  by  way  of  the  Euphrates 
river  and  the  Persian  Gulf.    After  several  months  delay,  during 
which  time  the  government  came  near  to  abandoning  the  project 
because  of  the  opposition  of  the  Porte,53  an  expedition  for  the 
purpose  was  equipped  and  placed  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Chesney.   Chesney  and  his  band  departed  from  England 
early  in  the  year  1835  and  they  arrived  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Orontes    river,   on   the   coast   of   northern   Syria,   on   April   3." 
Although  the  Sultan,  three  months  earlier,  had  at  last  issued  a 
firman  granting  permission  to  the  English  to  navigate  the  Eu- 
phrates,55 the   Colonel   and  his   followers   were  destined  to  ex- 
perience a  second  tiresome  delay  before  they  could  proceed  with 
the  execution  of  their  plans.   Mehemet  Ali  had  promised  to  give 
his  assistance  to  the  British  government  in  favor  of  the  undertak- 
ing but  when  the  moment  came  to  give  a  "bouyourldee"  to  the 
local  governors   to  enjoin  them  to  assist  Chesney,   he  delayed 
signing  the  document,  and  hence  the  expedition  could  not  pro- 
ceed.56  The  British  commander,  chafing  under  this  inaction,  ob- 
tained an  interview  with  Ibrahim  Pasha  at  Tripoli  on  April  24, 

1835,  but  he  could  not  prevail  upon  him  to  do  otherwise  than 
await  his  father's  orders.57  It  was  only  after  strong  remonstrances 
were  made  by  His  Britannic  Majesty's  government  to  the  Viceroy 
that  the  latter  finally  consented  to  lend  his  cooperation  to  the 
project.58  However,  by  the  close  of  the  summer  of  1835,  all  of  the 
expedition's  equipment,  including  the  parts  of  two  iron  steam- 
boats— the  Tigris  and  the  Euphrates — had  been  loaded  on  wagons 
and  transported  from  the  mouth  of  the  Orontes  inland  toward  the 

"Chesney,  op.  cit.,  p.  157-158. 

"Barker,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  216. 

55Letter  from  Constantinople,  May  6,  1835,  The  Times,  June  I,  1835. 

"Barker,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  216-217.  The  Constantinople  correspondent  of  The 
Times  claimed  that  the  hostile  attitude  of  the  Pasha  was  due  to  the  influence 
at  Alexandria  of  the  Tsar's  representative,  M.  Duhamel.  See,  letters  from  Con- 
stantinople, May  13,  21,  26,  1835,  The  Times,  June  8,  13,  20,  1835. 

"Chesney,  op.  cit.,  pp.  179-180. 

**Ibid.,  pp.  199-200. 


5O  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [376 

waters  of  that  famous  river,  the  commercial  possibilities  of  which 
it  was  the  aim  of  Chesney's  party  to  discover.59  The  difficulties 
encountered  were  numerous  but,  as  a  contemporary  periodical 
expressed  it,  the  "resolute  perseverance"  of  the  commander  and 
the  "never  failing  exertions"  of  the  officers  and  men  triumphed 
over  all  obstacles.60  On  May  21,  1836,  soon  after  the  two  steam- 
ers had  been  launched  upon  the  Euphrates,  they  encountered  a 
hurricane  which  blew  in  from  the  desert  with  so  much  violence 
that  the  Tigris  foundered,  carrying  down  with  her  several 
members  of  her  crew.61  Nevertheless,  Chesney  and  the  rest  of  the 
survivors,  refusing  to  become  discouraged,  continued  their 
journey  in  the  one  vessel  which  had  successfully  weathered  the 
storm.  They  reached  the  Persian  Gulf  in  June,  1836,  and  the 
following  winter,  after  a  delay  occasioned  by  their  waiting  to  effect 
a  communication  with  India,  steamed  up  the  Tigris  river  to  Bag- 
dad, where  the  party  finally  was  disbanded.62  That  the  expedition 
was  a  significant  one  cannot  be  denied.  A  fellow-countryman  has 
paid  the  following  tribute  to  its  resolute  commander:  "Although 
neglected  and  overlooked  by  an  ungrateful  country,  his  name  will 
live  forever  as  the  pioneer  of  the  greatest  work,  in  reference  to 
India,  of  the  nineteenth  century,  and  one  which  will  one  day  be 
seen  in  its  true  light  as  being  the  only  real  route  to  our  Indian 
possessions."63 


"Ibid.,  pp.  192-199.   Barker,  op.  at.,  II,  pp.  217-218,  222. 

^Gentleman's  Magazine,  Aug.,   1836,  Series  3,  VI,  p.  199. 

nlbid.,  Sept.,  1836,  p.  317.   Chesney,  op.  cit.,  pp.  251-259. 

"Ibid.,  pp.  293-326.  For  a  more  detailed  account  of  the  Euphrates  expedi- 
tion see  F.  R.  Chesney,  The  Expedition  for  the  Survey  of  the  Rivers  Euphrates 
and  Tigris,  carried  on  by  order  of  tine  British  Government  in  the  years  1835, 
1836,  and  1837.  (4  vols.) 

""Barker,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  222.  Some  others  were  not  so  enthusiastic.  Lord 
Broughton  recorded  in  his  "Recollections"  under  date  of  Aug.  10,  1836:  "A  very 
numerous  deputation,  headed  by  Lord  William  Bentinck,  waited  on  me  at  the 
Indian  Board,  to  discuss  a  proposal  for  establishing  a  steam  communication  with 
India.  The  scheme  met  with  many  and  serious  obstructions,  but  was  started  at 
last.  I  heard  no  complaints,  except  from  a  very  clever  friend  of  mine,  who  said 
to  me,  The  deuce  take  these  projectors!  Letters  come  from  India  now  quite  quick 
and  quite  often  enough;  I  am  sure  many  of  them  are  not  answered  yet.  What 
will  it  be  when  letters  and  despatches  come  from  India  once  a  week?' " — Lord 
Broughton,  Recollections  of  a  Long  Life,  V,  p.  60. 


377]  EVOLUTION  IN  NEAR  EASTERN  RELATIONS,  1834-1838  5  I 

At  the  same  time  that  Chesney  was  pushing  forward  through 
Syria  and  Mesopotamia,  a  growing  British  interest  in  Oriental 
affairs  was  marked  at  Constantinople  by  increased  activity  on  the 
part  of  Lord  Ponsonby.  The  English  Ambassador,  refusing  to 
permit  himself  to  be  influenced  by  the  convictions  expressed  by 
Lord  Durham  in  regard  to  the  policies  of  Russia,  was  absolutely 
convinced  that  the  intentions  of  the  northern  court  were  Machia- 
vellian in  character.64  Also,  he  was  imbued  with  a  violent  hatred 
for  Mehemet  AH.65  Hence  it  was  natural  that  he  should  desire 
both  to  destroy  the  preponderance  of  Russian  influence  in  Turkey 
and  to  limit  the  developing  power  of  the  ambitious  Viceroy  of 
Egypt.  In  his  endeavor  to  realize  the  former  aim  progress  was 
extremely  slow,  for  he  was  handicapped  by  the  opposition  of  the 
representatives  of  the  Emperor  Nicholas  and  by  the  feelings  of 
gratitude  which  the  Porte  bore  towards  Russia  because  of  the 
aid  that  Power  had  tendered  to  it  when  Ibrahim's  army  was 
threatening  Constantinople.66  In  his  efforts  to  accomplish  the 
latter  aim,  aided  by  the  Grand  Seignior's  desire  for  revenge  against 
the  Egyptians,  he  was  more  fortunate.  It  is  significant  in  this 
connection  that  when,  in  December  of  1835,  Ponsonby  complained 
that  the  Pasha's  system  of  monopoly  and  trade  restriction  was  in 
violation  of  the  rights  conferred  upon  English  merchantmen  by  the 
treaties  of  commerce  existing  between  the  Ottoman  Porte  and 
Great  Britain,  Mahmoud  promptly  issued  a  firman  to  his  power- 
ful vassal  ordering  him  to  abolish  within  the  territories  under  his 


"Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  223.  Ponsonby  persisted  in  maintaining  that  view  even  in 
1836  after  the  Russian  Cabinet  had  consented  a  second  time  to  remit  a  part  of 
the  indemnity  due  from  Turkey  and  to  evacuate  Silistria.  See,  F.  0.  Turkey  273, 
Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  March  14,  1836,  cited  by  ibid.,  p.  224.  Letter  from 
Constantinople,  Sept.  6,  1836,  published  in  the  Allgemeine  Zeitung  and  copied  in 
The  Times,  Oct.  6,  1836.  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  256-257,  III,  p.  4. 

"See  a  Memorandum  addressed  to  the  Porte  by  Lord  Ponsonby,  March  3, 
1836,  quoted  by  P.  Merruau,  L'Egypte  contemporaine  de  Mehemet-Ali  a  Said 
Pacha,  p.  XLV. 

"For  comment  on  the  subserviency  of  the  Porte  to  Russia  see:  C.  B.  El- 
liott, Travels  in  the  Three  Great  Empires  of  Austria,  Russia,  and  Turkey,  I, 
p.  131.  Annual  Register,  1835,  pp.  [494]-[499].  Letters  from  Constantinople, 
Dec.  2,  30,  1834,  March  4,  1835,  Jan.  20,  May  25,  1836,  The  Times,  Jan.  i,  28, 
March  30,  1835,  Feb.  16,  June  17,  1836.  Raikes,  Journal,  II,  pp.  164-165. 


52  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [378 

control  all  such  restrictions  as  were  not  in  conformity  with  the 
established  Turkish  practices.67 

Russia  viewed  with  alarm  the  evidence  of  Britain's  increasing 
interest  in  the  Near  East  and,  zealous  in  her  efforts  to  guard  the 
influences  she  had  gained  at  Constantinople,  looked  suspiciously 
upon  every  advance  made  by  the  Porte  to  Ponsonby.  After  it 
became  known  that  the  British  Ambassador  had  persuaded  the 
Sultan  to  permit  the  undertaking  of  the  Euphrates  expedition, 
Count  Nesselrode  forwarded  a  long  protest  to  the  Turkish  capital. 
"His  Imperial  Majesty,"  the  Russian  Chancellor  instructed  M.  de 
Boutenieff  to  warn  the  Porte,  "has  remarked  with  surprise,  that, 
deaf  to  his  own  interests  and  to  every  friendly  suggestion,  the 
Sultan  had  authorized  the  English  Government  to  establish  a 
steam  communication  on  the  Euphrates,  and  still  favored  the 
execution  of  its  ambitious  designs  in  Egypt,  by  delivering  a  fir- 
man, which,  when  the  opportune  moment  has  arrived,  will  serve 
to  legitimate  an  attack  on  its  governor.  The  Emperor,  after  hav- 
ing uselessly  warned  the  Sultan  of  the  dangers  to  which  he  ex- 
poses the  empire  by  acceding  to  the  demands  of  the  English 
Cabinet,  now  considers  himself  bound  to  inform  the  Porte  that 
should  hostilities  between  England  and  the  Governor  of  Egypt 
arise  on  his  refusal  to  obey  the  firman  of  the  Porte,  Russia  could 
hot  remain  a  passive  spectator  of  so  unequal  a  conflict,  and  might 
find  herself  drawn  by  the  force  of  circumstances  into  a  position 
which  might  render  the  continuation  of  the  present  friendly  rela- 
tions no  longer  possible."68 


"State  Papers,  XXIII,  pp.  1291-1292.  English  merchants  at  that  time  were 
complaining  constantly  about  the  trade  restrictions  in  the  Near  East.  See,  let- 
ters from  Constantinople,  Aug.  5,  Dec.  2,  16,  1835,  March  9,  May  4,  1836,  The 
Times,  Aug.  28,  Dec.  28,  1835,  Jan.  12,  April  4,  May  28,  1836. 

"Martens,  N.  S.,  Ill,  p.  760-762.  Letter  from  Constantinople,  March  16, 
1836,  The  Times,  April  u,  1836.  Gentleman'!  Magazine,  May,  1836,  Series  3, 
V,  p.  541.  The  date  of  this  document  has  not  been  found  but  it  is  apparent  that 
the  Russian  government  was  openly  hostile  to  the  Euphrates  project  at  a  yery 
early  date.  In  "A  Statement  of  His  [Britannic]  Majesty's  General  Proceedings, 
and  of  the  Principles  by  which  he  was  guided  from  the  period  of  his  Accession, 
1830,  to  that  of  the  recent  Change  in  the  Administration,"  dated  Jan.  14,  1835,  men- 
tion, was  made  of  Russia's  "recent  opposition  to  the  projected  establishment  of 
a  steam  communication  with  India,  by  the  Euphrates."  See  L.  J.  Jennings,  The  Cor- 
respondence and  Diaries  of  the  late  Right  Honorable  John  Wilson  Croker,  p.  348. 


379]  EVOLUTION  IN  NEAR  EASTERN  RELATIONS,  1834-1838  53 

Lord  Durham  realized  that  the  anti-Russian  activities  of  the 
British  Ambassador  in  Turkey  were  a  serious  handicap  to  him  in 
his  efforts  to  improve  the  status  of  Anglo-Russian  relations  and 
he  complained  to  Palmerston  about  the  matter.69  The  British 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  thoroughly  approved  of  the  course  fol- 
lowed by  His  Britannic  Majesty's  Ambassador  at  the  Muscovite 
Court  but,  being  unwilling  to  trust  Russia  as  far  as  the  latter  did, 
took  a  more  cynical  view  of  her  assurances  and  refused  really  to 
condemn  the  stand  which  Ponsonby  had  taken  in  opposition  to 
Russian  influence  in  Turkey.  In  answer  to  Durham's  complaint  he 
declared:  "Ponsonby  goes  perhaps  too  far  in  his  suspicions  of 
Russia,  and  certainly  is  too  warlike  in  his  own  inclinations;  .  .  . 
but  Ponsonby  has  great  merits  and  has  done  us  good  service  at 
Constantinople,  .  .  .  what  you  say  about  Russia  very  much  coin- 
cides with  our  views.  Whether  we  entirely  believe  or  not  that  the 
Russian  government  has  altered  the  policy  which,  certainly,  at  no 
distant  period,  it  pursued  as  to  Turkey,  it  would  be  unwise  not  to 
appear  to  give  credit  to  acts  which  are  in  conformity  with  pro- 
fessions; .  .  ."70 

It  is  obvious  that  in  Great  Britain  Durham  encountered  innum- 
erable obstacles  in  his  efforts  to  quiet  apprehensions  in  regard  to 
Russian  policies.  In  addition  to  the  alarm  occasioned  there  by 
Russia'sNear Eastern policyin  1833, and  the  Anglo-Russian  rivalry 
at  Constantinople  in  the  period  immediately  following  that  year, 
strong  sentiments  were  stirred  up  by  the  way  in  which  the  Rus- 

The  Due  de  Barante,  French  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  reported  in 
May,  1836,  that  Durham  had  confidentially  told  him  that  if  he  were  a  member 
of  the  British  Cabinet,  Lord  Ponsonby  would  not  remain  at  Constantinople  for 
twenty-four  hours.  See,  Barante  to  Thiers,  May  14,  1836,  Barante,  Souvenirs 
du  Baron  de  Barante,  V,  pp.  380-381. 

'"Palmerston  to  Durham,  May  31,  1836,  Reid,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  43.  Six  weeks 
later  Palmerston  wrote  to  his  brother  William:  '"Russia  is  coquetting  with 
Durham;  and  in  order  to  cajole  him,  is  obliged  to  be  civil  to  us;  so  his  appoint- 
ment has  answered.  Metternich  has  taken  a  fling,  as  if  bit  by  a  horse-fly,  and 
Ancillon  has  mimicked  him  as  a  donkey  would  do.  .  .  . 

'I  have  just  got  Ponsonby's  reports  about  Churchill,  but  have  not  been 
able  to  read  them  yet.  I  fear  he  may  have  gone  a  little  too  far;  but  all  his 
colleagues,  not  excepting  Roussin,  are  jealous  of  him,  and  would  be  too  glad  of 
an  opportunity  to  throw  him  over  if  they  could.  I  must  support  him  to  the 
full  extent  of  propriety.' " — Palmerston  to  Temple,  July  9,  1836,  Bulwer,  op.  cit., 
Ill,  pp.  13-14. 


54  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [380 

sians  had  suppressed  the  risings  of  the  Poles,  71  by  the  Tsar's  part 
in  the  occupation  of  Cracow  in  i836,72  and  by  his  attempts  to  crush 
an  insurrection  which  had  broken  out  a  short  time  before  in 
southern  Russia  among  the  Circassians.  The  sympathy  of  the 
British  nation  was  particularly  aroused,  it  seems,  by  the  efforts  of 
the  latter  peoples  to  win  their  independence,  and  certain  adventur- 
ous Englishmen  even  went  so  far  as  to  join  openly  with  the 
rebels.73  In  December  of  1836,  the  activities  of  some  of  these 
Britons  came  near  to  occasioning  very  serious  and  far  reaching 
results.  A  schooner,  the  Vixen,  which  had  been  engaged  in  illicit 
trade  with  the  Circassians,  was  captured  in  the  Black  Sea  by  a 
Russian  brig  of  war.74  The  owners  of  the  vessel,  Messrs.  Bell  and 
Company,  complained  loudly  about  their  loss  and  appealed  to 
the  British  government  for  support.75  Palmerston  was  inclined 
to  sympathize  with  their  cause  but  he  had  no  wish  "  'to  begin 
fighting  at  the  goodwill  and  bidding  of  Mr.  James  Bell,  the  bank- 
rupt of  Bucharest,' "  as  he  called  him.76  It  is  true  that  the  affair 
served  to  increase  English  animosity  against  Russia,  but  the 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  adopted  the  stand  that  there  had  been 
no  violation  of  International  Law  and  hence  refused  to  insist  that 
reparation  should  be  made  by  the  Court  of  St.  Petersburg.77 
Thus,  this  possibility  of  hostilities  resulting  between  the  two 
Powers  was  happily  averted. 

"Note  the  following:  "The  wrongs  of  the  Poles  at  that  time  [the  early 
i83o's]  excited  as  much  indignation  in  England  as  was  afterwards  evoked  by  the 
Bulgarian  atrocities  of  the  Turks." — Reid,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  4. 

"In  February,  1836,  the  little  Republic  of  Cracow,  the  last  stronghold  of 
the  Poles,  was  occupied  by  the  troops  of  the  three  eastern  Powers.  At  that 
time  the  indignation  of  the  British  was  so  great  that  the  peace  of  Europe  was 
seriously  threatened.  See  Lavisse  et  Rambaud,  Histoirf  generate,  X,  p.  331. 
Reid,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  41.  Blanc,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  29-30.  Pad.  Deb.,  XXXII,  pp.  403- 
426. 

"Letter  from  Constantinople,  Oct.  12,  1836,  The  Times,  Nov.  4,  1836. 

"Letter  from  Constantinople,  Dec.  28,  1836,  ibid.,  Jan.  27,  1837.  State 
Papers,  XXVI,  pp.  24-26. 

"George  Bell  to  Palmerston,  Jan.  27,  1837,  ibid.,  p.  II.  The  appeal  was  re- 
peated. See  Bell  to  Palmerston,  Apr.  4,  1837,  Ibid.,  p.  33.  ' 

"Palmerston  to  Granville,  Feb.  3,  1837,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  248-249, 
[footnote]. 

"Reid,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  67.  Palmerston  to  Durham,  May  23,  1837,  State  Pa- 
pers, XXVI,  pp.  40-41.  For  a  more  detailed  study  of  the  affair  see  additional 
papers  in  ibid.,  pp.  3-60. 


381]  EVOLUTION  IN  NEAR  EASTERN  RELATIONS,  1834-1838  55 

The  fear  and  hatred  of  Russia  amongst  the  British  people  in 
1835  and  1836  must  have  been  intense  indeed.  At  any  rate  a  re- 
view of  certain  contemporary  products  of  the  press  leads  to  that 
conclusion.  Not  only  the  publications  of  such  radicals  as  David 
Urquhart,  the  editor  of  the  Portfolio,78  but  also  the  journals  of 
the  Conservatives  were  extremely  bitter  in  their  denunciation  of 
the  policies  of  the  Muscovite  state  which,  according  to  The  Times, 
was  "an  ambitious,  grasping,  domineering,  despotic,  and  most 
artful  power."79  A  few  brief  quotations  will  suffice  to  reveal  the 
character  of  some  of  the  sentiments  which  were  expressed.  The 
following  is  an  extract  from  an  anonymous  pamphlet  written  in 
1834,  and  entitled  England,  France,  Russia,  and  Turkey:  "Are 
not  the  remains  of  Turkey  to  be  laid  on  the  tomb  of  Poland, 
unless  England  and  France,  in  their  resistless  twinship  say  no? 
...  It  is  by  the  Dardanelles  that  we  must  reach  the  heart  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire;  it  is  from  the  Bosphorus  that  our  fleets  must 
issue,  to  arrest  the  invader.  Invigorate  Turkey,  you  not  only 
save  her  but  repair  the  disaster  her  weakness  alone  has  brought 
about.  The  existence  of  Poland  is  bound  to  that  of  Turkey.  One 
hand  of  iron  is  laid  upon  both;  unlock  that  withering  grasp,  and 
both  start  simultaneously  to  life.  The  Dardanelles  are  the  key  to 
both;  both  are  to  be  secured  by  its  possession,  or  sacrificed  by  its 
loss."80  "Is  it  true  that  Russia  deserves  the  foul  and  angry 
epithets  which  are  heaped  upon  her?"  questioned  the  Monthly 
Review  for  January,  1835,  in  commenting  upon  this  pamphlet. 
"Yes;  think  of  Poland!  But  is  her  appetite  of  ambition  insatiate 
and  unsated?  yes;  think  of  Turkey!"81  The  editorial  writer  of 
The  Times  was  always  hostile  to  Russia  and  he  was  occasionally 
even  quite  militant.  On  February  21,  1836,  after  criticising  the 
"flippant  apologies"  made  by  the  British  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
relative  to  the  "insulting  convention  of  Hoonkiar  'Skelessi,' "  he 
declared:  "We  all  know  quite  as  well  as  Lord  Palmerston  the 

"See  above,  Note  No.  29.  Urquhart  was  one  of  the  most  active  and  most 
bitter  critics  of  Russia's  policy  at  that  time.  See  D.  Urquhart,  Le  sitltan  et  le 
pacha  d'Egyptf  (a  pamphlet). 

"The  Times,  Feb.  8,  1836. 

80The  Monthly  Review,  Jan.,  1835,  I,  pp.  51-52. 

MIbid.,  p.  51.  See  similar  reviews  in  ibid.,  May,  1835,  II,  pp.  84-92;  July, 
1836,  II,  pp.  439-440;  Oct.,  1836,  III,  pp.  149-158,  303-304;  Aug.,  1837,  II,  pp. 
498-505. 


56  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [382 

intrinsic  power  of  this  great  country  [England] ;  we  all  know  that 
if  fairly  pitted  against  Russia,  and  with  her  force  efficiently  di- 
rected, she  would  smash  the  head  of  the  Tartar  Emperor  against 
the  dockyard  gate  of  Sevastopol,  or  the  inmost  defense  of 
Cronstadt."82 

Such  hostile  articles  as  these,  which  were  frequently  reported 
to  the  Emperor  Nicholas  by  Count  Pozzo  di  Borgo,  were  a  source 
of  constant  difficulty  for  Durham.83  Nevertheless,  the  British 
Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  succeeded  in  improving  greatly  the 
diplomatic  relations  between  England  and  Russia.  On  March 
20,  1836,  he  wrote  to  a  friend:  "I  have  interposed  a  barrier  be- 
tween Russia  and  Turkish  conquest,  which  they  [the  Russians] 
admit  to  be  insuperable,  and  which  therefore  they  disclaim.  I 
have  while  asserting  our  own  superiority  and  right  and  power  to 
intervene,  at  the  same  time  done  it  in  such  a  way  as  to  inspire 
confidence  in  our  motives  and  determination,  and  never  at  any 
moment  was  English  influence  more  powerful  here  [at  St.  Peters- 
burg]. Excuse  this  Vain  glory';  it  is  only  in  private  to  you;  it  will 
never  be  conceded  to  me  in  public,  but  it  is  my  consolation  in 
sorrow  and  sickness."84  Lord  Palmerston  frankly  admitted  the 
value  of  Durham's  success  at  the  Russian  Court.  On  December 
14,  1837,  after  the  Ambassador  had  returned  to  England,  the 
Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs  declared  in  the  House  of  Commons 
that  "it  was  impossible  for  any  public  servant  at  a  foreign  court 
to  have  served  his  country  with  more  zeal  and  firmness"  than 


"The  Times,  Feb.  22,  1836.  See  ibid.,  June  4,  Oct.  I,  1835;  Jan.  5,  7,  April 
18,  19,  22,  1836.  Aaron  Vail,  thei  American  representative  at  London,  wrote  Jan. 
22,  1836:  "The  European  Press,  without  any  material  exception  but  that  portion 
of  it  which  is  under  Russian  control,  has  not  ceased  to  fan  the  embers  of  that 
anti-Russian  feeling;  and  the  Imperial  Court  has  been  galled  by  the  severity  and 
virulence  with  which  its  acts  have  been  scanned,  and  its  policy  commented  upon 
by  the  acknowledged  ministerial  organs  of  England  and  France,  and  even  by 
some  German  journals,  formerly  advocates  of  the  doctrines  set  up  by  the  Holy 
Alliance  of  which  the  Emperor  of  Russia  was  the  head  and  master.  Rash  and 
mendacious  as  portions  of  the  Press  may  at  times  be  found  all  the  world  over, 
still,  when  with  all  but  an  unanimous  voice  it  utters  the  same  sentiments,  it 
must  be  acknowledged  then  unequivocally  to  speak  the  public  mind." — State 
Dept.  England,  XLIII,  Vail  to  Forsyth,  No.  224,  Jan.  22,  1836. 

83Reid,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  24,  46. 

"Durham  to  Parkes,  March  20,  1836,  ibid.,  p.  80. 


383]  EVOLUTION  IN  NEAR  EASTERN  RELATIONS,  1834-1838  57 

Durham  had.85  Although  Palmerston  still  believed  that  the  British 
Cabinet  ought  not  to  "relax  in  any  degree  the  vigilance  with  which 
[it  watched]  the  proceedings  of  Russia,"  he  had  become  convinced 
that  the  Muscovite  government  had  no  intention  of  immediate 
aggression.86  "I  think,"  he  wrote  to  Durham  in  November,  1836, 
"you  would  not  demur  to  what  I  said  about  Russia  in  my  conver- 
sation with  Esterhazy  [the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  London]  upon 
his  return  here.  I  said  our  situation  with  respect  to  Russia  is 
greatly  improved,  as  compared  with  what  it  was  two  years  ago. 
Then  there  was  much  personal  irritation  between  the  two  govern- 
ments and  no  preparation  on  our  part  to  resist  Russia  if  neces- 
sary; whereas  now,  by  your  good  management  at  St.  Petersburg 
the  two  governments  are  placed  upon  a  perfectly  good  footing  of 
mutual  intercourse,  while  the  vote  of  Parliament  of  last  session 
has  put  into  our  hands  the  means  of  giving  effect,  if  requisite,  to 
any  remonstrance  we  might  be  obliged  to  make."87  Moreover,  in 
the  halls  of  Parliament  Palmerston  pointed  out  the  absurdity  of 
the  fears  of  those  who  were  alarmed  lest  Great  Britain  should  be 
attacked  by  the  Russians  and  he  even  declared  that  Russia  gave 
"the  world  quite  as  much  security  for  the  preservation  of  peace  as 
England  did."88 

While  the  British  government's  fear  of  immediate  aggressive  in- 
tentions on  the  part  of  the  Court  of  St.  Petersburg  was  thus  being 
allayed,  its  apprehensions  in  regard  to  the  policies  of  Mehemet  Ali 
were  increasing.  In  1834,  soon  after  the  Egyptian  army  had  been 
withdrawn  from  Asia  Minor,  an  expedition  which  the  Pasha  fitted 
out  under  the  command  of  Kourchid  Bey,  the  governor  of  Jeddah, 


KParl.  Deb.,  XXXIX,  p.  1109.   See  also  Reid,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  39,  59. 

"Palmerston  to  Durham,  Sept.  24,  1836,  ibid.,  p.  63. 

^Palmerston  to  Durham,  Nov.  I,  1836,  ibid.,  p.  65.  Palmerston  appears  to 
have  had  little  fear  of  Russian  power.  On  March  10,  1835,  he  wrote  to  his 
brother  William:  "The  fact  is  that  Russia  is  a  great  humbug,  and  that  if 
England  were  fairly  to  go  to  work  with  her  we  should  throw  her  back  half  a 
century  in  one  campaign.  But  Nicholas,  the  proud  and  insolent,  knows  this,  and 
will  always  check  his  pride  and  moderate  his  insolence  when  he  finds  that  Eng- 
land is  firmly  determined  and  fully  prepared  to  resist  him.' " — Palmerston  to 
Temple,  March  10,  1835,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  p.  5. 

Tarl.  Deb.,  XXXIX,  pp.  IHOIIII.  Others  entertained  similar  sentiments. 
See  views  recorded  by  Lieut.-Col.  Frederic  Smith,  an  officer  of  the  Royal  En- 
gineers, in  Marmont,  op.  cit.,  pp.  313-316. 


58  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [384 

crossed  the  Hedjaz  country  and  advanced  as  far  as  the  village  of 
Kassim,  about  ten  day's  journey  from  Bassorah.89  Kourchid  soon 
succeeded  in  occupying  the  isle  of  Bahrein  in  the  Persian  Gulf  and 
in  effecting  a  union  at  the  mouth  of  the  Shatt-el-Arab  with  a 
naval  force  which  the  Viceroy  had  sent  around  the  Arabian  penin- 
sula. The  road  to  Bagdad  lay  open  before  him  but  as  the  British 
government,  alarmed  by  the  advance  of  the  expedition,  protested 
vigorously  to  Mehemet  AH,  the  latter,  who  was  already  being 
troubled  by  the  revolts  in  Syria,  decided  that  the  project  should 
be  abandoned.89  Accordingly,  he  ordered  Kourchid  to  retreat  with 
his  troops  to  Egypt.  Nevertheless,  in  the  following  year  he  again 
took  up  his  aggressive  policy  and  despatched  an  army  against 
Yemen.90  While  this  particular  undertaking  failed,  it  was  soon 
apparent  that  there  was  a  real  danger  of  the  Viceroy's  making 
himself  master  of  all  Arabia  if  he  should  be  permitted  to  continue 
his  activities  against  the  Bedouin.91 

Great  Britain  had  too  many  vital  interests  at  stake  to  fail  to 
become  alarmed  in  such  circumstances.  She  viewed  with  special 
concern  the  developments  in  Egypt,  Arabia,  and  Syria,  for,  it  will 
be  remembered,  she  was  beginning  to  realize  that  the  bulk  of  the 
future  European  intercourse  with  India  would  flow  through  either 
the  Red  Sea  or  the  Persian  Gulf.  It  has  been  noted  before  that 
even  in  1834,  tne  special  Parliamentary  committee  on  steam  navi- 
gation with  India  reported  that  the  practicability  of  the  former  of 
those  routes  appeared  to  be  certain  and  in  order  to  develop  it 
suggested  that  the  government  should  proceed  to  take  action  in 
cooperation  with  the  East  India  Company.92  The  committee's 

""Brehier,  op.  cit.,  pp.  149-150.   Mouriez,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  pp.  235-258. 

Annual  Register,  1835,  p.  [499]. 

"Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  232.  Note  the  following  statement  made  by  Sir  John  Hob- 
house  (Lord  Broughton)  in  a  British  Cabinet  meeting,  June  15,  1838:  '"...I 
added  that  the  continued  encroachments  of  Mahomet  Ali  on  the  shores  of  the 
Persian  Gulf  rendered  a  collision  between  him  and  ourselves  almost  inevitable, 
unless,  indeed,  we  had  made  up  our  minds  to  allow  him  to  become  master  of 
Bassorah  and  perhaps  of  Baghdad.' "  Quoted  by  A.  Hasenclever,  Die  Orientalische 
Frage  in  den  fahren  1838-1841,  p.  3  [footnote  10]. 

"In  order  to  continue  investigation  of  the  possibilities  of  steam  navigation 
with  India  a  second  Parliamentary  committee  was  appointed  on  June  9,  1837. 
This  committee,  which  included  Sir  John  Hobhouse  and  Lord  William  Bentinck 
among  its  members,  considered  various  projects  for  rapid  communication  with 
the  East  and  in  a  report  on  July  15,  1837,  made  the  following  suggestions: 


385]  EVOLUTION  IN  NEAR  EASTERN  RELATIONS,  1834-1838  59 

report  was  received  favorably  in  the  House  of  Commons93  and 
the  public  press  exerted  itself  to  prevent  the  British  people  from 
losing  interest  in  the  question,  but  nevertheless  over  two  years 
elapsed  before  appreciable  results  could  be  obtained.  Three  par- 
ticularly serious,  or  supposedly  serious,  obstacles  contributed  to 
this  delay.  One  arose  from  a  problem  of  navigation.  As  Sir  John 
Hobhouse,  the  chairman  of  the  Court  of  Directors  of  the  East 
India  Company,  declared  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  August 
17,  1835,  during  two  or  three  months  of  each  year  the  south-west 
monsoons  blew  with  so  much  violence  in  the  Red  Sea  that  it  was 
then  believed  no  steamship,  of  whatever  size  and  power,  would 
be  able  to  face  them.94  A  second  difficulty  arose  when  it  came  to 
finding  a  method  of  transporting  travellers  and  goods  across  the 
Isthmus  of  Suez.  For  a  time  the  question  of  building  a  railroad 
was  considered  but  it  was  finally  given  up  as  being  impracticable.95 
A  third  difficulty  arose  from  the  fact  that  the  finances  of  the  East 
India  Company  were,  unfortunately,  in  a  very  dilapidated 
condition.96 

Fortunately,  however,  these  obstacles  did  not  prove  to  be  insur- 
mountable.   They  were  all  overcome  eventually  and,  beginning 

"Your  committee  feel  bound  to  recommend  a  continued  and  zealous  attention 
to  the  subject  [of  steam  navigation  to  India]  on  the  part  of  Her  Majesty's 
Government  and  the  East  India  Company. 

"But  strong  as  your  committee  are  impressed  with  a  sense  of  the  advan- 
tages, Political,  Commercial,  and  Personal,  which  would  arise  from  the  more 
extended  system  of  communication  [proposed],  they  would  earnestly  deprecate 
any  interruption  of  the  valuable  arrangements  now  in  progress,  with  which  it 
appears  to  them,  from  the  Evidence  adduced,  to  be  perfectly  compatible." — 
Parl.  Papers,  1837,  VI,  Report  of  Select  Committee  on  Steam  Navigation  to 
India  [218  pages]. 

93Parl.  Dtb.,  XXV,  pp.  930-932. 

**Ibid.,  XXX,  p.  609.  Other  men  expressed  similar  beliefs.  See  C.  R.  Scott, 
Rambles  in  Egypt  and  Candia,  II,  pp.  79-82. 

B5The  idea  of  building  a  railroad  across  the  Isthmus  was  suggested  as  early 
as  1833.  In  1834  a  road-bed  was  surveyed  between  Cairo  and  Suez  by  a  certain 
Mr.  Galloway  who  seems  to  have  had  considerable  influence  with  the  Viceroy. 
Rails  for  the  proposed  road  actually  reached  Egypt  but  they  were  used  for 
other  purposes.  See,  Parl.  Papers,  1840,  XXI,  Report  on  Egypt,  pp.  61,  72. 
Gentleman's  Magazine,  Dec.,  1833,  Series  2,  XXVI,  p.  534.  Scott,  op.  cit.,  II, 
p.  152.  See  also  Galloway's  map  of  the  proposed  railroad  in  Parl.  Papers,  1837, 
VI,  Report  of  Select  Committee  on  Steam  Navigation  to  India,  Appendix  No.  2. 

"See  statement  made  by  Hobhouse,  Parl.  Deb.,  XXX,  p.  609. 


6O  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [386 

with  the  year  1837,  regular  communication  with  India  by  the 
way  of  the  Red  Sea  was  successfully  established  and  maintained.97 
"Egypt  is  fast  becoming  of  moment  in  the  opinion  of  other  na- 
tions," the  editor  of  the  Gentleman's  Magazine  wrote  in  Sep- 
tember, 1838.  "Five  years  ago  there  was  not  a  single  steam-vessel 
of  any  nation  plying  from  her  ports;  now  those  of  England, 
France,  Austria,  and  Egypt  number  18  regular  opportunities  to 
and  fro  every  month  from  Alexandria.  When  will  our  Govern- 
ment build  the  'Great  Eastern'  of  1500  tons,  to  go  direct  (both 
ways)  between  Plymouth  and  Alexandria  in  15  days,  with  India 
mails  and  passengers  and  thus  keep  the  French  and  Austrian 
lines  from  our  Indian  correspondence?"98 

The  realization,  on  the  part  of  the  government  of  India,  of  the 
value  of  the  Red  Sea  route  was  marked  by  its  taking  advantage, 
in  1838,  of  a  quarrel  it  had  formerly  entered  into  with  one  of  the 
native  rulers  of  Yemen,  in  order  to  secure  for  England  the 
strategic  position  of  Aden.99  The  importance  of  this  position  as  a 
coaling  station  on  the  road  to  India  was  well  known  at  that  time. 
"It  would  be  needless  my  remarking  on  the  position  of  Aden  for 
a  coal  depot,"  Captain  Haines,  a  prominent  officer  of  the  Bombay 
navy,  declared,  "It  having  been  already  considered  on  by  abler 
heads  than  mine;  but  as  a  sailor  who  well  knows  the  place  from 
long  experience,  it  will  not  be  considered  presumptuous  in  my 

''Note  the  following  statement  made  by  Col.  Campbell,  in  his  Report  to 
Bowring,  Jan.  18,  1838:  "...I  now  proceed  to  give  you  some  details  upon  the 
steam  communication  between  Europe  and  India  by  the  Red  Sea,  and  which  is 
daily  becoming  an  object  of  more  and  more  importance.  At  present  it  is  con- 
fined to  letters  and  passengers,  but  may  shortly  be  expected  to  include  the 
conveyance  of  jewels  and  other  less  bulky  merchandise. 

"In  regard  to  steam  navigation  between  England  and  India  by  the  Red  Sea, 
this  is  a  point  which  for  some  years  past  has  been  forcing  itself  upon  the  atten- 
tion of  [the]  Government  and  the  Court  of  directors  [of  the  East  India  Co.], 
and  has  now  commenced  to  be  carried  into  full  operation." — Part.  Papers, 
1840,  XXI,  Report  on  Egypt  and  Candia.  Appendix  A.,  p.  189. 

"Gentleman's  Magazine,  Sept.,  1838,  Series  3,  X,  p.  314,  See  also  The 
Monthly  Review,  March,  1837,  I,  p.  441. 

"On  Jan.  14,  1837,  the  Dona  Dowlut,  a  vessel  flying  the  British  flag,  was 
shipwrecked  near  Aden.  Her  cargo  was  plundered  and  her  crew  and  passengers 
were  maltreated  by  the  Bedouin.  A  year  later  the  Sultan  of  Aden  consented  to 
the  cession  of  the  coaling  station  demanded  as  reparation  by  the  British.  Cap- 
tain Haines,  with  an  English  force,  took  possession  of  the  place  in  Jan.,  1839. — 
Martens,  N.  R.,  XV,  pp.  222-250. 


387]  EVOLUTION  IN  NEAR  EASTERN  RELATIONS,  1834-1838  6 1 

observing,  it  is  the  best  adapted  port  in  existence  for  our  over-land 
communication  via  the  Red  Sea;  it  is  in  fact  perfect  as  such,  and, 
if  a  pier  were  built,  steamers  could  at  all  times  and  seasons  lay 
along  side  of  it  and  receive  their  coal."100 

In  the  very  same  year  Lord  Palmerston  manifested  his  interest 
in  the  developments  in  the  Near  East  by  directing  Sir  John  Bow- 
ring  to  make  an  extensive  study  of  "the  existing  state  and  future 
probable  situation  of  Egypt,"  Candia,  and  Syria.101  After  having 
spent  a  considerable  period  of  time  travelling  through  the  various 
parts  of  Mehemet  Ali's  dominion,  where  he  carefully  observed  the 
existing  conditions,  Bowring  returned  to  England  and,  in  1839, 
presented  to  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  a  series  of  three 
elaborate  reports — one  on  each  of  the  three  provinces  he  had 
been  directed  to  visit.  In  an  introductory  paragraph  of  his  most 
famous  report — that  on  Egypt — he  pointed  out:  "The  more  atten- 
tion is  directed  to  Egypt  and  Syria,  the  more  important  and  inter- 
esting will  their  position  appear;  for,  in  process  of  time,  there  can 
be  little  doubt  that  both  the  Red  Sea  and  the  Persian  Gulf  will 
become  the  high  roads  to  India,  .  .  ,"102  In  another  part  of  the 
document  he  stated :  "It  may  be  safely  predicted  that  much  of  the 
European  trade  which  now  circumnavigates  Africa,  will  in  process 
of  time,  take  the  more  direct  course  through  Egypt  and  the  Red 
Sea,  but  that  trade  will  be  of  gradual  growth,  and  its  development 
will  much  depend  on  the  facilities  which  are  given  to  transit.  As 
yet,  the  steam  communications  with  India,  have  not  led  to  any 
considerable  increase  of  commerce,  on  or  through  the  Red  Sea. 
It  is  certain,  however,  that  commerce  will  soon  follow  the  track  of 
travellers,  but  its  extent  will  be  greater  or  less  according  to  the 
regulations  of  the  Egyptian  Government.  The  more  costly  and 


1<x>Parl.  Papers,  1839,  XL,  Correspondence  relating  to  Aden,  p.  96.  Note  also, 
the  following  extract  from  a  "Minute  by  the  Governor  of  Bombay,  to  which  Mr. 
Parish  subscribed,"  March  26,  1838:  "Undoubtedly  the  advantage  of  occupying 
Aden  as  a  station  convenient  for  the  purposes  of  steam  navigation,  entered  largely 
into  the  views  of  the  Bombay  Government;. . ."  Ibid.,  p.  38. 

™llbid.,  1840,  XXI.  Bowring's  Reports  covered  a  great  variety  of  subjects. 
The  author  was  anxious  to  reveal  the  true  state  of  the  resources  of  the  terri- 
tories under  Mehemet  Ali's  rule.  See  D.  A.  Cameron,  Egypt  in  the  Nineteenth 
Century,  pp.  173-175. 

*°*Parl.  Papers,  184.0,  XXI,  Report  on  Egypt,  p.  4. 


62  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [388 

less  bulky  articles  will,  in  the  progress  of  time,  naturally  be  con- 
veyed by  the  most  direct  and  rapid  channel.  Already  articles  of 
jewelry,  precious  stones,  some  rich  shawls,  and  bullion  are  con- 
veyed from  and  to  India  by  the  English  steamers."103  Bowring 
did  not  fail  to  realize  the  importance  of  rinding  an  improved 
method  of  transit  across  the  Isthmus  of  Suez.  "Steam  navigation 
will  gradually  alter  the  character  of  our  intercourse  [with  India] ," 
he  remarked  significantly;  "the  shortest  and  the  cheapest  channel 
will  be  reverted  to;  the  difficulties  which  the  monsoon  presented 
to  sailing  vessels  in  the  Indian  Seas  will  certainly  be  mastered 
by  the  boundless  powers  of  steam  .  .  .  The  question  still  remains 
to  be  decided  whether  or  not  a  canal  is  practicable  from  the 
Mediterranean  to  the  Red  Sea  .  .  .  improved  as  are  the  arts  of 
labor  and  of  navigation,  and  increased  as  is  the  importance  of 
the  question  by  the  relative  positions  of  India  and  Europe,  it  is  to 
be  desired  that  serious  and  detailed  investigation  should  examine 
the  extent  of  the  impediments,  and  the  means,  if  means  there  be 
of  vanquishing  them."104 

Mehemet  Ali  must  have  perceived  that  the  Red  Sea  route  was 
destined  to  become  of  great  importance  in  the  future,  for  he 
exerted  himself  greatly  in  order  to  aid  those  who  were  endeavoring 

1<albid.,  p.  67.  By  1839,  it  was  clear  to  many  that  no  doubt  could  any  longer 
be  entertained  relative  to  the  merits  of  the  Red  Sea  steam  route  to  India.  The 
editor  of  the  Monthly  Review,  in  January  of  that  year,  in  commenting  upon  a 
pamphlet  entitled,  "Steam  to  India,  via  the  Red  Sea,  and  via  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope,"  declared:  'We  agree  fully  with  the  author,  and  wonder,  indeed,  that 
doubt  or  hesitation  can  any  longer  attach  to  the  matter.  To  us,  as  he  eloquently 
shows,  for  all  the  grand  interests  concerned,  the  route  via  the  Red  Sea  is  not 
only  by  far  the  most  advantageous  line,  but  in  fact  the  only  line  that  can  be 
called  a  'Comprehensive  Plan,'  which  is  the  title  of  that  which  he  so  warmly 
recommends." — Monthly  Review,  Jan.,  1839,  pp.  16-20. 

104The  value  of  a  canal  across  the  Isthmus  was  realized  by  others.  Note  the 
following  extract  from  a  letter  written  at  Cairo  on  Dec.  9,  1839:  "I  cannot  leave 
Egyptian  subjects  (says  Mr.  D'Abbadie,  in  a  letter  to  Capt.  Beaufort,  read  at 
the  last  meeting  of  the  Geog.  Society)  without  mentioning  the  map  of  Upper, 
and  particularly  of  Lower  Egypt,  made  by  M.  Linant,  who  having  been  em- 
ployed for  nearly  ten  years  as  head  engineer  in  the  Delta,  has  had  opportunities 
of  adding  many  details  to  the  topography  of  those  parts. . .  .Lower  Egypt  must, 
sooner,  or  later,  by  means  of  canals,  become  the  high  road  for  merchandise  be- 
tween Europe  and  India;  and  the  map  contains  many  notes  explaining  the  con- 
struction of  such  a  canal." — The  Athenaeum  Journal  of  Literature,  Science,  and 
the  Fine  Arts,  Jan.  18,  1840,  p.  53. 


389]  EVOLUTION  IN  NEAR  EASTERN  RELATIONS,  1834-1838  63 

to  develop  it.105  Some  Englishmen,  who  believed  that  the  Pasha 
was  willing  to  cooperate  with  England  in  furthering  her  Indian 
interests,  advocated  that  their  country,  like  France,  should  ally 
herself  with  him  instead  of  with  Turkey.106  However,  the  majority 
of  Englishmen  saw  in  the  extension  of  his  power  a  direct  threat 
against  their  interests  in  the  Orient.107  Lord  Palmerston,  who 
agreed  with  the  latter,  was  determined  to  prevent  the  ascendancy 
of  Mehemet  Ali.  Realizing  that  if  he  contributed  to  the  military 
and  naval  resources  of  the  Porte,  he  would  thereby  add  mater- 
ially to  the  accomplishment  of  his  object,  he  permitted  officers 
from  the  English  fleet  to  enter  the  service  of  the  Sultan108  and 
even  despatched,  under  British  pay,  General  Chrzanowski,  a  Pole, 
whom  he  considered  "  'just  the  sort  of  man  to  be  of  the  greatest 
use  to  Reshid  Pasha,' "  to  Asia  Minor  to  study  the  strategical 
situation  there.109  On  the  other  hand,  he  directed  Colonel  Camp- 
bell, the  British  Consul-General  at  Alexandria,  to  complain  to  the 
Viceroy  about  the  latter's  extensive  system  of  conscription,  his 
active  military  preparations,  and  his  concentration  of  troops  in 
Syria.  Campbell  was  also  instructed  to  warn  the  Pasha  "against 
the  evil  consequences"  which  would  result  to  himself,  if  he  recom- 
menced an  attack  upon  "any  part  of  the  Sultan's  forces."110 

1<xsNote  the  following:  "[The]  Pasha  is  fully  impressed  with  a  sense  of  the 
value  which  public  opinion  attaches  to  a  safe,  speedy,  and  convenient  intercourse 
with  our  Asiatic  dominions.  The  subject  has  been  one  of  frequent  discussion 
with  his  highness;  and  he  has  continually  shown  not  only  the  greatest  willing- 
ness to  lend  his  aid  and  protection  but  has  on  several  occasions,  made  extraordi- 
nary exertions  and  sacrifices  in  order  that  the  service  should  not  suffer. . .  .he  has 
frequently  overcome  difficulties  which,  without  him,  would  have  been  insuper- 
able;..  ." — Part.  Papers,  1840,  XXI,  Report  on  Egypt,  p.  72. 

iatMonthly  Review,  Nov.,  1837,  III,  p.  447.  See  a  statement,  which  Bowring 
made  at  a  later  date,  quoted  by  Hasenclever,  op.  cit.,  p.  4,  [footnote  17]. 

107Prokesch-Osten,  Mehmed-Ali,  p.  145.  Letters  signed  "Veritas,"  The  Times, 
Sept.  n,  Oct.  8,  Nov.  7,  Dec.  8,  1835. 

108The  most  famous  of  these  officers  was  Captain  Sir  Baldwin  Walker.  See, 
J.  Reid,  Turkey  and  the  Turks,  pp.  48-50,  52-53.  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  252. 

10*F.  0.  Turkey  271,  Palmerston  to  Ponsonby,'  March  7,  1836,  quoted  by 
Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  229. 

""Palmerston  to  Campbell,  Feb.  6,  1838,  State  Papers,  XXVI,  p.  694.  On 
March  29,  1838,  Palmerston  repeated  his  warning  in  the  following  terms:  "I  have 
to  instruct  you  [Campbell]  to  state  to  Mehemet  Ali  that  you  have  been  ordered 
by  your  Government  seriously  to  warn  him  of  the  consequences  to  himself,  which 
will  follow  any  attempt  on  his  part  to  extend  his  authority,  by  force  of  arms, 
in  any  direction."  Ibid.,  p.  695. 


64  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [390 

Later,  when  Palmerston  learned  that  Mehemet  AH  had  announced 
an  intention  of  throwing  off  his  allegiance  to  the  Sultan,111  he  took 
a  still  more  decided  stand  on  the  question.  "The  British  Govern- 
ment/' he  wrote  to  the  Consul-General  at  Alexandria,"  .  .  .  feels 
itself  bound,  in  return  for  the  frank  and  unreserved  Communica- 
tion which  it  has  received  from  the  Pasha,  to  declare  to  him,  in  a 
manner  equally  unreserved  and  explicit,  that  if  he  should  unfor- 
tunately proceed  to  execute  his  announced  intentions,  and  if  hos- 
tilities should  (as  they  indisputably  would)  breakout  thereupon  be- 
tween the  Sultan  and  the  Pasha,  the  Pasha  must  expect  to  find  Great 
Britain  taking  part  with  the  Sultan,  in  order  to  obtain  redress  for 
so  flagrant  a  wrong  done  to  the  Sultan,  and  for  the  purpose  of 
preventing  the  dismemberment  of  the  Turkish  Empire;  .  .  .  ,"112 
While  British  interests  in  the  Near  East  were  developing,  and 
while  Lord  Palmerston  was  taking  such  a  decided  stand  against 
the  pretensions  of  Mehemet  Ali,  the  ties  of  alliance  between  Eng- 
land and  France  were  tending  to  lose  their  hold.  It  has  been 
pointed  out  upon  a  former  occasion  that  even  as  early  as  1833, 
when  the  Cabinets  of  the  two  western  Powers  were  perfectly 
agreed  in  their  opposition  to  Russian  intervention  in  Turco-Egyp- 
tian  affairs,  evidence  existed  proving  that  they  were  not  in  accord 
upon  all  that  appertained  to  the  question  of  the  Near  East.  As 
time  progressed,  and  as  rival  interests  between  the  two  courts 
developed  elsewhere,  the  Anglo-French  estrangement  became 
more  serious  and  also  more  obvious.  While  Broglie  was  at  Louis 
Philippe's  foreign  office  he  was  particularly  careful  to  avoid  action 
which  might  incur  hostility  abroad.  However,  M.  Thiers,  who 
became  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  on  February  22,  1836,  inaug- 
urated a  more  aggressive  policy.113  Immediately  after  entering 
upon  his  official  duties  he  set  about  consolidating  French  influence 
in  northern  Africa.  With  the  aim  of  furthering  the  conquest  of 
Algiers  he  planned  to  despatch  an  expedition  against  the  Bey  of 
Constantine.  While  protesting  that  he  had  no  thought  of  extend- 
ing French  control  over  either  Tunis  or  Tripoli,  he  refused  to 

"'Campbell  to  Palmerston,  May  25,  1838,  ibid.,  pp.  695-697.  See  also, 
Raikes,  Journal,  III,  p.  289.  Raikes,  France  since  1830,  I,  p.  XXX. 

"'Palmerston  to  Campbell,  July  7,  1838,  State  Papers,  XXVI,  pp.  698-699. 
See  also,  Palmerston  to  Granville,  June  6,  1838,  Palmerston  to  Ponsonby,  June 
23,  1838,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  267,  269. 

113Lavisse  et  Rambaud,  op.  cit.,  X,  pp.  392-393. 


391  ]  EVOLUTION  IN  NEAR  EASTERN  RELATIONS,   1834-1838  65 

recognize  the  sovereignty  of  the  Sultan  over  those  territories  and, 
in  order  to  support  his  policy,  sent  a  fleet  under  Admiral  Hugon 
to  Tunis  to  oppose,  by  force  if  necessary,  the  entry  of  the  Ottoman 
squadron  into  the  bay.114  In  addition,  a  secret  negotiation  was 
initiated,  both  at  Constantinople  and  at  Cairo,  for  the  purpose 
of  establishing,  under  the  guarantee  of  the  French  government, 
the  relations  of  the  Sultan  and  the  Pasha  of  Egypt  upon  a  more 
secure  foundation.118  With  the  hope  of  eliminating  the  isolation 
of  France  on  the  continent,  he  engaged  in  an  attempt  to  secure 
a  marriage  alliance  between  the  Houses  of  Orleans  and  Habs- 
burg.  Louis  Philippe  was  strongly  in  favor  of  such  an  arrange- 
ment but  the  prejudices  of  the  Emperor  of  Austria,  his  family, 
and  his  court  against  a  government  born  of  the  Revolution  of 
1830,  proved  too  strong  a  handicap  to  permit  the  project  to 
succeed.116 

Naturally,  the  aggressive  policies  adopted  by  Thiers  aroused 
apprehensions  in  Great  Britain.    The  time  was  particularly  aus- 

U4Hall,  op.  cit.,  pp.  225-226.  Letter  from  Constantinople,  Dec.  I,  1836,  pub- 
lished in  the  Augsburg  Gazette  and  copied  in  The  Times,  Dec.  30,  1836. 

"This  negotiation  was  without  important  results.  See  Hall,  op.  cit.,  pp. 
226-227. 

"The  proposed  marriage  alliance  was  to  be  between  the  Duke  of  Orleans 
and  the  Archduchess  Maria  Theresa.  See,  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  pp.  143-144.  Met- 
ternich  to  Apponyi,  July  30,  1836,  Metternich,  op.  cit.,  VI,  pp.  155  ff.  Louis 
Philippe  had  been  anxious  for  some  time  to  draw  closer  to  the  Eastern  Powers. 
Austria  and  Prussia  were  inclined  to  favor  his  advances.  Note  the  following 
extract  from  a  message  sent  by  the  Prussian  King,  Frederick  William  III,  to 
Rauch,  his  military  attache  at  St.  Petersburg:  "Ludwig  Philipp  hat  zum 
Oefteren  die  Neigung  gezeigt  sich  den  Continentalmachten  zu  nahern  und  in 
ihrem  Sinne  zu  handeln.  So  lange  indessen  der  Kaiser  seine  Antipathien  gegen 
ihn  nicht  zu  iiberwinden  im  Stande  ist  und  sich  hieriiber  unverhohlen,  ganz 
offen,  ausspricht,  so  lange  wird  auch  auf  Ludwig  Philipp  wenig  zu  rechnen  sein 
und  er  allerdings  andere  Alliirte  suchen  miissen.  Wollte  der  Kaiser  aber  an 
seiner  vorgesassten  Meinung  in  etwas  nachlassen,  so  ware  es  auch  ein  grosser 
Gewinn  fur  die  conservative  Partei." — Ranch's  Report,  July  23,  1837,  quoted  by 
H.  von  Treitschke,  Deutsche  Geschichte  im  ntunzehnten  Jahrhundert,  V,  p.  62. 
See  also,  Blanc,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  29,  33,  35  ff.  Haussonville,  Histoire  de  la  politiquf 
exterieure  du  gouvernement  \ranqais,  1830-1848,  pp.  63,  81-85.  Even  as  early  as 
September.  1835,  Barton,  the  American  representative  at  Paris,  was  able  to 
write:  ''This  Govt.  by  the  late  laws  against  the  press,  appear  to  have  sealed 
their  peace  with  the  three  northern  Powers,  and  it  is  probable  that  they  are 
gradually  detaching  themselves  from  the  English  Alliance." — State  Dept.  France, 
XXVII,  Barton  to  Forsyth,  No.  17,  Sept.  7,  1835. 


66  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [392 

picious  for  such  apprehensions  to  develop,  for  in  March,  1836,  a 
serious  disagreement  upon  the  question  of  a  joint  intervention  in 
Spain  in  favor  of  the  young  Queen  Isabella,  whose  right  to  the 
throne  was  being  challenged  by  her  uncle,  Don  Carlos,  had 
occurred  between  the  Cabinets  of  the  two  western  Powers.117  The 
situation  was  not  improved  in  September,  1836,  when  Thiers  re- 
signed his  duties,  and  the  direction  of  foreign  affairs  at  Paris  was 
taken  over  by  Count  Mole.  Mole  entered  office  on  September 
6,  and  just  two  weeks  later  Palmerston  wrote  to  his  friend, 
Lord  Granville :  "  'France  is  putting  herself  in  a  false  position,  and 
at  no  distant  time  she  will  find  her  mistake.  We  have  performed 
the  duty  of  friendship  in  warning  her;  the  fault  will  be  hers  if  the 
warning  is  in  vain.'  "118  Again,  in  a  letter  written  on  January  27, 
1837,  he  stated:  "  'Our  speech  [to  be  delivered  by  the  King  on  the 
opening  of  Parliament]  will  be  moderate  and  short.  On  foreign 
affairs  we  shall  say  little,  and  especially  not  one  word  about 
France  or  [the]  French  alliance.  We  can  say  nothing  in  their 
praise,  and  therefore  silence  is  the  most  complimentary  thing  we 
can  bestow  upon  them.'  "119 

At  Constantinople,  the  growing  coolness  between  England  and 
F  nance  was  marked  by  an  augmentation  of  the  influence  of  the 
former  and  by  a  corresponding  decline  in  the  influence  of  the 
latter.  It  will  be  remembered  that  Lord  Ponsonby  and  the  Porte 
were  in  perfect  accord  upon  the  question  of  opposition  to  the 

UIFaucher  to  Reeve,  March  26,  1836,  L.  Faucher,  Biographie  et  correspond- 
ence, I,  pp.  45-46.  Blanc,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  34-35,  Raikes,  France  since  1380,  I, 
pp.  XVIII-XX.  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  247. 

^Palmerston  to  Granville,  Sept.  20,  1836,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  241.  Note 
also  the  following,  Palmerston  to  Granville,  Jan.  2,  1837:  "'I  do  not  like  the 
French  speech  [delivered  upon  the  opening  of  the  legislative  chambers]  at 
all  ...  In  short,  the  speech  is  a  thorough  Mole  speech;  and  all  I  can  say  is, 
I  wish  him  a  speedy  and  safe  deliverance  from  the  cares  of  office,  for  it  is 
evident  that  the  reports  we  heard  of  his  anti-English  feeling  were  by  no  means 
exaggerated,  .  .  .  ' " — Ibid.,  pp.  242-243.  Bulwer  did  not  agree  with  Palmer- 
ston. See  a  footnote  in  ibid.,  p.  243. 

^Palmerston  to  Granville,  Jan.  27,  1837,  ibid.,  p.  243.  The  omission  of  a 
reference  to  France  in  the  King's  speech  attracted  attention.  Note  the  follow- 
ing extract  from  the  diary  of  the  Earl  of  Malmesbury:  "February  5th  [1837]. — 
French  very  indignant  at  no  mention  of  them  in  King's  speech.  Their  govern- 
ment paper  calls  the  omission  an  insult.  No  doubt  the  Ministers  are  angry 
with  Louis  Philippe  because  he  will  not  go  the  length  they  do  about  Spain." — 
Earl  of  Malmesbury  Memoirs  of  an  Ex-Minister,  I,  pp.  72-73. 


393]  EVOLUTION  IN  NEAR  EASTERN  RELATIONS,  1834-1838  6j 

developing  power  of  Mehemet  AH.  At  the  same  time  Admiral 
Roussin  was  inclined  to  be  friendly  in  his  attitude  towards  the 
Viceroy  and  even  proposed  under  the  excuse  of  "  'saving  the 
dignity  of  the  Sultan,'  "  the  idea  of  holding  out  "  'to  the  Pasha  the 
prospect  of  obtaining  for  his  son  the  reversion  of  his  Syrian 
possessions,  in  return  for  the  abandonment  of  the  other  territories 
which  he  occupied.'  "12°  When,  in  1836,  the  Sultan  entertained  the 
idea  of  renewing  the  struggle  with  his  hated  vassal  it  was  to  Eng- 
land that  he  looked  for  assistance.  Although  his  appeal  for  aid 
was  rejected,  it  is  not  probable  that  he  failed  to  perceive  that  the 
hesitation  of  Palmerston  was  prompted  from  fear  that  the  Forte's 
"Military  resources  would  be  unequal  to  the  contest,  rather  than 
from  any  desire  to  see  the  status  quo  in  Syria  maintained."121 
Also,  it  was  apparent  at  the  Turkish  capital  that  the  British  gov- 
ernment viewed  with  suspicion  the  aggressive  policy  which  France 
was  following  in  her  relations  with  Algiers  and  Tunis.122  That  fact 
was  of  particular  importance  in  improving  the  influence  of  Pon- 
sonby  with  the  Porte,  for  the  Sultan  was  alarmed  by  the  French 
encroachments  against  his  vassals  in  northern  Africa.128 

In  1838,  the  developing  cordiality  in  Anglo-Turkish  relations 
culminated  in  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  of  commerce  and  naviga- 
tion which  replaced  the  ancient  capitulations.  One  provision  in 
Article  II  of  this  treaty  was  of  real  significance.  It  read  as  fol- 
lows: "...  the  Sublime  Porte  formally  engages  to  abolish  all 
monopolies  of  agricultural  produce,  or  of  any  other  articles  what- 
soever, as  well  as  all  Permits  from  the  local  Governors,  either  for 
the  purchase  of  any  article,  or  for  its  removal  from  one  place  to 
another  when  purchased;  and  any  attempt  to  compel  the  subjects 
of  Her  Britannic  Majesty  to  receive  such  Permits  from  the  local 


"°F.  O.  France  562,  Granville  to  Palmerston,  June  25,  1838,  quoted  by 
Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  228. 

M1F.  0.  Turkey  271,  274,  Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  April  8;  Palmerston  to 
Ponsonby,  May  7,  1836,  cited  by  ibid.,  p.  228. 

""Letters  from  Constantinople,  Aug.  17,  Dec.  I,  1836,  The  Times,  Sept.  9, 
Dec.  30,  1836. 

"'Note  the  following  extract  of  a  letter  from  Constantinople,  Sept.  14,  1836: 
"Admiral  Roussin  went  yesterday  to  take  leave  of  the  Sultan.  His  reception  was 
remarkably  cool  and  formal.  The  Sultan,  as  well  may  be  supposed,  being  highly 
incensed  against  the  French  Government  in  consequence  of  its  late  unprincipled 
proceedings  at  Tunis." — The  Times,  Oct.  7,  1836. 


68  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [394 

Governors,  shall  be  considered  as  an  infraction  of  Treaties,  and 
the  Sublime  Porte  shall  immediately  punish  with  severity  any 
Viziers  and  other  Officers  who  shall  have  been  guilty  of  such  mis- 
conduct, .  .  .  ,"124  It  is  obvious  that  this  article  was  directed 
primarily  against  His  Highness  the  Viceroy  of  Egypt.  Henry 
Bulwer,  who  actively  aided  Ponsonby  in  bringing  the  negotiations 
to  a  successful  conclusion,  later  commented  that  "in  the  destruc- 
tion of  monopolies  the  astute  and  determined  old  Sultan  saw — as 
Lord  Ponsonby  had  expected  him  to  see — the  means  of  bringing 
Europe  and  his  rebellious  vassal  into  differences"  and  hence  the 
"order  was  given  to  settle  and  sign  without  an  hour's  delay."125 
When  Palmerston  learned  of  the  arrangement  he  wrote  enthusias- 
tically to  Bulwer:  "'A  thousand  thanks ...  above  all  for  your 
treaty,  which  as  far  as  I  can  judge  is  a  capo  d'opera,  and  will  be 
ratified  without  reserve;. . .  We  certainly  shall  not  reject  it  from 
any  concurrence  in  the  French  apprehension  that  it  will  be  bad 
for  Mehemet  Ali,  and  drive  him  to  declare  himself  independent 
in  order  to  escape  from  its  obligations.'  "126 

Count  Mole,  like  Palmerston,  professed  anxiety  to  prevent  a 
fresh  outbreak  of  hostilities  in  the  Near  East,  and  he  even  joined 
with  the  latter  in  warning  the  Egyptian  Pasha  not  to  permit  his 
forces  to  attack  those  of  the  Grand  Seignior.127  In  the  Chamber 
of  Deputies  the  French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  emphatically 
proclaimed  his  adherence  to  the  alliance  with  England.128  Never- 
theless, it  was  obvious  that  the  sympathies  of  the  people  of  France 


treaty  was  signed  at  Balta-Liman,  near  Constantinople,  Aug.  16, 
1838.  See,  State  Papers,  XXVI,  pp.  688-692.  Martens,  N.  R.,  XV,  pp.  695-701. 
Noradounghian,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  249-253.  At  first  the  French  were  alarmed  lest 
Mehemet  Ali  would  not  accept  the  arrangement.  See,  Journal  des  Debats,  Sept. 
17,  1838.  The  Times,  Oct.  I,  Nov.  26,  Dec.  27,  1838.  However,  when  the  Pasha 
announced  that  he  would  not  object  to  its  provisions  the  government  of  France 
signed  a  similar  arrangement  with  the  Porte,  Nov.  26,  1838.  See  Noradounghian, 
op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  256-260. 

U5Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  263. 

""Palmerston  to  Bulwer,  Sept.  13,  1838,  ibid.,  pp.  284-285. 

"'Mole  to  Louis  Philippe,  July  15,  1838,  Taschereau,  Revue  retrospective, 
ou  archives  secretes  du  dernier  gouvernement,  1830-1848,  p.  100.  The  Times, 
Aug.  8,  1838.  Revue  des  deux  Mondes,  Aug.  15,  1838,  XXXI,  p.  561. 

^Archives  Part.,  CXXIII,  pp.  416-417. 


395J  EVOLUTION  IN  NEAR  EASTERN  RELATIONS,  1834-1838  69 

were  overwhelmingly  in  favor  of  the  cause  of  Mehemet  Ali.129 
Frenchmen  pointed  with  pride  at  the  extensive  improvements 
which  had  been  wrought  in  Egypt,  for  they  realized  that  the 
success  of  those  improvements  was  due  largely  to  the  activities  of 
the  corps  of  their  countrymen  who  were  in  the  Viceroy's 
employ.130  "For  our  part,"  the  Journal  des  Debats  declared  on 
September  17,  1838,  "we  believe  that  the  interest  of  France  in 
the  Mediterranean  is  equally  to  applaud  and  assist  the  power  at 
Alexandria  as  that  of  Constantinople."131  The  National,  an  organ 
of  the  radical  "left"  was  willing  to  take  a  more  decided  stand. 
"Mehemet  Ali,"  it  stated,  "has  detached  at  least  two  magnificent 
provinces  from  the  tottering  monarchy  of  the  Osmanlis132. . . 
Egypt  and  Syria,  in  which  the  Viceroy  and  Ibrahim  may  be  said 
to  have  merely  a  life  interest,  will  be  exposed  to  all  the  perils  of 
anarchy  after  the  death  of  those  two  powerful  personages,  who 
will  have  no  political  descendants.  But  will  France  allow  this 
newly  created  empire  to  be  consumed  in  intestine  warfare,  or 
again  to  fall  under  the  dominion  of  the  Porte,  or,  in  other  terms 
under  the  yoke  of  the  Autocrat  [of  Russia]  ?  The  neighborhood 
of  Toulon,  the  possession  of  Corsica  and  Algiers,  give  to  France, 
with  regard  to  Alexandria  and  Cairo,  advantages  nearly  equal  to 

""At  that  time  French  writers  openly  advocated  that  the  independence  of 
Mehemet  Ali  should  be  recognized  by  the  Powers.  See,  L.  P.  D.  D'Aubignosc, 
La  Turquif  nouvelle,  II,  pp.  446-447.  F.  Mengin,  Histoire  sommaire  de  I'Egyptf 
sous  le  gouvernement  de  Mohammed  Aly,  pp.  511-524.  At  the  same  time,  French 
agents  exerted  themselves  to  increase  the  influence  of  their  country  with  the 
peoples  of  Syria.  These  activities  on  the  part  of  Frenchmen  occasioned  increased 
apprehensions  in  Great  Britain.  See  E.  H.  Michelsen,  The  Ottoman  Empire  and 
its  Resources,  pp.  14-15. 

""Note  the  following:  "L'Egypte  est  la  fille  adoptive  de  la  France;  de  son 
sein  sont  sortis  les  elements  precieux  qui  ont  servi  a  clever  1'edifice  qu'elle  pre- 
sent au  monde  civilise." — Mengin,  op.  cit.,  p.  512.  "La  France  est  regardee,  en 
Orient,  comme  la  protectrice  naturelle  de  Mehemet-Ali;  elle  n'est  point  6trangere 
a  sa  grandeur;  elle  1'a  constamment  soutenu." — Revue  des  deux  Mondes,  Oct.  I, 
1838,  XXII,  p.  141. 

™fournal  des  Debats,  Sept.  17,   1838. 

132Lord  Palmerston  entertained  views  diametrically  opposed  to  those  of  the 
National.  He  believed  that  the  Ottoman  Empire  would  not  fall  unless  some 
"  'Kind  neighbours' "  should  forcibly  tear  it  to  pieces.  See,  Palmerston  to 
Bulwer,  Sept.  22,  1838,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  286-287. 


7O  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [396 

those  which  Russia  possesses  with  respect  to  Constantinople. 
France,  therefore,  ought  to  watch  over  Egypt  and  the  neighboring 
regions  as  over  a  succession  which  Providence  and  the  wishes  of 
mankind  may  one  day  adjudge  to  her  civilizing  genius."133 

Lord  Palmerston  realized  that  such  sentiments  were  entertained 
by  the  French.  He  undoubtedly  believed  as  one  of  his  trusted 
diplomats  did  that  there  was  "a  policy  dating  far  back  in  the 
traditions  of  the  French  Foreign  Office,  which  would  assign  to 
France  the  possession  or  patronage  over  Egypt."134  That  policy 
was  natural  for  France  when  France  was  the  enemy  of  England, 
but  it  was  a  policy  impossible  for  her  if  there  was  to  be  a  sincere 
alliance  between  the  two  countries.  ".  .  .  the  mistress  of  India," 
Palmerston's  diplomat  declared,  "cannot  permit  France  to  be 
mistress  directly  or  indirectly  of  the  road  to  her  Indian  do- 
minions."135 It  is  certain  that  before  the  end  of  the  year  1838, 
the  British  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  had  determined  that  he 
would  act  immediately,  regardless  of  what  the  attitude  of  France 
might  be  if  Mehemet  AH  should  again  venture  to  attack  the 
Porte.  "  'My  opinion  is,'  "  he  wrote  to  Granville  on  June  5,  1838, 
"  'and  has  long  been  made  up;  it  is  that  we  ought  to  support  the 
Sultan  heartily  and  vigorously;  with  France  if  France  will  act  with 
us;  without  her  if  she  should  decline.'"136  Thus,  as  England's 
interest  in  the  Orient  increased,  her  anxiety  to  defend  her  posi- 
tion in  that  part  of  the  world  was  augmented  greatly.  It  was 


""Extract  copied  from  the  National,  in  The  Times,  July  6,  1838. 

"'Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  292.  See  also  Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  Aug.  28,  1838, 
ibid.,  p.  283.  Palmerston  and  Bulwer  were  not  the  only  Englishmen  who 
were  suspicious  of  the  French.  See,  "Observations"  by  Lieut.-Col.  Smith  in 
Marmont,  op.  cit.,  p.  305.  Blackwood's  Edinburgh  Magazine,  1839,  XLVI,  pp. 
100-115.  The  Times,  Sept.  12,  1837,  Sept.  13,  1838.  Note  the  following  ex- 
tract from  a  pamphlet  published  in  1836  and  entitled  A  jew  Remarks  on  Our 
Foreign  Policy:  "Our  most  natural  allies  are  the  Germans,  and  our  most  natural 
enemies,  or  to  use  a  less  odious  word,  our  natural  rivals,  the  French  and  Rus- 
sians." The  author  even  questioned  whether  a  war  with  France  would  not 
have  been  better  for  Great  Britain  than  the  "quasi-alliance"  which  had  existed 
"for  the  last  five  years." — Monthly  Review,  Sept.,  1836,  III,  pp.  132-133.  See 
ibid.,  July,  1836,  II,  p.  444. 

"'Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  293. 

""Palmerston  to  Granville,  June  5,  1838,  ibid.,  p.  266. 


39?]  EVOLUTION  IN  NEAR  EASTERN  RELATIONS,  1834-1838  7! 

obvious,  even  at  the  time,  that  she  would  not  again  passively 
permit  a  rival  Power  to  extend  its  influence  there  as  Russia  had 
in  1833.  The  Tsar  Nicholas  must  have  realized  this  fact,  for  in 
a  conversation  with  Barante,  which  the  latter  reported  to  Mole 
on  February  13,  1839,  he  declared:  "Egypt!  the  English  wish  it. 
They  have  need  of  it  for  the  new  communication  which  they  wish 
to  open  with  the  Indies.  They  have  established  themselves  in 
the  Persian  Gulf  and  in  the  Red  Sea.  Vous  vous  brouillerez  avec 
eux  pour  I'Egypte."137 

Anglo-Russian  relations  had  improved  while  Durham  was 
British  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg.  Nevertheless,  the  British 
were  still  determined  that  the  Russians,  as  well  as  Mehemet  Ali 
— the  ally  of  the  French — should  not  increase  their  power  in  the 
Near  East.  On  June  8,  1838,  Palmerston  wrote  to  the  Queen's 
representative  at  Paris :  "  'What  7  should  like,  and  what  I  should 
think  I  could  get  the  Cabinet  to  agree  to,  would  be  a  short  con- 
vention between  England  and  France  on  the  one  hand,  and 
Turkey  on  the  other,  by  which  the  two  former  should  bind  them- 
selves for  a  limited  time  to  afford  to  the  latter  naval  assistance, 
in  the  event  of  his  demanding  it  to  protect  his  territory  against 
attack;  and  the  wording  might  be  so  framed  as  to  include  the 
case  either  of  Russia  or  of  Mehemet  Ali. . . . 

"Now,  all  this  I  write  to  you  on  the  supposition  that  France  is 
honest  and  can  be  trusted. .  .you  will  use  your  judgment  as  to  the 
degree  to  which  you  will  confidentially  sound  Mole  on  this  matter. 
It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  one  great  danger  to  Europe  is  the 
possibility  of  a  combination  between  France  and  Russia,™*  which, 
though  prevented  at  present  by  the  personal  feelings  of  the 
Emperor,  may  not  always  be  as  impossible  as  it  is  now;  and  it 
would  be  well  to  fix  the  policy  of  France  in  the  right  track 
with  respect  to  affairs  of  the  Levant  while  we  have  the  power 


137Barante  to  Mole,  Feb.  13,  1839,  Barante,  op.  tit.,  VI,  p.  184.  The 
attempts  of  the  English  to  establish  a  line  of  communication  through  Egypt  to 
India  were  carefully  watched  by  the  French.  See  Revue  des  deux  Mondes,  Jan. 
15,  1838,  XXIX,  p.  236-248.  D'Aubignosc,  op.  tit.,  II,  p.  XXXVI.  Mengin,  op. 
tit.,  p.  IX.  Letter  from  Alexandria,  June  6,  1838.  The  Examiner,  July  I,  1838. 

138The  "Legitimists"  in  France  favored  such  an  alliance.  See  an  editorial 
in  The  Times,  Jan.  16,  1836. 


72  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [398 

to  do  so.'  "339  Undoubtedly  Palmerston  had  in  mind  the  danger  of 
an  attempted  division  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  on  the  part  of  the 
Tsar  and  Louis  Philippe,  the  former  taking  Constantinople  and 
the  latter  Alexandria. 

In  the  very  same  year  the  situation  of  affairs  came  near  being 
complicated  by  a  threatened  renewal  of  strained  relations  be- 
tween England  and  Russia.140  The  British,  for  a  considerable 
period  of  time,  had  been  suspicious  of  the  advances  made  by  the 
Muscovites  in  the  direction  of  Persia  and  India.  Indeed,  agents 
of  the  government  of  St.  Petersburg  were  engaged  actively  in 
intrigues  against  British  interests  at  Teheran,  in  Afghanistan,  and 
even  in  India.1*1  One  of  the  most  prominent  of  those  agents,  as 
the  English  government  well  knew,  was  Count  Simonitch,  the 
Russian  Envoy  to  the  Court  of  the  Shah  of  Persia.  Palmerston 
was  alarmed  by  his  activities,  and  in  October,  1838,  after  Simon- 
itch  had  influenced  the  Shah  to  lead  an  attack  against  Herat,  drew 
up  a  long  protest  which  was  forwarded  promptly  to  the  Russian 
capital  where  it  was  presented  to  Nesselrode  by  Lord  Clanricarde, 
the  new  British  Ambassador  to  Russia.142  Anxious  to  preserve 
friendly  relations  with  Great  Britain,  the  Tsar's  Chancellor  im- 
mediately directed  his  master's  Ambassador  at  London  to  offer  to 

139Palmerston  to  Granville,  June  8,  1838,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  268-269. 
See  also,  Palmerston  to  Granville,  July  6,  1838,  ibid.,  pp.  270-272.  Count  Mole 
was  unwilling  to  agree  to  Palmerston's  proposals.  See  Mole  to  Louis  Philippe, 
July  15,  1838,  Taschereau,  op.  cit.,  p.  100.  Henry  Wheaton,  the  American  rep- 
resentative at  Berlin,  reported  that  Palmerston  likewise  proposed  in  1838  to 
Russia  to  draw  up  a  concerted  agreement  between  all  the  Powers  for  the  protec- 
tion of  Turkey.  See  No.  12,  Appendix  D. 

140L.  C.  Sanders,  Lord  Melbourne's  Papers,  p.  452.  See  also,  Melbourne  to 
Russell,  Sept.  26,  1838;  Palmerston  to  Melbourne,  Sept.  9,  1838,  ibid.,  pp.  452- 
453.  Reeve  to  his  mother,  Dec.  3,  1839,  J.  K.  Laughton,  Memoirs  of  the  Life 
and  Correspondence  of  Henry  Reeve,  I,  pp.  105-106. 

'"Martens,  N.  R.,  XV,  pp.  678-679.  Pad.  Papers,  1839,  XL,  Correspondence 
relating  to  Afghanistan,  and  Correspondence  relating  to  Persia  and  Afghanistan. 
H.  Rawlinson,  England  and  Russia  in  the  East,  pp.  139  ff.  The  year  1838  wit- 
nessed a  fresh  outbreak  of  anti-Russian  declarations  in  the  British  press.  See, 
Monthly  Review,  Dec.,  1838,  III,  p.  607.  Gentleman's  Magazine,  Dec.  1838, 
Series  3,  X,  pp.  652-653.  The  Times,  Sept.  24,  Nov.  15,  19,  Dec.  17,  20,  27, 
1838.  The  Examiner,  Nov.  4,  1838,  pp.  691-692,  694. 

14*Parl.  Papers,  1839,  XL,  Correspondence  relating  to  Persia  and  Afghanis- 
tan, pp.  176-180. 


399]  EVOLUTION  IN  NEAR  EASTERN  RELATIONS,   1834-1838  73 

Palmertson  a  conciliatory  reply.143  The  latter  must  have  been 
entirely  satisfied  with  this  reply,  for  on  December  20,  1838,  he 
declared  to  Count  Pozzo  di  Borgo:  "The  despatch  from  Count 
Nesselrode  which  your  Excellency  has  communicated  to  me  con- 
tains. .  .assurances  the  most  full  and  complete;  and  Her  Majesty's 
Government  accept  as  entirely  satisfactory,  the  declarations  of 
the  Imperial  cabinet,  that  it  does  not  harbour  any  designs  hostile 
to  the  interests  of  Great  Britain  in  India; . .  .and  that  in  the  future 
the  Russian  agents  in  Persia  will  unite  themselves  with  those  of 
Great  Britain  in  earnestly  dissuading  the  Shah  from  engaging 
again  in  any  expedition  similar  to  that  which  he  has  lately  under- 
taken against  Herat.  .  .  .  The  two  cabinets  being  thus  entirely 
agreed  as  to  the  future,  it  appears  to  Her  Majesty's  Government 
that  no  good  could  result  from  any  controversial  discussion  as  to 
the  past."144  Hence,  by  the  opening  of  the  year  1839,  the  danger 
of  an  immediate  break  between  England  and  Russia  because  of 
their  rival  interests  in  the  Orient  had  again  been  dispelled  and 
cordial  relations  had  been  restored.  To  be  sure  the  Court  of 
St.  James  was  awake  to  the  importance  of  its  Near  Eastern  in- 
terests and  it  was  not  reconciled  to  the  idea  of  permitting  Russia 
or,  in  fact,  any  Power  to  attempt  aggressions  against  either 


14*Nesselrode  to  Pozzo  di  Borgo,  Oct.  20,  Nov.  i,  1838,  ibid.,  pp.  181-186. 
See  also,  Clanricarde  to  Palmerston,  Nov.  20,  1838,  ibid.,  p.  194. 

144Palmerston  to  Pozzo  di  Borgo,  Dec.  20,  1838,  ibid.,  pp.  192-193.  See  also, 
Nesselrode  to  Pozzo  di  Borgo,  Jan.  29,  Feb.  21,  March  5,  1839;  Palmerston  to 
Pozzo  di  Borgo,  April  4,  1839,  ibid.,  pp.  195-200,  204-205.  Melbourne  to 
Russell,  Nov.  14,  1838,  Sanders,  Melbourne's  Papers,  p.  455.  The  British  gov- 
ernment's fear  of  Russia,  it  should  also  be  noted,  tended  to  decrease  in  1838 
because  of  an  improvement  in  Anglo-Austrian  relations.  The  Emperor  Francis 
II  had  died  on  March  2,  1835,  and  his  successor,  Ferdinand  I,  was  less  inclined 
to  maintain  a  close  alliance  with  his  sovereign  brothers — Nicholas  I  and  Fred- 
erick William  III.  See  a  letter  from  Constantinople,  Nov.  n,  1835,  The  Times, 
Dec.  10,  1835.  A  commercial  treaty  which  was  concluded  between  England  and 
Austria,  July  3,  1838,  was  hailed  as  marking  the  triumph  of  British  influence 
over  that  of  Russia  at  the  court  of  the  Emperor  Ferdinand.  See,  The  Exam- 
iner, Oct.  21,  1838,  p.  660.  The  Times,  Oct.  29,  1838,  Jan.  4,  1839.  Letter  from 
Constantinople,  Nov.  7,  1838,  ibid.,  Nov.  28,  1838.  For  copies  of  the  said  treaty 
see,  State  Papers,  XXVI,  pp.  677-686.  Martens,  N.  R.,  XV,  pp.  626-639. 


74  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,  1832-184!  [400 

Turkey  or  the  countries  bordering  on  India.1*5  Nevertheless,  real 
significance  lay  in  the  fact  that  the  British  government's  appre- 
hensions, in  regard  to  the  policies  which  the  Tsar  was  expected  to 
adopt  in  the  near  future,  were  to  a  considerable  extent  allayed. 
At  the  same  time,  it  was  evident  that  the  rival  interests  which 
had  developed  between  England  and  France  in  northern  Africa, 
Spain,  and  the  Orient  would  make  an  agreement  between  those 
two  states  especially  difficult  to  maintain  if  the  Turco-Egyptian 
conflict  were  ever  to  be  renewed.  In  the  year  1833,  the  Cabinets 
of  the  western  Powers,  alarmed  by  the  Turkish  policy  of  the 
Emperor  Nicholas,  had  united  in  opposition  to  Russia.  At  the 
beginning  of  the  year  1839,  the  possibility  of  such  an  alignment 
was  not  entirely  removed  but  it  was,  to  say  the  least,  very  im- 
probable. 


"'Perhaps  it  should  be  mentioned  in  this  same  connection  that  there  was  a 
tendency  for  Austrian  interest  in  the  Near  East  to  increase  because  of  the  develop- 
ment of  steam  navigation  on  the  Danube.  A  leaflet  entitled  "Information  on  the 
Trade  of  the  Danube"  by  Charles  Cunningham  found  in  State  Dept.  Consular 
Letters,  Constantinople,  Vol.  II,  reveals  the  importance  of  the  trade  on  the  latter 
in  1837  and  1838.  In  1837,  1,300  vessels  entered  the  Danube  from  the  Black  Sea 
and  1,242  departed  from  the  river.  In  1838,  968  vessels  were  loaded  at  Galatz 
and  Ibraila  alone.  This  was  an  increase  of  89  over  the  preceding  year.  The 
imports  up  the  Danube  into  Galatz  were  valued  at  £86,674  f°r  1837  and 
£136,998  for  1838.  Vail,  the  American  representative  at  London,  after  calling 
attention  to  Austria's  improvement  of  the  Danube  and  mentioning  that  this 
brought  her  into  contact  with  Russia  at  the  mouth  of  the  river,  declared:  "Thus 
industry,  that  great  civilizer  of  nations  and  never  ending  source  of  universal 
prosperity,  is  now  operating  a  change  in  the  politics  of  those  two  nations;" — 
State  Dept.  England,  XLIII,  Vail  to  Forsyth,  No.  214,  Nov.  28,  1835. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  QUESTION  OF  CONSTANTINOPLE   VERSUS  THE 
QUESTION  OF  ALEXANDRIA 

When  Mehemet  AH,  in  the  spring  of  1838,  announced  his  inten- 
tion to  declare  himself  independent,  the  Sultan  refrained  from 
taking  immediate  action  against  him.  Nevertheless,  Mahmoud 
was  so  exasperated  by  the  attitude  which  his  hated  vassal  as- 
sumed that  he  at  once  surrendered  himself  completely  to  the  views 
of  the  Turkish  war-party  and  set  about  placing  his  army  and 
navy  in  a  condition  which  would  warrant  a  more  aggressive 
policy.1  He  sent  men,  guns,  horses,  and  supplies  of  all  kinds  to 
the  forces  of  Hafiz  Pasha  in  Asia  Minor;  he  imported  powder,  to 
the  amount  of  five  schooner  loads,  from  London;  and  he  pushed 
forward  the  activities  in  the  Ottoman  navy  yards  "with  all  possible 
speed."2  When  winter  came  on,  although  it  was  contrary  to  the 
established  Turkish  practice,  he  retained  his  sailors  and  his 
marines  in  active  service.2  In  January  of  1839,  he  called  together 
a  great  council  of  all  his  chief  ministers  and  pashas  to  discuss  the 
question  of  peace  or  war,  he  ordered  a  new  levy  of  80,000  men 
to  be  made,  and  he  directed  a  subordinate,  the  Riala  Bey,  to  pro- 
ceed to  Alexandria  in  order  to  secure  for  his  master  reliable  infor- 
mation relative  to  the  military  and  naval  preparations  which  were 
being  carried  on  by  the  Egyptians.3  Moreover,  late  in  the  year 
1838,  with  the  aim  of  securing  foreign  aid  to  further  the  ac- 
complishment of  his  plans,  he  sent  Reschid  Pasha  upon  a  special 

*At  that  time  the  Turks  who  were  about  the  Seraglio  were  divided  into  two 
parties.  One,  wishing  for  peace  at  all  hazards,  urged  the  Sultan  to  rely  upon 
the  protection  of  Russia.  The  other,  imbued  with  a  bolder  and  more  patriotic 
spirit,  preached  incessantly  a  combination  to  destroy  Mehemet  Ali.  See  Bulwer, 
op.  cit.,  II,  p.  256.  Hafiz  Pasha  and  his  officers  in  the  army  were  particularly 
anxious  to  measure  their  swords  with  the  Egyptians.  See  Ponsonby  to  Palmers- 
ton,  Jan.  27,  Feb.  8,  March  19,  1839,  Pad.  Papers,  1841,  XXIX,  Correspondence 
relative  to  the  Levant,  I,  pp.  2,  3,  8. 

*John  Reid,  Turkey  and  the  Turks,  pp.  47-48.  See  also,  Hall,  op.  cit.,  pp. 
237-238.  State  Dept.  Turkey,  VIII,  Brown  to  Porter,  July  15,  Aug.  I,  1838. 

*Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  Jan.  27,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  p.  2. 
Paton,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  127. 

[75] 


76  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,  1832-184!  [402 

mission  to  England.4  In  fact,  according  to  one  observer,  it  ap- 
peared as  though  he  neglected  nothing  that  was  called  for  by  the 
critical  situation  in  which  he  was  placed.5  Although  some,  like  the 
noted  von  Moltke  who  was  then  in  the  Ottoman  service,  must  have 
realized  that  many  of  Mahmoud's  preparations  were  more  ap- 
parent than  real,  Europeans  perceived  more  and  more  clearly, 
as  time  advanced,  that  he  was  set  on  adopting  a  bellicose  policy.6 
"The  lazy  Turk,"  a  contemporary  wrote,  "seemed  determined  for 
once  to  shake  off  his  habitual  sloth;  and  the  best  informed  Franks 
at  Constantinople  began  to  speculate  on  what  would  be  the  result 
of  the  evident  determination  on  the  part  of  the  Porte  to  settle  its 
difficulties  by  an  appeal  to  arms."7 

Early  in  the  fall  of  1838,  Lord  Palmerston  suggested  to  Achmed 
Fethi  Pasha,  the  Ottoman  representative  at  London,  that  "  'the 
Sultan  ought  to  employ  himself  in  organizing  his  army  and  navy, 
and  in  improving  his  revenue,' "  in  order  that  he  "  'should  thus 
make  himself  strong  enough  to  be  able  to  beat  Mehemet  Ali  by 
his  own  means.'  "8  It  is  obvious,  though,  that  the  British  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs  believed  the  time  had  not  yet  come  when 


4Hall,  op.  cit.,  pp.  239-240.  The  Porte,  it  seems,  was  particularly  anxious 
to  win  the  cooperation  of  Great  Britain.  See  a  letter  from  Constantinople,  Sept. 
12,  1838,  The  Times,  Oct.  4,  1838. 

5See  a  letter  from  Constantinople,  Sept.  4,  1838,  published  in  the  Allgem- 
eine  Zeitung  and  copied  in  The  Times,  Oct.  I,  1838. 

'See  the  account  of  Turkish  preparations  for  war  as  given  in  letters  written 
by  von  Moltke  between  July,  1838,  and  June,  1839,  published  in  H.  von  Moltke, 
Briefe  uber  Zustande  und  Begebenheiten  in  der  Tiirkei  aus  den  Jahren  1835  bis 
1839,  pp.  286  ff. 

7John  Reid,  op.  cit.,  p.  47.  Note  also  the  following  extract  from  a  letter 
from  Constantinople,  Oct.  3,  1838:  ".  .  .  unless  the  European  Powers  insist  on 
the  disarmament  of  both  parties  [Turkey  and  Egypt],  all  their  efforts  for  the 
preservation  of  peace  in  the  East  are  likely  to  prove  but  of  temporary  avail." — 
The  Times,  Oct.  25,  1838.  Evidently  Commodore  Porter,  the  American,  had  a 
higher  regard  for  Turkish  character  than  Mr.  Reid.  In  1836  he  wrote:  "A 
Turk  will  prevaricate  sometimes  if  necessary,  and  is  skilful  as  a  diplomatist  and 
negotiator,  in  which  characters  he  endeavors  to  gain  every  advantage,  is  always 
covetous,  and  perhaps  sometimes  may  be  corrupted,  but  in  general  no  one 
respects  truth  more  than  he  does,  or  holds  it  more  sacred  or  inviokte;  .  .  . 

"Perhaps  no  people  in  any  part  of  the  world  are  generally  so  regardless  of 
truth  as  the  Franks,  and  Rayahs  of  the  Levant." — State  Dept.  Turkey,  VIII, 
Porter  to  Forsyth,  No.  376,  Feb.  5,  1836. 

"Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  Sept.  13,  1838,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  281. 


403  ]      THE  QUESTION  OF  CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  OF  ALEXANDRIA  JJ 

Mahmoud  unaided  could  with  a  reasonable  chance  of  success  try 
conclusions  with  the  Viceroy.  "  'I  strongly  urged  upon  him 
[Achmet  Fethi  Pasha],'"  he  wrote  on  September  13,  1838,  to 
Lord  Ponsonby,  "  'How  expedient  it  is  for  the  Sultan  to  abstain 
from  attacking  Mehemet  AH,  because  Mehemet's  army  is  now 
probably  better  than,  or  at  least  as  good  as  that  of  the  sultan.'  "8 
At  the  same  time  Palmerston  was  unwilling,  probably  because  of 
the  danger  of  incurring  the  hostility  of  Russia  and  France,  to  prom- 
ise that  the  British  government  would  join  the  Grand  Seignior  in 
an  attack  upon  the  Pasha.  Consequently,  when  Reschid  Pasha  ar- 
rived in  London  he  found  that  it  was  impossible  to  persuade 
Palmerston  to  enter  into  any  arrangement  other  than  one  which 
would  provide  for  a  strict  maintenance  of  the  status  quo.9  Such  an 
arrangement,  however,  was  not  the  kind  that  the  Porte  desired, 
and  when  the  terms  which  the  British  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
was  willing  to  accept  became  known  at  Constantinople,  Nouri 
Effendi,  the  Ottoman  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  even  went  so 
far  as  to  declare  to  Lord  Ponsonby  "that  no  Treaty  would  be  of 
any  use  to  the  interests  of  the  Porte,  which  had  not  for  its  object 
the  destruction  of  Mehemet  Ali.  .  .  ."10  The  Ottoman  government, 
he  let  the  Ambassador  understand,  was  resolved  not  to  bind  itself 
in  any  way  so  as  to  prevent  it  from  taking  advantage  of  some 
future  opportunity  to  destroy  its  hated  vassal.11 

When  the  governments  of  the  great  Powers  perceived  that  there 
was  danger  of  war  being  waged  between  the  Porte  and  the 
Viceroy,  they  all  manifested  concern.  The  Russian  government 
as  on  former  occasions,  was  particularly  anxious  it  seems  to  pre- 
vent an  outbreak  of  hostilities  in  the  East.12  The  Tsar  and  his 
ministers  must  have  feared  that  if,  in  conformity  with  the  terms 


*See  a  copy  of  the  terms  of  the  treaty  which  was  drawn  up  at  London, 
Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp.  13-15. 

10Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  April  22,    1839,  ibid.,  p.   13. 

"Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  April  6,  1839,  ibid.,  p.  n.  See  also,  Rechid  to 
Palmerston,  April  26,  1839;  Palmerston  to  Rechid,  May  6,  1839,  ibid.,  pp.  9-11. 

"See,  Barante  to  Mole,  Oct.  25,  1838,  Barante,  op.  cit.,  VI,  pp.  143-144. 
Note  the  following  extract  from  a  despatch,  Clanricarde  to  Palmerston,  April  I, 
1839:  "My  colleagues  here  are  firmly  convinced  that  it  is  the  sincere  and  earnest 
desire  of  the  Emperor  that  Turkey  should  remain  in  perfect  tranquility:  and  I 
see  no  reason  to  differ  from  them  in  that  opinion." — Levant  Correspondence,  I, 
pp.  8-9. 


78  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [404 

of  the  Treaty  of  Unkiar  Skelessi,  they  should  again  send  troops  to 
the  Turkish  capital,  a  break  would  result  between  Russia  and  the 
two  western  Powers.  At  any  rate  M.  Boutenieff  was  instructed  to 
warn  the  Porte  that  the  assistance  to  the  Turkish  government 
provided  for  in  the  Treaty  of  Unkiar  Skelessi  could  not  be  claimed 
if  the  Turks  were  the  aggressors  in  a  war  with  the  Egyptians,13 
and  Count  Medem,the  Russian  Consul-General  at  Alexandria,  was 
directed  to  urge  the  Pasha  not  only  to  withdraw  his  forces  from 
the  advanced  positions  they  had  occupied  in  Syria  but  also  to 
promise  that  he  would  remain  on  the  defensive,  satisfied  with 
merely  repulsing  the  enemy,  in  case  they  were  attacked.14  Met- 
ternich,  who  likewise  was  very  anxious  to  preserve  peace,  believed 
that  the  united  remonstrances  of  all  the  great  Powers  was  neces- 
sary in  order  to  put  a  stop  to  the  "warlike  ebullitions"  in  the 
Levant.  In  March,  1839,  he  urged  Mr.  Milbanke,  the  British 
charge  d'affaires  at  Vienna,  to  call  the  "earnest  attention"  of  Her 
Britannic  Majesty's  government  to  the  matter,  and  he  let  it  be 
known  that  he  was  about  to  send  a  messenger  to  Constantinople 
with  instructions  to  Baron  Stiirmer,  the  Austrian  Internuncio  in 
Turkey,  to  state  to  the  Sultan  that  if  Mehemet  Ali  attacked  him 
he  might  count  on  the  assistance  of  the  Powers  to  aid  in  repelling 
such  attack,  but  if  the  Turkish  army  should  be  the  aggressor  he 


"Granville  to  Palmerston,  April  8,  1839,  Ibid.,  p.  5. 

"Nesselrode  to  Medem,  March  29,  1839;  Bouteneff  to  Medem,  April  12/24, 
1839;  Campbell  to  Palmerston,  May  7,  1839;  Clanricarde  to  Palmerston,  May 
14,  1839,  ibid.,  pp.  59-61,  63-64,  18-19,  16.  The  situation  of  affairs  in  Russia, 
it  seems,  was  such  that  the  Tsar  could  not  afford  to  risk  his  country's  being 
involved  in  a  European  war.  See  Guichen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  95,  191-194.  Henry 
Wheaton,  the  American  representative  at  Berlin,  wrote  on  January  9,  1839:  "It 
is  supposed  by  the  best  informed  persons  here  that  the  checks  which  the  invad- 
ing policy  of  Russia  has  recently  encountered  at  Constantinople,  in  Circassia, 
and  on  the  frontiers  of  India,  together  with  the  seeds  of  dis-content  which  are 
thickly  sown  throughout  the  vast  Empire,  have  contributed  to  multiply  the 
embarrassments  which  its  ruler  constantly  encounters  in  the  restless  ambition, 
corruption,  and  faithlessness  of  the  nobles,  who  regard  him  and  his  family  as 
strangers  to  their  nation.  .  .  .  His  recent  tour  in  this  country  has  only  con- 
tributed to  swell  the  contempt  and  hatred  previously  felt  for  the  Russian  name 
and  race,  notwithstanding  the  showers  of  gold,  decorations,  and  other  baubles 
which  he  scattered  in  his  path." — State  Dept.  Prussia,  I,  Wheaton  to  Forsyth, 
No.  93,  Jan.  9,  1839.  "Confidential." 


405]      THE  QUESTION  OF  CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  OF  ALEXANDRIA  79 

must  not  be  surprised  if  the  Powers  should  leave  him  to  his  fate.15 
Lord  Palmerston,  who  on  that  occasion  was  quite  willing  to  co- 
operate with  the  Austrian  Chancellor,  sent  similar  instructions  to 
Lord  Ponsonby.16  Baron  Werther,  the  Prussian  Chief  Minister, 
and  Count  Mole,  the  French  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs,  also 
exerted  themselves  to  prevent  hostilities  from  breaking  out  be- 
tween the  Viceroy  and  the  Sultan.17 

Although  the  Powers  were  thus  united  in  their  efforts  to  main- 
tain peace  in  the  Orient,  their  representatives  were  unable  to  per- 
suade the  Sultan  to  abandon  his  determination  to  declare  war.18 

When  it  became  apparent  that  their  remonstrances  were  to 
prove  of  no  avail  the  Cabinets  of  the  five  great  nations  awoke  to 
the  fact  that  they  must  agree  upon  some  common  course  of 
action,  or  the  peace  of  Europe  even  would  be  in  serious  danger. 
The  securing  of  such  an  agreement,  however,  in  1839  as  on  many 
other  occasions,  involved  great  difficulty.  At  that  time  the  Powers 
were  confronted  in  the  Near  East  by  two  fundamental  questions 
which,  in  the  Parliamentary  language  of  the  day,  may  be  termed 
the  "Question  of  Constantinople"  and  the  "Question  of  Alex- 
andria."19 In  connection  with  the  former — but  not  the  latter — 
of  these  questions  the  interests  of  England  and  France  were  iden- 
tical and  they  were  obviously  in  opposition  to  those  of  Russia. 
The  Russian  government,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  promised  by 
the  treaty  of  alliance  with  Turkey,  signed  on  July  8,  1833,  to 
afford  to  the  Porte  the  "most  efficacious  assistance"  in  case  its 
"tranquillity  and  safety"  were  again  endangered.  Hence,  when  it 
became  apparent  that  that  "tranquillity  and  safety"  was  being  en- 

"Milbanke  to  Palmerston,  March  28,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp. 
4-5.  See  also,  Beauvale  to  Palmerston,  May  8,  1839,  ibid.,  p.  15. 

"Palmerston  to  Ponsonby,  March  15,  April  12,  1839,  ibid.,  pp.  4,  5-6. 

"Russell  to  Palmerston,  June  5,  1839;  Granville  to  Palmerston,  Feb.  15, 
1839;  Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  April  6,  1839,  ibid.,  pp.  30,  I,  n. 

"Inclosure  in  Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  May  I,  1839,  ibid.,  pp.  21-22. 

MM.  d'Haussonville,  referring  to  the  two  questions  at  issue  in  1839,  pointed 
out  that  "le  premier  [question],  commun  avec  toutes  les  nations  de  1'Europe, 
la  Russie  exceptee,  c'etait  la  duree  de  1'empire  ottoman  et  son  independence  absolue; 
le  second,  qui  nous  etait  particulier,  c'etait  la  consolidation,  aux  meilleures  condi- 
tions possibles,  de  1'etablissement  egyptien.  Cela  s'appelait,  dans  le  langage 
parlementaire  du  temps,  la  question  de  Constantinople  et  la  question  d'Alex- 
andrie." — Haussonville,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  148. 


8O  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [406 

dangered  the  Cabinets  of  the  Western  Powers  were  alarmed  lest 
Russian  troops  and  Russian  war  vessels  should  repeat  the  inter- 
vention in  Turkish  affairs  which  they  had  effected  with  success 
six  years  earlier. 

It  is  true  that  in  the  period  between  1833  and  1839,  Anglo- 
Russian  relations  had  improved  greatly.  Nevertheless  Lord  Palm- 
erston  was  as  determined  as  ever  in  the  latter  part  of  that 
period  that  the  Treaty  of  Unkiar  Skelessi  should  not  result  in  a 
second  Russian  armed  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  Turkey.20 
"  'The  Cabinet  yesterday  agreed/  "  he  wrote,  on  June  8,  1838,  to 
Lord  Granville,  "  'that  it  would  not  do  to  let  Mehemet  Ali  declare 
himself  independent,  and  separate  Egypt  and  Syria  from  the 
Turkish  empire.  They  see  that  the  consequence  of  such  a  declara- 
tion on  his  part  must  be  either  immediately  or  at  no  distant  time 
conflict  between  him  and  the  Sultan  [sic.].  That  in  such  conflict 
the  Turkish  troops  would  probably  be  defeated;  that  then  the 
Russians  would  fly  to  the  aid  of  the  Sultan,  and  a  Russian  garrison 
would  occupy  Constantinople  and  the  Dardanelles;  and  once  in 
possession  of  those  points,  the  Russians  would  never  quit 
them.'  "21  France,  also,  was  determined  that  Russia  should  not 
profit  at  the  expense  of  the  Porte.22  Moreover,  in  1839  there  was 
considerable  evidence  which  indicated  that  Austria  was  inclined 
to  unite  with  and  that  Prussia  was,  at  least,  not  ready  to  oppose 
England  and  France  in  their  determination  to  prevent  Russian 
aggression  against  Turkey.23  It  was  obvious,  in  fact,  that  if  Russia 

MOn  Sept.  13,  1838,  Palmerston  declared,  in  a  letter  written  to  Ponsonby, 
that  "  'it  would  be  most  important  for  the  interests  and  independence  of  the 
Porte  to  get  rid  of  that  treaty  [of  Unkiar  Skelessi];'" — Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp. 
281-282. 

"Palmerston  to  Granville,  June  8,  1838,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  267.  See 
also,  Barante  to  Mole,  Dec.  17,  1838,  Barante,  op.  cit.,  VI,  pp.  159-163. 

"Note  the  following:  "...  the  government  of  France  and  England,  in  par- 
ticular, were  apprehensive,  lest  the  eventual  discomfiture  of  the  Turkish  army, 
an  event  by  no  means  improbable,  should  be  followed  by  the  arrival  of  a 
Russian  force  in  the  Bosphorus,  in  accordance  with  the  stipulations  of  the 
treaty  signed  ...  at  Unkiar  Skelessi." — Annual  Register,  1839,  p.  [408]. 

*"See  Goriainow,  op.  cit.,  pp.  53,  60-61;  Thureau-Dangin,  op.  cit.,  IV,  pp. 
12,  21-22.  Russia  and  Austria  had  rival  interests  in  the  control  of  trade  upon 
the  Danube  river.  See  letters  from  Constantinople,  Feb.  16,  March  21,  1839, 
The  Times,  March  18,  April  15,  1839.  Note  also  the  following:  "Austria  pre- 
served a  sort  of  neutrality  [in  the  East,  according  to  the  correspondence  re- 


407]      THE  QUESTION  OF  CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  OF  ALEXANDRIA  8 1 

should  attempt  to  repeat  the  policy  which  she  had  followed  in 
1833  in  her  relations  with  Turkey  she  would  be  in  great  danger 
of  encountering  a  strong  and  determined  coalition  which  would 
be  formed  to  oppose  her. 

At  the  same  time,  it  was  also  apparent  that  if  Russia  should 
refrain  from  adopting  an  aggressive  policy  in  regard  to  Turkey, 
and  if  the  attention  of  the  European  Powers  should  be  directed 
to  the  question  of  limiting  the  power  of  Mehemet  Ali — in  other 
words,  if  the  so-called  "Question  of  Alexandria"  should  become  the 
most  important  subject  of  European  diplomatic  relations — an  en- 
tirely different  alignment  of  Powers  would  result.  Under  such 
circumstances  England,  Russia,  Prussia,  and  Austria,  united  by 
similar  interests,  would  probably  be  able  to  agree  upon  a  common 
course  of  action,  and  France,  the  friend  and  self-appointed  protec- 
tor of  the  Viceroy,  would  be  the  Power  which  would  be  in  danger 
of  finding  itself  isolated.24  Consequently  it  was  to  the  interest  of 
France  to  emphasize  the  danger  of -Russian  intervention  at  Con- 
stantinople and  to  minimize  the  danger  which  would  result  from 
the  aggrandizement  of  the  power  of  Mehemet  Ali.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  was  to  the  interest  of  Russia  to  play  up  the  importance 
of  the  danger  which  would  result  from  the  latter  and  to  exert 
herself  in  order  to  allay  the  fears  which  other  European  courts 
entertained  relative  to  the  former. 

Count  Mole  must  have  experienced  very  little  difficulty  in  seeing 
the  true  significance  of  the  situation,  for  at  a  very  early  date  he 
brought  the  matter  to  the  attention  of  Lord  Granville.  He  ad- 
mitted that  there  were  "shades  of  difference"  between  the  inter- 
ests of  England  and  France  in  regard  to  Eastern  affairs,  and  in 
order  to  prevent  serious  consequences  resulting  therefrom  he 
urged  that  the  two  Powers  should  come  to  an  understanding  for 
concerted  action.  Their  object,  he  pointed  out,  ought  to  be  to 
gain  time  and  thus  stave  off  a  crisis  in  the  Levant.  The  best  way 

ported  in  the  Toulonnais  on  May  8,  1839],  determined,  however,  on  opposing  the 
new  encroachments  on  the  Ottoman  Empire  contemplated  by  Russia." — Ibid., 
May  14,  1839.  Guichen  accuses  the  Prussians  of  being  very  subservient  to 
Russian  policy.  See  Guichen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  37-39. 

"The  four  Powers  named  above,  it  will  be  remembered,  were  all  unwilling 
to  permit  the  Viceroy  of  Egypt  to  increase  his  strength  at  the  expense  of  the 
Porte.  See  Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  April  23,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I, 
p.  15. 


82  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [408 

to  attain  that  object,  according  to  his  opinion,  was  "to  indulge" 
the  Pasha  in  the  expectation  that  England  and  France  would 
employ  their  "good  offices"  at  Constantinople  to  secure  the  succes- 
sion of  his  son  to  the  government  of  Egypt  on  the  same  conditions 
under  which  he  held  it  himself.25 

Marshal  Soult,  who  on  May  12,  1839,  succeeded  Mole  as  Secre- 
tary of  Foreign  Affairs,  was  also  anxious  that  England  and  France 
should  agree  upon  united  action  in  the  Near  East.  Unlike  Mole, 
however,  he  and  his  colleagues  in  the  Cabinet  were  unwilling  to 
admit  openly  that  there  was  a  real  difference  between  the  interests 
of  the  two  Powers.  Lord  Granville,  after  a  conversation  with  M. 
Duchatel,  the  new  Minister  of  the  Interior,  and  General  Schneider, 
the  new  Minister  of  War,  reported  in  a  despatch  written  to  Lord 
Palmerston  on  May  24,  1839,  that  both  of  those  statesmen,  im- 
pressed by  the  seriousness  of  the  danger  with  which  the  Eastern 
situation  threatened  the  peace  of  Europe,  had  expressed  anxious 
desires  for  a  cordial  concert  between  England  and  France.  "I  may 
therefore,  I  think,"  he  wrote  in  conclusion,  "give  your  Lordship 
reason  to  expect  that  whatever  may  be  suggested  by  Her  Majes- 
ty's Government  as  most  expedient  to  be  done  in  the  present 
alarming  state  of  affairs  in  the  East,  will  be  most  favourably  at- 
tended to  by  the  French  Government."26 

In  the  meantime,  the  Porte  was  continuing  actively  its  prepara- 
tions for  war.  The  Turkish  Ministers,  in  answer  to  the  inquiries 
made  repeatedly  by  the  European  diplomats,  gave  assurances  that 
the  Sultan's  troops  would  not  attack  the  Egyptians,  but  the  war- 
like activities  at  Constantinople  and  elsewhere  in  the  empire  be- 
spoke differently.27  It  is  significant,  it  should  be  noted  in  this 
connection,  that  the  Grand  Seignior  complained  bitterly  to  Lord 
Ponsonby  against  the  pretentions  of  Mehemet  Ali.  He  even  de- 

"Granville  to  Palmerston,  Feb.  1"$,  1839,  ibid.,  pp.  1-2.  Count  Mole,  while 
speaking  of  the  variation  in  the  interests  of  the  two  nations,  alluded  to  Egypt's 
affording  a  means  of  communication  and  transit  between  Europe  and  the 
British  Empire  in  India,  "which  was  an  object  of  far  greater  importance  to 
England  than  to  France."  Granville  professed  that  he  did  not  see  why  this 
should  tend  to  a  divergence  in  the  measures  to  be  adopted  for  averting  a 
collision  between  Mehemet  Ali  and  the  Sultan. — Ibid. 

"Granville  to  Palmerston,  May  24,   1839,  ibid.,  pp.   19-20. 

"Granville  to  Palmerston,  May  27,  1839,  ibid.,  pp.  20-21.  Letters  from 
Constantinople,  March  27,  1839,  commented  on  in  The  Times,  April  18,  1839. 


409]      THE  QUESTION  OF  CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  OF  ALEXANDRIA  83 

manded  that  the  Pasha  should  restore  Adana,  Damascus,  Aleppo, 
Seyda,  Jerusalem,  and  Naplous,  and  that  he  should  reduce  his 
forces  to  a  figure  which  would  be  compatible  with  his  condition 
as  a  subject.28  Furthermore,  he  sent  orders  to  his  forces  in  Asia 
Minor  to  move  forward,  thus  demonstrating  that  he  was  deter- 
mined to  follow  up  his  threats  and  his  preparations  by  aggressive 
belligerent  measures.29 

On  April  21,  1839,  the  army  under  command  of  Hafiz  Pasha 
effected  a  crossing  of  the  Euphrates  river  near  the  village  of  Bir,30 
but  Mehemet  Ali,  who  was  probably  influenced  by  the  remon- 
strances against  war  which  were  made  at  Alexandria  by  the  rep- 
resentatives of  the  great  Powers,  was  too  cautious  to  permit 
Ibrahim  Pasha  to  accept  immediately  the  Ottoman  challenge  and 
attempt  to  expel  the  invaders.31  He  even  promised  in  a  despatch 
which  the  Consuls-General  received  on  May  16,  1839,  that  in  case 
the  Sultan's  forces  which  had  just  crossed  the  Euphrates  should 
retire  to  the  other  side  of  the  river,  he  would  order  his  own  troops 
to  execute  a  retrograde  movement  and  he  would  recall  his  son 
Ibrahim  to  Damascus.  If  that  pacific  demonstration  should  be 
followed  by  a  "retrograde  movement  on  the  part  of  the  army  of 
Hafiz  Pasha,  beyond  Malatia,  his  highness  would  enjoin  the  gen- 
eralissimo to  return  to  Egypt."  In  addition,  the  Viceroy  suggested 
"that  if  the  four  Powers  [England,  France,  Austria,  and  Russia] 
consented  to  guarantee  the  continuance  of  peace,  and  interest 
themselves  in  securing  the  hereditary  reversion  of  the  government 
[of  his  possessions]  to  his  family,  he  would  withdraw  a  portion  of 
his  troops  from  Syria  and  be  ready  to  conclude  a  definitive  ar- 
rangement conducive  to  the  wants  of  the  country,  and  calculated 


^See  Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  May  I,  1839,  and  an  "Inclosure"  published 
with  it.  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp.  21-23. 

Thureau-Dangin,  op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  14.  See  also  Ponsonby  to  Palmerston, 
April  6,  1839;  Campbell  to  Palmerston,  May  4,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I, 
pp.  n,  16.  Extracts  from  a  despatch,  Roussin  to  Soult,  May  16,  1839,  quoted 
by  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV.,  p.  332.  Annual  Register,  1839,  p.  [409]. 

30Thureau-Dangin,  op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  14.    Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  331. 

"For  comment  on  the  remonstrances  of  the  Consuls-General  and  the  result- 
ing attitude  of  Mehemet  Ali,  see  a  report  which  was  prepared  by  Count  Medem, 
May  3/15,  1839,  quoted  by  Schiemann,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  pp.  507-511.  See  also  a 
letter  from  Alexandria,  April  7,  1839,  The  Times,  April  30,  1839.  Annual  Register, 
1839,  p.  [409]. 


84  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [410 

to  guarantee  its  security."32  It  was  only  after  a  body  of  Turkish 
cavalry  had  sacked  a  number  of  villages  in  the  district  of  Anteb 
and  after  they  had  occupied  the  town  of  Ouront  that  the  Pasha 
finally  directed  his  army  to  adopt  measures  of  an  aggressive  char- 
acter. In  answer  to  letters  written  in  June,  1839,  informing  him 
about  the  above  mentioned  outrages,  he  ordered  Ibrahim  Pasha 
to  despatch  an  officer  to  Hafiz  Pasha  to  demand  from  him  an  ex- 
planation of  his  conduct,  and  during  the  interval  while  he  waited 
for  a  reply,  to  send  forward  a  sufficient  number  of  troops  to  pro- 
tect the  province  and  the  garrison  of  Anteb  against  a  coup  de 
main.  If  the  Turks  should  persist  in  their  aggressions  and  march 
against  the  latter,  the  garrison  should  retreat  towards  the  main 
army,  which  should  advance  at  the  same  time  "a  la  recontre  [sic] 
de  I'armee  turque."  Thus  it  should  be  made  certain  that  the  battle 
would  be  fought  on  Egyptian  territory  and  that  the  Turks  would 
appear  to  be  the  aggressors.33 

When  Marshal  Soult  learned  that  the  Turkish  forces  had 
crossed  the  Euphrates  he  became  alarmed  and  determined  at  once 
to  make  a  final  effort  to  persuade  Mahmoud  and  Mehemet  to 
refrain  from  actual  hostilities.  With  that  in  view,  late  in  May, 
1839,  he  sent  two  officers  from  his  own  staff,  M.  Caille  and  M. 
Foltz,  upon  special  missions  to  Alexandria  and  Constantinople.84 
Furthermore,  in  order  to  be  sure  that  the  French  diplomatic  rep- 
resentatives in  the  Near  East  would  lend  their  hearty  cooperation 
he  forwarded  instructions  outlining  his  views  to  both  Admiral 
Roussin  and  M.  Cochelet.  According  to  a  report  written  by 
Lord  Ponsonby  on  June  16,  he  ordered  the  former  "to  apply  in 
the  strongest  manner"  to  the  Sublime  Porte  to  prevent  hostilities 

"Martens,  N.  S.,  Ill,  p.  872.  The  Times,  June  27,  1839.  Annual  Register, 
1839,  p.  [409].  See  also  a  despatch  from  the  French  Consul-General  in  Egypt, 
May  15,  1839;  and  a  declaration  "made  by  Mehemet  AH  to  Colonel  Campbell," 
[no  date  given],  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp.  53-54,  65. 

"Mehemet  AH  to  Ibrahim,  June  1839,  Martens,  N.  S.,  Ill,  pp.  874-875. 
See  also,  Granville  to  Palmerston,  June  24,  1839;  and  a  Minute  of  interview 
between  the  four  Consuls-General  and  Mehemet  AH,  Levant  Correspondence,  I, 
PP-  95-96,  109-110.  Thureau-Dangin  quotes  the  following  extract  from  a  des- 
patch which  he  maintains  Mehemet  AH  sent  to  Ibrahim:  " 'Au  regu  de  la 
presente  depeche,  vous  attaquerez  les  troupes  ennemies  qui  sont  entrees  sur 
notre  territoire,  et,  apres  les  en  avoir  chassees,  vous  marcherez  sur  leur  grande 
armee,  a  laquelle  vous  livrerez  bataille.  Si,  par  1'aide  de  Dieu,  la  victoire  se  declare 
pour  nous,  vous  passerez  le  defile  de  Kulek — Boghaz,  et  vous  vous  porterez  sur 
Malathia,  Kharpout,  Orfa  et  Diar  bekir.' " — Thureau-Dangin,  op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  52. 

"Granville  to  Palmerston,  May  31,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  p.  24. 


41 1  ]      THE  QUESTION  OF  CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  OF  ALEXANDRIA  85 

and  "to  put  an  instant  end"  to  them  if  they  had  begun.  He  also 
directed  Roussin  to  communicate  with  the  British  Ambassador  at 
the  Turkish  capital  with  the  aim  of  inducing  him  to  take  a 
similar  stand.  This,  however,  Ponsonby  refused  to  do,  his  excuse 
being  that  he  had  no  instructions  to  that  effect.36  Nevertheless, 
Roussin,  unwilling  to  be  discouraged  by  the  attitude  of  his 
British  colleague,  did  not  hesitate  to  comply  with  the  wishes  of 
his  superior.  He  informed  the  Porte  immediately  that  it  must, 
without  delay,  recall  the  army  of  Hafiz  Pasha  from  the  Egyptian 
side  of  the  Euphrates  or  it  would  be  considered  to  be  the  aggres- 
sor.35 M.  Cochelet,  whose  despatch  from  Soult  was  similar  in 
language  to  the  one  which  the  Marshal  sent  to  the  French  Am- 
bassador at  Constantinople,  made  equally  energetic  representa- 
tions to  the  Viceroy.36 

While  Roussin  and  Cochelet  were  endeavoring  thus  to  persuade 
the  rivals  in  the  Orient  to  refrain  from  hostile  measures,  Lord 
Ponsonby  was  actually  encouraging  the  Porte  to  come  to  con- 
clusions with  its  hated  vassal.  It  was  of  course  necessary  for  him 
in  his  official  communications  to  the  Ottoman  ministers  to  follow 
the  directions  of  Lord  Palmerston  and  insist  on  a  maintenance  of 
the  status  quo,  but  in  his  unofficial  transactions  he  assumed  an 
attitude  of  an  entirely  different  character.  Indeed,  the  way  in 
which  he  acted  at  Constantinople  soon  became  so  notorious  that 
Marshal  Soult  complained  to  Palmerston  about  the  matter,37  and 

35Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  June  16,  1839,  ibid.,  p.  152. 

""Campbell  to  Palmerston,  June  16,  1839,  ibid.,  pp.  145-146.  See  also, 
Guichen  op.  cit.,  pp.  47-48. 

STSoult  to  Bourqueney,  July  6,  1839,"  Bourqueney  to  Soult,  July  9,  1839, 
quoted  by  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  pp.  333-335.  In  June,  1839,  Roussin  had  written  to 
Soult:  " 'Votre  Excellence  a  du  voir,  depuis  longtemps,  dans  ma  correspon dance, 
que  j'ai  perdu  toute  confiance  dans  mon  collegue  anglais  et  dans  les  vues  de  son 
gouvernement.  J'ai  ici  des  motifs  immediats  qui  justifient  mes  soupgons,  et 
1'offre  que  lord  Ponsonby  a  faite,  a  notre  insu,  d'employer  les  troupes  de  1'Inde 
pour  empecher  1'invasion  du  territoire  de  Bassorah  par  les  troupes  egyptiennes.' " 
See  Roussin  to  Soult,  June  14  and  16,  1839,  quoted  by  Guichen,  op.  cit.,  p.  61. 
See  also,  Barante  to  Mole,  Jan.  31,  1839,  Barante,  op.  cit.,  VI,  p.  172.  In  July, 
1839,  Palmerston  admitted  to  Bourqueney:  " '  .  .  .  je  ne  saurais  vous  nier  que 
1'opinion  personnelle  de  lord  Ponsonby,  opinion  que  je  ne  partage  pas,  a  toujours 
etc  opposee  au  maintein  du  statu  quo  de  Kutaieh;  il  preferait  meme  les 
partis  extremes  comme  susceptibles  au  moins  d'un  denoument  favorable;  mais 
je  suis  fonde  a  croire  que,  dans  les  rapports  officiels  a  Constantinople,  I'ambassa- 
deur  a  fait  passer  ses  opinions  personnelles  apres  ses  instructions.' " — Bourqueney 
to  Soult,  July  9,  1839,  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  505. 


86  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [412 

M.  Metternich  even  claimed  that  Ponsonby  was  responsible  for 
the  warlike  stand  which  the  Sultan  had  taken.38  On  May  20, 
1839,  Ponsonby  himself  wrote  to  Palmerston  that  "no  one  of  the 
Great  Powers  would  have  continued  in  a  pacific  attitude  so  long 
as  the  Sultan  did,  had  any  one  of  them  been  exposed  to  even  a 
small  part  of  the  danger  and  the  provocations  he  had  to  bear 
with,"39  and  two  days  later  he  admitted  openly  in  a  similar 
despatch  that  after  Nouri  Effendi  had  informed  him  of  the  Porte's 
determination  to  attack  the  Viceroy  he  had  said  in  answer  that  it 
only  remained  for  him  to  hope  that  the  Porte  had  taken  the  "best 
measures  to  secure  success."40 

The  French  representatives  in  Turkey,  handicapped  by  the 
effect  which  Lord  Ponsonby's  attitude  had  upon  the  Porte  and 
by  the  hatred  which  Mahmoud  bore  against  Mehemet,  failed  to 
secure,  immediately  at  least,  the  results  for  which  they  strove.41 
The  Ottoman  authorities  became  "excessively  angry"  when 
Roussin  demanded  that  they  should  withdraw  their  troops  from 
Syria42  and  they  promptly  refused  to  grant  an  order  for  the  sus- 
pension of  hostilities.43  In  Egypt,  however,  the  French  were  more 
successful.  Mehemet  Ali,  influenced  it  seems  by  the  representa- 
tions of  Cochelet  and  Caille,  consented  to  instruct  his  son  Ibrahim 
to  halt  his  advance  and  await  future  instructions.44 

MMetternich  to  Apponyi,  May  21,  1839,  Metternich,  op.  cit.,  VI,  pp.  345- 
346.  See  also,  ibid.,  p.  345,  [footnote].  Vicomte  de  Guichen  characterizes  Pon- 
sonby as  "1'homme  le  plus  dangereux  qui  ait  jamais  tenu  une  ambassade,  .  .  .  , 
passionne,  violent,  brouillon,  mu  par  une  seule  idee,  sa  haine  centre  le  Pacha 
d'Egypte  et  centre  la  France."  See  Guichen,  op.  cit.,  p.  IX. 

"Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  May  20,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp. 
28-29. 

*°Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  May  22,   1839,  ibid.,  pp.  70-72. 

4ISome  evidence  which  has  been  found  indicates  that  on  June  28,  just  two 
days  before  his  death,  Mahmoud  finally  consented  to  grant  an  order  for  the 
suspension  of  hostilities.  See  "Telegraphic  despatch  from  Strasburg,"  July  15, 
1839,  ibid.,  p.  172.  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  342. 

**Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  June  16,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  p.  152. 

"Mouriez,  op.  cit.,  IV,  pp.  49-52. 

"Mehemet  Ali  to  Ibrahim  Pasha,  June  16,  1839,  Martens,  N.  S.,  Ill,  p.  875. 
Mouriez,  op.  cit.,  IV,  pp.  30-32.  Col.  Campbell  criticized  Cochelet  in  a  despatch 
written  to  Palmerston  June  16,  1839,  claiming  he  believed  that  if  the  Frenchman 
had  "held  out"  a  little  longer  the  "united  remonstrances"  of  the  representatives 
of  the  great  Powers  might  have  led  the  Pasha  to  promise  "to  retire  the 
Egyptian  troops,  in  the  event  that  they  were  ...  in  the  Sultan's  territory;  but 


413]      THE  QUESTION  OF  CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  OF  ALEXANDRIA  8/ 

At  the  same  time  when  Marshal  Soult  set  about  adopting 
measures  to  prevent  hostilities  in  the  East,  he  and  his  colleagues 
also  took  steps  with  the  aim  of  protecting  the  French  position  in 
case  those  measures  failed  to  accomplish  their  purpose.  On  May 
25>  l%39>  almost  as  soon  as  it  was  known  at  Paris  that  the 
Turkish  troops  had  entered  Egyptian  territory,45  M.  Duperre,  the 
Minister  of  Marine,  presented  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  a 
project  of  a  law  which  provided  for  a  grant  of  10,000,000  francs 
to  the  government.  With  this  amount,  Duperre  proposed  to  aug- 
ment the  French  naval  forces  in  the  Mediterranean.46  Also,  Soult, 
on  whom  the  chief  responsibility  for  the  French  foreign  policy 
rested,  moved  to  secure  a  definite  understanding  with  the  British 
Ministers  relative  to  the  alarming  situation  which  was  developing 
in  the  Levant.  He  professed  to  Lord  Granville  that  he  concurred 
in  the  opinions  of  Palmerston  on  the  subject47  and  he  ordered 
Baron  de  Bourqueney,  the  French  charge  d'affaires  at  the  Court  of 
St.  James,  "to  communicate  to  the  English  Cabinet  aH  the  in- 
formation which  reached  Paris,  all  the  ideas  which  sprang  up,  and 
all  the  measures  which  were  preparing  in  consequence  of  the  new 
position,  and  to  establish  between  the  two  governments  the  most 
frank  and  intimate  cooperation."48  "  'In  thus  exposing  to  the 
Cabinet  of  London  the  entirety  of  our  point  of  view  upon  the 
important  circumstances  of  the  moment,'  the  Duke  of  Dalmatia 
wrote,  'we  tender  to  it  an  unequivocal  pledge  of  our  confidence, 
and  of  our  desire  to  act  with  it  in  the  most  perfect  accord.'  "49 

Palmerston  was  quite  willing  to  cooperate  with  the  French,  but 
be  it  remembered,  he  was  determined  that  such  cooperation  must 
be  on  the  basis  of  British  terms.  Soult  must  have  been  well  aware 
of  what  those  terms  were,  but  as  it  has  been  suggested  before, 
instead  of  admitting  that  they  differed  from  the  terms  which 

M.  Cochelet  was  ...  so  glad  that  he  had  prevailed  so  far  on  the  Pasha  with- 
out the  aid  of  his  Colleagues,  that  he  hastened  to  accept  the  Pasha's  offer  [to 
instruct  Ibrahim  to  halt  his  advance],  in  order  that  he  might  be  able  to  say 
that  France  had  done  everything,  and  that  her  voice  was  all-powerful." — Levant 
Correspondence,  I,  pp.  145-146. 

"Granville  to  Palmerston,  May  23,  1839,  ibid.,  p.  19. 

"Archives  Parl,  CXXIV,  p.  666. 

4TGranville  to  Palmerston,  May  31,  1838,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  p.  24. 

^Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  335. 

"Soult  to  Bourqueney,  June  17,  1839,  quoted  by  ibid.,  pp.  335-336. 


88  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [4T4 

France  favored,  he  attempted  to  hide  the  fact  that  there  were  any 
real  differences  between  them  and  the  latter.  "The  necessity  of  con- 
ceding toMehemet  Ali  the  hereditary  investiture  of  at  least  a  part  of 
his  actual  possessions  seems  now  to  be  almost  unanimously  ad- 
mitted," he  wrote  on  June  17,  1839,  to  Bourqueney.  "...[but] 
we  cannot  flatter  ourselves  with  a  hope  that  the  Porte  will  con- 
sent to  yield  to  him  this  increase  of  moral  force  unless,  by  way 
of  compensation,  some  advantage  is  granted  to  itself  which  may 
furnish  a  material  guarantee  against  the  eventual  enterprises  of  an 
enemy  whose  power  it  has  thus  augmented.  The  nature  and  the 
extent  of  this  advantage  are  surely  not  easy  to  determine.  Lord 
Palmerston  thinks  that  it  should  not  fall  short  of  the  entire 
restitution  of  Syria. 

"At  Berlin,  they  seem  to  admit  that  the  Sultan  should  content 
himself  with  merely  a  portion  of  that  province.  For  ourselves, 
Monsieur,  we  acknowledge  that  the  Porte  has  a  claim  to  a  sub- 
stantial compensation,  but  we  think  that  the  moment  for  fixing 
the  exact  proportion  has  not  yet  arrived,  that  such  a  question 
cannot  be  decided  until  after  much  important  and  complicated 
data  has  been  considered,  the  appreciation  of  which  cannot  be 
the  work  of  a  moment  .... 

"You  should  wish,  Monsieur,  to  permit  Lord  Palmerston  to 
read  the  present  despatch."50 

Since  Soult  did  not  attempt  to  oppose  the  British  position, 
Palmerston  assumed  that  the  French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
was  willing  to  take  a  stand  similar  to  it.  "  'We  understand  each 
other  upon  all  points;'"  he  declared  after  reading  the  Marshal's 
despatch,  "  'our  accord  will  be  complete.  Principle,  end,  means  of 
execution,  all  is  full  of  reason,  simplicity,  and  clearness.  This  is 
not  the  communication  of  one  government  to  another;  call  it 
rather  an  understanding  between  colleagues,  between  members 
of  the  same  Cabinet.'  "51 

In  truth,  during  the  early  stages  of  the  negotiations  upon  Turco- 
Egyptian  affairs  in  1839,  England  and  France  did  succeed  quite 
well  in  reaching  an  agreement  relative  to  the  important  problems 
which  were  at  stake.  One  of  the  first  of  those  problems  which 

MSoult  to  Bourqueney,  June  17,   1839,  ibid.,  pp.  488-489.    Levant  Corres- 
pondence, I,  pp.  77-79.   Note — The  translation  follows  Guizot. 

"Bourqueney  to  Soult,  June  20,   1839,  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  494. 


415]      THE  QUESTION  OF  CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  OF  ALEXANDRIA  89 

confronted  the  two  western  Powers  after  Marshal  Soult  entered 
office  was  that  of  agreeing  upon  joint  instructions  to  the  naval 
forces  which  they  were  sending  to  the  Mediterranean.  Late  in 
May,  Granville  suggested  to  Soult  that  a  combined  Anglo-French 
fleet,  the  commanders  of  which  would  have  "identical"  orders, 
should  proceed  to  the  East  and  that  the  object  of  such  fleet 
should  be  "to  arrest  the  progress  of  hostilities."52  The  Duke  of 
Dalmatia  concurred  readily  in  the  idea  and  he  even  became  im- 
patient when  Palmerston  delayed  following  up  immediately  the 
suggestion  made  by  the  British  Ambassador  at  Paris.  Granville 
reported,  June  17,  1839,  that  Soult  was  disappointed  because  he 
had  received  no  official  communication  from  the  British  foreign 
office.  The  French  had  seven  sail  of  the  line  off  Smyrna  already. 
Louis  Philippe's  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  was  going  to  send 
three  more,  and  according  to  Granville,  he  was  confident  of  the 
moral  effect  which  the  two  allied  fleets  would  have  in  the  Near 
East  if  they  would  only  cooperate.53  Marshal  Soult,  in  a  letter 
written  on  the  same  date,  declared  to  Bourqueney:  "We  anxiously 
await  an  answer  . . .  upon  the  proposed  instructions  to  Stopford."54 
Two  days  later  Palmerston  complied  with  the  wishes  of  the 
Marshal  by  forwarding  to  Paris  a  copy  of  the  directions  which  he 
believed  the  Admiral  of  the  British  Levant  fleet  should  follow.  He 
suggested  therein  that  the  outbreak  of  war,  or  the  continuance  of 
it  if  it  had  already  broken  out,  should  be  prevented.  He  was  un- 
willing that  any  means  other  than  those  of  persuasion  should  be 
employed  in  order  to  procure  the  consent  of  the  Sultan  to  a 
suspension  of  hostilities,  but  he  proposed  that  if  the  Viceroy 
should  refuse  to  refrain  from  fighting,  "the  [British]  Admiral 
should  then  employ  such  means  of  pressure,  gradually  increasing 
in  their  stringency,"  as  he  might  find  necessary,  or  might  think 
"best  calculated  to  accomplish  the  desired  result."65  Palmerston 
also  took  into  consideration,  in  the  instructions  proposed,  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  Russian  force  entering  "the  ports  and  territory  of 
Turkey  with  the  professed  object  of  protecting  the  sultan,  and  of 

"Granville  to  Palmerston,  May  31,   1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  p.  24. 
"Granville  to  Palmerston,  June  17,  1839,  ibid.,  pp.  76-77. 
"Soult  to  Bourqueney,  June  17,   1839,  ibid.,  p.  79. 

"Proposed  Instructions  to  Stopford,  ibid.,  p.  83  ff.    Annual  Register,  1840, 
PP-  453-457- 


9O  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-1841  [416 

repelling  the  Egyptian  invaders."  "In  such  a  case,"  he  ventured, 
"and  after  the  Admiral  had  obtained  from  the  Pasha  the  order 
for  the  retreat  of  his  troops,  and  after  he  had  received  certain 
information  that  such  order  had  been  obeyed,  it  would  be  ex- 
tremely desirable  that  the  British  squadron  should  proceed  to 
Constantinople,  and  should  remain  there,  or  in  the  Black  Sea, 
until  the  Russian  forces  had  evacuated  the  Turkish  territory."86 
After  Soult  had  become  acquainted  with  this  document  he  in- 
timated unofficially  to  Granville  that  he  was  satisfied  with  the 
"general  statement"  of  it  and  he  made  remarks  which  led  the 
latter  to  believe  that  he  would  send  similar  instructions  to  the 
French  Admiral  in  the  Levant.57  The  British  Ambassador  reported 
those  facts  to  Palmerston  in  a  despatch  written  on  June  22,  and 
on  the  third  day  following  that  date  the  British  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs,  stirred  to  action  by  fresh  reports  of  an  alarming 
character  from  the  Orient,  directed  the  Lords  Commissioners  of 
the  Admiralty  to  send  the  instructions,  which  had  been  prepared, 
to  Stopford.58  If  further  communications  between  the  English 
and  French  governments  should  lead  to  a  modification  in  them, 
he  wrote  to  Granville,  that  modification  could  easily  be  provided 
for  later.59  This,  however,  was  not  necessary  for  the  instructions 
to  the  French  naval  forces  which  were  prepared  promptly  by 
Soult  were  quite  similar  to  those  drawn  up  by  Palmerston.  The 
Admirals  of  the  two  fleets,  the  French  Minister  declared,  "should 
act  towards  each  other  with  all  the  confidence  and  frankness 
requisite  to  introduce  into  their  operations  the  same  unanimity" 
which  subsisted  between  the  two  governments.60 

"Ibid.,  p.  456. 

"Granville  to  Palmerston,  June  22,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  p.  89. 
See  also,  Granville  to  Palmerston,  June  24,  1839,  ibid.,  pp.  94-95. 

"Palmerston   to   Lords  Commissioners  of  Admiralty,   June   25,    1839,   ibid., 

PP-  90-93,  93-94- 

"Palmerston  to  Granville,  June  25,  1839,  ibid.,  p.  94. 

""Instructions  to  French  Admiral  in  Levant,  June  26,  1839,  ibid.,  pp.  101- 
102.  Granville,  in  a  despatch  written  to  Palmerston  on  June  28,  1839,  pointed 
out  that  the  French  proposed,  in  their  instructions  to  Lalande,  to  cut  off  all 
communication  by  sea  to  the  theatre  of  war.  Palmerston,  it  will  be  recalled, 
had  suggested  that  only  those  communications  which  were  carried  on  between 
Syria  and  Egypt  should  be  stopped.  See  ibid.,  pp.  104-105. 


4I/]      THE  QUESTION  OF  CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  OF  ALEXANDRIA  9! 

A  more  difficult  problem  for  the  diplomats  of  England  and 
France  was  that  of  negotiating  a  settlement  between  the  rival 
parties  in  the  Near  East.  Palmerston  and  Granville,  it  will  be 
recalled,  had  made  it  clear  to  the  French  Ministers  that  the  British 
government  believed  Egypt  should  become  hereditary  in  the  fam- 
ily of  Mehemet  Ali  under  the  sovereignty  of  the  Sultan  but  that 
the  Pasha  should  withdraw  his  troops  from,  and  give  up  all  his 
claims  to,  the  other  territories  which  were  under  his  control.61 
Soult,  being  unwilling  to  oppose  openly  the  British  position  was 
in  favor  of  leaving  the  question  of  terms  to  the  decision  of  a 
joint  conference  at  Vienna  between  representatives  of  the  Powers. 
He  believed,  he  declared  in  the  latter  part  of  May,  1839,  that 
though  a  collision  should  be  averted  in  the  Levant  for  the  time 
being,  it  would  be  necessary  for  the  five  great  nations  of 
Europe  to  concert  together  as  to  the  means  of  definitely  set- 
tling the  future  relations  between  the  Sultan  and  the  Viceroy.62 
A  few  days  later  he  again  referred  to  the  question  in  a  conversa- 
tion with  Granville  and  he  expressed  a  desire  that  if  a  conference 
should  take  place  the  instructions  issued  to  the  English  and 
French  representatives  should  be  identical.63  He  hoped,  un- 
doubtedly, that  at  such  a  conference  the  accord  between  England 
and  France  would  be  maintained  easily  because  of  the  danger  of  a 
Russian  intervention  in  Turkey.  "In  the  event  of  our  resolutions 
and  the  attitude  of  our  squadrons  not  being  able  to  prevent  the 
two  contending  parties  [in  the  East]  from  having  recourse  to 
arms,  the  necessity  of  a  common  action  would  become  evident;" 
he  wrote  on  June  17,  1839,  "and  there  is  no  reason  to  expect  that 
we  should  then  be  able  to  induce  Russia  to  abstain  from  material 
interference  in  a  question  in  which  her  interests  would  be  so 
directly  engaged.  What  we  ought  to  insist  on,  is  that  her  action 
should  be  determined  and  limited,  in  concert  with  the  other  courts; 
that  she  should  confine  herself  to  the  course  adopted  by  France 

wSee,  in  addition  to  statements  made  above,  Granville  to  Palmerston,  June 
14,  1839,  ibid.,  p.  31. 

"Granville  to  Palmerston,  May  31,  1839,  ibid.,  p.  24. 
"Granville  to  Palmerston,  June  14,  1839,  ibid.,  p.  31. 


92  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [418 

and  England;  and,  in  fact,  that  a  European  convention  should 
replace  the  stipulation  of  Unkiar-Skelessi."64 

When  Metternich  learned  of  the  French  suggestion  he  imme- 
diately objected  to  the  idea  of  a  formal  conference  and  suggested 
instead  that  each  of  the  Cabinets  should  send  its  opinion  to  its 
representative  at  Vienna.*55  A  certain  latitude  for  discussion  should 
be  permitted  so  that  through  a  compromise  of  the  five  opinions 
one  in  which  all  could  agree  might  be  discovered.  Such  an 
opinion,  when  found,  should  form  the  basis  of  identical  communi- 
cations from  the  Powers  to  the  Sultan  and  to  the  Pasha.66  Marshal 
Soult  consented  readily  to  this  modification  of  his  suggestion.67 

Palmerston,  while  discussing  the  French  and  Austrian  proposals, 
declared  that  the  latter  was  open  to  fewer  objections  but  that  it 
also  held  out  "less  advantages."  He  was  willing  to  accede  to  it 
provided  that  Prussia  and  Russia  did  likewise.  Consequently,  he 
forwarded  to  Lord  Beauvale,  the  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna, 
a  detailed  statement  of  his  own  position  upon  Turco-Egyptian 
affairs.68  The  outstanding  feature  of  that  statement  was  the 
emphasis  placed  therein  upon  the  contention  that  Mehemet  Ali 
should  give  up  all  Syria,  retaining  only  Egypt  in  hereditary  pos- 
session. He  despatched  a  copy  of  the  said  statement  to  Granville 
on  June  29,  1839,  and  in  a  note  which  accompanied  it  he  em- 
phasized that  it  seemed  to  the  British  government  that  the  affairs 
of  Turkey  could  never  be  secure  until  Mehemet  Ali  had  evacuated 

"Soult  to  Bourqueney,  June  17,  1839,  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  488.  Note  also 
the  following  explanation  of  the  French  desire  for  a  conference  of  the  Powers: 
"Dans  un  congres,  tout  1'avantage,  pensait-on  alors,  serait  pour  nous  [the 
French].  Appuyes  sur  la  Prusse  et  1'Autriche  nous  pouvions  faire  successivement 
tete  a  1'Angleterre  et  a  la  Russie.  Nous  etions  comme  assures  d'avance  de  nous 
trouver  presque  toujours  quatre  contre  un,  et,  dans  la  plus  facheuse  hypothese, 
tout  au  moins  trois  contre  deux." — Haussonville,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  150. 

"Metternich  explained  that  the  protocol  of  Aix-la-chapelle,  signed  by  rep- 
resentatives of  the  Powers  in  1818,  read  that  no  question  relative  to  the  rights 
of  any  state  should  be  resolved  upon  unless  the  said  state  was  invited  to  be 
represented  in  the  conference.  Turkey  could  not  be  invited,  he  believed,  be- 
cause she  would  not  send  a  representative  empowered  sufficiently  to  allow 
affairs  to  advance.  See  Metternich  to  Apponyi,  June  14,  1839,  Metternich, 
op.  cit.,  VI,  pp.  347-348.  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp.  120-121. 

"Beauvale  to  Palmerston,  June  14,  1839,  ibid.,  p.  88. 

"Granville  to  Palmerston,  June  22,  1839,  ibid.,  p.  89. 

^Palmerston  to  Beauvale,  June  28,  1839,  ibid.,  pp.  117-119. 


419]      THE  QUESTION  OF  CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  OF  ALEXANDRIA  93 

Syria  and  recalled  his  troops  to  Egypt.69  If  Marshal  Soult  still 
had  doubts  relative  to  the  attitude  of  the  British  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  they  must  have  been  removed  when  Granville 
revealed  to  him  the  contents  of  this  document.  He  declined  at 
that  time  to  assent  to  Palmerston's  proposition  that  no  settlement 
would  be  satisfactory  which  did  not  restore  the  whole  of  Syria  to 
the  direct  authority  of  the  Sultan  but,  as  before,  he  refrained 
from  adopting  a  stand  in  opposition  to  the  British  contentions. 
Instead  of  doing  so  he  continued  to  evade  the  issue.  The  Court 
of  Berlin,  he  claimed,  had  suggested  that  the  Egyptians  should 
give  up  in  Syria,  only  the  Pashalics  of  Tripoli  and  Aleppo,  thus 
leaving  to  them  those  of  Acre  and  Damascus.  Soult  said  he  was 
not  aware  what  the  Austrian  attitude  was,  and  "the  French  Gov- 
ernment had  not  yet  formed  any  opinion"  upon  the  question  of  a 
settlement  between  Mehemet  and  Mahmoud.70  He  even  con- 
tended to  Granville,  according  to  a  report  made  on  July  2,  1839, 
by  the  latter,  that  his  hesitation  to  accept  Palmerston's  proposal 
arose  from  his  doubt  of  the  possibility  of  obtaining  Mehemet  Ali's 
acquiescence  in  it,  rather  than  from  any  objection  to  the  arrange- 
ment itself.70  Hence,  it  was  only  natural  that  Palmerston  should 
become  optimistic  and  look  forward  to  the  maintenance  of  a  state 
of  complete  harmony  in  Anglo-French  relations.  "  'Soult  is  a 
jewel,' "  he  wrote  on  July  19,  1839;  "  'nothing  can  be  more  satis- 
factory than  his  course  with  regard  to  us,  and  the  union  of 
England  and  France  upon  these  Turkish  affairs  will  embolden 
Metternich  and  save  Europe.'  "71 

Nevertheless,  the  accord  between  England  and  France  was  more 
apparent  than  real.  Radical  differences  existed  between  the  senti- 
ments relative  to  Turco-Egyptian  affairs  entertained  by  the  masses 
within  the  two  countries.  This  fact  is  revealed  very  clearly  by 
articles  which  appeared  in  the  contemporary  English  and  French 
newspapers.  "There  is  one  way  of  settling  the  question  attended 
with  little  immediate  difficulty,.  .  .by  laying  it  down  as  a  funda- 

"Palmerston  to  Granville,  June  29,  1839,  ibid.,  pp.  119-120. 

"Granville  to  Palmerston,  July  2,  1839,  ibid.,  p.  153. 

"Palmerston  to  Granville,  July  19,  1839,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  295.  Lord 
Palmerston  declared  on  July  9,  in  the  House  of  Commons  "that  the  English 
and  French  governments  perfectly  understood  each  other,  and  were  acting  in 
concert  with  regard  to  these  important  matters  [Turco-Egyptian  affairs]." — 
Parl.  Deb.,  XLIX,  p.  81. 


94  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [420 

mental  law  that  the  conflict  shall  not  have  a  beginning,"  an 
editorial  writer  stated  in  The  Times.12  The  views  expressed  in  the 
Morning  Chronicle,  Palmerston's  organ,  were  of  a  more  pro- 
nounced character.  The  abandonment  of  Syria  by  Mehemet  AH, 
according  to  one  of  those  views,  was  the  "sine  qua  non"  of  the 
final  solution  of  the  Eastern  question.73  The  French  press,  on  the 
other  hand,  warmly  supported  the  cause  of  the  Viceroy  and  re- 
vealed an  attitude  of  suspicion  in  regard  to  the  increased  interest 
of  Great  Britain  in  the  Levant.74  "Whether  France  declare  in 
favor  of  England  or  of  Russia,75  it  must  be  on  condition  of  obtain- 
ing in  return  her  Rhenish  frontier  and  the  cession  of  her  former 
province  of  Egypt,  and  perhaps  something  more,"  a  correspond- 
ent of  the  National  declared.76  Even  the  editors  of  the  conserva- 
tive Journal  des  Debats  maintained  that  the  hereditary  right 
should  be  conceded  to  the  family  of  Mehemet  AH,  and  one  of  them 
remarked  in  an  article  published  on  June  I,  1839,  that  while 

nThe  Times,  July  5,  1839. 

"Extract  from  the  Morning  Chronicle  copied  into  the  Journal  des  Debats, 
June  27,  1839. 

T4Note  the  following  extract  from  an  article  signed  by  Saint-Marc  Girardin 
which  appeared  in  the  Journal  des  Debats  on  May  23,  1839:  "Depuis  qu'elle 
est  maitresse  de  1'Inde,  1'Angleterre  a  toujours  eu  les  yeux  ouverts  sur  1'Egypte 
et  sur  la  mer  Rouge.  L'Egypte  est,  en  effet,  la  route  naturelle  de  1'Inde;  .... 
A  1'aide  de  ses  bateaux  a  vapeur,  1'Angleterre  semble  en  ce  moment  commencer, 
pour  ainsi  dire,  une  nouvelle  conquete  de  1'Asie.  ...  La  pris  d'Aden  et  celle  de 
Khareck,  nous  le  repetons,  .  .  .  indiquent  les  plans  de  1'Angleterre,  et  comment 
elle  cherche  a  se  fortifier  et  a  s'etendre  pour  resister  a  son  adversaire  [Russia]. 
La  pris  d'Aden  et  de  Khareck  fait  encore  partie  de  la  question  d'Orient  a  un 
autre  titre;  car,  par  cette  conquete,  1'Angleterre  a  un  pris  de  plus  centre  1'vice- 
roi  d'Egypte.  D'Aden,  elle  le  menace  a  1'entree  de  la  mer  Rouge,  et  de  Khareck 
elle  survielle  le  progres  de  ses  armes  en  Arabic,  et  protege  Bagdad  et  Bassora." 
Those  Frenchmen  who  were  alarmed  at  Britain's  Levant  policy  were  not  all 
newspaper  writers  and  correspondents.  See,  Campbell's  report  upon  the  attitude 
of  Cochelet.  Campbell  to  Palmerston,  July  13,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence, 
I,  p.  221. 

"Many  Frenchmen  believed  that  a  war  between  England  and  Russia  was 
inevitable.  Some,  at  least,  favored  a  union  with  the  latter  for  the  partitioning  of 
Turkey — Russia  taking  Constantinople  and  France  Alexandria.  See  Guichen, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  45-46. 

"Extract  from  the  National,  copied  in  The  Times,  June  7,  1839. 


42 1  ]      THE  QUESTION  OF  CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  OF  ALEXANDRIA  95 

France  had  an  interest  in  the  maintenance  of  the  Ottoman  Empire, 
she  also  had  an  interest  "a  la  grandeur  de  I'Egypte,"77 

The  views  relative  to  Near-Eastern  affairs  which  were  enter- 
tained by  the  various  factions  existing  within  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies  are  also  worthy  of  notice.  They  were  revealed  very 
clearly  when  Duperre's  request  for  a  credit  of  10,000,000  francs 
was  up  for  consideration,  for  that  was  the  occasion  of  a  great  and 
solemn  debate,  in  which  the  question  of  the  Orient  was  examined, 
not  only  in  its  relations  to  the  immediate  quarrel  between  the 
governor  of  Egypt  and  his  suzerain  but  also  under  its  most  general 
aspects.78  One  of  the  first  speakers  who  took  part  in  the  debates 
was  the  legitimist  orator,  Valmy.  After  criticizing  the  government 
sharply  for  attempting  to  defend  Mehemet  AH  and  bolster  up 
Turkey  at  the  same  time,  and  after  warning  against  the  danger 
of  an  Anglo-Russian  accord,  he  let  it  be  understood  he  was  willing 
that  the  Pasha  of  Egypt  should  be  sacrificed  to  the  Sultan.79 
However,  the  limited  applause — it  came  from  the  right  only  it 
seems — by  which  his  remarks  were  received  indicates  that  a 
majority  of  the  deputies  were  not  willing  to  support  him  in  the 


^Journal  des  Debats,  June  i,  1839.  See  other  articles  in  ibid.,  May  17, 
June  8,  17,  24,  25,  28,  July  i,  1839.  See  also  an  extract  from  the  Siecle  of  June 
14,  1839,  copied  in  Guichen,  op.  cit.,  p.  44. 

780dilon  Barrot,  Memoires  Posthumes,  I,  p.  343. 

""Note  the  following:  "1'orateur  legitimiste  aurait  voulu,  en  haine  des  revolu- 
tions, qu'on  immolat  le  pacha  d'Egypte  au  sultan." — Blanc,  op.  cit.,  V,  p. 
427.  See  also  The  Times,  July  4,  1839.  Valmy  must  be  given  credit,  however, 
for  seeing  clearly  that  the  Soult  Administration  was  assuming  a  false  position. 
In  commenting  on  its  policy  he  declared:  "II  en  resulte  que  nous  divisons  les 
elements  musulmans  qu'il  faudrait  reunir,  que  nous  detruisons  a  Alexandrie  ce 
que  nous  faisons  a  Constantinople,  que  nous  mecontentons  le  sultan  et  le  vice- 
roi  en  voulant  les  epargner  tous  deux,  et  que  nous  n'avons  de  credit  ni  sur  1'un 
ni  sur  1'autre."  "  .  .  .  je  1'avoue,"  he  stated  later  in  conclusion,  "rien  dans 
le  langage  du  ministere  ne  me  fait  croire  qu'il  ait  adopte  une  politique  qui  le 
mette  en  mesure  de  regler  serieusement  le  statu  quo  dans  lequel  s'engloutit 
1'Empire  ottoman  et  1'equilibre  de  1'Europe. 

"Je  le  repete  done,  je  ne  veux  pas  exposer  un  seul  homme  ni  un  seul 
vaisseau  pour  de  perilleuses  et  impuissantes  manifestations."  Archives  Parl., 
CXXVI,  pp.  631,  636.  Guichen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  76-78. 


96  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,  1832-184!  [422 

position  which  he  had  taken.80  M.  de  Carne,  the  next  speaker  to 
ascend  the  tribune,  declared  in  a  speech  which  was  received  by 
"marques  nombreuses  d' approbation"  that  modern  Egypt  was  a 
French  creation.  France  had  important  commercial  and  political 
interests  at  stake  there  which  would  be  benefited  by  a  recognition 
of  the  independence  of  the  Viceroy.  The  Chamber  of  Deputies, 
therefore,  ought  to  declare  itself  in  favor  of  such  recognition,  and 
diplomatic  Europe  ought  to  recognize  French  influence  in  Egypt 
as  being  on  a  par  with  English  influence  in  Portugal  and  the  in- 
fluence of  Austria  in  Italy.81  Later  in  the  day  M.  de  Lamartine, 
who  had  traveled  extensively  in  the  Orient,82  revealed  that  he  had 
little  faith  either  in  the  suggestions  made  by  Carne  or  in  those 
advanced  by  Valmy.  France,  he  maintained,  should  withhold  her 
support  from  both  the  Viceroy  and  the  Sultan.  She  should  favor, 
instead,  a  partition  of  the  territories  which  were  held  by  Mehemet 
and  Mahmoud  between  the  four  great  European  Powers — Eng- 

80 *  Archives  Parl.,  CXXVI,  pp.  632-636.  Vicomte  de  Guichen  maintains  in 
his  Crise  d'Orient  et  I'Europe,  [p.  78]  that  "La  Chambre,  presque  unanime- 
ment,  applaudit  Valmy,"  but  the  editors  of  the  Archives  Parlementaire  have 
described  the  applause  given  Valmy  as  follows:  "Foix  a  droite:  Tres  bien! 
tres  bien!  (Une  legere  agitation  succede  a  ce  discours,  et  la  seance  reste 
quelques  instants  interrompue.)"  See  ibid.,  p.  636.  For  Valmy's  attitude  towards 
England,  note  the  following  extract  from  his  speech:  "De  son  cote,  1'Angleterre, 
fatiguee  de  tant  d'impuissance,  a  cesse  d'agir  franchement  de  concert  avec  nous. 
Elle  a  songe  a  prendre  sa  part  du  statu  quo;  c'est  1'Egypte  qu'elle  convoite 
et  que  le  sultan  est  appele  aujourd'hui  a  conquerir  pour  elle." — Ibid.,  p.  634. 
Other  deputies  accused  England  of  having  designs  against  Egypt.  See,  in  par- 
ticular, the  statements  attributed  to  M.  Denis  and  M.  de  Tocqueville,  in  ibid., 
pp.  643-649,  705-708. 

KIbid.,  pp.  637-638.  Carne  also  stated:  "je  dis  qu'en  face  de  1'avenir  qui 
peut  se  produire.  il  est  de  Pinteret  de  la  France  d'agir  immediatement,  d'agir 
seule,  se  declarer  qu'elle  protege  1'Egypte;  qu'elle  est  la  dans  son  role  legitime, 
dans  son  role  naturel;  qu'elle  prend  sous  son  abri  une  nationalite  qui  n'est 
menagante  pour  personne,  une  nationalite  qui  importe  a  Pequilibre  europeen; 
qu'elle  la  protege  contre  le  despotisme  maritime,  tout  aussi  bien  que  centre 
le  despotisme  militaire." — Ibid.,  p.  639. 

MSee  A.  de-  Lamartine,  Souvenirs,  impressions,  pensees,  et  paysages  pendant 
un  voyage  en  Orient,  (1832-1833). 


423  ]      THE  QUESTION  OF  CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  OF  ALEXANDRIA  f)J 

land,  France,  Austria,  and  Russia.83  His  statements,  like  those  of 
Valmy,  did  not  receive  the  general  approval  of  the  deputies.  In- 
deed, they  were  even  followed  by  "Sensation,"  "Murmures," 
"Violent*  mur  mures"  and  "Vive  agitation" 

The  most  significant  speech  which  was  delivered  on  this 
occasion  in  defense  of  the  Levantine  policies  of  the  Ministry  was, 
undoubtedly,  the  one  delivered  by  M.  Guizot.84  According  to  him, 
Mehemet  Ali's  success  in  Egypt  was  due  largely  to  French  in- 
fluence and  cooperation.  "  'We  have  protected  it  [Egypt]  from 
its  origin...'"  he  explained.  "'We  beheld  there  a  natural  dis- 
location of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  and  perhaps  a  rising  power  des- 
tined at  some  future  day  to  become  independent  and  to  play  its 
part  in  the  affairs  of  the  world.'  "85  In  calling  attention  to  the  policy 
which  he  thought  France  should  follow  he  declared:  "'To  main- 
tain the  Ottoman  Empire  for  the  maintenance  of  the  equilibrium 
of  Europe,  and  when,  by  the  force  of  events,  by  the  natural 
progress  of  facts,  some  dismemberment  takes  place,  some  province 
detaches  itself  from  that  Empire  in  decadence,  to  favor  the  trans- 
formation of  that  province  into  a  new  and  independent  sovereignty 
which  may  take  its  place  in  the  family  of  nations,  and  assist  at  a 
future  day  in  the  new  European  equilibrium,  destined  to  replace 
that  whose  elements  will  exist  no  longer;  such  is  the  policy  suit- 

**  Archives  Pad.,  CXXVI,  pp.  649-653.  Note  in  particular  the  following  extract 
from  Lamartine's  speech:  "La  politique  de  la  France  doit  etre  tout  autre;  elle 
doit  etre  francaise,  elle  doit  etre  europeenne.  Son  systeme,  c'est  le  systeme 
europeen;  c'est  Pequilibre  maintenu  par  PAutriche  et  par  elle  dans  1'Orient 
comme  dans  1'Occident;  non  pas  ce  chancelant  et  faux  equilibre  qui  repose 
aujourd'hui  sur  cette  section  d'empire  a  Constantinople,  equilibre  que  n'est  au 
fond  que  la  domination  russe  en  Orient,  sous  le  nom  de  Mahmoud,  sans  com- 
pensation, sans  surete,  sans  avenir  pour  nous,  mais  un  equilibre  fonde  sur  une 
part  egale  d'influence  et  de  territoires  attribute  des  aujourd'hui  en  Orient  aux 
quatre  grandes  puissances  qui  y  ont  droit  et  interet,  la  Russie,  FAutriche,  la 
France,  et  1'Angleterre.  Voila  le  systeme  qui  s'appelle  le  systeme  occidental." — 
Ibid.,  p.  652.  See  also,  Odilon  Barrot,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  343-344. 

84Guizot,  although  not  a  member  of  the  Cabinet,  was  on  the  best  of  terms 
with  those  who  did  belong  to  it.  See  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  314. 

™Ibid.,  p.  330.  Archives  Part.,  CXXVI,  p.  713.  Note:  The  phraseology  of 
the  two  sources  is  not  exactly  the  same.  The  translation  follows  that  of  the 
Mtmoirts.  • 


98  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [424 

able  to  France;  to  this  she  has  been  naturally  led,  and  in  this, 
according  to  my  opinion,  she  will  do  well  to  persevere.'  "88  In 
other  words,  the  policy  which  M.  Guizot  advocated  was  that  of 
the  status  quo  ante  helium  in  1839,  and  it  was,  he  later  claimed 
in  his  Memoires,  the  policy  which  the  Ministry  and  the  great 
majority  of  the  members  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  favored.87 
Meanwhile,  as  the  Cabinets  of  England  and  France  appeared 
to  be  in  accord  upon  Turco-Egyptian  affairs,  "the  Court  of  Rus- 
sia looked  on  in  silence  and  remained  in  suspense,  visibly  dis- 
turbed by  the  impending  future  and  [doubtful]  of  the  attitude  it 
would  have  to  assume."88  The  Emperor  Nicholas  had  no  desire 
for  war,  and  realizing  that  the  Treaty  of  Unkiar  Skelessi  furnished 
a  constant  source  of  danger  to  the  peace  of  his  Empire,  longed 
for  the  day  to  arrive  when  the  term  of  that  arrangement  should 
expire.89  Nevertheless,  he  was  resolved  that  he  would  not  permit 
other  Powers  to  violate  the  rules  denned  therein,  nor  would  he 
consent  to  the  merging  of  the  said  treaty  into  some  more  general 
compact  of  the  same  nature  by  which  all  of  the  great  European 
nations  would  become  obliged  to  defend  the  Porte.90  Hence  when 
it  was  suggested  that  a  conference  of  representatives  from  the 
latter  should  be  assembled  at  Vienna  to  negotiate  with  the  aim  of 
discovering  a  policy  upon  which  all  could  agree,  Nicholas  and  his 

"*Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  330-331.  Archives  Parl,  CXXVI,  p.  713.  Note  the 
following  contemporary  comment  upon  Guizot's  speech:  "M.  Guizot  a  noble- 
ment  defendu  ce  qu'il  appelle  la  politique  seculaire  de  la  France;  il  a  felicite 
le  ministere  du  12  Mai  de  s'etre  rallie  a  cette  politique;  il  a  protest^  avec 
energie  centre  ces  chimeriques  partages  que  Ton  nous  fait  toucher  au  doigt,  et 
contre  ces  alliances  non  moins  chimeriques  qui  nous  feraient  payer  1'abandon  de 
1'empire  ottoman  en  un  agrandissement  territorial  sur  nos  frontieres  du  nord. 
La  politique  de  M.  Guizot,  c'est  le  maintien  de  1'independance  de  la  Turquie, 
c'est  le  statu  quo." — Journal  des  Debats,  July  2,  1839. 

8TThe  debates  were  closed  on  the  day  following,  July  3,  1839,  and  a 
ballot  was  taken  to  determine  whether  the  credit  asked  for  by  Duperre  should 
be  granted.  The  measure  was  passed,  287  to  26. — Archives  Parl.,  CXXVII, 
p.  4.  For  a  more  detailed  discussion  of  the  French  debates  see  Guichen,  op.  cit., 
pp.  71-84. 

88Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  339. 

''Goriainow,  op.  cit.,  p.  53. 

*°Lord  Palmerston,  as  well  as  Marshal  Soult,  had  favored  concluding  such 
a  compact.  See  Palmerston  to  Ponsonby,  Sept.  13,  1838,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II, 
p.  282. 


425]      THE  QUESTION  OF  CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  OF  ALEXANDRIA  99 

ministers  opposed  the  idea.  They  probably  would  have  agreed  to 
it  if  they  had  been  assured  that  at  the  proposed  conference  the 
concluding  of  a  settlement  between  the  Sultan  and  the  Viceroy 
would  be  the  only  matter  which  would  be  considered.91  However, 
it  was  believed  at  St.  Petersburg  that  the  maritime  Powers  would 
insist  upon  the  admission  of  their  fleets  into  the  Sea  of  Marmora 
and  that  they  would  demand  the  signing  of  a  joint-convention  to 
guarantee  the  integrity  and  the  independence  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire.92  "  'In  any  affair/ "  Nesselrode  wrote  to  Struve,  the 
Russian  charge  d'affaires  at  Vienna,  "  'it  is  necessary  first  of  all  to 
know  to  whom  one  ought  to  speak.  In  the  present  situation  we 
ought  to  speak  to  the  Pacha  of  Egypt.  Therefore,  the  allied  war 
vessels  ought  to  be  sent  to  Alexandria.  They  [England  and 
France]  wish  to  send  them  into  the  Sea  of  Marmora.  They  would 
speak  to  the  Ottoman  Porte  and  I  fear  very  much  that  they  would 
then  speak  to  it  for  the  last  time,  car  ell e  n'est  plus  de  force  a  se 
tenir  longtemps  debout,  si  I' on  en  venait  au  point  de  tirer  le  canon 
devant  les  tnurs  du  serail'  "93  The  Tsar's  government  preferred 
that  instead  of  taking  a  part  in  a  conference  at  Vienna,  Russia 
and  Austria  should  hold  strictly  to  the  stipulations  of  the  con- 

MSee  Granville  to  Palmerston,  July  12,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I, 
p.  168. 

"Goriainow,  op.  cit.,  p.  53.  Note  also  the  following  extract  of  a  letter 
written  on  July  24,  1839,  by  Count  Nesselrode  to  Meyendorff,  the  Russian 
representative  at  Berlin:  "Vous  verrez,  mon  cher  Meyendorff,  que  1'idee  d'une 
conference  a  Vienne,  sur  les  affaires  turco-egyptiennes,  n'est  pas  de  notre  gout. 
Nous  devons  cette  conception  qui,  certes,  n'est  pas  une  conception  bienveillante 
pour  la  Russie,  a  notre  bon  prince  Metternich  qui,  de  gaiete  de  coeur,  a  em- 
brouille  une  affaire  devenue  tres  simple  et  placee  sur  le  meilleur  terrain,  par 
la  raison  que  tous  les  cabinets  sont  tombes  d'accord,  aussi  bien  sur  les  mesures 
a  prendre  pour  preserver  le  trone  du  Sultan  d'une  chute  inevitable  dans  cette 
crise,  que  sur  les  bases  de  1'arrangement  a  conclure  entre  la  Porte  et  le  pacha 
d'Egypte.  Ce  qu'il  y  avait  a  faire  a  etc  fait  sans  conference  et  peut-etre  tout 
juste  parce  qu'il  n'y  a  pas  eu  de  conference.  Je  ne  sais,  en  verite,  ce  que  Ton 
pourrait  faire  de  plus  a  Vienne,  a  moins  qu'on  ne  veuille  s'occuper  des  futurs 
contingents  et  Her  les  mains  a  la  Russie,  ce  qui  ne  saurait  nous  convenir  d'aucune 
maniere.  Notre  refus  de  participer  a  cette  conference  fera  beaucoup  de  bruit 
dans  le  monde  et  excitera  de  nouvelles  mefiances  en  Angleterre.  II  m'a  paru 
utile  que  vous  fussiez  informe  des  motifs  qui  nous  1'ont  dicte." — Nesselrode,  op. 
cit.,  VII,  pp.  285-287. 

""Quoted  by  Goriainow,  op.  cit.,  pp.  54-55. 


IOO  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [426 

vention  of  Miinchengratz.94  The  thing  to  do,  according  to  Count 
Nesselrode,  was  to  take  steps  by  diplomacy  to  prevent  Ibrahim 
from  marching  upon  Constantinople.  If  that  was  done  it  would 
not  be  necessary  again  for  the  Emperor  to  send  a  Russian  fleet 
into  the  Bosphorus  to  protect  the  throne  of  the  Sultan.  The  two 
rivals  in  the  Levant  could  under  such  circumstances  even  be  per- 
mitted to  settle  their  difficulties  without  the  aid  of  foreigners  and, 
consequently,  the  danger  of  a  break  resulting  between  the 
European  Powers  because  of  conflicting  views  upon  the  Eastern 
question  would  be  removed.95 

At  the  same  time  the  Russian  statesmen  desired  to  avoid 
antagonizing  England  and  France.  The  hereditary  Grand  Duke, 
who  later  became  Emperor  Alexander  II,  and  Count  OrlofT  were 
then  at  London.  "  'Whenever  I  have  met  Count  Orloflf  during  the 
last  five  days,'  Bourqueney  wrote  on  May  29  to  Soult,  'he  has 
denied  with  emotion  the  authenticity  of  the  news  of  the  resump- 
tion of  hostilities  between  the  Turks  and  the  Egyptians.  He 
founds  his  assertion  on  the  last  letters  of  the  Emperor.  ...  He 
has  held  the  same  language  to  nearly  all  the  members  of  the 
diplomatic  body.'  "96  Some  days  later  the  French  envoy  con- 
tinued: "The  Russian  Embassy  listens,  watches,  but  hesitates 
both  in  action  and  language.  There  have  been  many  Russians  in 
London  during  the  last  month  .  .  .  and  [amongst  them]  some 
enjoying  the  highest  confidence  of  the  Emperor.  I  venture  with 
timidity  an  opinion  hastily  formed;  but  it  appears  evident  to  me 
that  .  .  .  they  [the  Russians]  are  not  prepared  for  extreme 


**Ibid.,  p.  53.  Metternich  in  some  of  his  despatches  defended  Russia's 
policy  in  the  Near  East.  See  Metternich  op.  cit.,  VI,  pp.  345-351.  Barante  to 
Soult,  July  13,  1839,  Barante,  op.  cit.,  VI,  p.  256.  However,  in  the  words  of  M. 
Goriainow,  "Quoique  le  prince  Metternich  ne  manquat  pas  de  protester  de  sa 
fidelite  a  1'alliance  avec  la  Russie,  il  n'etait  pas  etranger  a  l'id£e  de  restreindre  la 
trop  grande  influence  que  1'empereur  Nicolas  avait  acquise  sur  la  Turquie 
depuis  le  traite  d'Unkiar-Iskelessi.  Outre  cela,  il  lui  souriait  de  convoquer  a 
Vienne  une  conference  de  tous  les  representants  des  puissances  europeenes,  au 
milieu  desquels  il  occuperait  la  premiere  place." — Goriainow,  op.  cit.,  p.  53. 

"See  extract  of  a  despatch,  Nesselrode  to  Struve,  July  4,  1839,  quoted  by 
ibid.,  p.  54. 

"Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  pp.  339-340. 


427]      THE  QUESTION  OF  CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  OF  ALEXANDRIA         IOI 

measures."97  This  despatch  was  written  on  June  17,  1839,  and 
just  ten  days  later  M.  de  Kisseleff,  the  Russian  charge  d'affaires 
at  the  British  Court,  transmitted  to  Lord  Palmerston  a  significant 
note  which  Nesselrode  had  addressed  on  June  15,  1839,  to  Count 
Pozzo  di  Borgo.  In  that  note  the  Russian  position  relative  to 
Turco-Egyptian  affairs  was  explained  carefully.  Undoubtedly  the 
Tsar's  Chancellor  hoped  thereby  to  gain  the  confidence  and  co- 
operation of  the  British  ministers.  "The  last  despatches  from  Con- 
stantinople . . .  and  from  Alexandria  . . .  apprize  us  that  the  Otto- 
man and  Egyptian  troops  had  approached  so  near  to  each  other 
that  a  conflict  between  them  appeared  imminent,"  he  declared. 
"...  There  remains  but  one  task  to  us  to  fulfil,  that  is,  to  con- 
fine this  struggle  within  the  narrowest  possible  bounds,  so  that  it 
may  not  compromise  the  maintenance  of  the  general  repose  of 
Europe  .  .  . 

"The  real  danger  for  Europe  at  large  is  not  in  a  combat  carried 
on  in  Syria  between  the  troops  of  the  Sultan  and  those  of  the 
Pasha  of  Egypt  .  .  .  The  danger  would  not  begin  to  become 
serious  until  in  the  event  of  the  fate  of  arms,  declaring  against  the 
Sultan,  the  Pasha  of  Egypt  should  profit  by  this  advantage  to 
place  the  safety  of  Constantinople  and  the  existence  of  the  Otto- 
man Empire  in  peril.  .  .  . 

"  .  .  .  it  has  appeared  to  us  essential  to  come  to  an  understand- 
ing, frankly,  with  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe,  who,  equally  with 
us,  have  at  heart  to  prevent  the  danger  which  we  have  just 
pointed  out.  Among  those  Powers  Great  Britain  is  incontestably 
the  one  that  can  exercise  the  greatest  influence  over  the  fate  of 
this  question,  and  can  cooperate  in  the  most  decisive  manner  in 
realizing  the  pacific  intentions  of  our  august  Master. 

"With  this  conviction  his  majesty  desires  you,  Sir,  to  come  to 
an  explanation  with  the  British  Cabinet  on  this  subject,  without 
the  least  reserve.  Have  the  goodness  to  submit  to  that  Cabinet, 
that  it  is  as  much  for  its  interest  as  for  ours,  to  take  care  that 
the  struggle  between  the  Porte  and  Egypt  shall  not  assume  so 

97Bourqueney  to  Soult,  June  17,  1839,  ibid.,  p.  493.  Guichen  quotes 
despatches  to  prove  that  the  Russians  were  working  even  before  that  early 
date  to  destroy  the  Anglo-French  entente.  See  Guichen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  51  ff.,  68 


IO2  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [428 

serious  a  character  as  may  ever  place  the  safety  of  the  capital  of 
the  Ottoman  Empire  in  danger; 

"That  in  order  ...  to  set  due  bounds  to  the  action  of  the  Pasha 
of  Egypt  ...  it  would  be  necessary  to  declare  to  him  in  the  most 
formal  manner,  'That  as  long  as  he  shall  confine  himself  to  the 
defence  of  the  territories  which  have  been  assigned  to  him  by 
the  arrangement  of  Kutaya;  as  long  as  he  shall  not  extend  his 
military  operations  beyond  the  district  of  Diarbekir  and  Orfa, 
...  so  long  will  Great  Britain  in  conjunction  with  the  other 
Powers  of  Europe,  remain  a  passive  spectator  of  the  struggle 
which  is  going  on  in  Syria;  but  that  from  the  instant  .  .  .  that  he 
shall  extend  the  theatre  of  war  beyond  the  defiles  of  the  Taurus 
in  order  to  carry  it  into  the  centre  of  Asia  Minor,  from  that 
moment  England  would  consider  such  act  of  hostility  as  if  it  were 
directed  against  herself,  and  would  thenceforward  act  as  if  she 
were  at  open  war  with  the  Pasha  of  Egypt;'  .  .  . 

"If  England  came  [sic]  to  an  agreement  with  us  to  issue  a 
declaration  couched  in  these  terms,  the  Emperor  will  authorize  his 
Representative  at  Alexandria  to  hold  precisely  the  same 
language.  .  .  . 

"For  the  moment,"  Nesselrode  pointed  out  in  conclusion,  "we 
must  confine  ourselves  to  what  is  most  pressing,  that  is  to  say,  to 
guard  against  the  ill-advised  policy  of  the  Sultan  dragging  us  into 
a  complication  of  a  nature  to  bring  on  a  chance  of  a  European 
conflict  ...  it  is  with  this  view  that  we  have  thought  it  indis- 
pensable to  come  to  a  frank  explanation  with  England,  by  taking 
in  London  the  step  of  which  by  the  Emperor's  orders,  I  have 
pointed  out  to  you  the  plan  and  the  object.  It  will  prove  to  the 
British  Ministry  that,  far  from  wishing  to  bring  about  a  complica- 
tion in  the  Levant,  we  are  using  all  our  care  to  prevent  one;  and 
that,  instead  of  greedily  availing  ourselves  of  the  stipulations  of 
our  Treaty  of  Alliance  with  the  Porte,  we  are  ourselves  the  first  to 
desire  to  prevent  the  recurrence  of  a  crisis  which  would  compel  us 
in  spite  of  ourselves,  again  to  take  up  a  military  attitude  on  the 
shores  of  the  Bosphorus."98 

Lord  Palmerston  must  have  been  puzzled  when  he  received  the 
despatch  from  which  the  above  extract  has  been  quoted.  The 

^Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp.  96-98.   Annual  Register,  1840,  pp.  457-460. 


429]      THE  QUESTION  OF  CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  OF  ALEXANDRIA         IO3 

communication  from  Kisseleff,  he  wrote  to  Beauvale  on  the  day 
after  it  was  handed  to  him,  was  "generally  speaking"  satisfactory 
but  the  British  could  not  agree  with  the  Russian  government  when 
it  stated  that  the  Powers  might  remain  passive  spectators  if  the 
contest  between  the  two  rivals  in  the  Levant  was  confined  to  Syria. 
Austria,  France,  and  England  seemed  agreed  that  the  existing 
relative  positions  of  the  Pasha  and  the  Sultan  were  incompatible 
with  the  safety  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  therefore  some  differ- 
ent arrangement  must  be  concluded.  Some  parts  of  Nesselrode's 
despatch,  according  to  the  views  expressed  by  the  British  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  might  perhaps  be  construed  to  imply  that  Rus- 
sia, instead  of  being  of  this  opinion,  was  satisfied  with  the  status 
quo.  Other  parts  of  the  despatch,  though,  he  admitted,  indicated 
that  Russia  was  "not  disinclined"  to  take  into  consideration  the 
possibility  of  making  some  more  permanent  settlement." 

While  the  advance  made  by  Count  Nesselrode  to  the  British 
government  must  have  had  some  influence  upon  the  attitude  of 
Lord  Palmerston,  it  is  certain  that  the  latter  did  not  abandon 
immediately  all  of  his  apprehensions  in  regard  to  the  intentions 
of  Russia.  "I  have  to  instruct  your  Excellency  to  state  to  the 
Porte,"  he  wrote  to  Lord  Ponsonby  on  July  5,  1839,  "that  if 
the  course  of  events  should  lead  the  Porte  to  ask  or  to  accept 
military  or  naval  aid  from  any  European  Power,  in  the  contest 
with  Mehemet  Ali,  Her  Majesty's  Government  trusts  that  the 
Porte  will  at  the  same  time  address  itself  to  Great  Britain  to  the 
same  effect."100  Some  days  later,  after  having  learned  that  the 
Sultan's  health  was  in  a  critical  condition,  Palmerston  wrote  again 
to  Ponsonby  advising  that  if  Mahmoud  died  and  if  consequently  the 
presence  of  the  British  squadron  at  Constantinople  should  appear 
useful,  he  should  in  concert  with  the  French  Ambassador  Roussin 
offer  its  assistance  to  the  Turkish  government.101  Furthermore, 
the  British  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  issued  instructions  to 
Admiral  Stopford,  dated  July  18,  1839,  directing  that  if  a  Russian 

"Palmerston  to  Beauvale,  June  28,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp. 
117-119.  Palmerston  was  less  critical  in  a  despatch  in  which  he  directed  Clanri- 
carde  to  reply  to  the  Russian  proposals.  See,  Palmerston  to  Clanricarde,  July 
9,  ibid.,  pp.  156-158. 

100Palmerston  to  Ponsonby,  July  5,   1839,  ibid.,  pp.  124-125. 

101Palmerston  to  Ponsonby,  July  13,  1839,  ibid.,  p.  166.  See  also,  Palmerston 
to  Lords  Commissioners  of  Admiralty,  July  13,  1839,  ibid.,  pp.  166-167. 


IO4  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [430 

fleet  entered  the  Bosphorus  he  should  apply  for  the  admission  of 
his  vessels  through  the  Dardanelles.102 

While  the  representatives  of  the  great  Powers  were  negotiating 
and  corresponding  thus,  events  destined  to  alter  the  situation 
materially  were  occurring  in  the  Near  East.  The  Viceroy,  in  June, 
1839,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  sent  instructions  to  Ibrahim  to 
avoid  hostilities.  The  measure  which  he  then  adopted  was  too 
tardy  to  accomplish  its  object.  On  June  21,  several  days  before 
the  arrival  at  the  Egyptian  camp  of  M.  Caille,  who  carried  the 
pacific  instructions  which  Mehemet  Ali  had  prepared,  a  decisive 
battle  was  fought  between  the  forces  of  Ibrahim  and  those  of 
Hafiz  Pasha  near  the  village  of  Nezib.  The  Ottoman  army  was 
routed,  and  when  Caille  arrived  on  the  scene  it  was  only  with 
difficulty  that  he  was  able  to  persuade  the  Egyptian  commander 
to  refrain  from  following  up  his  victory  by  a  vigorous  offensive.103 

Fate  was  merciful  on  this  occasion  to  the  aged  Mahmoud,  for 
on  June  30,  1839,  before  the  news  of  the  engagement  at  Nezib 
had  reached  Constantinople,  he  expired.  After  his  death,  Abd-ul- 
Mejid,  his  sixteen  year  old  son,  was  proclaimed  Sultan  and  a 
new  group  of  ministers,  headed  by  Reouf  and  Kosrew  Pashas,  took 
charge  of  the  government.  Nouri  Eifendi,  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  announced  on  July  3,  1839,  that  his  young  sovereign, 
willing  to  offer  Mehemet  Ali  a  full  pardon  for  the  past,  was  ready 
to  concede  to  him  Egypt  in  hereditary  possession  if  he  would 
agree  to  evacuate  Syria,  Adana,  the  Holy  Cities,  and  the  Island  of 
Crete.104  In  addition,  Kosrew  Pasha,  the  Grand  Vizier,  sent  orders 
to  Hafiz  Pasha  to  suspend  hostilities,  and  he  directed  Achmet 
Pasha,  the  commander  of  the  Ottoman  fleet,  to  retain  his  vessels 
within  the  Dardanelles.105  Achmet,  however,  dissatisfied  with  the 
new  government,  put  to  sea  at  once.  Off  the  Island  of  Tenedos, 

^Instructions  to  Stopford,  July  18,  1839;  Palmerston  to  Ponsonby,  July 
18,  1839,  ibid.,  pp.  167-168. 

103Mouriez,  op.  cit.,  IV,  pp.  38-4.1.  Annual  Register,  1839,  p.  [411].  For  a 
contemporary  account  of  the  battle  of  Nezib  see  von  Moltke,  op.  cit.,  pp.  378,  ff. 

104Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  July  3,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  p.  183. 
See  also  Granville  to  Palmerston,  July  22,  1839,  ibid.,  p.  186.  On  July  5,  1839, 
Kosrew  Pasha  sent  such  an  offer  to  Mehemet  Ali.  See  Grand  Vizier  to  Mehemet 
Ali,  July  5,  1839,  ibid.,  p.  227. 

105Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,   July  3,   1839,  ibid.,  p.    183.    Annual  Register, 

1839,  p.  [4«3- 


43  I  ]      THE  QUESTION  OF  CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  OF  ALEXANDRIA         IO5 

July  5,  1839,  he  feU  m  with  the  French  fleet  commanded  by 
Admiral  Lalande.  Osman  Bey,  the  second  in  command  of  the 
Turkish  squadron,  who  had  formed  an  acquaintance  with  Lalande 
while  he  was  in  Tunis,  obtained  an  interview  with  him  on  this  oc- 
casion and  declared  at  that  meeting  that  Mahmoud  had  not  died 
a  natural  death  but  had  been  murdered  by  Kosrew  and  Halil 
Pashas.106  The  former,  who  had  assumed  the  leadership  of  the 
government,  he  claimed  was  at  the  head  of  a  Russian  party  which 
intended  to  surrender  the  country  into  the  hands  of  the  Musco- 
vites. In  order  to  prevent  this  from  happening,  his  superior  officer, 
Achmet,  had  resolved  to  sail  to  Crete  in  order  that  he  might  come 
to  terms  with  Mehemet  Ali.  After  that  had  been  accomplished  the 
fleet  would  return  and  in  cooperation  with  the  army  of  the 
Taurus  under  command  of  Hafiz  Pasha  would  overthrow  the  pro- 
Russian  Kosrew  and  his  associates.  Lalande,  refusing  to  cooperate 
with  Achmet  Pasha  and  Osman  Bey  in  their  projects,  advised  that 
they  should  proceed  to  Rhodes  rather  than  to  Crete.  Nevertheless, 
he  took  no  steps  to  prevent  them  from  executing  their 
intentions.107  Instead  of  stopping  at  either.  Rhodes  or  Crete  they 
sailed  direct  to  Alexandria  where  they  delivered  up  their  squadron 
unconditionally  into  the  hands  of  the  Pasha.108 

News  about  these  alarming  developments  in  the  Near  East 
began  to  arrive  at  Paris  about  the  middle  of  July.  Soult,  who 
must  have  been  aroused  greatly  by  the  gravity  of  the  situation, 

10*Halil  Pasha  was  the  Seraskier  in  the  new  government.  See  Annual 
Register,  1839,  p.  [411]. 

197 Affaires  etrangeres.  Turquie  278,  fol.  44,  Lalande  to  Roussin,  July  5,  1839, 
quoted  by  A.  Stern,  in  Revue  Historique,  CVII,  pp.  325-326.  Ponsonby  to 
Palmerston,  July  8,  1839,  Roussin  to  Ponsonby,  July  7,  1839,  Levant  Corres- 
pondence, I,  p.  188.  Paton,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  138-141.  See  also  an  article  written 
by  the  Prince  de  Joinville,  who  was  with  Lalande  during  the  interview  with 
Osman  Bey,  published  in  Revue  des  deux  Mondes,  Aug.  I,  1852,  LXXXVII,  pp. 
425-482. 

108The  indifference  with  which  Lalande  acted  on  this  occasion  did  not  fail 
to  attract  attention.  Marshal  Soult,  who  had  been  particularly  anxious  that  the 
status  quo  should  be  maintained,  despatched  a  sharp  reprimand  to  him  and  in 
discussing  the  surrender  of  the  Turkish  fleet  with  Lord  Granville,  admitted  that 
the  Admiral's  conduct  appeared  inexplicable.  See  Affaires  etrangeres.  Turquie 
278,  fol.  182,  Instructions  to  Lalande,  July  27,  1839,  quoted  by  Stern  in  Revue 
Historique,  CVII,  pp.  327-328.  F.  O.  France,  584,  Granville  to  Palmerston,  July 
29,  1839,  cited  by  Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  244. 


IO6  THE  TURCO-EGYPTrAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [432 

became  active  immediately.  On  July  17,  1839,  having  learned 
already  that  the  Sultan  was  dead,  he  wrote  to  Bourqueney: 
"Although  it  is  at  present  extremely  difficult  to  anticipate  the 
nature  of  the  influence  which  this  change  of  reign  may  exercise 
upon  the  destinies  of  the  Orient,  it  is  evident  that  a  crisis  has 
arisen  which  calls  for  the  most  serious  and  loyal  concurrence  of 
all  the  Cabinets  to  secure  the  continuance  of  peace.  It  seems  to 
me  that  the  moment  -has  arrived  to  act  upon  the  idea  already 
suggested  by  M.  de  Metternich,  of  guaranteeing,  by  means  of  an 
interchange  of  diplomatic  declarations,  the  maintenance  of  the 
integrity  and  independence  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  and  in  order 
to  prevent  any  delay,  I  have  resolved  to  assume  the  initiative 
myself  in  the  necessary  steps  to  be  taken  for  that  object.  .  .  . 
Lord  Palmerston  will  no  doubt  reply  to  the  communication  which 
you  will  make  to  him  in  terms  sufficiently  precise  to  attain  the  end 
we  have  in  view."109  Nine  days  later,  after  he  had  received  addi- 
tional information  from  the  Levant,  Soult  continued:  "I  think 
.  .  .  that  it  will  be  desirable  to  continue  the  course  adopted  up  to 
this  time,  .  .  .  which  consists  in  subordinating  as  much  as  pos- 
sible to  an  intimate  and  sustained  concert  between  the  Cabinets, 
the  action  which  some  amongst  them  are  prepared  to  exercise 
in  the  Eastern  question.  As  regards  'England  and  France,  includ- 
ing also  Austria,  although  she  does  not  as  openly  proclaim  her 
views,  the  principal,  the  veritable  object  of  this  concert,  is  to 
restrain  Russia  and  to  accustom  her  to  treat  in  common  on 
Oriental  affairs.  It  is  enough  to  say  that  under  existing  conjunc- 
tions there  is  more  reason  than  ever  for  our  strict  unanimity, 
.  .  .  "110  On  the  same  day  Lord  Granville  reported  in  a  despatch 
written  to  Palmerston  that  the  French  government  was  of  the 
opinion  that  neither  the  disastrous  overthrow  of  the  Turkish  army, 
nor  the  traitorous  conduct  of  the  Capitan  Pasha,  nor  the  pros- 
trate attitude  of  the  Divan  ought  to  affect  the  course  which  the 

10"Soult  to  Bourqueney,  July  17,  1839,  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  pp.  513-514. 
Palmerston  replied  favorably  to  Souk's  proposal.  See  Palmerston  to  Bourqueney, 
July  22,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  p.  175.  Soult  was  always  anxious  to 
make  it  appear  that  the  most  important  question  at  issue  was  that  of  protecting 
Turkey  against  Russia.  The  question  of  the  terms  which  should  be  enforced 
upon  the  two  rivals  in  the  Levant,  he  wished  to  have  it  believed,  was  a  matter 
of  only  secondary  importance.  See  Soult  to  Bourqueney,  Aug.  22,  1839,  Guizot, 
op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  545. 

"°Soult  to  Bourqueney,  July  26,  1839,  ibid.,  p.  519. 


433]      THE  QUESTION  OF  CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  OF  ALEXANDRIA         IO/ 

great  Powers  of  Europe  should  pursue.  A  declaration  to  that 
effect,  Soult  believed,  should  be  made  to  Mehemet  AH.  He  would 
write  to  Vienna  to  let  Metternich  know  the  French  opinion  and 
he  would  urge  him  to  adopt  a  similar  one.111 

In  the  meantime  some  progress  in  the  direction  of  securing  an 
understanding  between  the  eastern  Powers  and  Great  Britain 
relative  to  a  settlement  of  Turco-Egyptian  affairs  was  being  made 
by  means  of  informal  discussions  which  were  promoted  at  Vienna 
by  the  Austrian  Chancellor.  ."Upon  all  the  details,"  Lord  Beauvale 
wrote  to  Palmerston,  July  n,  1839,  "Prince  Metternich  agrees  to 
your  Lordship's  ideas  without  reserve,  and  is  sure  of  their  adop- 
tion by  Russia:  so  that,  according  to  him,  England,  Austria  and 
Russia  are  placed  exactly  upon  the  same  line,  and  there  only 
remains  to  induce  France  to  relinquish  her  deviations  from  it."112 
"The  outline  of  the  terms  is  already  sketched,"  he  stated  in 
another  despatch  written  the  same  day,  "and  may  be  considered 
as  adopted  by  England,  Austria,  Prussia,  and  Russia.  .  .  .  Prince 
Metternich  requests  the  British  government  to  persuade  France." 
The  only  points  which  remained  to  be  agreed  on  by  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  four  Powers,  according  to  the  British  Ambas- 
sador, were  those  relative  to  the  possession  of  the  east  coast  of 
the  Red  Sea,  the  amount  of  tribute  to  be  levied  upon  Egypt  by 
the  Sultan,  the  "obligation  of  [Mehemet  Ali  to  accept  Ottoman] 
treaties,"  and  the  extent  of  disarmament  to  be  required  of  the 
Viceroy.  He  admitted  that  these  points  would  yet  occasion  many 
difficulties,  but  he  maintained:  "It  is  clear  that  Vienna  in  its 
relations  with  that  place  [Constantinople]  is  nearly  a  month 
ahead  of  London  and  Petersburg."113 

The  activities  at  the  Austrian  capital  were  intensified  when  it 
became  known  there  that  the  Sultan  was  dead  and  that  the  new 
Ottoman  government  proposed  to  offer  its  pardon  to  Mehemet 
Ali.  Beauvale  reported  to  Palmerston  on  July  19,  1839,  that 
events  had  totally  changed  the  state  of  things,  and  it  might  be  felt 

luGranville  to  Palmerston,  July  26,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  p.  195. 

luBeauvale  to  Palmerston,  July  II,  1839,  ibid.,  p.  180. 

U8Beauvale  to  Palmerston,  July  II,  1839.  Ibid.,  pp.  178-179.  According  to 
Beauvale,  Metternich  was  applied  to  by  the  Porte  for  advice  and  this,  with  the 
proximity  of  Vienna  to  Constantinople,  threw  the  negotiation  very  much  into 
his  hands.  "...  nor,"  Beauvale  commented,  "considering  the  identity  of  his 
objects  with  our  own,  can  it  be  better  placed."  See  ibid. 


IO8  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [434 

by  Her  Majesty's  government  to  require  an  alteration  in  their 
determinations.  It  was  probable,  he  thought,  that  the  Sultan  and 
the  Pasha  would  come  to  an  agreement,  for  the  latter  would  prefer 
closing  at  once  rather  than  waiting  for  the  interposition  of  the  five 
Powers.114  Metternich's  views  were  of  a  similar  character.115 
Alarmed  lest  a  direct  settlement  should  actually  be  concluded 
between  the  two  rivals  in  the  Orient,  he  immediately  despatched, 
probably  with  the  consent  of  the  Vienna  representatives  of  the 
Powers,116  instructions  to  Constantinople  for  the  Internuncio  and 
his  colleagues  to  adopt  measures  to  dissuade,  if  possible,  the  Sultan 
from  prostrating  himself  before  Mehemet  Ali,  and  to  engage  him 
to  rely  upon  the  European  Powers  for  protection.117  These 
instructions  sent  from  Vienna  on  July  16,  arrived  in  the  Ottoman 
capital  on  the  27th,  and  before  the  day  of  their  arrival  was  spent 
the  European  representatives — Sturmer,  Ponsonby,  Roussin,  Bou- 
tenieff,  and  Koenigsmarck — had  signed  the  famous  collective  note  of 
July  27,  i839,118  framed  in  the  following  terms:  "The  undersigned 

U4Beauvale  to  Palmerston,  July  19,  1839,  ibid.,  p.  192. 

""See  an  extract  of  a  despatch,  Metternich  to  Roller,  Austrian  representa- 
tive in  Berlin,  July  26,  1839,  Berlin  Archives,  vol.  3,  quoted  by  Hasenclever, 
op.  cit.,  p.  54  [footnote  115]. 

"'See  an  extract  of  a  despatch,  Sturmer  to  Metternich,  July  29,  1839, 
Vienna  Archives,  Turkey  50,  quoted  by  ibid.,  p.  55  [footnote  118].  Metternich's 
fear  was  well  founded.  Note  the  following  extract  of  a  despatch,  Ponsonby  to 
Palmerston,  July  29,  1839:  "It  [the  collective  note]  was  .  .  .  most  fortunately 
well-timed,  for  the  Ottoman  Ministers  had  actually  resolved  upon  concessions  to 
the  Egyptian  Pasha,  which  would  have  been  at  this  moment  on  their  way  to 
Alexandria,  and  which  would  have  mischievously  complicated  the  affairs  of  this 
country." — Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp.  292-293.  Annual  Register,  1840, 
p.  467. 

"'Hasenclever,  op.  cit.,  pp.  50-52.  Granville  to  Palmerston,  July  22,  1839, 
Levant  Correspondence,  I,  p.  186.  See  also  the  diary  of  the  Princess  Metternich, 
[Fiirstin  Melanie]  under  date  of  Aug.  2,  1839,  Metternich,  op.  cit.,  VI, 
pp.  309-310. 

^Hasenclever,  op.  cit.,  p.  53.  Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  July  29,  1839, 
Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp.  292-293.  The  issuance  of  the  collective  note,  as 
Hasenclever  points  out,  was  provoked  by  Metternich  alone,  and  it  was  perhaps 
the  only  outward  result  of  the  negotiations  for  the  Vienna  conference  plan. 
Metternich's  chief  interest  was  not  in  saving  Turkey  but  in  securing  the  unity 
of  the  Powers  and  their  domination  of  the  situation  in  the  Near  East.  Hasen- 
clever credits  Maltzan  with  claiming  that  Metternich  hoped  to  crown  his 
career's  accomplishments  with  the  settlement  of  the  Near  Eastern  question.  See 
Hasenclever,  op.  cit.,  pp.  47,  50-55. 


435]      THE  QUESTION  OF  CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  OF  ALEXANDRIA         IO9 

have  received,  this  morning,  from  their  respective  Governments 
instructions,  in  virtue  whereof  they  have  the  honor  to  inform  the 
Sublime  Porte,  that  agreement  among  the  Five  Great  Powers  on 
the  Question  of  the  East  is  secured,  and  to  invite  it  to  suspend  any 
definitive  resolution  without  their  concurrence,  waiting  for  the 
effect  of  the  interest  which  these  Powers  feel  for  it."119 

Regardless  of  the  profession  which  was  made  in  the  text  of  the 
collective  note,  it  is  evident  that  on  that  occasion  the  Russian 
government  was  still  anxious  to  avoid  entering  into  a  conference 
for  the  settlement  of  the  Near  Eastern  question.120  On  the  same 
day  that  Sturmer  and  the  other  European  representatives  at  Con- 
stantinople signed  the  note  quoted  above,  after  he  had  learned 
that  the  Porte  had  offered  to  make  peace  with  the  Viceroy,  the 
Russian  Chancellor  wrote  to  M.  de  Kisseleff:  "These  determina- 
tions [of  the  Porte  to  make  peace],  dictated  by  a  genuine  spirit 
of  conciliation  and  wisdom,  simplify  greatly  the  question,  the 
solution  of  which  the  Allied  Cabinets  have  at  heart.  The  Porte, 
induced  by  a  just  appreciation  of  its  true  interests,  has  anticipated 
the  propositions  which  the  Five  Powers  were  on  the  point  of  making 
to  it.  ...  It  has  resolved  to  offer  to  Mehemet  AH  the  inheritance 
of  Egypt  in  return  for  the  cession  of  Syria.  .  .  . 

"The  basis  of  negotiation  has  thus  been  laid  down  by  the 
Porte  itself.  It  has  of  its  own  accord  opened  the  deliberation,  and 
has  virtually  fixed  its  locality  at  Constantinople,  the  only  place 
where  it  was  fitting  that  interests,  having  direct  reference  to  the 
future  fate  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  should  be  discussed."121  It  is 
quite  apparent  that  the  cause  for  the  persistent  refusal  on  the  part 
of  Russia  to  join  in  a  conference  with  the  other  Powers  was  the 
Cabinet  of  St.  Petersburg's  time-worn  fear  that  at  such  a  confer- 

™*State  Papers,  XXVIII,  pp.  408-409.  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  p.  293. 
Annual  Register,  1840,  p.  468.  Martens,  N.  S.,  Ill,  p.  875. 

1JOSee  an  extract  of  a  despatch,  Nesselrode  to  Strove,  July  18/30,  1839, 
quoted  by  Goriainow,  op.  cit.,  pp.  55-58.  Nesselrode  complained  to  the  foreign 
Ambassadors  at  St.  Petersburg  but  evidently  was  not  greatly  dissatisfied  when 
he  learned  that  the  collective  note  had  been  signed.  The  note,  it  can  be  seen 
readily,  did  not  in  any  way  bind  Russia  to  enter  into  a  formal  conference 
between  the  Powers.  See  Barante  to  Soult,  Aug.  10,  1839,  Barante,  op.  cit., 
p.  296.  Hasenclever,  op.  cit,,  p.  55. 

'"Nesselrode  to  Kisseleff,  July  15/27,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp. 
257-259-  Annual  Register,  1840,  pp.  463-466. 


IIO  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,  1832-1841  [436 

ence  England  and  France — especially  the  latter — would  insist  on 
the  conclusion  of  a  convention  to  guarantee  the  integrity  and  the 
independence  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.122  On  July  25,  1839,  Baron 
Meyendorff,  the  Russian  representative  at  Berlin,  declared  to  Sir 
George  Hamilton,  the  British  charge  d'affaires,  that  the  Musco- 
vite Cabinet  would  be  willing  to  sign  at  once  a  declaration  of  the 
independence  of  the  Turkish  Empire  and  that  it  would  promise, 
along  with  the  rest  of  the  European  Cabinets,  not  to  seek  to 
profit  by  the  existing  state  of  things,  but  guaranteeing  the  in- 
tegrity of  the  Empire  was  something  entirely  different.123 

The  persistent  hesitation  of  Russia  to  unite  in  a  conference  with 
the  other  Powers  for  the  settlement  of  the  affairs  of  the  East 
pleased  the  French  most  highly.  "M.  de  Metternich  has  forwarded 
an  answer  in  conformity  with  our  declaration  in  favor  of  the  inde- 
pendence and  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,"  Marshal  Soult 
wrote  on  August  i,  1839.  "According  to  what  M.  de  Sainte- 
Aulaire  [the  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna]  writes  to  me,  the 
Chancellor  of  Austria,  who  recently  appeared  to  be  quite  satisfied 
with  the  intentions  manifested  by  Russia,  is  now  extremely  uneasy 
on  that  point.  It  appears  that  the  Cabinet  of  St.  Petersburg,  far 
from  continuing  the  assurances,  otherwise  sufficiently  vague, 
which  it  had  at  first  proffered  of  its  desire  to  act  in  concert  with 
the  other  Powers,124  now  recedes,  under  frivolous  pretexts,  from  all 
that  might  substantiate  or  reduce  them  to  formal  acts.  I  am  sur- 
prised at  the  astonishment  which  M.  de  Metternich  evinces  at 
this  proceeding.  I  never  imagined  that,  in  the  actual  question, 
Russia  would  be  brought  to  associate  herself  frankly  with  the 
other  Cabinets  whose  policy  is  so  opposed  to  hers;  ...  It  is 

^See  an  extract  from  Nesselrode's  report  to  Nicholas,  Aug.  3/15,  1839, 
quoted  by  Goriainow,  op.  cit.,  pp.  58-60. 

123Hamilton  to  Palmerston,  July  31,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I, 
pp.  236-237. 

"'Note  the  following  comment  made  by  M.  de  Barante  at  a  later  date:  "II 
[the  Tsar]  en  fut  mecontent  et  presque  irrite.  Toute  fois  apres  quelque  delai, 
apres  plus  d'une  conversation  avec  1'ambassadeur  d'Autriche,  il  lui  dit  qu'un 
plenipotentiaires  russe  se  rendrait  a  la  conference  de  Vienne.  Quelques  heures 
apres  cette  determination,  qui  n'etait  encore  ni  officielle  ni  ecrite,  la  mort  du 
Sultan  fut  soudainement  annoncee." — quoted  by  Hasenclever,  op.  cit.,  p.  46, 
[footnote  90].  See  also  Barante,  op.  cit.,  VI,  pp.  261,  265.  Russell  to  Palmer- 
ston, July  6,  1839;  Granville  to  Palmerston,  July  12,  1839,  Levant  Correspond- 
ence, I,  pp.  162,  168. 


43?]      THE  QUESTION  OF  CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  OF  ALEXANDRIA         III 

necessary  .  .  .  that  the  Powers,  particularly  France  and  England, 
should  hold  an  absolutely  uniform  language  towards  the  Cabinet 
of  St.  Petersburg  and  to  address  it  only  by  measures  identical  in 
character."125  On  another  occasion  he  professed  that  he  personally 
was  disposed  to  think  that  the  ground  on  which  the  Powers  should 
propose  to  negotiate  with  Mehemet  Ali  should  be  the  latter's  ob- 
taining the  hereditary  possession  of  Egypt  and  his  giving  up  the 
other  pashalics  which  he  was  then  holding;  "but,"  he  continued, 
"...  some  latitude  must  be  given  to  our  Representatives  at 
Vienna,  to  accede  to  terms  more  favourable  to  Mehemet  AH."126 

Although  the  Marshal  did  follow  a  cautious  policy,  the  apparent 
accord  between  England  and  France  was  destined  to  be  short- 
lived. When  it  became  known  at  London  that  the  Turkish  fleet 
had  been  treacherously  surrendered  to  the  Pasha,  Palmerston  was 
aroused  to  action,  and  accordingly  on  August  3,  and  5  and  7,  he 
forwarded  to  Bourqueney  and  to  Granville,  respectively,  for  the 
approval  of  the  French  government  sets  of  proposed  instructions 
of  a  drastic  character  for  the  two  Admirals  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean.127 Palmerston's  plan  was  for  the  fleets  of  Stopford  and 
Lalande  to  sail  direct  to  Alexandria  and  demand  the  release  of  the 
Turkish  vessels.  If  the  Viceroy  should  refuse  to  do  promptly  as  he 
was  ordered,  the  allied  squadron  should  then  secure  their  ends  by 
resorting  to  force.  Such  measures,  however,  were  entirely  too 
drastic  to  secure  the  endorsement  of  Marshal  Soult.  "The 
hostilities  in  the  East  are  evidently  terminated,"  he  reflected 
in  a  despatch  written  on  August  6,  1839.  "Neither  by  land 
nor  by  sea  have  we  any  announcement  of  an  intention  to  continue, 
or  rather  to  resume  them.  ...  In  this  state  of  things,  the 
defection  of  the  Ottoman  fleet  is  an  unfortunate  and  much  to 
be  regetted  event,  for  which  we  must  endeavor  to  provide  a 
remedy;  but  it  scarcely  constitutes  one  of  those  cases  of 
imminent  danger  which  justifies  such  extreme  measures  as  are 

"5Soult  to  Bourqueney,  Aug.  I,  1839,  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  pp.  527-528. 

^Granville  to  Palmerston,  Aug.  2,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  p.  235. 

mSee  Palmerston's  proposed  instructions  to  the  two  Admirals,  Aug.  3,  1839; 
Supplementary  instructions  to  the  Admirals,  Aug.  3,  1839;  Palmerston  to  Lords 
Commissioners  of  Admiralty,  Aug.  5,  1839;  Palmerston  to  Granville,  Aug.  5, 
1839,  ibid.,  pp.  233,  234,  238-239,  240.  See  also,  Palmerston  to  Lords  Commis- 
sioners of  Admiralty,  Aug.  7,  1839;  Palmerston  to  Granville,  Aug.  7,  1839,  ibid., 
pp.  255-256. 


112  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-1841  [438 

now  proposed  to  us  ...  an  act  of  hostility  against  Mehemet  AH 
would  not  facilitate  the  plan  proposed  by  England  and  France  in 
concert.  In  destroying  the  Egyptian  fleet  we  would  not  only  add 
no  strength  to  the  Porte,  but  also  we  would  not  induce  the  Viceroy 
to  abate  his  pretensions  in  the  slightest  degree  ...  I  do  not 
hesitate  to  say  that  in  ruining  the  Pasha  of  Egypt  we  shall  bring 
about  the  destruction  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Our  policy  today, 
as  from  the  commencement  of  the  crisis,  ought  to  be  to  take  care 
above  all  other  considerations  that  Constantinople  receive  no  for- 
eign protection  without  our  common  consent."128 

Only  a  few  days  before  the  above  quoted  despatch  was  written, 
Soult  received  information  from  Cochelet  which,  it  appears,  in- 
fluenced him  to  be  more  outspoken  than  he  had  been  formerly  in 
his  favoritism  for  Mehemet  Ali.129  As  Palmerston,  influenced  by 
news  of  the  events  which  were  taking  place  in  the  Levant,  was 
at  the  same  time  becoming  more  determined  in  his  hostility 
towards  the  Viceroy,  it  soon  became  apparent  that  England  and 
France  would  very  probably  be  unable  to  reach  an  agreement 
upon  all  that  appertained  to  the  question  of  the  Near  East.  On 
August  13,  1839,  Soult  directed  the  French  Minister  of  Marine, 
Duperre,  to  instruct  Admiral  Lalande  that  if  the  Captain  Pasha's 
fleet  was  still  outside  of  the  harbor  of  Alexandria  he  should  com- 
municate with  the  captains  of  the  vessels  and  try  to  induce  them 
to  return  to  Constantinople.  No  force  should  be  used,  though,  un- 
less it  was  necessary  for  self-defense.  In  case  the  Ottoman 
squadron  had  already  entered  Egyptian  waters,  and  in  case 
Mehemet  Ali  refused  to  give  it  up,  the  French  Admiral  should  be 
satisfied  with  leaving  a  few  warships  to  observe  it  and  return 
with  the  remainder  of  his  armament  to  his  station  off  the  coast 
of  Asia  Minor.  Furthermore,  when  he  first  went  to  Egypt  he 


to  Bourqueney,  Aug.  6,  1839,  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  pp.  532-535. 
mCochelet  had  reported  that  the  Viceroy,  conscious  of  the  power  he 
possessed,  could  not  be  induced  to  recede  in  any  essential  point  from  the  condi- 
tions of  a  reconciliation  which  he  had  put  forward  in  communication  with  the 
Consuls-General  at  Alexandria  on  July  14  and  15,  1839.  At  that  time,  the  Pasha 
declared  he  would  not  be  satisfied  unless  he  received  the  hereditary  possession 
of  all  the  provinces  and  all  the  Sandjaks  which  he  held.  According  to  Cochelet 
he  had  more  than  60  war  vessels  and  an  army  of  200,000  men  with  which  to 
enforce  his  demands.  See,  Granville  to  Palmerston,  Aug.  5,  1839,  Levant  Cor- 
respondence, I,  pp.  256-257.  See  also,  Brief  Summary  of  two  Interviews  between 
Pasha  of  Egypt  and  Consuls-General,  July  14  and  15,  1839;  Mehemet  Ali  to 
Grand  Vizier,  July  16,  1839,  ibid.,  pp.  244-246,  296. 


439]       THE  QUESTION  OF  CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  OF  ALEXANDRIA         113 

should  leave  behind  an  adequate  portion  of  his  fleet  to  be  ready  to 
act  if  the  Russians  should  appear  at  Constantinople  or  if  an  allied 
squadron  should  be  summoned  by  the  Porte  to  sail  into  the  Sea 
of  Marmora.  "It  must  not  be  forgotten,"  Soult  declared  in  con- 
clusion, "that  this  [the  latter],  after  all,  is  the  principal  question, 
and  that  consequently,  watchfulness  on  this  point  should  be  in- 
cessant."130 

The  instructions  which  Palmerston  at  length  prepared  for  Stop- 
ford  were  of  an  entirely  different  character.  "I  am  to  acquaint 
your  Lordships,"  he  wrote  on  August  24  to  the  Lords  Commis- 
sioners of  the  Admiralty,  "that  it  is  Her  Majesty's  pleasure  that 
Admiral  Sir  Robert  Stopford  should  not  be  precluded  from  execut- 
ing any  instructions  given  to  him  by  Lord  Beauvale,  and  arising 
out  of  the  negotiations  at  Vienna,  provided  the  measures  to  be 
taken  shall  be  such  as  Sir  Robert  Stopford  may  think  himself 
to  have  adequate  means  to  execute,  even  though  the  French 
Admiral  should  not  receive  corresponding  instructions  from  his 
own  Government  or  from  the  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna."131 

The  divergence  between  the  respective  positions  taken  by  Eng- 
land and  France  became  most  obvious  after  it  was  known  in  the 
west  that  the  European  representatives  at  Constantinople  had 
issued  a  "collective  note"  to  the  Porte  enjoining  it  "to  suspend 
any  definitive  resolution"  without  the  concurrence  of  the  Powers, 
for  the  immediate  danger  of  Russian  intervention  in  Turkey, 
which  had  tended  to  hold  the  two  western  Cabinets  together,  was 
thereby  removed.132  On  August  20,  1839,  the  day  after  Palmer- 

130Soult  to  Duperre,  Aug.  13,  1839,  ibid.,  pp.  288-289. 

131Palmerston  to  the  Lords  Commissioners  of  Admiralty,  Aug.  24,  1839, 
ibid.,  p.  314. 

""Lord  Ponsonby  was  elated  after  the  note  of  July  27,  1839,  had  been 
signed.  See  Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  July  29,  1839,  ibid.,  pp.  292-293.  Annual 
Register,  1840,  pp.  467-468.  Palmerston  was  also  well  pleased.  See  Palmerston  to 
Ponsonby,  Aug.  21,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  p.  311.  Note  also  the 
following  extract  of  a  despatch,  Bourqueney  to  Soult,  Aug.  18,  1839,  which  was 
written  after  Palmerston  had  learned  from  Austrian  sources  about  the  signing 
of  the  note  of  July  27,  1839:  "Votre  Excellence  jugera,  par  ce  qui  precede, 
du  changement  qui  s'est  opere  depuis  trente-huit  heures  dans  1'esprit  des 
membres  du  cabinet  anglais. 

"On  n'admettait  pas  la  possibilite  du  concours  de  la  Russie:  aujourd'hui, 
on  1'espere. 

"On  esperait  le  concours  de  1'Autriche  jusqu'au  bout:  on  n'en  doute  plus." 
— Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  pp.  542-543. 


114  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-1841  [440 

ston  had  received  from  Lord  Ponsonby  a  copy  of  the  collective 
note,  he  wrote  to  Henry  Bulwer,  the  British  charge  d'affaires  at 
Paris  in  the  absence  of  Lord  Granville,  stating  that  the  five  Powers 
were  the  friends  and  the  allies  of  the  Sultan.  They,  in  fact,  had 
declared  spontaneously  in  the  note  of  July  27,  1839,  their  inten- 
tion to  uphold  the  integrity  and  the  independence  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire.  The  British  government  felt,  therefore,  that  they  were 
bound  to  compel  Mehemet  Ali  to  return  the  Ottoman  fleet.  More- 
over, because  of  the  fact  that  the  government  of  Great  Britain  be- 
lieved that  all  future  steps  ought  to  be  taken,  if  possible,  col- 
lectively by  the  five  and  that  a  decision  concerning  such  steps 
ought  to  emanate  from  Vienna,  which  was  the  central  point  of 
negotiations,  it  was  about  to  send  instructions  to  Beauvale  to  take 
up  with  the  representatives  of  the  Powers  at  the  Court  of  the 
Emperor  Ferdinand  the  question  of  insisting  on  the  restoration  of 
the  fleet  as  an  indispensable  preliminary  to  any  negotiation  what- 
ever upon  any  other  point.  The  consular  agents  at  Alexandria, 
according  to  Palmerston's  view,  should  be  instructed  by  the  dip- 
lomats at  Vienna  to  demand  of  Mehemet  Ali  the  restoration  of  the 
Turkish  vessels,  and  if  he  should  refuse  to  obey,  then  they  [the 
consular  agents]  should  all  withdraw.  If  that  did  not  bring  the 
Pasha  to  terms,  Syria  and  Egypt  should  be  blockaded,  Egyptian 
merchant  ships  should  be  seized  on  the  high  seas  and  in  Syrian 
ports,  Candia  should  be  occupied  and  restored  to  the  direct 
authority  of  the  Sultan,  and  finally,  Mehemet  Ali  should  be 
notified  that  the  allied  fleet  would  defend  the  Turkish  Empire 
"against  any  attack  on  his  part,  as  effectually  as  if  it  were  a 
Turkish  fleet."133  "Her  Majesty's  government,"  Palmerston  de- 
clared "will  give  instructions  to  Sir  Robert  Stopford  to  take  any, 
or  all,  of  these  steps,  if  he  shall  be  directed  so  to  do  by  Her 
Majesty's  Ambassador  at  Vienna  .  .  .  and  you  are  instructed  to 
invite  the  French  Government  to  send  similar  instructions  and 
authority  to  their  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  and  to  their  Admiral  in 
the  Mediterranean."133 

The  British  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  must  have  realized, 
however,  that  there  was  not  much  chance  that  the  French  Min- 
isters would  send  such  instructions  to  their  representatives,  for 

"'Palmerston  to  Bulwer,  Aug.  20,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp.  309- 
310.    Annual  Register,   1840,  pp.  472-475. 


441  ]      THE  QUESTION  OF  CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  OF  ALEXANDRIA        115 

in  his  despatch  to  Bulwer,  which,  by  the  way,  the  latter  was 
directed  to  communicate  to  Soult,  he  warned  that  Stopford 
might  act  "either  with,  or  without  the  co-operation  of  any  one  of 
the  other  squadrons,"  and,  on  August  25,  1839,  Just  fiye  days  after 
he  had  written  thus  to  Bulwer,  he  wrote  as  follows  to  Beauvale: 
"Her  Majesty's  Government  are  most  anxious  to  proceed  ...  in 
concert  with  the  other  Four  Powers  and  are  ready  to  make  some 
sacrifice  of  opinion  in  order  to  arrive  at  unanimous  action.  But  if 
your  Excellency  should  find  it  impossible  to  obtain  an  unanimous 
assent  of  your  colleagues  to  any  course  of  proceeding  on  this  mat- 
ter which  would  be  consistent  with  the  principles  upon  which  the 
British  government  is  acting,  or  which  could  be  likely  to  attain 
the  objects  in  view,  your  Excellency  is  authorized  to  act  in  concert 
with  a  less  number  than  the  Four,  if  you  shall  find  that  any 
reasonable  and  effectual  course  of  proceeding  is  assented  to  by 
such  a  proportion  of  the  Five  as  may  give  to  that  course  adequate 
moral  weight  and  sufficient  physical  means."134 

It  soon  became  apparent  that  what  Palmerston  must  have  at 
least  suspicioned  in  regard  to  the  intentions  of  the  French  govern- 
ment was  based  on  excellent  grounds.  Bulwer  reported  on  August 
26,  1839,  that  from  a  conversation  he  had  had  with  Soult  that 
same  morning  he  was  induced  to  apprehend  that  the  government 
of  France  was  resolved  to  throw  obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  se- 
lection of  Vienna  as  the  place  for  settling  and  agreeing  upon  the 
affairs  of  the  East.  The  cause  for  that  resolution,  Bulwer  believed, 
was  to  be  sought  in  the  difference  which  really  existed  between 
the  views  of  the  French  government  and  those  entertained  by  the 
other  governments  relative  to  the  manner  in  which  they  should 
deal  with  Mehemet  Ali.  "I  fear,"  he  added,  "that  no  decided 
measures  of  a  coercive  character  will  be  employed  by  France  for 

"'Palmerston  to  Beauvale,  Aug.  25,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp.  315- 
317.  In  another  despatch  written  on  the  same  date  to  Beauvale,  Palmerston 
pointed  out  that  up  to  that  time  nothing  had  happened  to  alter  the  opinion  of 
the  British  government  as  to  the  nature  of  the  final  settlement  which  it  would 
be  desirable  for  the  five  Powers  to  effect  between  the  Sultan  and  Mehemet  Ali, 
nor  to  change  its  belief  that  if  the  five  should  agree  to  press  any  given  arrange- 
ment upon  the  Viceroy,  their  union  would  carry  sufficient  moral  weight  to  ob- 
tain from  him  his  acquiescence  in  their  decision.  Ibid.,  pp.  317-319.  See  also 
Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  296. 


Il6  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,  1832-1841  [442 

limiting  the  ambition  of  the  Viceroy,  or  for  restoring  the  [Turkish] 
fleet  to  the  Sultan."135 

Meanwhile  the  Court  of  St.  Petersburg,  which  from  an  early 
date,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  attempted  to  satisfy  the  other 
European  Courts,  and  in  particular  the  Court  of  St.  James,  that 
Russia  was  not  desirous  of  effecting  an  armed  intervention  in 
Turkey  under  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  of  Unkiar  Skelessi, 
realized  that  the  seeming  accord  between  England  and  France  in 
regard  to  Eastern  affairs  was  likely  to  disappear.  Nesselrode  had 
repeated  more  than  once,  Lord  Clanricarde,  the  British  Ambas- 
sador at  the  Tsar's  capital,  wrote  to  Palmerston,  July  18,  1839, 
that  the  Russian  government  was  ready  to  accede  to  any  proposal 
which  was  favorable  to  the  Sultan.  In  addition,  he  had  expressed 
great  doubts  whether  the  Powers  could  prevail  upon  Mehemet 
Ali  to  resign  Syria  immediately  and  he  asked  the  British  Ambas- 
sador if  he  believed  France  would  press,  "or  even  propose"  to  the 
Viceroy  that  he  should  make  such  a  sacrifice.136  Again,  on  July 
27,  1839,  Clanricarde  reported  that  Nesselrode  had  discussed  with 
him  the  "probability"  that  France  would  desire  better  terms 
than  those  which  were  favored  by  the  other  Powers  for  Mehemet 
Ali  and  whether  she  would  not  insist  especially  that  the  Egyptian 
should  retain  the  Pashalic  of  Acre.  Of  still  more  significance  was 
the  statement  within  this  despatch  which  revealed  that  Nesselrode 
had  told  the  representative  of  Great  Britain  that  the  precise  terms 
of  the  final  settlement  to  be  imposed  upon  the  hostile  parties  in 
the  Levant  "would  virtually  depend  upon  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment."137 

While  Russia's  chief  Minister  was  making  advances  thus  to  the 

135Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  Aug.  26,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  p.  321. 

13*Clanricarde  to  Palmerston,  July  18,  1839,  ibid.,  p.  201.  Metternich,  also, 
became  suspicious  at  an  early  date  in  regard  to  the  intentions  of  France.  See 
Metternich  to  Apponyi,  July  14,  1839,  Metternich,  op.  cit.,  VI,  p.  351. 

^Clanricarde  to  Palmerston,  July  27,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  p.  237. 
Nesselrode  perceived  very  early  that  France  was  placing  more  emphasis  upon  the 
conclusion  of  a  convention  to  guarantee  the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  than 
England  was.  Aug.  3,  1839,  Barante  quoted  Nesselrode  as  follows:  "  'Je  doute 
qu'il  convienne  a  PAngleterre,' — me  repondit  M.  de  Nesselrode, — 'de  voir  1'etat 
de  I'Orient  sous  la  garantie  commune  de  1'Europe.' " — Barante  to  Soult, 
Aug.  3,  1839,  Barante,  op.  cit.,  VI,  p.  276.  See  also,  Barante  to  Soult,  July  20, 
1839,  ibid.,  pp.  265-266. 


443]      THE  QUESTION  OF  CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  OF  ALEXANDRIA         I IJ 

British  through  their  Ambassador  at  the  Muscovite  capital  he  was, 
on  the  other  hand,  becoming  less  friendly  with  the  French,  object- 
ing in  particular  against  the  attitude  which  Louis  Philippe's  gov- 
ernment had  assumed  on  the  question  of  sending  its  fleet  through 
the  Dardanelles.  "If,  unfortunately,  the  hope  which  the  Emperor 
has  reason  to  found  upon  the  moderation  of  the  French  Govern- 
ment," he  wrote  to  Count  Medem,  the  Tsar's  representative  at 
Paris,  "should  not  be  realized;  if  the  appearance  of  a  foreign  fleet 
in  the  Sea  of  Marmora  should  come  to  aggravate  the  state  of 
affairs  at  Constantinople,  the  course  which  Russia  would  have  to 
pursue  would  not  be  doubtful.  In  the  presence  of  a  foreign  fleet 
the  Emperor's  Minister  [at  Constantinople]  would  formally  pro- 
test against  the  flagrant  violation  of  the  principle  of  the  closing 
of  the  Dardanelles;  a  principle  which  the  Porte  has  at  all  times 
considered  as  a  fundamental  rule  of  its  policy,  and  which  it  has 
engaged  itself  to  us  invariably  to  maintain;  he  would  declare  that 
he  regarded  this  violation  as  contrary  to  the  independence  of  the 
Porte;  he  would  immediately  suspend  his  functions,  and  quit  Con- 
stantinople. Then  it  would  only  remain  for  the  Emperor  to  take 
such  measures  as  he  might  consider  necessary  to  re-establish  the 
Porte  in  its  entire  independence,  and  to  enable  it  to  fulfil  its  en- 
gagements towards  us,  free  from  all  foreign  constraint."1?8 

As  time  advanced,  the  anxiety  of  Russia  to  come  to  an  under- 
standing with  Great  Britain  increased.  Clanricarde  stated  in  a 
despatch  written  to  Palmerston  August  10,  1839,  that  Nesselrode 
had  repeated  to  him  the  same  assurances  which  he  had  formerly 
made  that  the  Russian  government  was  most  desirous  of  avoiding 
any  military  demonstration,  or  any  necessity  for  carrying  into 
execution  the  main  clause  of  the  Treaty  of  Unkiar  Skelessi.139 
August  22,  1839,  less  than  two  weeks  later,  the  British  Am- 
bassador continued:  "Count  Nesselrode  told  me  yesterday,  that 
he  had  that  morning  received  a  courier  from  London;  that  the 
English  Government  took  the  same  view  of  the  affairs  of  Turkey 

"'Nesselrode  to  Medem,  July  25/Aug.  6,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I, 
pp.  304-306.  Annual  Register,  1840,  pp.  469-472.  See  also,  Metternich,  op.  cit., 
VI,  p.  353,  [footnote].  Metternich  to  Apponyi,  Aug.  7,  1839,  ibid.,  pp.  352-354. 
Barante  to  Soult,  July  13,  Aug.  3,  1839,  quoted  by  Guichen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  105-107. 

139Clanricarde  to  Palmerston,  Aug.  10,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp. 
299-300. 


Il8  THE  TURCO-EGYPTI AN  QUESTION,   1832-1841  [444 

as  that  of  Russia;  that  the  French  Government,  in  reply  to  a 
proposition  made  by  your  Lordship,  had  refused  to  be  a  party  to 
coerce  Mehemet  Ali,  who  had  become  more  and  more  insolent, 
and  positive  in  his  demands  upon  the  Sultan."140  Finally,  on  August 
27,  1839,  the  Russian  Chancellor  informed  Clanricarde  that  the 
Emperor,  having  reason  to  believe  that  the  British  government 
was  better  disposed  toward  Russia  and  that  it  entertained  a  more 
favorable  and  just  opinion  of  his  views  and  policy  than  theretofore, 
was  desirous  of  improving  that  disposition  to  the  utmost  and  of 
strengthening  the  good  understanding  which  "so  happily  existed" 
between  the  two  Powers.  Hence,  His  Majesty  had  resolved  on 
sending  Baron  de  Brunnow,  one  of  his  most  favored  diplomats, 
upon  a  special  mission  to  London.141  The  Emperor  Nicholas  and 
his  ministers  perceived,  undoubtedly,  that  the  most  strategic  posi- 
tion in  the  whole  affair  was  that  occupied  by  Lord  Palmerston.  If 
the  latter  agreed  to  unite  with  the  Russians  upon  a  definite  pro- 
gram, it  was  practically  certain  that  Austria  and  Prussia  would  do 
likewise142  and  France  would  be  forced  either  to  conform  with 

"°Clanricarde  to  Palmerston,  Aug.  22,  1839,  ibid.,  p.  375. 

141Clanricarde  to  Palmerston,  Aug.  27,  1839,  ibid.,  p.  375.  On  the  same 
date,  according  to  Clanricarde,  Nesselrode  told  him  that  the  French  government 
would  "on  no  account"  join  in  coercing  the  Pasha  of  Egypt  by  force  of  arms. 
It  deemed  it  better  that  the  Sultan  should  accede  to  Mehemet  Ali's  demands 
than  that  armed  interference  should  be  effected  to  prevent  the  dismemberment 
of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  In  answer,  Clanricarde  claimed,  he  said  that  he  was 
sure  that,  even  if  the  British  government  were  to  be  alone  in  such  a  course, 
it  would  support  the  just  rights  and  interests  of  the  Sultan.  Nesselrode  replied 
"in  a  manner  that  showed  it  was  a  decision  which  had  been  maturely  formed. 
'You  may  be  sure  that  we  shall  not  desert  you  in  such  a  case.' "  See  Clanricarde 
to  Palmerston,  Aug.  28,  1839,  ibid.,  p.  376.  In  the  same  despatch  Clanricarde 
remarked:  "On  the  whole,  I  found  Count  Nesselrode  yesterday  more  at  his 
ease  upon  the  state  of  the  Turco-Egyptian  Question,  than  he  had  been,  because, 
although  it  appeared  more  difficult  than  ever  to  settle  without  some  act  or 
demonstration  of  armed  intervention,  there  appeared  a  chance  of  Russia  and 
England  acting  in  concert."  Note  also  the  following  statement  which  Barante 
reported  Nesselrode  had  made  to  him:  "  'Nous  profitons  du  moment  ou  lord 
Palmerston  est  aimable  pour  nous!'" — Barante  to  Soult,  Aug.  28,  1839,  Barante, 
op.  cit.,  VI,  p.  311.  See  also,  Schiemann,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  p.  383  [footnote]. 

142Austria  and  Prussia,  it  should  be  remembered,  were  inclined  to  favor  the 
position  taken  by  Palmerston.  See  Russell  to  Palmerston,  June  26,  1839; 
Beauvale  to  Palmerston,  July  n,  19,  Aug.  I,  2,  1839;  Hamilton  to  Palmerston, 
July  24,  Aug.  14,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp.  122,  178-181,  192-193, 
269-271,  272,  202-203,  302. 


445]       THE  QUESTION  OF  CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  OF  ALEXANDRIA         I  19 

the  wishes  of  the  other  Powers  or  permit  herself  to  be  isolated. 
However,  if  the  British  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  remained 
hostile  to  Russia,  he  would  beyond  question  agree  to  some  sort  of 
union  with  the  French.  Under  such  circumstances  Russia  could 
not  even  count  upon  the  active  support  of  her  eastern  neighbors — 
Austria  and  Prussia.  Hence  her  position  would  be  one  in  which 
there  would  be  real  and  immediate  peril. 

Thus  at  the  close  of  the  month  of  August,  1839,  the  diplomatic 
stage  for  the  solution  of  the  Turco-Egyptian  question  was  almost 
set.  The  actors  had  been  chosen  and  each  was  assuming  his 
proper  role.  France,  in  her  desire  to  alienate  Russia  from  the 
Concert  of  Europe  and  to  wind  up  the  whole  affair  by  a  joint  con- 
vention guaranteeing  the  integrity  and  the  independence  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire,  was  well  on  the  road  to  failure,  and  Russia,  anx- 
ious to  avoid  what  France  desired,  was  about  to  succeed.  The 
destruction  of  the  Turkish  army  and  the  surrender  of  the  Capitan 
Pasha's  fleet  had  caused  the  European  Powers,  excepting  France 
apparently,  to  look  with  alarm  upon  the  threatening  position  of 
Mehemet  Ali,  while  on  the  other  hand  the  engagement  which  M. 
Boutenieff  had  taken  on  July  27,  1839,  binding  his  Court  to  act  in 
cooperation  with  the  other  great  Courts  of  Europe,  had  removed 
the  fears  which  those  Courts  entertained  lest  Russia  should  at- 
tempt an  independent  intervention  in  Turkey  under  the  pro- 
visions of  the  treaty  of  1833.  In  other  words,  the  triumph  of  the 
cause  of  those  who  wished  to  see  the  crisis  in  the  Near  East  settled 
on  the  basis  of  the  "Question  of  Alexandria"  over  that  of  those 
who  wished  to  see  it  settled  on  the  basis  of  the  "Question  of 
Constantinople"  was  imminent. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE   NEGOTIATION   OF  THE  TREATY   OF 
JULY  15,  1840 

When  the  Russian  Cabinet  ordered  Brunnow,  the  Tsar's  Minis- 
ter at  Stuttgart,  to  go  on  a  special  mission  to  London,  it  gave  him 
instructions  defining  the  limits  within  which  his  superiors  were 
willing  that  he  should  negotiate.  The  courts  of  the  maritime 
Powers,  it  directed  therein,  should  be  requested  to  abandon  the 
idea  of  concluding  a  convention  to  guarantee  the  integrity  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire.  They  should  also  be  asked  to  renounce  the 
project  of  having  their  fleets  enter  the  Sea  of  Marmora  if  Russian 
forces  should  appear  there  to  defend  Constantinople  against  the 
army  of  Ibrahim  Pasha.  If  they  so  agreed,  Brunnow  should,  in 
turn,  announce  that  the  Emperor  was  ready  to  consider  as  a 
permanent  European  principle  that  the  Bosphorus  and  the  Dar- 
danelles should  be  closed  to  the  warships  of  all  nations  both  in 
times  of  peace  and  in  times  of  war.  Furthermore  he  should  then 
declare  that  the  Treaty  of  Unkiar  Skelessi  would  not  be  renewed,1 
and  that  if  it  should  be  necessary  to  send  a  Russian  detachment 
to  the  aid  of  the  Porte  it  would  be  done  not  by  reason  of  the 
said  treaty,  but  because  of  engagements  about  to  be  contracted 
between  the  Powers  of  EUCOJDC.  and  the  Sultan.2 

The  Russian  Envoy  Extraordinary  arrived  at  London  on  Sep- 
tember 15,  1839,  and  immediately  began  negotiating  with  Lord 
Palmerston.  His  Emperor,  he  was  careful  to  explain  to  the  British 
Minister,  agreed  entirely  with  the  British  views  concerning  the 
affairs  of  Turkey  and  Egypt,  and  would  join  in  whatever  measures 

'During  an  Interview  at  London,  Brunnow  declared  to  Palmerston :  "  'Si 
vous  consentez  a  reconnaitre  et  a  sanctionner  formellement  le  principe  que  je 
viens  de  poser,  je  suis  pret  a  vous  annoncer  que  sa  majeste  ne  tient  nullement 
a  renouveler  le  traite  d'Unkiar-Iskelessi.  Cette  transaction  a  toujours  etc  mal 
comprise  chez  vous.  L'empereur  ne  1'a  jamais  conclue  dans  1'interet  exclusif  de 
la  Russie.  Sa  majeste  a  daigne  la  signer  parce  qu'elle  1'a  envisagee  comme  un 
moyen  de  salut  pour  la  Porte  .  .  .  sa  majeste  est  decidee  a  ne  point  faire 
durer  ce  traite,  si  nous  parvenons  a  nous  concerter  entre  nous  et  a  nous  entendre 
sur  les  moyens  necessaires  pour  assurer  a  1'avenir  1'existence  et  le  repos  de 
1'empire  ottoman.' "  See  Brunnow's  report,  Sept.  12/24,  1839,  quoted  by 
Goriainow,  op.  cit.,  p.  67. 

'Ibid.,  p.  63. 

[  120] 


44/]          THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  JULY  15,   1840  121 

might  be  necessary  to  carry  those  views  into  effect.  Nicholas 
would  unite  with  England,  Austria,  and  Prussia,  either  with 
France  or  without  her.  Though  politically  speaking,  he  saw  the 
advantage  of  having  France  one  of  the  party,  personally  he  would 
be  better  pleased  if  she  should  be  left  out.3  He  felt  that  he  de- 
served to  be  trusted  and  he  hoped  that  the  British  government, 
trusting  him  unreservedly,  would  agree  that  if  Mehemet  AH  by 
belligerent  measures  should  place  Constantinople  in  danger  and 
render  any  military  or  naval  operations  in  the  Bosphorus  or  Asia 
Minor  necessary  it  would  leave  that  to  him,  and  that  it  would  on 
its  part  undertake  whatever  was  to  be  done  in  the  Mediterranean 
and  on  the  coasts  of  Syria  and  Egypt.4 

Palmerston  must  have  foreseen  that  the  French  Ministers 
would  be  alarmed  when  they  learned  of  the  advances  which  were 
being  made  by  the  Russian  representative  to  Great  Britain  and 
it  is  probable  that  he  believed  they  would  then  be  more  inclined 
to  make  concessions  in  order  to  come  to  an  understanding  with 
Great  Britain  in  regard  to  the  Turco-Egyptian  question.  At  any 
rate,  he  revealed  the  principal  facts  about  the  negotiations,  "  'ex- 
cept the  preference  of  the  Emperor  to  leave  France  out,' "  to 
Count  Sebastiani,  the  French  Ambassador,  who  early  in  September 
had  returned  to  the  British  capital  after  a  leave  of  absence.5  He 
let  Sebastiani  believe  that  he  personally  favored  the  Russian  over- 
tures.6 It  seemed  to  him,  he  contended,  that  there  was  no  wise 
medium  between  confidence  and  distrust.  If  England  and  France 
should  tie  up  Russia  by  a  treaty,  they  could  trust  her,  and 
trusting  her,  they  had  better  mix  no  evidence  of  suspicion  with 
their  confidence.7  Sebastiani  reported  promptly  to  his  own  gov- 
ernment the  opinions  of  the  British  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
"It  is  evident  to  me,  Monsieur  the  Marshal,"  he  declared,  "that 
the  English  Cabinet  regards  the  abolition  of  the  Treaty  of  Unkiar 
Skelessi  as  an  ample  success  for  its  policy  in  the  East.  Now  this 
success  it  does  not  consider  as  too  dearly  purchased  by  its  previous 
assent  to  the  appearance  of  Russian  forces  in  the  Bosphorus;  .  .  . 

'See  also,  Barante  to  Soult,  Oct.  23,  1839,  Barante,  op.  cit.,  VI,  pp.  345-347- 
Guichen,  op,  cit.,  pp.  133-137. 

4Palmerston  to  Bulwer,  Sept.  24,  1839,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  300. 

*Ibid. 

"Sebastian!  to  Soult,  Sept.  23,  1839,  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  551. 

'Palmerston  to  Bulwer,  Sept.  24,  1839,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  301. 


122  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [448 

"I  told  Lord  Palmerston  that  the  convention  [that  Brunnow 
proposed],  the  basis  of  which  he  had  just  explained  to  me,  would 
be  looked  upon  in  Europe  as  an  act  of  weakness  and  of  pusillanim- 
ite  towards  Russia.  Lord  Palmerston  considers  it  as  an  able 
measure;  the  action  of  Russia,  even  at  Constantinople,  regulated, 
denned  in  advance  by  the  concurrence  of  the  other  Powers,  seems 
to  him  to  be  the  action  of  the  five  courts  and  an  abdication  of 
the  exclusive  protectorate  of  Russia."8 

When  Marshal  Soult  received  notification  of  what  was  going  on 
at  the  British  capital  he  was  aroused  indeed. ,  It  was  not  without 
feelings  of  painful  astonishment,  he  replied  to  Sebastiani,  that  he 
perceived  a  man  of  such  "enlightened  judgment"  as  Lord  Palmer- 
ston entertain  with  so  much  complacency  a  project  like  the  one 
proposed  to  him  by  M.  Brunnow.  After  criticising  bitterly  the 
Russian  advances  and,  after  charging  that  the  Tsar's  government 
entertained  most  aggressive  designs,  he  continued:  "Whatever 
may  be  the  consequences  of  a  deplorable  difference  of  opinion, 
should  it  effect  the  accomplishment  of  the  favorite  project  of 
Russia,  that  of  separating  us  from  our  Allies,  we  shall  not  have 
incurred  the  responsibility  of  it.  We  will  keep  our  ground.  It 
will  not  be  our  fault  if  we  no  longer  find  there  those  who  at  first 
placed  themselves  side  by  side  with  us."9 

Regardless  of  the  attitude  which  the  head  of  the  French  Cabinet 
assumed,  Palmerston  undoubtedly  would  have  accepted  the 
Russian  proposal  had  the  decision  rested  with  him  alone.10  Several 

8Sebastiani  to  Soult,  Sept.  23,  1839,  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  pp.  552-553.  Sebas- 
tiani concluded  his  despatch  as  follows:  "Lord  Palmerston,  a  qui  j'ai  demande 
ou  aurait  lieu  la  signature  de  la  convention  qu'il  venait  de  m'analyser,  m'a 
repondu:  'Je  nV  avais  pas  songe,  mais  a  Londres  si  Ton  veut.' " 

'Soult  to  Sebastiani,  Sept.  26,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp.  406-408. 
See  also  extracts  from  a  despatch,  Soult  to  Sebastiani,  Sept.  10,  1839,  quoted 
by  Guichen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  129-132. 

10On  Oct.  25,  1839,  Palmerston  wrote  to  Clanricarde:  "...  he  [Brunnow] 
had  several  long  conversations  with  myself,  and  with  other  members  of  Her 
Majesty's  Government,  upon  various  matters  connected  with  the  relations  be- 
tween Great  Britain  and  Russia. 

"The  substance  of  all  his  communications  on  these  different  matters  was 
extremely  satisfactory;  and  nothing  could  be  more  conciliatory  than  his  manner 
upon  every  occasion.  He  was  frank  and  unreserved  in  his  conversations;  and  his 
mission,  whatever  may  be  its  results,  as  to  the  main  point  upon  which  it  bore, 
cannot  fail  to  produce  beneficial  effects  upon  the  relations  between  the  two  Gov- 
ernments." Levant  Correspondence,  I,  p.  438,  Annual  Register,  1840,  p.  475. 


449]          THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  JULY  15,   1840  1 23 

members  of  the  British  Ministry,  however,  were  unwilling  to  agree 
to  his  views,  and  at  an  important  Cabinet  meeting,  held  on 
October  i,  1839,  at  Windsor,  they  gained  the  upper  hand.11  "  'Ac- 
cording to  the  unanimous  opinion  of  the  Council,'  "  Palmerston 
informed  Brunnow  on  the  following  day,  "  'the  military  interven- 
tion of  Russia,  if  it  should  become  necessary  for  the  protection  and 
defence  of  Constantinople,  ought  to  take  place  in  such  a  manner 
as  that  it  might  be  combined  with  a  certain  degree  of  cooperation 
and  assistance  on  the  part  of  the  naval  forces  of  England. 

"  'This  co-operation,'  "  he  explained,  "  'might  be  settled  so  as  not 
to  blend  and  not  to  bring  in  contact  the  forces  of  one  Power  with 
those  of  the  other.  .  .  .  Each  of  the  two  Straits  would  be  placed 
under  the  protection  of  the  respective  Powers,  whose  forces  would 
in  this  manner  remain  separated,  and  would  not  find  themselves 
in  [the]  presence  of  each  other.  You  on  one  side,  we  on  the  other, 
would  be  there  to  prevent  the  Egyptian  Army  from  crossing  the 
canal  of  Constantinople.  ...  All  that  would  be  necessary  for  us, 
would  be  to  prove  to  the  nation,  that  we  have  not  consented  to 
allow  ourselves  to  be  excluded  from  a  common  operation,  having 
for  its  object  to  preserve  the  Capital  of  the  Ottoman  Empire;  that 
we  have  not  formally  agreed  to  a  principle  by  which  Russia  would 
be  empowered  to  exercise  that  protectorate  alone.' "  Brunnow,  be- 
lieving that  his  instructions  were  too  precise  to  admit  of  any 
deviation  therefrom,  answered,  "That  the  will  of  the  Emperor," 
being  for  him  the  sole  rule  of  his  conduct,  it  was  necessary  for  him 
to  stop  at  the  point  at  which  they  had  arrived.  He  would  report 
faithfully  to  his  court  the  observations  which  had  just  been  im- 
parted to  him  and  would  "wholly  reserve  to  the  Emperor  to 
pronounce  upon  them  a  decision  which  rested  with  himself 
alone."12 

While  Brunnow  and  Palmerston  were  negotiating  thus  the  gap 
between  the  positions  taken  by  the  British  and  French  govern- 
ments in  regard  to  the  affairs  of  the  Near  East  was  widening 
rapidly.  On  August  30,  1839,  Bulwer  reported  from  Paris  that 
he  believed  the  French  government  would  endeavor  seriously  to 

"Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV.,  pp.  363-364.  Brunnow  to  Nesselrode,  Sept.  26/Oct.  8, 
1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  p.  442,  Annual  Register,  1840,  p.  481. 

"Brunnow  to  Nesselrode,  Sept.  26/Oct.  8,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I, 
pp.  442-446.  Annual  Register,  1840,  pp.  482-483. 


124  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,  1832-184!  [450 

get  the  Pasha  to  abandon  a  portion  of  his  demands,  but  that  he 
feared  it  would  be  unwilling  to  resort  to  any  other  means  than 
those  of  persuasion  to  accomplish  that  purpose.13  Five  days  later 
Palmerston  had  a  long  conversation  with  Sebastian!  from  which 
he  gathered  that  France  was  disinclined  to  be  a  party  to  any 
active  measures  of  coercion  which  might  be  employed  against 
Mehemet  Ali.  The  steps  which  the  five  Powers  would  be  able  to 
take  for  such  a  purpose,  Louis  Phillipe's  representative  claimed, 
would  be  unsatisfactory.  Some  of  them  would  be  insufficient;  oth- 
ers were  likely  to  overshoot  their  mark.  The  withdrawal  of  the  con- 
suls might  be  resorted  to  if  it  were  done  by  the  five  jointly,  but 
he  doubted  very  much  that  it  would  produce  any  effect.  A  block- 
ade would  be  ineffectual.  Mehemet  Ali,  he  believed,  had  very  few 
merchant  vessels  which  could  be  seized,  and  Ibrahim,  even  though 
his  communications  by  sea  with  Egypt  were  cut  off,  could  secure 
supplies  by  advancing.14  September  27,  1839,  Palmerston  con- 
versed again  on  the  subject  of  the  affairs  of  the  Levant  with  the 
French  Ambassador.  At  that  time  the  latter  presented  a  plan  of 
settlement  which  he  declared  his  government  was  willing  to 
accept.15  According  to  that  plan  Mehemet  Ali  would  evacuate 
Adana  and  he  would  hold  Crete  in  tenure  for  life  only,  but  all 
the  other  territories  which  he  occupied  would  be  given  to  him  in 
full  hereditary  possession.  Mehemet  Ali  was  becoming  very  strong 
and  it  was  necessary  to  secure  peace  immediately,  Sebastian!  ex- 
plained. The  settlement  proposed  by  the  French,  he  argued,  would 

"Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  Aug.  30,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp.  354- 
356.  Soult,  it  appears,  did  urge  the  Pasha  to  abandon  part  of  his  demands.  See 
Guichen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  140-141. 

"Palmerston  to  Bulwer,  Sept.  10,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp. 
366-370. 

"At  an  earlier  date  Sebastiani  had  suggested  to  Palmerston,  on  his  own 
responsibility  and  without  Soult's  knowing  of  it,  that  Syria  should  be  divided 
between  Mehemet  Ali  and  the  Sultan.  The  line  of  division,  he  suggested, 
should  be  drawn  from  the  coast  at  Beyrout  through  Damascus.  When  Soult 
learned  of  the  French  Ambassador's  suggestion  he  refused  to  agree  to  it.  See, 
Palmerston  to  Bulwer,  Sept.  23,  1839,  Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  Sept.  27,  Oct.  4, 
1839,  ibid.,  pp.  395-397,  398-400,  412-414. 


45  I  ]  THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  JULY   15,   1840  125 

strengthen  the  Sultan,  for  Mehemet  AH  would  be  satisfied  and 
would  always  be  ready  to  defend  his  overlord.16 

The  British  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  as  the  French  should 
have  foreseen,  was  not  in  a  mood  even  to  consider  such  a  proposal 
as  the  one  which  was  made  to  him  by  Sebastiani  on  September 
27.  On  September  I,  almost  as  soon  as  he  perceived  that 
France  was  unwilling  to  take  steps  of  coercion  against  the  Viceroy, 
he  wrote  to  Bulwer:  " '  .  .  .  anxious  as  we  are  to  continue  to  go 
on  with  them  [the  French],  we  are  not  at  all  prepared  to  stand 
still  with  them.  .  .  . 

"  'They  must  therefore  take  their  choice  between  three  courses : — 
either  to  go  forward  with  us,  and  honestly  redeem  the  pledges  they 
have  given  to  us  and  to  Europe;  or  to  stand  aloof  and  shrink  from 
a  fulfilment  of  their  own  spontaneous  declarations;  or,  lastly,  to 
go  right  about  and  league  themselves  with  Mehemet  Ali,  and  em- 
ploy force  to  prevent  us  and  those  other  Powers  who  may  join 
us  from  doing  that  which  France  herself  is  bound  by  every 
principle  of  honour,  and  every  enlightened  consideration  of  her 
real  interests,  to  assist  us  in  doing,  .  .  .  '  "17  Instead  of  adopting 
the  plan  which  Sebastiani  suggested  to  him,  Palmerston  replied 
with  a  counter  project.  The  British  government  was  willing,  he  an- 
nounced to  the  Frenchman,  to  add  to  the  hereditary  investiture  of 
Egypt  in  favor  of  the  Viceroy,  the  possession  equally  hereditary 
of  the  Pashalic  of  Acre,  exclusive  of  the  fortress.  But,  he  added, 
it  must  be  on  condition  that  the  King's  government  will  accept  "its 
share  of  action  in  constraining  Mehemet  Ali  should  he  refuse  the 
conditions  offered."18 

Unfortunately,  Sebastiani  forwarded  to  Soult  the  facts  concern- 
ing the  proposal  Palmerston  had  made  to  him  in  the  same  des- 
patch in  which  he  revealed  that  the  British  Cabinet  had  rejected 
the  plan  suggested  by  the  Imperial  Court  of  Russia.  The  Mar- 

"Palmerston  to  Bulwer,  Sept.  28,  1839,  ibid.,  pp.  404-406.  The  French  hoped 
to  win  the  support  of  Austria  to  their  views.  See  Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  Aug. 
30,  Sept.  13,  1839;  Beauvale  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  3,  1839,  ibid.,  pp.  354-356, 
380-381,  424.  Undoubtedly  the  French  Ministers  were  led  to  believe  by  their 
reports  from  Cochelet  that  Mehemet  Ali  would  not  accept  less  favorable  terms. 
See  Guichen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  143-144. 

17Palmerston  to  Bulwer,  Sept.  I,  1839,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  297.  See  also, 
Sebastiani  to  Soult,  Sept.  5,  1839,  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV.,  pp.  546-550. 

"Sebastiani  to  Soult,  Oct.  3,  1839,  ibid.,  p.  554. 


126  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [452 

shal,  whose  belief  that  the  English  government  would  never  go 
to  the  extreme  of  allying  itself  in  the  Levant  with  Russia19  was 
thereby  strengthened,  and  who  was  urged  on  constantly  by  the 
French  press  to  defend  Mehemet  Ali,20  replied  to  Sebastiani,  Oc- 
tober 14,  1839:  "'The  King's  government,  after  having  weighed 
maturely  the  objections  of  the  Cabinet  of  London  [to  the  French 
proposal],  feels  bound  to  persist  in  the  views  which  I  have  already 
communicated  to  you  on  the  basis  of  a  settlement  of  the  affairs  of 
the  East.  If  our  own  interests  alone  were  concerned,  we  might 
make  concessions  in  favor  of  our  desire  to  bind  more  closely  our 
alliance  with  England;  but  the  question  is  not  of  that  nature;  it 
consists  solely  in  determining  conditions  which,  while  combining 
in  just  measure  the  rights  of  the  Sultan  and  the  future  security  of 
his  throne  with  the  pretensions  of  Mehemet  Ali,  may  tend  to  the 
pacification  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  We  feel  convinced  that  the 
proposals  of  the  British  Cabinet  could  not  attain  this  end,  and 
that,  rather  than  submit  to  them,  Mehemet  Ali,  who  would  see 
in  them  his  ruin,  would  plunge  into  the  chances  of  a  resistance 
less  dangerous  to  himself  but  more  embarrassing  and  compromis- 
ing for  Europe.  .  .  .  We  should  decline  driving  him  to  this  course, 
even  though  we  felt  absolutely  certain  that  our  refusal  would  be 
the  signal  for  a  close  alliance  between  England  and  Russia.  For- 
tunately this  certainty  is  far  from  existing;  the  reasons  which  have 
once  already  caused  the  failure  of  such  a  strange  combination 
subsist  in  all  their  strength.  I  do  not  believe  they  can  escape  the 
penetration  of  Lord  Palmerston,  and  I  know  positively  that  some 
of  his  colleagues  are  very  deeply  impressed  by  them.  Finally, 
if,  contrary  to  all  appearances,  this  combination  should  be  realized, 
without  doubt  we  should  lament  it  as  the  rupture  of  an  alliance  to 
which  we  attach  much  value;  but  we  should  apprehend  little  from 
its  immediate  effects,  because  a  coalition  contrary  to  the  nature  of 
things,  and  condemned  beforehand,  even  in  England,  by  public 

"Ibid.,  p.  365. 

""Note  the  following:  "The  desperate  fidelity  with  which  the  French  press 
clings  to  its  ancient  possession — Egypt,  should  not  be  lost  sight  of  in  the 
arrangement  of  the  dispute  between  the  Sultan  and  Mehemet  Ali." — The  Times, 
Oct.  21,  1839.  See  also  ibid.,  Sept.  19,  Oct.  23,  1839. 


453]    THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  JULY  15,  1840     127 

opinion,21  would  necessarily  be  tainted  with  impotence.'  "22 
Palmerston  listened  with  the  "  'most  earnest  attention' "  when 
Sebastiani  revealed  to  him  the  contents  of  this  despatch  and  after 
the  latter  had  finished  speaking  he  replied:  "  'I  announce  to  you, 
in  the  name  of  the  Council,  that  the  concession  which  we  had 
agreed  to  of  a  "portion  of  the  Pashalic  of  Acre  is  withdrawn.'  "23 
It  is  evident  that  when  Soult  and  his  colleagues  decided  to  favor 
openly  the  cause  of  Mehemet  Ali  they  realized  that  such  a  course 
would  tend  to  occasion  suspicion  at  the  other  European  courts 
in  regard  to  their  intentions.  A  report  drawn  up  by  Granville, 
October  25,  1839,  soon  after  his  return  to  Paris,  is  significant  in- 
deed in  this  connection.  The  French  government,  he  wrote,  stated 
that  if  it  were  supposed  that  it  had  any  desire  to  aggrandize  the 
Pasha  of  Egypt  such  supposition  was  groundless.  France  would 
be  willing  even,  if  it  were  possible,  to  restore  "Egypt  itself"  to 
the  Sultan.24  The  question,  however,  was  not  what  was  desirable 
but  what  was  feasible.  France  did  not  see  "the  means  of  driving 
Mehemet  Ali  out  of  Syria."  She  could  not  furnish  a  military  force 

"See,  in  this  connection,  editorials  in  ibid.,  Oct.  25,  Nov.  14,  1839. 

22Soult  to  Sebastiani,  Oct.  14,  1839,  quoted  by  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  pp. 
365-366.  See  also,  Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  7,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence, 
I,  pp.  417-419.  It  was  significant  of  the  divergent  courses  upon  which  the  two 
governments  were  embarked  that,  almost  at  the  same  time,  Admiral  Roussin 
was  recalled  from  Constantinople,  and  Colonel  Campbell  from  Alexandria — the 
Frenchman  because  of  his  hostility  to,  and  the  Englishman  because  of  his 
sympathy  with  Mehemet  Ali.  The  former  was  succeeded  by  Admiral  Pontois  and 
the  latter  by  Colonel  Hodges.  See,  Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  257.  Palmerston  to  Hodges, 
Sept.  27,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  p.  401.  Paton,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp. 
162-164. 

"Sebastiani  to  Soult,  Oct.  18,  1839,  quoted  by  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  pp. 
366-367.  See  also  Palmerston  to  Granville,  Oct.  29,  1839.  Levant  Correspond- 
ence, I,  pp.  458-462.  At  the  same  time  when  England  and  France  were  failing 
to  agree  upon  a  plan  of  solution  for  the  Turco-Egyptian  question,  Mehemet 
Ali  was  being  encouraged  by  Cochelet's  activities  to  persist  in  all  of  his  de- 
mands, and  the  Ottoman  ministers  were  being  directly  encouraged  by  the 
representatives  of  England,  Austria,  and  Russia  to  persist  in  refusing  to  carry 
on  any  negotiations  whatsoever  with  the  Viceroy.  See  Guichen,  op.  cit.,  pp. 
167,  169  ff. 

"Soult,  it  seems,  was  always  anxious  to  make  it  appear  that  his  govern- 
ment entertained  no  partiality  in  favor  of  Mehemet  Ali.  See  ibid.,  pp.  102- 
103,  176. 


128  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [454 

for  that  purpose;  England  was  not  prepared  to  send  an  army  to 
the  Levant;  nor  were  Austria  and  Prussia  able  to  do  so.  There- 
fore, measures  of  coercion  could  be  undertaken  by  Russia  only, 
and  the  moral  power  of  the  Sultan  would  be  far  more  seriously 
impaired  by  having  his  Empire  and  his  capital  protected  by  the 
Muscovites  than  by  the  undue  aggrandizement  of  his  vassal.25 
After  the  total  rout  of  the  Turkish  army  and  the  surrender  of  the 
fleet  by  the  Capitan  Pasha,  Marshal  Soult  explained  upon-  a  later 
occasion,  the  position  of  affairs  was  entirely  changed.  ".  .  .  we 
had  to  consider,"  he  declared,  "what  it  was  possible  to  do,  as  well 
as  what  arrangement  it  was  desirable  to  effect.  The  French  Gov- 
ernment is  not  disposed  to  deny,  that  the  arrangement  proposed 
by  the  British  Government,  if  it  could  be  carried  into  effect,  affords 
a  better  security  to  the  Turkish  Empire  than  the  arrangement 
proposed  by  France;  but  we  have  not  the  means  of  compelling 
Mehemet  Ali  to  evacuate  Syria,  and  we  must  not  vouloir  Vimpos- 
sible."  A  naval  blockade,  he  emphasized,  could  not  effect  that 
object.  Russia  alone  could  send  troops,  and  her  occupation  of 
Constantinople  and  Asia  Minor  would  be  a  "far  more  irrecover- 
able blow"  to  the  independence  of  the  Sultan  than  if  all  the  terri- 
tories occupied  by  the  Egyptians  were  conceded  to  the  administra- 
tion of  Mehemet  Ali.26 

Lord  Palmerston,  it  appears,  was  unmoved  by  the  French 
contentions.  Influenced  by  the  reports  which  he  received  relative 
to  discontent  existing  within  the  domains  of  the  Viceroy,27  he  re- 

"Granville  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  25,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  p.  457. 
On  Oct.  21,  1839,  Granville  wrote  to  Palmerston:  "[At  the  French  foreign 
office]  I  found  with  regret,  that  the  language  of  the  Marshal  manifested  a  less 
anxious  desire  to  act  in  union  and  concert  with  Her  Majesty's  Government,  than 
appeared  in  his  communications  with  me  on  his  first  undertaking  the  duties 
of  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs."  Soult  spoke,  Granville  reported,  of  Mehemet  Ali 
as  having  an  army  150,000  strong  and  a  fleet  of  20  sail  of  the  line. — Ibid.,  pp. 

436-437- 

"Granville  to  Palmerston,  Nov.  18,  1839,  ibid.,  pp.  489-490. 

"Note  the  following  extract  from  a  despatch,  Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  Oct. 
16,  1839:  "The  reports  from  the  Consuls  in  Syria,  which  go  home,  and  other 
information  I  have  received  all  show  how  little  solid  power  the  Egyptians  have; 
and  a  report  from  the  Austrian  Consul-General  at  Alexandria  to  the  Inter- 
nuncio,  which  I  have  read,  .  .  .  ,  gives  an  account  from  Alexandria  of  a  similar 
state  of  things." — Ibid.,  p.  473.  See  also  Young  to  Palmerston,  Aug.  19,  1839; 
Werry  to  Palmerston,  Aug.  30,  1839;  Ponsonby  to  Rechid,  Oct.  25,  1839: 


455]  THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  JULY  15,    1840  129 

fused  to  believe  that  the  latter  could  offer  any  serious  resistance 
to  a  European  force.  On  November  22,  1839,  he  wrote  to  Gran- 
ville:  "With  respect  to  the  notion,  that  the  Five  Powers  acting  in 
union  with  the  Sultan,  have  not  the  means  of  compelling  the  Pasha 
of  Egypt  to  evacuate  Syria,  that  opinion  is  one  which  it  can  scarcely 
be  worth  while  seriously  to  argue;  the  disparity  of  forces  between 
the  two  parties  .  .  .  being  so  infinitely  great,  that  resistance  on 
the  part  of  the  Pasha  must  necessarily  be  vain."  Furthermore, 
Great  Britain  could  not  agree,  he  continued,  that  Russian  assist- 
ance to  the  Sultan,  if  given  in  pursuance  of  a  concert  between  the 
five  allied  Powers,  would  necessarily  occasion  favors  or  concessions 
from  Turkey  to  Russia  that  would  be  injurious  to  the  former's 
independence.28 

In  the  meantime  Baron  Brunnow  had  returned  to  his  former 
post  at  Stuttgart  and  had  communicated  to  the  Court  of  St. 
Petersburg  the  full  particulars  concerning  his  mission  to  the  Court 
of  St.  James.29  The  Tsar  and  his  Cabinet  received  Brunnow's 
reports  with  real  satisfaction.  "The  Emperor  has  been  well 
pleased,"  Nesselrode  wrote  to  Meyendorff,  October  8,  1839, 
"...  If  the  plan  of  Lord  Palmerston  is  adopted  the  Anglo- 
French  alliance  is  ipso-facto  dissolved  and  is  replaced,  in  the 
affairs  of  the  Orient,  by  an  accord  between  the  two  Imperial 
Courts  and  England.  .  .  .  For  myself,  I  avow  to  you  that  I  should 
like  very  much  the  plan  of  Lord  Palmerston."30  The  letter  from 
which  this  extract  has  been  copied  was  written  after  Nicholas 
and  his  Chancellor  had  read  the  first  despatch  which  Brunnow  had 
forwarded  to  them  after  his  arrival  in  England.  When  they  re- 
ceived his  final  reports  they  were  still  far  from  being  dissatisfied. 
They  were  aware  that  the  kind  of  a  settlement  which  the  French 


Laurin  to  Stunner,  Oct.  15,  1839,  ibid.,  pp.  414-415,  415-416,  484-485,  486.  The 
reports  which  the  French  government  received  from  the  East  were  contradictory 
to  these.  See,  Granville  to  Palmerston,  Nov.  25,  Dec.  6,  1839,  ibid.,  pp.  500,  514. 

"Palmerston  to  Granville,  Nov.  22,  1839,  ibid.,  pp.  490-491. 

"While  Baron  Brunnow  was  returning  to  Stuttgart,  he  met  Metternich  at 
Johannisberg,  on  the  Rhine,  and  succeeded,  it  seems,  in  convincing  him  that 
the  Russian  plan  for  the  settlement  of  the  question  of  the  Near  East  was 
sound.  Goriainow,  op.  cit.,  p.  73.  Hasenclever,  op.  cit.,  p.  102.  King  of  Belgians 
to  Victoria,  Oct.  24,  1839,  Queen  Victoria's  Letters,  I,  pp.  189-191. 

*°Nesselrode  to  Meyendorff,  Oct.  8,  1839,  Nesselrode,  op.cit.,\ll,  pp.  288-289. 


I3O  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [456 

government  wished  was  not  in  conformity  with  their  own  desires.31 
Seeing  in  the  proposals  of  Lord  Palmerston  the  means  of  realizing 
the  essential  parts  of  their  program  as  well  as  an  opportunity  for 
the  destruction  of  the  troublesome  Anglo-French  alliance,  they 
determined  immediately  to  agree  to  them.  Accordingly  they  so 
instructed  Brunnow  and  ordered  him  to  return  to.  Great  Britain 
where  he  should  negotiate  with  the  view  of  concluding  a  conven- 
tion on  the  basis  of  the  English  conditions.32 

It  would  have  been  very  difficult  for  the  Cabinet  of  St.  Peters- 
burg to  adopt  a  policy  which  would  have  been  more  satisfactory 
to  the  British  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  " '  .  .  .  The  Russian 
government  agrees,' "  he  stated  on  December  6,  1839,  "  'to  our 
proposal  about  the  Dardanelles,  and  is  willing  that  if  a  Russian 
force  shall  enter  the  Bosphorus,  ships  of  war  of  all  the  other  co- 
operating Powers  shall  enter  the  Dardanelles.  .  .  .  This  will  give 
us  a  pull  upon  France,  and  will  enable  us  to  carry  our  own  views 
into  execution  about  Turkey  and  Egypt;  for  Austria  and  Prussia 
will  side  with  us  and  Russia; — and  France  if  she  stands  aloof, 
will  be  left  to  herself.'  "33 

The  French  Cabinet,  on  the  other  hand,  was  both  surprised  and 
disturbed.  Marshal  Soult  and  his  colleagues  had  not  expected  to 
see  Russia  abandon  her  privileged  position  in  regard  to  Turkey  by 
admitting  that  French,  English,  and  Austrian  ships  of  war  might 
appear  simultaneously  with  her  own  in  the  waters  before  Con- 


MThe  Brunnow  missions  have  often  been  explained  as  having  been  occasioned 
by  Russia's  desire  to  separate  England  and  France.  At  the  time  Nesselrode  claimed 
that  his  advances  to  England  were  made  because  of  the  similarity  in  British 
and  Russian  views  upon  Levant  affairs.  It  is  probable  that  some  truth  lies  with 
each  of  these  contentions.  See  Nesselrode  to  Meyendorff,  Nov.  19,  Dec.  20, 
1839,  ibid.,  pp.  292,  297.  Clanricarde  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  18,  Nov.  5,  1839, 
Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp.  458,  482.  According  to  Hasenclever,  Nesselrode 
maintained  in  a  report  to  the  Tsar  that  the  Brunnow  mission  was  prompted  by 
fear  lest  France,  England,  and  Austria  should  unite  in  an  alliance  to  guarantee 
the  integrity  and  the  independence  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  It  is  Hasenclever's 
contention  that  Brunnow  was  sent  on  his  first  mission  to  London  merely  to  feel 
out  the  British  position.  If  his  mission  was  directed  against  anyone  it  was 
against  Metternich.  See  Hasenclever,  op.  c\t.,  pp.  82-85. 

"Clanricarde  to  Palmerston,  Nov.  22,  1839;  Nesselrode  to  Kisseleff,  Nov. 
10/22,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp.  503,  504-505. 

"Palmerston  to  Granville,  Dec.  6,  1839,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  305-307. 


45?]          THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  JULY  15,   1840  Ijl 

stantinople.34  Less  than  two  weeks  before  it  became  known  in 
western  Europe  that  Russia  was  ready  to  concede  all  that  Lord 
Palmerston  demanded,  Marshal  Soult  had  declared  in  a  despatch 
written  to  Sebastiani  that  France  had  had  in  view  principally  the 
European  side  of  the  question.  England,  he  complained,  had  been 
too  much  engrossed  with  considerations  relative  to  the  respective 
positions  of  the  Porte  and  of  the  Viceroy.  France  had  aimed,  above 
all,  to  abolish  the  exclusive  and  predominant  protectorship  which 
Russia  was  beginning  to  impose  upon  the  Porte,  or  at  least  to 
prevent  that  protectorship  from  finding  in  the  current  crisis  a  new 
occasion  for  its  exercise  and  its  legalization.  England  had  at 
first  appeared  to  pursue  the  same  object,  but,  he  feared,  she  had 
since  "somewhat  lost  sight  of  these  views."36  The  news  which  soon 
arrived  unexpectedly  from  the  Muscovite  capital  seemed  to  prove 
that  Soult's  suspicions  in  regard  to  the  intentions  of  Russia  were 
without  foundation.  The  French  Cabinet  thereby  lost  its  leading 
argument  against  the  ideas  and  plan  of  Lord  Palmerston.36  The 
French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  adopting  the  only  logical 
course  which  remained  open  to  him,  instructed  Sebastiani,  De- 
cember 9,  1839,  to  convey  to  the  English  Ministers  his  satisfaction 
at  the  unlocked  for  concessions  on  the  part  of  Russia.  "We  may 
now,"  he  said,  "at  last  hope  for  a  return  to  the  true  path;  .  .  . 
if  the  overtures  of  Russia  are  such  as  they  have  been  described  to 
you,  if  they  contain  nothing  more,  nothing  at  least  that  can  change 
their  bearing,  I  am  ready  to  authorize  you  to  accede  to  them 
formally.  I  even  go  farther;  the  King's  government,  acknowledg- 
ing with  its  accustomed  loyalty,  that  a  convention  entered  into  on 
such  a  basis  would  change  materially  the  aspect  of  affairs,  would 
find  in  it  a  sufficient  motive  to  reconsider  the  whole  of  the  Eastern 
question,  even  with  regard  to  the  points  on  which  each  of  the 
Powers  seemed  to  have  formed  its  opinion  so  absolutely  that  pro- 


"Guizot,  op.  clt.,  IV,  p.  369. 

*5Soult  to  Sebastiani,  Nov.  25,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp.  507-510. 
The  Russian  government  protested  loudly  when  it  learned  about  this  despatch. 
See  Nesselrode  to  Brunnow,  Dec.  20,  i839/Jan.  i,  1840;  Nesselrode  to  Medem, 
Dec.  26,  1839,  ibid.,  pp.  545-547,  549-55 1.  V 

"Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  369. 


132  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [458 

longed  debate  appeared  impossible."37  The  French,  nevertheless, 
continued  their  extensive  naval  preparations  in  the  Mediterran- 
ean,38 and  "some  days"  after  the  despatch,  a  part  of  which  has 
been  quoted  above,  was  written,  the  Marshal  returned  to  the 
position  of  suspicion  in  regard  to  Russia  which  he  had  taken 
often  before  "to  repulse  the  urgencies  of  the  English  Cabinet." 
"  'I  repeat  it,' "  he  wrote  to  Sebastiani,  "  'all  these  tactics  resolve 
themselves  into  two  words:  They  [the  Russians]  seek  to  break 
up  the  Anglo-French  alliance  to  which  Europe  has  owed  for  ten 
years  the  preservation  of  peace.  It  is  impossible  that  the  Cabinet 
of  London  cannot  fail  to  see  this  as  clearly  as  we  do;  and  as  I  am 
certain  it  would  deplore  such  a  result  equally  with  ourselves  .  .  . 
I  feel  no  hesitation  in  calling  the  most  serious  attention  of  Lord 
Palmerston  and  his  colleagues  to  this  state  of  things.'  "39 

In  due  course  of  time,  Brunnow  arrived  at  the  British  capital 
on  his  second  mission,  bringing  with  him  an  elaborately  worked 
out  plan  of  an  arrangement,  which  was  in  harmony  with  British 
views,  for  the  settlement  of  the  Eastern  question.  The  quarrel 
between  the  Porte  and  the  Pasha,  he  proposed  therein,  should  be 
settled  definitely  under  the  guarantee  of  Europe.  Mehemet  AH 


"Soult  to  Sebastiani,  Dec.  9,  1839,  ibid.,  p.  557.  See  also,  Palmerston  to 
Hobhouse,  July  27,  1843,  English  Historical  Review,  Jan.  1903,  XVIII,  p.  126. 

"Palmerston  objected  strongly  to  the  French  naval  preparations.  See 
Palmerston  to  Granville,  Dec.  10,  13,  1839;  Granville  to  Palmerston,  Dec.  9, 
13,  1839,  Jan.  13,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp.  520-521,  523,  521-522, 
523-524,  554-555.  Soult  to  Sebastiani,  Dec.  9,  1839,  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV.,  pp. 

558-559- 

^Ibid.,  pp.  369-370.  Barante  accused  Prussia  and  Austria,  as  well  as 
Russia,  of  desiring  to  see  the  Anglo-French  alliance  destroyed.  See  Barante  to 
Soult,  Dec.  14,  1839,  quoted  by  Guichen,  op.  cit.,  p.  180.  It  is  certain  that 
Metternich,  at  least,  had  no  love  for  France.  On  April  27,  1840,  he  wrote  to 
King  Leopold  of  Belgium:  "Your  Majesty  calls  France  a  dangerous  neighbour, 
and  you  add  that  what  is  happening  there  displeases  you,  and  deserves  general 
attention.  I  quite  agree;  but  I  extend  the  principle  beyond  the  present  to  the 
past.  France  is  a  lost  land  (as  far  as  lands  can  be)  and  a  ceaseless  source 
of  misfortune  for  the  whole  of  Europe.  When  the  foundations  of  order  are 
shattered  in  any  empire,  it  will  take  more  than  a  lifetime  to  restore  it  to 
equilibrium  in  itself  and  with  its  neighbours.  .  .  .  Yet  this  State  continues  its 
baleful  propaganda,  based  upon  the  impulse  to  communicate  its  own  misery  to 
others  in  order  to  have  equality." — Quoted  by  E.  C.  Corti,  Leopold  I  of  Belgium, 
P-  125. 


459]  THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  JULY  15,   1840  133 

should  receive  Egypt  and  Syria  to  the  fortress  of  Acre,40  in  hered- 
itary possession.  All  the  other  territories  which  he  held  he  should 
restore  to  the  Sultan  immediately.  If  he  refused  to  accept  such 
an  arrangement,  measures  of  coercion  denned  by  the  representa- 
tives of  the  Powers  at  London  should  be  employed  against  him. 
In  the  event  of  Ibrahim  Pasha  advancing  into  Asia  Minor, 
Russia  would  pass  the  Bosphorus  with  troops  for  disembarkation 
and  would  undertake  the  defense  of  Constantinople  in  the  name 
of  the  concert.  The  other  Powers  might  then  pass  the  Dardanelles, 
each  with  two  or  three  ships  of  war,  to  cruise  in  the  waters  of  the 
Sea  of  Marmora  "between  Gallipoli  and  the  Gulf  of  Moudania." 
As  soon  as  the  object  proposed  was  attained  by  the  submission  of 
Mehemet  Ali,  the  Porte  would  resume  full  and  immutable  posses- 
sion of  the  right  of  closing  the  two  Straits  against  all  the  flags  of 
Europe.41  Brunnow  revealed  his  proposals  to  the  British  govern- 
ment early  in  January,  1840,  and  on  the  fifth  day  of  the  month 
Palmerston  declared  to  Sebastian!:  "'Brunnow  is  empowered  to 
negotiate  with  the  object  of  bringing  about  a  permanent  and  defin- 
ite solution  of  the  Turkish  and  Egyptian  question,  in  order  to  en- 
sure the  independence  and  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Baron 
Neumann  has  arrived  from  Vienna  and  has  expressed  to  us  that 
Austria  is  entirely  with  us  and  Russia  in  this  important  affair.  I 
think  I  can  say  for  certain  that  Prussia  will  look  at  matters  in 
the  same  light.  It  only  remains  for  us,  therefore,  to  secure  a 
European  accord  on  a  question  which  is  incontestably  the  most 
important  that  we  have  had  to  deal  with  these  last  years.  We 
sincerely  hope  that  the  co-operation  of  France  will  not  be 
refused.  .  '"42 


40When  Palmerston  discussed  Brunnow's  proposals  with  Sebastiani,  Jan.  4, 
1840,  he  declared:  "  'J'ai  vivement  combattu  cette  idee  [the  cession  of  Syria 
to  the  fortress  of  Acre  to  Mehemet  Ali]  dans  mes  entretiens  avec  M.  de 
Brunnow;  elle  compromettrait  le  principe:  I'Egypte  seule  et  le  desert  •pour 
frontiere,  voila  le  vrai.  J'ai  ramene  M.  de  Brunnow  et  je  suis  sur  de  1'adhesion 
des  deux  autres.' " — Sebastiani  to  Soult,  Jan.  5,  1840,  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  562. 

"Measures  suggested  by  Brunnow  for  Settlement  of  Turco-Egyptian  ques- 
tion, Jan.  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp.  529-531.  Sebastiani  to  Soult,  Jan. 
5,  1840,  *Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  pp.  559-561. 

"Affaires  etrangeres,  654  Angleterre,  Sebastiani  to  Soult,  Jan.  5,  1840, 
quoted  by  Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  258. 


134  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [460 

Matters,  nevertheless,  proceeded  very  slowly.  The  representa- 
tives of  England,  Austria,  and  Russia  were  able  to  agree  upon  the 
main  points  at  issue,43  but  the  plenipotentiary  of  Prussia  was 
without  instructions,44  and  the  Ambassador  of  France  was  unable 
to  announce  what  attitude  his  court  would  assume  in  case  the 
other  Powers  resolved  to  employ  coercive  measures  against  the 
Viceroy.45  Furthermore,  before  the  negotiations  had  proceeded 
very  far  it  was  resolved  that  the  final  arrangement  which  should 
be  concluded  should  be  in  the  form  of  a  convention  between  the 
Powers  on  the  one  hand  and  the  Porte  on  the  other.46  Hence  it 
was  necessary  to  await  the  arrival  of  a  representative  from 
Turkey.  This  delay  of  affairs  was  intensely  gratifying  to  Marshal 
Soult  who  believed  that  the  Emperor  of  Russia  would  not  author- 

"Nesselrode  to  Meyendorff,  Jan.  31,  1840,  Nesselrode,  op.  cit.,  VIII,  pp.  8-9. 
Palmerston  to  Ponsonby,  Jan.  25,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  p.  560. 
Beauvale  reported  to  Palmerston,  Jan.  12,  1840,  that  Metternich  was  willing 
even  to  go  on  without  France  if  France  refused  "to  go  along"  with  the 
other  Powers. — Ibid.,  pp.  559-560.  From  April  until  June,  1840,  the  Austrians, 
nevertheless,  did  hesitate  to  go  on  without  France.  This  was  occasioned  perhaps 
by  Austrian  suspicion  of  Russian  intentions.  On  January  n,  1840,  Muhlenberg, 
the  American  representative  at  Vienna,  wrote:  "Under  these  circumstances  [the 
physical  weakness  of  Metternich]  little  business  of  any  consequence  can  be 
expected  to  be  transacted  for  sometime  here,  the  Prince  [Metternich]  being  the 
center  from  which  alone  light,  heat  and  activity  emanate.  .  .  . 

"The  Austrian  Government,  as  you  are  no  doubt  aware,  does  not  like  the 
French  people  or  the  Government  but  there  is  no  little  jealousy  entertained  on 
the  other  hand  towards  Russia,  a  jealousy  which  is  certainly  not  on  the  decline 
having  been  newly  awakened  by  some  rather  imprudent  publications  in  regard 
to  Germany  evidently  emanating  from  Russian  Agents." — State  Dept.  Austria,  I, 
Muhlenberg  to  Forsyth,  No.  10,  Jan.  n,  1840. 

""On  Jan.  25,  1840,  Palmerston  wrote  to  Ponsonby  that  the  Prussian  envoy 
expected  to  receive  instructions  soon  similar  to  those  which  had  been  received 
by  the  plenipotentiaries  of  Austria  and  Russia. — See,  Levant  Correspondence,  I, 
p.  560. 

"Soult  maintained  continually  that  the  means  of  coercion  which  the 
Powers  proposed  to  employ  against  Mehemet  would  be  inadequate.  He  wrote 
to  Sebastiani,  Jan.  26,  1840:  "A  moins  d'abandonner  le  sultan  a  sa  faiblesse,  ne 
seraient-elles  pas  forcees  de  souffrir  qu'une  armee  imperiale  traversal  1'Asie 
Mineure  et  la  Syrie  pour  refouler  jusqu'en  Egypte  les  soldats  du  vice-roi?  Je  ne 
pense  pas  que  cette  extremite  put  convenir  a  1'Angleterre  plus  qu'elle  ne  nous 
conviendrait  a  nous-memes." — Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  569. 

48The  idea  of  having  the  Porte  become  a  party  to  the  convention  was 
suggested  by  Palmerston.  See  Sebastiani  to  Soult,  Jan.  20,  1840,  ibid.,  pp.  564- 
568.  Guichen,  op.  cit.,  p.  208. 


461]  THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  JULY  15,    1840  135 

ize  Brunnow  to  bind  his  court  by  a  treaty  to  which  the  Porte  was 
a  party.47  He  calculated  that  it  would  be  two  months  before  an 
envoy  of  the  Sultan  could  arrive  in  London,  and  he  seemed  to  re- 
joice, Granville  reported  on  January  31,  1840,  that  the  French 
government  would  not  be  under  the  immediate  necessity  of  refus- 
ing or  assenting  to  sign  a  convention  of  the  five  Powers  in  regard 
to  the  affairs  of  the  Levant.48 

Although  Louis  Philippe's  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  did  not 
expect  that  the  negotiators  at  the  British  capital  would  attain 
important  results  in  the  near  future,  he  realized  that  the  situation 
was  a  dangerous  one  for  France.49  The  position  which  Palmerston 
had  taken  "disturbed  and  wearied"  him  and  his  colleagues.  They 
began  to  fear  that  their  cause  was  not  being  defended  properly  at 
the  Court  of  St.  James.  Because  of  Sebastiani's  "antecedents" 
they  looked  upon  him  as  "too  favorable  to  Turkey,"  and  so  nearly 
in  accord  with  the  opinions  of  Lord  Palmerston  as  to  be  ill  fitted 
"for  the  vigorous  support  of  opposite  views."  He  appeared  to 
them  to  be  neither  a  true  representative  of  the  French  govern- 
ment, nor  an  effective  interpreter  of  the  policy  for  which  the 
debates  [of  June  and  July,  1839]  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies 
"had  established  a  precedent."50  Therefore,  they  resolved  to  recall 

"Granville  to  Palmerston,  Jan.  27,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  p.  564. 
The  French  Ministers  continued  to  believe  that  an  alliance  between  England 
and  Russia  was  not  practicable.  See  an  extract  taken  from  a  speech  delivered 
by  M.  Villemain,  the  Minister  of  Public  Instruction,  in  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies  early  in  Jan.,  1840. — The  Examiner,  Jan.  12,  1840,  p.  19.  For  addi- 
tional remarks  made  by  Villemain  concerning  Near  Eastern  affairs  see  Journal 
des  Debats,  Jan.  12,  1840. 

^Granville   to   Palmerston,   Jan.    31,    1840,   Levant   Correspondence,   I,   pp. 

573-574- 

^It  should  be  noted  that  on  Jan.  27,  1840,  Sebastiani  reported  that  Palmer- 
ston had  replied  in  the  affirmative  to  Neumann's  official  inquiry  as  to  whether, 
in  the  event  of  the  four  Powers  arriving  at  an  agreement,  and  France  with- 
holding her  consent,  the  clauses  of  the  treaty  would  be  acted  upon  in  spite  of 
her  abstention.  See  Affaires  etrangeres,  654  Angleterre,  Sebastiani  to  Soult,  Jan. 
27,  1840,  cited  by  Hall,  op.  cit.,  pp.  258-259. 

50Guizot,  op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  370.  Note  the  following  extract  from  a  letter, 
Palmerston  to  Hobhouse,  July  27,  1843:  "...  it  did  so  happen  that 
Sebastiani  was  sincerely  anxious  to  maintain  the  integrity  and  independence  of 
Turkey,  and  did  not  care  a  straw  for  Mehemet  Ali;  and  that  Guizot  was  heart 
and  soul  for  Mehemet  Ali,  and  did  not  care  much  about  the  dignity  and  inde- 
pendence of  the  Turkish  empire." — English  Historical  Review,  XVIII,  p.  127. 


136  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [462 

him,  and  they  chose  as  his  successor,  Frangois  Pierre  Guillaume 
Guizot,  who,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  argued  eloquently  on  July 
2,  1839,  for  the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo  in  the  Near  East. 

Before  Guizot  departed  from  Paris  he  received  instructions  from 
Marshal  Soult  which  revealed  clearly  that  the  main  object  of  his 
mission  should  be  to  obtain  from  the  government  of  England  great 
concessions  to  the  advantage  of  the  Egyptian  Pasha.  "The  King's 
government,"  Soult  explained  in  those  instructions,  "has  believed 
and  still  believes  that,  in  the  condition  in  which  Mehemet  Ali  finds 
himself,  to  offer  him  less  than  the  hereditary  possession  of  Egypt 
and  Syria  as  far  as  Mount  Taurus,  would  be  to  expose  ourselves 
to  a  refusal  ...  on  his  part  which  in  case  of  need  he  would  sus- 
tain by  a  desperate  resistance  the  rebound  of  which  would  shake 
and  perhaps  subvert  the  Ottoman  Empire;  .  .  .  ."51 

Before  Guizot  had  an  opportunity  to  attempt  negotiations  on 
the  basis  of  the  Marshal's  instructions,  the  Soult  Ministry,  having 
sustained  a  parliamentary  defeat  on  the  question  of  granting 
a  donation  of  500,000  livres  per  annum  to  the  Due  de  Nemours, 
resigned.52  Soult  and  his  colleagues  went  out  of  office  on  February 
29,  1840,  and  their  places  were  taken  directly  by  a  cabinet  formed 
under  the  leadership  of  M.  Thiers.  In  the  Chamber  of  Deputies, 
January  13,  1840,  Thiers  had  delivered  a  noteworthy  address  de- 
fending the  Anglo-French  alliance.53  His  remarks  on  that  occasion 

"Instructions  given  by  Soult  to  Guizot,  Feb.  19,  1840,  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V, 
p.  416. 

"Ibid.,  IV,  pp.  374-375- 

"Journal  des  Debats,  Jan.  14,  1840.  The  Times,  Jan.  15,  1840.  Raikes, 
France  since  1830,  I,  p.  XVI.  Blanc,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  454-456.  Concerning  the 
Anglo-French  alliance,  Thiers  said:  "...  pour  moi  je  ne  puis  pas  encore 
renoncer  a  cette  belle  et  noble  alliance,  qui  est  fondee,  non  seulement  sur  la 
puissance  mat£rielle  mais  sur  la  force  morale  des  principes.  Car  quand  nous 
sommes  avec  PAngleterre,  nous  ne  sommes  pas  obliges  de  cacher  notre  drapeau, 
tandis  que  telle  autre  alliance  qu'on  nous  conseille  nous  forcera  a  le  cacher. 
Mais,  d'accord  avec  PAngleterre,  nous  pouvons  clever  nos  deux  drapeaux;  ils 
portent  pour  devise:  Libertt  modernee  et  Paix  du  monde.  .  .  . 

"Eh  bien!  je  le  dis  avec  confiance,  tous  le  torts  ne  sont  pas  du  cote  de 
PAngleterre,  il  y  a  eu  des  malentendus  des  deux  cotes,  et  je  suis  convaincu 
qu'il  serait  facile  d'aplanir  les  difficultes  en  eclair  cissant  quelques  parties  de  la 
question,  et  ce  serait  la  un  grand  avantage." — Journal  des  Debats,  Jan.  14,  1840. 
See  also,  Boudin,  Histoire  de  Louis  Philippe,  II,  pp.  418-420. 


463]    THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  JULY  15,  1840     137 

attracted  much  attention  and  were  commented  upon  extensively 
throughout  both  England  and  France.54  An  English  press  corres- 
pondent who  heard  the  speech  went  so  far  as  to  declare:  "It 
[Thiers'  speech]  .  .  .  had  as  powerful  an  effect  as  any  burst  of 
eloquence  that  I  ever  witnessed.  Thiers  rose  to  warmth  and 
eloquence  only  when  treating  of  the  English  alliance.  He  had 
certainly  for  the  moment  the  sentiments  of  the  chamber  against 
him,  so  much  so  that  once  or  twice  he  raised  an  incipient  murmur. 
He  braved  all,  and  overcame  all,  however,  and  none  dared  to  lift 
up  a  voice  against  him.  This  speech  is  more  than  an  effort  of 
eloquence,  it  is  a  great  and  good  act  tending  strongly  to  re-knit 
those  bonds  between  the  countries  which  foolish  hands  were  daily 
loosening."55  Consequently,  when  Thiers  entered  office  many  ex- 
pected that  the  two  western  Powers  would  come  promptly  to  an 
understanding  in  regard  to  Turco-Egyptian  affairs.56  Lord 
Palmerston  even  remarked  that  he  did  not  despair  of  finding  that 
the  opinions  of  the  new  French  Ministers  would  "approximate  more 


"The  Constitutionnel,  a.  Paris  paper,  declared  that  Thier's  speech  was  a 
" disco urs-ministrf."  "Et,  en  realite,  M.  Thiers  venait  de  poser  sa  candidature 
du  haut  de  la  tribune." — Blanc,  op.  cit.,  V,  p.  457.  See  also,  Boudin,  op.  cit.,  II, 
p.  420. 

"The  Examiner,  Jan.  19,  1840,  p.  35.  Lamartine,  who  spoke  in  the  Cham- 
ber of  Deputies  on  Jan.  n,  1840,  favored  partitioning  the  Turkish  territories, 
giving  Constantinople  to  Russia,  Egypt  to  England,  Asia  Minor  to  France,  and 
the  coast  of  the  Adriatic  to  Austria.  According  to  his  opinion,  Mehemet  AH 
was  only  an  "ephemeral  adventurer."  "The  high  road  from  Asia  to  Europe, 
since  the  perfection  of  steam,"  he  declared,  "lay  through  Egypt  and  the  Red 
Sea.  Mehemet  AH  posted  himself  as  the  gaoler  of  that  sea,  the  obstacle  to 
prevent  the  communication  between  East  and  West,  which  England  would 
never  suffer,  if  it  took  her  a  century's  war  to  put  it  down.  By  supporting  Egypt, 
France  made  herself  the  rival  of  England,  whilst  she  might  remain  England's 
friend,  with  more  advantage." — Ibid.,  J.  Irving,  The  Annals  of  Our  Time,  p.  22. 
Journal  des  Debats,  Jan.  12,  1840.  Lamartine's  ideas  were  condemned  both  by 
the  Ministry  and  by  the  press  in  France.  See  a  speech  delivered  by  Villemain  in 
answer  to  Lamartine  and  editorial  comment  thereon. — Ibid.,  Jan.  12,  13,  1840. 

MSee  a  letter  from  Paris,  March  25,  1840.    The  Times,  March  27,  1840. 


138  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [4^4 

nearly  than  those  of  their  predecessors,  to  the  views  of  the  Four 
Powers."57 

Time  soon  revealed,  however,  that  Thiers  was  no  more  anxious 
than  Marshal  Soult  had  been  to  defy  the  wrath  of  public  opinion 
in  France  by  joining  those  who  wished  to  coerce  the  Viceroy.  In 
instructions  which  he  sent  to  Guizot  he  declared  that  it  was  essen- 
tial to  gain  time,  to  say  that  the  French  Cabinet  had  formed  no 
absolute  opinion  or  resolution,  to  discuss  the  various  lines  of 
policy,  to  demonstrate  the  inconveniences  of  that  which  Lord 
Palmerston  was  anxious  to  see  adopted,  and  thus  to  retard  a 
final  decision.  It  was  necessary  also  to  hold  no  official  relations 
whatever  except  with  the  English  Ministers,  and  in  this  way  to 
disengage  the  French  government  from  the  ties  imposed  on  it  by 
the  note  of  July  27,  1839.  He  did  not  mean  that  France  should  re- 
cede from  the  obligation  which  she  had  contracted  when  Roussin 
signed  the  collective  note,  but  he  hoped  that  in  the  presence  of 
incessant  difficulties  attending  a  concert  between  the  five  Powers, 
the  Sultan  and  the  Pasha  would  come  finally  to  an  agreement 
between  themselves,58  or  rather,  that  from  being  tired  of  the 
question,  the  Powers  would  accept  and  guarantee  to  the  Porte  and 
its  vassal,  "the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo;  which,  according  to 
his  [Thiers']  opinion,  was  the  best  of  the  combinations."59 

"Palmerston  to  Beauvale,  March  12,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp. 
600-603.  Annual  Register,  1840,  p.  491.  On  March  9,  1840,  Granville  had  written 
to  Palmerston:  "M.  Thiers  then  proceeded  to  say,  that  whatever  turn  affairs 
might  take  in  the  East,  there  was  no  danger  of  firing  of  cannon  between  our 
fleets;  he  hoped  that  the.  two  Governments  might  arrive  at  a  concordance  of 
opinion  in  the  Turco-Egyptian  Question,  but  even  should  they  not  agree  upon 
the  measures  to  be  pursued,  such  disagreement  would  not  affect  the  friendly 
relations  between  the  two  countries." — Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp.  598-599. 
See  also,  Palmerston  to  Hobhouse,  July  27,  1843,  English  Historical  Review, 
XVIII,  p.  128. 

raAt  a  later  date,  June,  1840,  the  British  suspicioned  rightly  that  Thiers  was 
secretly  encouraging  the  Sultan  and  the  Pasha  to  come  to  an  agreement  be- 
tween themselves.  See,  Hall,  op.  cit.,  pp.  269-272.  Letters  from  Constantinople, 
June  27,  1840,  The  Times,  July  20,  30,  1840. 

MGuizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  p.  64.  On  April  25,  1840,  Thiers  wrote  to  Barante:  "  'En 
resume  le  gouvernement  du  Roi  est  pret  a  negocier.  II  ne  consentira,  il  est 
vrai,  a  entrer  dans  aucune  conference,  dans  aucune  deliberation  commune  et 
formelle,  parce  qu'il  croit  qu'il  pourrait  en  sortir  de  nouvelles  complications.  II 
ne  fait  aucune  proposition,  il  ne  prend  aucune  initiative,  mais  si  le  project  de 
transaction  qui  avait  etc  mis  en  avant,  et  qui  consistait  a  donner  a  Mehemed  AH, 


465]  THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  JULY  15,   1840  139 

It  did  not  take  long  for  Lord  Palmerston  to  perceive  that  the 
hopes  which  he  had  entertained  in  regard  to  the  policies  of  Louis 
Philippe's  new  ministers  would  not  be  realized.60  They  continued 
the  naval  preparations  in  the  Mediterranean  which  had  been 
begun  while  Marshal  Soult  was  in  office  and  that  was  particularly 
distasteful  to  the  British  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.61  "  'The 
truth  is,' "  the  latter  wrote  on  April  16,  1840,  "  'however  reluctant 
one  may  [be  to]  avow  the  conviction,  that  Louis  Philippe62  is 
a  man  in  whom  no  solid  trust  can  be  reposed.  However,  there  he 
is,  and  we  call  him  our  ally;  only  we  ought  to  be  enlightened  by 
experience  and  not  to  attach  to  his  assertions  or  professions  any 
greater  value  than  really  belongs  to  them;  more  especially  when, 
as  in  the  case  of  Egypt,  63  his  words  are  not  only  at  variance  with 

moyennant  la  retrocession  d'Adana,  de  Candia  et  des  villes  Saintes  1'investiture 
hereditaire  de  la  Syrie  et  de  1'Egypte,  si  ce  project  qu'il  croit  reunir,  plus 
qu'aucun  autre,  les  conditions  de  succes,  etait  agree  par  les  cours  alliees,  il 
n'hesiterait  pas  d'user  de  toute  son  influence  pour  decider  Mehemed  AH  a 
1'accepter.' " — Quoted  by  Schiemann,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  p.  396,  [footnote]. 

*°In  a  conversation  with  Granville,  March  13,  1840,  Thiers  took  up  the 
same  line  of  argument  which  Soult  had  pursued.  It  was  a  matter  of  indiffer- 
ence to  the  French  government,  he  claimed,  whether  or  not  Mehemet  Ali  re- 
tained Syria,  but  he  was  persuaded  that  the  coercive  measures  which  the  Powers 
proposed  to  use  against  the  Pasha  would  fail  and  that  the  attempt  would 
entail  evils  of  far  greater  magnitude  than  any  that  could  be  apprehended  from 
Egyptian  occupation  of  the  disputed  territory.  At  the  same  time  he  declared 
also  that  no  ministry  in  France,  however  composed,  could  act  hostilely  against 
Egypt  for  the  purpose  of  restoring  the  pashalic  to  the  direct  authority  of  the 
Porte. — Granville  to  Palmerston,  March  13,  20,  April  3,  1840,  Levant  Corres- 
pondence, I,  pp.  603-604,  605-606,  617.  Palmerston  to  Hobhouse,  July  27,  1843, 
English  Historical  Review,  XVIII,  p.  128. 

"Palmerston  to  Granville,  March  5,  May  5,  1840;  Granville  to  Palmerston, 
March  9,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp.  597-598,  644-646,  598-599. 

"By  the  name  "Louis  Philippe,"  Palmerston  probably  meant  the  French 
government.  It  is  true,  however,  that  he  was  particularly  hostile  to  the 
French  King.  See  Palmerston  to  Granville,  April  23,  1840,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II, 
pp.  311-312. 

"See  also,  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  42-43.  The  attitude  of  France  in  regard 
to  Egypt  disturbed  other  Englishmen  besides  Lord  Palmerston.  The  following  is 
an  extract  from  a  letter  published  in  The  Examiner:  "England  holds  rank  as  a 
first  rate  power  by  her  Eastern  empire,  and  quick  and  sure  communication  and 
connection  with  that  empire  has  become  an  object  of  vital  necessity.  If  France 
would  deny  us  this,  France  is  our  enemy,  our  gratuitous  and  self-made  enemy. 
War  with  her  becomes  inevitable,  sooner  or  later,  and  it  comes  better  when  all 
the  powers  are  leagued  against  her,  than  when  she  shall  have  had  time  to  detach 
one  of  them  from  the  group." — The  Examiner,  April  5,  1840,  p.  212. 


I4O  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN   QUESTION,   1832-184!  [466 

his  conduct,  but  even  inconsistent  with  each  other.  The  Cabinet 
have  determined  that  we  must  without  delay  bring  the  French 
to  a  clear  and  definite  arrangement  about  their  fleet;  unless  they 
will  reduce  their  ships  in  commission  to  ten — the  number  which 
Soult  stated  to  you  in  July  last — as  the  intended  amount  of  the 
French  active  force,  we  must  go  down  to  Parliament  and  ask 
for  an  additional  vote  upon  the  specific  ground  of  the  unexplained 
armament  of  France.'  "64 

During  the  month  of  March,  1840,  Guizot  had  conferences 
frequently  with  Palmerston  and  other  members  of  the  British 
Cabinet.65  The  question  of  the  Near  East  was  often  the  subject  of 
conversation  at  those  conferences  and,  although  some  of  Palmer- 
ston's  colleagues  were  very  anxious  to  avoid  measures  which  might 
occasion  a  break  between  England  and  France,  Guizot  realized, 
ere  long,  that  it  would  be  difficult  to  induce  the  English  Secretary 
of  Foreign  Affairs  to  modify  his  plans.  "  'I  am  now  convinced,' " 
he  reported  to  Thiers,  March  12,  "  'that  Lord  Palmerston  has 
no  intention  of  doing  or  deciding  anything  until  the  arrival  of  the 
Turkish  plenipotentiary.  We  have  therefore  time  [before  us]. 
But  I  must  even  now  observe  to  your  Excellency  that  this  advan- 
tage would  become  a  danger  perhaps  should  we  suffer  ourselves 
to  suppose  that,  because  he  does  nothing  now,  he  will  do  nothing 
later,  and  that  we  shall  be  definitely  released  from  taking  a  resolu- 

"Palmerston  to  Granville,  April  16,  1840,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  310-311. 
Two  days  before  Palmerston  wrote  this  letter,  Thiers  declared  in  the  Chamber 
of  Peers:  "La  France  croit  que  les  provinces  conquises  par  le  pacha  sont  plus 
utilement,  placees  dans  ses  mains  que  dans  celles  du  Sultan.  Car  la  Syrie,  par 
exemple,  exposerait  le  Sultan  a  depenser  beaucoup  d'hommes  et  d'argent  pour 
administrer  une  province  qui  finirait  par  lui  echapper,  tandis  que,  laissee  dans 
les  mains  du  Pacha,  celui-ci  en  tirera  assez  d'argent  et  d'hommes  pour  la  bien 
gouverner." — Journal  des  Debats,  April  15,  1840.  See  also  Parl.  Debates,  LIV,  p. 
782.  Granville  to  Palmerston,  April  15,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  p.  628. 

*°Guizot,  in  his  Memoires  has  described  at  length  his  early  proceedings  at 
London.  See,  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  chapters  XVII  and  XVIII.  Guizot  learned  at 
one  of  his  early  conferences  with  Palmerston  about  two  drafts  already  prepared 
for  an  arrangement  to  conclude  the  Turco-Egyptian  question.  These  two  drafts, 
one  of  British  and  the  other  of  Continental — perhaps  Austrian — origin,  according 
to  Guizot,  were  similar  except  that  the  latter  was  to  be  signed  by  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  great  Powers  alone  while  the  former  was  to  be  signed  by  the 
representatives  of  the  Porte  as  well  as  by  those  of  the  Powers.  In  both, 
Mehemet  Ali  was  to  be  denied  the  possession  of  Syria.  See  ibid.,  pp.  44-45. 


467]    THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  JULY  15,  1840     14! 

tion  because  we  are  not  pressed  to  do  so  immediately.  The  more 
I  observe,  the  more  I  satisfy  myself  that  the  British  Cabinet 
considers  the  circumstances  as  favorable  for  settling  the  affairs  of 
the  East,  and  wishes  seriously  to  take  advantage  of  them.  It 
would  much  prefer  to  act  in  concert  with  us;  [and]  it  is  disposed 
to  make  concessions  to  establish  that  concert.  Nevertheless,  if,  on 
our  part,  we  do  not  decide  on  something  positive,  if  we  appear  to 
desire  only  to  adjourn  and  convert  all  difficulties  into  impossibil- 
ities, a  moment  may  arrive,  I  think,  when,  .  .  .  the  British 
Cabinet  would  act  without  us  and  with  others  rather  than  not  act 
at  all.'  "66 

Meanwhile,  the  Porte,  conforming  with  the  suggestion  which 
Palmerston,  in  his  despatch  of  January  25,  1840,  had  directed 
Ponsonby  to  make  to  it,  ordered  Nouri  Effendi,  the  Turkish 
Ambassador  at  Paris,  to  proceed  to  London.  It  was  not  the  inten- 
tion of  the  Porte  that  Nouri  should  be  its  permanent  agent  at 
the  conference  of  the  Powers,  for  it  was  anxious  to  be  represented 
by  an  abler  person  who,  "coming  direct  from  Constantinople, 
would  be  better  informed  as  to  the  state  of  affairs  in  the  East  and 
more  capable  of  enlightening  the  western  diplomats  as  to  the 
chances  of  success"  which  various  proposals  might  have.  The 
mission  of  the  Turkish  Ambassador  residing  in  France  was  to 
continue  only  until  such  a  personage  could  be  sent  to  succeed 
him.67 

April  7,  1840,  soon  after  his  arrival  at  the  British  capital,  Nouri 
forwarded  to  the  representatives  of  the  five  great  Powers  notes 
similar  in  character,  informing  them  that  he  had  power  to  con- 
clude a  convention  for  the  settlement  of  the  Turco-Egyptian 
question.68  The  Sultan  expected,  he  intimated,  that  such  a  con- 
vention would  be  drawn  up  on  the  basis  of  his  [the  Sultan's] 
offer  to  grant  the  hereditary  possession  of  Egypt  to  Mehemet  Ali 
provided  that  the  Viceroy  would  restore  to  him  the  Ottoman  fleet 
and  evacuate  all  of  the  other  provinces  which  he  [the  Viceroy] 

"Ibid.,  pp.  59-60.  King  Louis  Philippe  believed  that  Guizot's  fears  were 
groundless.  See  an  extract  of  a  letter,  Baudrand  to  Guizot,  March  30,  1840, 
quoted  by  ibid.,  pp.  61-62. 

"Ibid.,  pp.  87-88. 

wlt  is  doubtful  if  Nouri  Effendi  had  been  granted  as  much  power  as  he 
claimed.  See  ibid.,  p.  75.  Hasenclever,  op.  cit.,  pp.  137-138. 


142  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,  1832-184!  [468 

was  then  holding.69  Guizot  replied  the  following  day  by  a  brief 
acknowledgment  in  which  he  stated  to  the  Ottoman  plenipoten- 
tiary that  he  would  lay  the  note  before  his  home  government.70 
Lord  Palmerston  and  the  envoys  of  Austria,  Prussia,  and  Russia, 
on  the  other  hand,  answered  the  notes  which  Nouri  had  written 
to  them  by  statements  almost  identical,  expressing  a  willingness 
to  concert  with  His  Excellency  in  order  to  discover  the  best  means 
of  realizing  the  "friendly  intentions"  which  the  representatives  of 
the  five  Powers  had  manifested  in  the  name  of  their  respective 
courts,  by  the  collective  note  of  July  27,  iSjQ.71 

In  the  interval  which  had  elapsed  while  the  negotiations  were 
being  delayed  because  of  the  absence  of  a  Turkish  envoy,  the 
government  of  Berlin  had  finally  sent  instructions  to  von  Biilow, 
its  minister  at  Queen  Victoria's  Court,  ordering  him  to  follow  a 
policy  in  conformity  with  the  one  which  had  been  adopted  by 
Austria.72  Consequently,  when  Nouri  Effendi  arrived  in  London 
and  announced  that  he  was  empowered  to  negotiate  on  the  basis 
favored  by  Palmerston  and  Brunnow,  it  appeared  as  though 
France  was  the  only  Power  which  stood  in  the  way  of  an  im- 
mediate settlement. 

"'  ...  all  the  world  is  at  the  feet  of  England,' "  Guizot  wrote 
to  the  Due  de  Broglie,  April  7,  1840;  "  'all  the  world  offers  to  do 
what  she  pleases;  we  alone  say  no,  we  who  call  ourselves  her  par- 
ticular friends.  And  it  is  in  the  name  of  our  friendship,  to  main- 
tain our  alliance  that  we  ask  her  not  to  accept  what  all  the  others 
offer.  We  are  in  the  right,  but  we  are  not  accommodating.'  "73 
Thiers  also,  it  appears,  perceived  that  the  four  Powers  were 

*"Nouri  Effendi  to  Palmerston,  April  7,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp. 
624-625.  Nouri  Effendi  to  Guizot,  April  7,  1840,  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  420-423. 
Ibid.,  p.  76. 

MGuizot  to  Nouri  Effendi,  April  8,  1840,  ibid.,  p.  424.  At  first  Thiers  was 
so  dissatisfied  with  Noun's  note  that  he  ordered  Guizot  to  make  no  additional 
reply.  Later  he  permitted  him  to  make  an  evasive  one.  See  ibid.,  pp.  76-78. 
Guizot  to  Nouri  Effendi,  ibid.,  p.  425. 

nlbid.,  pp.  77,  424-425.  Palmerston  to  Nouri  Effendi,  April  n,  1840,  Levant 
Correspondence,  I,  p.  627. 

MSee  Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  Feb.  26,  1840,  ibid.,  p.  605. 

"An  extract  from  a  letter  quoted  by  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  52-53.  See  also, 
Guizot  to  Dumon,  April  7,  1840,  De  Witt,  Lettres  de  M.  Guizot  a  sa  Famille  et 
a  ses  amis,  pp.  186-188. 


469]          THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  JULY  15,   1840  143 

united  upon  the  principles  involved  in  regard  to  the  Turco- 
Egyptian  question  and  that  France  was  in  danger  of  being  iso- 
lated, for  about  the  middle  of  April,  when  it  was  proposed  to  him 
that  there  should  be  established  in  London  a  formal  conference 
of  the  five  Powers  to  consider  and  determine  what  measures 
should  be  adopted  to  settle  the  Eastern  affair,  he  refused  to  be  a 
party  to  such  a  conference,  stating  that  if  it  should  be  decided 
there  to  drive  Mehemet  Ali  out  of  Syria,  France  would  refuse  to 
assist  in  carrying  out  such  measures,  and  her  refusal  to  join  in 
them  after  she  had  been  a  party  to  the  conference  would  render 
her  separation  from  the  other  Powers  a  more  marked  step  than 
it  would  be  if  no  conference  of  the  five  were  to  take  place.74 

Many  writers  have  criticised  Thiers  for  adopting  such  an  un- 
compromising attitude.  Those  criticisms  are,  to  a  large  extent  at 
least,  unjust.  The  policy  followed  by  the  administration  of  Mar- 
shal Soult,  to  which  Thiers  fell  heir,  and  the  temper  of  the  French 
people  placed  him  in  a  position  from  which  there  was  no  other 
safe  nor  creditable  escape.75  Because  of  the  existing  circumstances 
it  was  imperative  that  he  should  refuse  to  cooperate  with  the  other 
Cabinets  of  Europe  if  they  should  attempt  to  coerce  Mehemet  Ali. 
It  is  certain  that  if  he  had  joined  with  Lord  Palmerston  and  his 
allies  on  the  basis  of  the  Anglo-Russian  terms  his  official  career 
would  have  ended  immediately.  He  maintained  always  that  the 
amount  of  territory  which  the  Pasha  should  receive  would  matter 
little  to  him  if  the  latter  would  accept  it  willingly,  and  it  is  prob- 
able that  he  was  sincere  in  this  contention.  While  he  was  declar- 
ing to  the  representatives  of  the  Powers  that  France  would  not 
join  them  in  coercing  the  Pasha,  he  was  at  the  same  time  writing 
to  Cochelet  directing  him  to  warn  Mehemet  Ali  to  be  more 
moderate  in  his  demands.76  Indeed,  in  one  of  his  despatches  to 
the  French  Consul-General  at  Alexandria  he  even  enjoined  him 
"to  make  it  clearly  understood  by  Mehemet  Ali,"  that  France 

"Granville  to  Palmerston,  April  17,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp. 
628-629.  Palmerston  to  Hobhouse,  July  27,  1843,  English  Historical  Review, 
XVIII,  pp.  128-129. 

75See  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  313. 

7aGranville  to  Palmerston,  April  20,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  p.  630. 


144  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [470 

would  not  "sacrifice  its  alliance  with  England  to  the  interests  of 
the  Pasha."77 

Although  in  April,  1840,  the  governments  of  England,  Austria, 
Prussia,  and  Russia  were  agreed  upon  the  main  principles  which 
were  involved  in  the  question  of  the  Near  East,  they  were  not 
ready  to  sign  a  convention  to  which  France  would  not  be  a  party. 
Austria  and  Prussia  particularly  were  anxious  that  the  concert  of 
Europe  should  be  complete.  "  'All  we  desire,' "  von  Billow  de- 
clared to  Guizot,  early  in  April,  1840,  "...  'is  that  France 
should  not  separate  from  the  other  Powers  in  this  matter;  this  is 
nearly  the  only  instruction  I  have  received  from  my  sovereign. 
Can  we  not  find  some  middle  course  which  may  preserve  to  all 
parties  their  old  engagements  and  personal  situations,  and  form 
the  basis  of  a  pacific  settlement  between  the  Sultan  and  the  Pasha? 
It  is  necessary  to  seek  for  varied  combinations,  for  some  trifling 
concessions  on  all  sides,  some  modifications  in  the  form  or  quality 
of  the  Pasha's  dominion,  in  a  word,  a  ground  somewhat  new  on 
which  we  may  unite.'  "78  The  attitude  which  Baron  Neumann, 
the  Austrian  representative,  assumed  in  his  conversations  with 
Guizot  was  of  a  similar  character.  On  April  15,  some  days  after 
von  Biilow  made  the  statement  quoted  above,  he  intimated  to  the 
Frenchman  that  even  all  Syria  might  be  given  to  Mehemet  AH  for 
life  if  France  would  join  with  the  other  Powers.79  When  Guizot 
replied  that  the  King's  government,  on  its  own  account,  attached 
little  importance  to  the  distribution  of  territory  between  the  two 
parties;  that  it  earnestly  desired  that  the  transaction  should  be 
acceptable  to  both;  but  that  nothing  authorized  it  to  believe  that 
the  Pasha  would  be  disposed  to  give  way  on  the  heirship  of 
Syria,80  the  Austrian  continued:  "'My  government  is  as  anxious 
as  yours  for  the  maintenance  of  peace  in  the  East;  .  .  .  what 

"Granville  to  Palmerston,  May  i,  1840,  ibid.,  p.  644.  At  a  later  date, 
Tillers,  while  speaking  to  Bulwer  of  the  attitude  which  he  maintained  in  regard 
to  Mehemet  AH,  declared:  "'In  short,'  ...  'to  you  I  speak  in  his  favour,  but 
to  himself  I  argue  in  favour  of  Turkey.'  " — Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  July  17,  1840, 
ibid.,  II,  p.  7. 

"Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  78-79.  This  statement  was  made  by  von  Billow 
during  an  interview  which  he  had  with  Guizot  "Des  qu'on  avait  su  Nouri- 
Effendi  arrive  a  Londres,  et  avant  la  remise  de  sa  note."  See  ibid.,  p.  78. 

"Two  days  earlier,  April  13,  von  Billow  had  likewise  intimated  that  Syria 
might  be  left  to  Mehemet  Ali  for  life.  See  ibid.,  pp.  79-81. 

"Ibid.,  pp.  81-82. 


a00,,£ 
47l]     THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  JULY  15,  1840      145 

we  consider  important  is,  that  there  should  be  a  really  effective 
settlement,  and  this  cannot  take  place  unless  we  all  fall  into  the 
same  view.  The  Emperor,  my  master,  and  the  King  of  Prussia 
equally,  desire  this.'  "81 

In  truth,  the  government  of  Austria  was  alarmed  considerably 
by  the  situation  of  affairs.  On  April  25,  1840,  Prince  Metternich 
forwarded  to  Neumann  a  memoir  in  which  he  discussed  the 
means  that  the  four  Powers  would  have  at  their  disposal  to 
coerce  Mehemet  AH  in  case  France  refused  to  cooperate  with 
them.  He  had  no  intention,  he  let  it  be  known,  of  allowing  Aus- 
trian troops  to  be  employed  in  the  East;  Prussia  was  not  inter- 
ested sufficiently  in  the  terms  of  the  settlement  to  be  enforced 
upon  the  Pasha  to  cause  her  to  do  so;  and  England,  he  believed, 
had  no  land  forces  which  would  be  available  for  such  an  under- 
taking. Russia  had  both  an  army  and  a  navy  in  the  region  of  the 
Black  Sea.  The  Emperor  Nicholas  might  be  willing  to  send  them 
against  Mehemet  AH  and  England  and  Austria  could  be  counted 
upon  to  furnish  their  fleets,  but  it  would  be  necessary  to  detach 
from  these  a  naval  force  of  considerable  strength  to  watch  the 
French  squadron.  Therefore,  he  concluded,  it  would  be  extremely 
difficult  for  the  four  courts  to  succeed  without  the  cooperation  of 
the  fifth.82 

"Ibid.,  pp.  82-83. 

^Metternich,  op.  cit.,  VI,  pp.  429-439.  Hasenclever  points  out  that  in  a 
secret  note  which  accompanied  this  memoir,  or  memorandum,  Metternich 
explained  that  Austria  was  not  opposed  to  the  use  of  forceful  means,  but  the 
latter  must  take  the  Russian  standpoint  strictly  into  account.  An  agreement 
regarding  everything  must  be  reached  first  to  assure  final  success.  He  sharply 
rejected  a  notion  advanced  by  Palmerston  that  all  might  be  left  to  chance. 
Undoubtedly  Metternich  was  determined  to  take  no  chances  of  permitting  further 
Russian  aggression  against  Turkey.  See  Hasenclever,  op.  cit.,  pp.  144-147.  See 
also  Metternich  to  Apponyi,  May  I,  6,  1840,  Metternich,  op.  cit.,  VI,  pp. 
404-408.  Note  in  particular  the  following  extract  from  the  despatch  of  May  6: 
''Lord  Palmerston  a  un  travers  dans  1'esprit  qui  1'empeche  toujours  d'avoir 
completement  raison  dans  une  affaire  quelconque.  La  ou  son  esprit  marche 
droit  dans  le  principe,  il  oublie  de  scruter  les  moyens  d'execution,  tandis  que 
la  ou  son  attitude  peche  par  la  base,  il  est  fertile  en  expedients.  Dans  le 
conflit  turco-egyptien,  il  est  place  droit  sur  la  base  des  principes,  mais  ses 
idees  sur  les  moyens  comminatoires  n'ont  pas  le  sens  commun.  Je  crois 
le  lui  avoir  demontre  par  ma  derniere  expedition."  The  attitude  which  Austria 
assumed  worried  both  Palmerston  and  Nesselrode.  See,  Nesselrode  to  Meyendorff, 
April  13,  1840.  Nesselrode,  op.  cit.,  VIII,  pp.  19-22.  Palmerston  to  Beauvale, 
March  28,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp.  610-611. 


146  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [472 

With  the  aim  of  winning  the  assistance  of  France,  the  Austrian 
Chancellor  promptly  instructed  Neumann  to  suggest  that  Syria 
should  be  divided  into  two  portions.  The  southern  portion  com- 
prising all  of  the  territory  south  and  west  of  a  line  beginning  at 
Beyrout  and  extending  to  the  northern  point  of  Lake  Tiberias; 
that  is  to  say,  the  greater  part  of  the  Pashalic  of  Acre,  including 
the  fortress,  should  be  retained  by  Mehemet  Ali,  while  the  re- 
mainder of  Syria,  forming  the  second  or  northern  portion  should 
be  surrendered  to  the  Sultan.  The  Austrian  envoy  at  London 
explained  this  proposal  to  Guizot,  May  5,  1840,  and  remarked 
that  if  Mehemet  Ali  rejected  it,  Austria,  though  unwilling  to  fur- 
nish troops,  would  be  disposed  to  unite  her  flag  to  those  of 
England  and  Russia  in  the  employment  of  means  of  maritime 
constraint.  .  .  .  Lord  Palmerston,  whom  he  had  interviewed  on  the 
preceding  evening,  appeared  to  be  determined,  he  declared,  to 
push  matters  to  that  end,  even  though  the  execution  should  be 
left  to  England  alone.83  Three  days  later  when  Guizot  himself 
conversed  with  Palmerston,  he  found  him  willing  to  agree  to  the 
Austrian  proposal.  "The  surrender  of  the  fortress  of  St.  Jean 
d'Acre,"  Guizot  wrote  in  his  Memoires,  "he  [Palmerston]  evi- 
dently considered  a  painful  sacrifice;  for  which  he  consoled  him- 
self by  telling  me,  what  I  knew  already,  that,  to  effect  this  arrange- 
ment and  in  case  of  the  Pasha's  refusal,  Austria  agreed  to  partici- 
pate in  coercive  measures  by  joining  her  flag  to  those  of  England 
and  Russia.  He  then  detailed  his  plan  of  compulsion,  which  con- 
sisted in  a  triple  blockade  of  Alexandria,  of  the  coasts  of  Syria 
and  of  the  Red  Sea.  He  seemed  satisfied  that  such  a  blockade, 
obstinately  prolonged,  if  requisite,  would  force  the  Pasha  to  sub- 
mit, without  any  necessity  of  a  campaign  by  land  or  of  employing 
Russian  troops.84  He  was,  he  said  to  me,  quite  determined  to 
follow  up  this  plan  rigorously  if  the  new  bases  for  an  arrangement 

83Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  85-86.  Palmerston  to  Granville,  July  21,  1840, 
Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp.  8-10. 

"Palmerston's  opinion  probably  was  based  on  the  reports  he  had  received 
from  the  British  agents  in  the  East.  On  Dec.  29,  1839,  Ponsonby  had  written: 
"I  have  long  believed  that  a  British  maritime  force,  acting  in  conjunction  with 
the  Sultan's  flag  on  the  coast  of  Syria,  cutting  off  the  communication  with 
Alexandria,  and  closing  that  port,  would  paralyse  the  whole  body  of  Mehemet 
Ali's  power." — Ibid.,  I,  p.  557.  See  also,  Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  March  3,  1840; 
Moore  to  Ponsonby,  Feb.  21,  1840,  ibid.,  pp.  609,  610. 


473]    THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  JULY  15,  1840      147 

were  not  accepted.  ...  I  confined  myself  to  persevering  in  the 
system  which  I  had  previously  advocated,  saying  that  I  already 
had  transmitted  these  new  overtures  to  the  King's  government, 
that  I  waited  its  answer,  and  that,  under  all  circumstances,  it 
would  require  time  in  order  to  consider  whether  the  success  of 
such  an  arrangement  could  be  brought  about  by  pacific  measures, 
the  only  course  of  proceeding  it  considered  practicable  and 
effectual."85 

The  government  of  France  was  destined  to  have  ample  time  for 
debate  as  to  the  resolution  which  it  should  take  in  answer  to  the 
proposal  just  mentioned,  for  the  approaching  arrival  of  Chekib 
Effendi,  the  representative  whom  the  Porte  was  sending  from 
Constantinople,  was  announced  directly  at  the  British  capital  and 
as  a  result  the  deliberations  upon  Eastern  affairs  were  suspended 
until  his  appearance. 

While  the  diplomats  waited  thus,  other  affairs,  much  less 
weighty,  but  still  of  considerable  momentary  interest,  became  the 
principal  objects  of  attention  and  negotiation  between  Paris  and 
London.86  One  of  these  was  the  so-called  "sulphur  dispute"  be- 
tween England  and  the  Kingdom  of  Naples.  In  the  month  of 
March,  1840,  the  British  government  had  protested  against  the 
monopoly  of  the  trade  in  the  sulphur  products  of  Sicily  which  King 
Ferdinand  was  attempting  to  establish.87  Instead  of  complying 
with  Great  Britain's  demands,  Ferdinand  began  to  make  elaborate 
preparations  for  the  defense  of  his  realm.  A  camp  was  formed 
near  Reggio,  a  general  levy  of  the  reserves  was  decreed,  an  army 
of  over  10,000  men  was  ordered  to  be  embarked  for  Sicily,  and 
the  King  himself,  it  was  said,  was  on  the  point  of  assuming  per- 
sonally the  defense  of  that  island.88  When  the  British  government 
learned  of  the  defiant  attitude  of  the  Italian  Prince,  it  directed 
Admiral  Stopford  to  blockade  the  coast  and  to  seize  and  send  to 
Malta  such  Neapolitan  merchant  vessels  as  he  could  capture.89 
Thiers,  seeing  in  this  situation  an  opportunity  to  better  the  feel- 
ings which  existed  between  England  and  France,  resolved  to 

"Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  86-87. 

"Ibid.,  pp.  87-88. 

"'Hall,  op.  at.,  p.  264. 

**The  Times,  April  15,  1840,  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  89-90. 

"Ibid.,  p.  93. 


148  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [474 

suggest  to  the  two  parties  that  he  should  act  as  mediator  between 
them.  On  April  12,  1840,  he  communicated  his  offer  to  do  so  to 
M.  Guizot,  whp  in  turn  presented  it  to  Lord  Palmerston.  The  lat- 
ter accepted  the  interposition  of  the  French  without  delay.90  King 
Ferdinand  did  likewise  but  approximately  two  and  a  half  months 
elapsed  before  the  affair  was  settled  completely.91 

The  question  of  the  restoration  to  France  of  Napoleon's  body 
was  another  matter  which  attracted  the  attention  of  diplomats  at 
London  and  Paris  in  May,  1840.  "  The  King  consents  to  trans- 
port the  remains  of  Napoleon  from  St.  Helena  to  the  Invalides,  in 
Paris,' "  Thiers  wrote  to  Guizot,  May  4.  "  'He  is  as  anxious  on 
this  point  as  I  am,  and  that  is  not  speaking  lightly.  The  consent 
of  the  English  Cabinet  must  be  obtained.  I  do  not  know  how  it 
can  be  honorably  withheld.  ...  If  England  gives  us  what  we 
require,  she  will  set  the  seal  of  her  reconciliation  with  France;  the 
entire  past  of  fifty  years  will  be  abolished;  the  effect,  in  her  favor, 
in  France  will  be  enormous.  It  is  under  this  point  of  view  that 
the  matter  must  be  proposed.  A  refusal  on  the  contrary  would 
produce  an  injurious  impression.  I  do  not,  and  I  cannot  expect 
it;  .  .  .'  "°2  Thiers  was  not  destined  to  be  disappointed  on  this 
occasion  for  when  Guizot  brought  the  matter  to  the  attention  of 
Lord  Palmerston,  the  British  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  granted 
his  consent  immediately.93 

While  the  attention  of  the  diplomats  in  western  Europe  was 
being  directed  momentarily  from  Turco-Egyptian  affairs,  an  event 
which  was  destined  to  have  important  consequences  occurred  at 
Constantinople.  That  event  was  the  dismissal  of  the  Grand  Vizier, 
Kosrew  Pasha.  Kosrew  always  had  been  an  uncompromising 
opponent  of  Mehemet  AH.  When  the  latter,  who  had  declared  per- 

"Ibid.,  pp.  97-98.    The  Times,  April  23,  24,  30,  1840. 

MSee,  Thiers  to  Granville,  July  5,  1840;  Guizot  to  Palmerston,  July  7, 
1840;  Palmerston  to  Guizot,  July  7,  1840,  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  426-429. 

"Ibid.,  pp.  106-108. 

KIbid.,  pp.  HI-II2,  Irving,  op.  cit.,  p.  25.  On  May  13,  Palmerston  wrote  to 
his  brother  William:  "'The  French  Government  have  asked  us  for  leave  to 
bring  over  from  St.  Helena  the  remains  of  Bonaparte,  and  we  have  given  them 
permission  to  do  so.  This  is  a  thoroughly  French  request,  but  it  would  have  been 
foolish  in  us  not  to  have  granted  it;  and  we  have  therefore  made  a  merit  of 
doing  so  readily  and  with  a  good  grace.'" — Palmerston  to  Temple,  May  13, 
1840.  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  p.  39.  See  also  Broughton,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  265,  267. 


475]  THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  JULY  15,   1840  149 

sistently  that  he  would  not  be  satisfied  unless  he  received  Egypt, 
Syria,  and  Adana  in  hereditary  possession9*  and  who  must  have 
foreseen  that  he  would  not  attain  his  ends  if  he  placed  his  trust 
in  the  mediatory  efforts  of  the  Concert  of  Europe,95  had  exerted 
himself  to  persuade  the  Ottoman  government  to  enter  into  direct 
negotiations,90  the  Grand  Vizier,  seconded  ably  by  Halil  and 
Reschid  Pashas,  had  refused  to  listen  to  his  proposals.  There 
was,  however,  a  faction  at  Constantinople,  headed  by  the  mother  of 
the  Sultan,  which  advised  that  the  Viceroy's  advances  should  be 
received  favorably,97  and  as  the  anxiety  of  the  Porte  to  come  to 
terms  with  its  vassal  had  increased  with  the  passing  of  time,  the 
influence  of  this  faction  had  increased  in  a  corresponding  manner. 
Consequently,  many  who  were  familiar  with  the  situation  at  the 
Turkish  capital  looked  upon  the  downfall  of  Kosrew  as  having 
been  occasioned  by  the  insidious  intrigues  of  the  Sultana  Mother 
and  her  friends  who  were  accused  of  being  in  alliance  with  the 
Pasha.98  Those  suspicions  may  have  been  false99  but  it  should 

"See,  The  Times,  Oct.  24,  1839.  Campbell  to  Palmerston,  Sept.  26,  1839, 
Werther  to  Palmerston,  Nov.  22,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp.  434-435, 
491.  Adana,  Mehemet  AH  maintained,  was  "the  door  to  his  house"  which  he 
never  could  be  willing  to  surrender. — Campbell  to  Ponsonby,  Oct.  19,  1839; 
Medem  to  Nesselrode,  Oct.  8/20,  1839,  ibid.,  pp.  479-480,  503. 

"Col.  Hodges,  the  British  Consul-General,  took  special  care  to  impress 
upon  the  Pasha  that  the  Powers  would  not  tolerate  his  pretensions.  See  Hodges 
to  Palmerston,  Dec.  30,  1839,  Jan.  4,  6,  13,  14,  16,  23,  24,  1840,  ibid.,  pp. 
574-576,  585-589.  Paton,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  167-173.  Mehemet  AH  was  aroused 
greatly  by  the  attitude  which  the  British  Consul-General  assumed  and  he 
accused  England  of  desiring  to  occupy  Egypt  in  order  "to  make  of  it  a  station 
on  the  road  to  India."  See,  a  letter  from  Alexandria,  Jan.  17,  1840,  The 
Examiner,  Feb.  16,  1840,  p.  105.  Letter  from  Alexandria,  Jan.  16,  1840, 
published  in  The  Augsburg  Gazette,  Feb.  14,  1840,  and  copied  in  The  Times, 
Feb.  20,  1840,  and  The  Examiner,  Feb.  23,  1840.  Guichen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  219  ff. 

MSee,  Mehemet  AH  to  Grand  Vizier  [no  date  given.  Rec'd.  at  Constanti- 
nople, Sept.  24,  1839],  Feb.  23,  1840;  Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  March  II,  1840, 
and  an  Inclosure,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp.  431-432,  611-613,  615.  Letter 
from  Alexandria,  Oct.  17,  1839,  The  Times,  Nov.  8,  1839. 

97Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  I,  1839,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  p.  434. 
Guichen,  op.  cit.,  p.  298.  Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  272. 

98F.  0.  Turkey  405,  Hodges  to  Palmerston,  June  17,  19,  1840,  cited  by 
ibid.,  p.  272,  Annual  Register,  1840,  p.  [189]. 

MSee  an  extract  from  a  despatch  written  by  Pontois  to  the  French  Cabinet, 
May  17,  1840,  quoted  by  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  p.  204. 


I5O  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [476 

be  noted,  nevertheless,  that  when  Mehemet  AH  learned  of  the  fall 
of  his  old  enemy  he  declared  at  once  to  Cochelet,  who  had  brought 
the  first  news  of  it  to  him,  that  the  last  obstacle  to  a  satisfactory 
conclusion  of  his  quarrel  with  the  Sultan  had  been  removed.  He 
would,  he  announced,  forthwith  send  back  to  his  sovereign  the 
Turkish  fleet,  and  Sami  Bey,  his  confidential  Secretary,  would  pro- 
ceed without  delay  to  Constantinople  to  make  the  necessary 
arrangements.100 

Before  the  news  of  the  overthrow  of  Kosrew  Pasha  reached 
western  Europe  Chekib  Effendi  arrived  at  London.  While  Chekib 
did  not  know  that  the  Grand  Vizier  had  been  dismissed,  he  did 
know  that  the  unsettled  state  of  affairs  in  the  Near  East  was  very 
embarrassing  to  the  Ottoman  government.  He  had  hoped,  he 
wrote  to  the  representatives  of  the  five  Courts  on  May  31,  1840, 
promptly  after  his  arrival,  to  find  the  Turco-Egyptian  question 
solved.  It  was  with  the  deepest  regret  that  he  discovered  it  was 
not,  for  the  Turkish  Empire  was  in  a  very  critical  position  and 
the  necessity  for  a  solution  of  this  question  was  becoming  daily 
more  urgent.  The  Powers,  he  pleaded,  should  redouble  their 
"generous  efforts"  in  order  to  put  an  end  to  an  evil  which  was 
increasing  continually  and  which  threatened  the  peace  of  the 
East.101 

The  diplomats  at  London,  it  appears,  were  convinced  by 
Chekib's  note  that  there  was  real  danger  in  further  delay.  Guizot, 
on  transmitting  a  copy  of  it  to  Thiers,  stated :  "  'If  your  Excel- 
lency .  .  .  judges  it  [Chekib's  note]  of  a  nature  to  require  new 
instructions,  I  beg  you  to  forward  them  at  once  .  .  .  evidently 
the  matter  is  about  to  receive  an  impulse  which,  without  perhaps 
leading  to  a  definite  result,  will  for  some  days  at  least,  be  strong 

100See  an  extract  from  a  despatch,  Cochelet  to  Thiers,  May  26,  1840,  quoted 
by  ibid.,  pp.  205-206.  No  one  perhaps  was  more  alarmed  by  these  developments 
in  the  Near  East  than  Lord  Ponsonby.  He  even  threatened  to  resign  if  his 
advice  regarding  the  coercion  of  Mehemet  AH  was  not  followed,  and  he  sent 
his  Dragoman,  Pisani,  to  London  to  make  an  oral  report  to  Palmerston  upon  the 
extremely  serious  situation  in  Turkey.  See  Hasenclever,  op.  cit.,  p.  153.  See 
also  F.  0.  Turkey,  394,  Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  June  23,  1840,  quoted  in 
Cambridge  Hist,  of  Br.  For.  Policy,  II,  pp.  639-640. 

10IChekib  Effendi  to  Palmerston,  May  31,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  I, 
pp.  658-660.  Chekib  Effendi  to  Guizot,  May  31,  1840,  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp. 
441-443.  See  also,  ibid.,  pp.  190-191. 


47?]    THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  JULY  15,  1840     15! 

and  pressing.  Everyone  is  now  convinced  that  there  is,  for  the 
Ottoman  Empire,  danger  in  delay;  .  .  .'  "102 

Thiers,  however,  who  even  hoped  that  the  Sultan,  because  of  his 
increasing  embarrassments,  at  length  would  agree  to  conclude 
a  settlement  direct  with  the  Viceroy,  was  not  alarmed  by  the 
situation  of  affairs  in  the  Levant  and  did  not  believe  that  the 
French  government  should  alter  its  policy.  "  'I  see  but  one  course 
to  follow,' "  he  wrote  in  reply  to  Guizot,  "  'it  is  to  answer  this 
[Chekib's]  note  as  [you  did]  that  of  Nouri  Effendi.  Acknowledge 
its  reception  by  saying  that  France  is  ready,  as  ever,  to  listen  to 
the  proposals  for  settlement  that  may  be  made,  and  to  take  the 
part  in  them  to  which  she  is  in  some  measure  compelled  by  the 
friendly  interest  she  has  ever  evinced  towards  the  Porte.  We 
must  not  seem  to  abjure  the  note  of  July  27,  1839;  .  .  .  But  say 
nothing  whatever  of  that  deplorable  engagement  to  terminate  the 
Eastern  question  [by  a  concerted  action]  between  the  five 
[Powers].'"103 

Although  the  government  of  France  did  hold  firmly  to  the 
position  which  it  had  maintained  previously,  the  representatives 
of  the  four  Powers  did  not  abandon  at  once  their  hope  of  finding 
some  plan  of  procedure  in  regard  to  Eastern  affairs  by  which  all 
of  the  five  great  nations  of  Europe  might  be  united.  Neumann 
and  von  Billow,  true  to  the  policies  which  they  had  followed  in 
April  and  May,  1840,  were  particularly  active  in  their  search  for 
such  a  plan.  The  former  had  not  received,  as  yet,  an  answer  to 
the  proposal  he  had  made  to  Guizot  on  May  5,  but  he  must 
have  perceived  that  that  proposal  was  doomed  to  be  rejected.  At 
any  rate  he  was  willing  to  make  additional  concessions.  "  'If 
Mehemet  Ali  must  have  Syria,  let  him  have  it,' "  he  declared  to 
the  French  Ambassador,  June  12,  1840,  "  'not  hereditarily,  no, 
that  cannot  be;  it  would  be  too  much  opposed  to  the  principle  of 
the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Besides,  Mehemet  Ali  must 
give  up  the  district  of  Adana;  the  Porte  requires  it  for  its  safety. 
But  let  us  finish  this  business.  I  suspect  that  Lord  Palmerston 
wishes  to  wait,  to  delay,  that  he  expects  that,  at  some  later  period, 

™Ibid.,  p.  191. 

103Ibid.,  p.  208.  See  also,  Thiers  to  Guizot,  June  II,  1840,  quoted  by  ibid., 
pp.  194-195.  Guizot's  reply  to  Chekib,  June  21,  1840,  conformed  with  Thiers' 
instructions.  See  a  copy  of  it  in  ibid.,  p.  443-444. 


152  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [4/8 

...  he  will  conclude  the  affair  in  a  manner  more  conformable  to 
his  views.  Meanwhile  the  mischief  increases,  the  danger  presses; 
it  is  now  clear  that  prolonged  doubt  injures  the  Sultan  more  than 
the  Pasha,  and  all  threatens  a  crisis  which  nobody  desires.'  "104 
The  Prussian  Envoy  adopted  an  attitude  similar  to  that  of  his 
Austrian  colleague.  "  'M.  de  Neumann  and  M.  de  Billow/ " 
Guizot  wrote  to  Thiers,  June  15,  1840,  "are  again  ready  to  leave 
to  the  Pasha  Egypt  hereditarily  and  Syria  for  life,  provided  that 
he  restores  Adana  and  Candia.'  "105  Baron  Brunnow,  even,  Guizot 
believed,  being  anxious  that  the  affairs  of  the  Near  East  should 
be  regulated  by  the  Powers  in  concert,  was  ready  to  be  more  con- 
ciliatory in  his  attitude  towards  France.106 

Thiers  hestitated.  The  willingness  of  the  German  diplomats  to 
make  additional  concessions  and  the  conciliatory  attitude  of 
Brunnow  seemed  to  prove  to  him  that  ultimately  he  would  carry 
his  point.107  "  'Certainly,'  "  he  replied  to  Louis  Philippe's  Ambas- 
sador at  London,  June  19,  1840,  "  'if  it  were  agreed  to  yield 
Syria,  (comma)  and  Egypt  hereditarily  to  the  Pasha,  the  five 
Powers  would  then  act  reasonably,  and  we  should  make  great 
efforts  to  succeed.  But  the  Pasha's  head  is  inflated,108  and  we  are 
sure  of  nothing  with  him.'  "109 

lotlbid.,  p.  198. 

lmlbid.,  p.  201. 

106See  an  account  of  an  interview  between  Brunnow  and  Guizot,  June  II, 
1840,  ibid.,  pp.  196-197.  Brunnow,  it  seems,  had  received  instructions  from  St. 
Petersburg  urging  him  to  speed  up  the  negotiations.  See  Hasenclever,  op.  cit., 
P-  154- 

107Thiers  was  interested  particularly  in  Brunnow's  attitude,  "  'which  could 
only  be  ascribed  to  disasters  in  Circassia.'  "  "  'It  was  clear,'  "  he  declared,  "  'that 
Russia  was  not  ready  to  embark  upon  serious  operations  elsewhere.' " — Affaires 
etrangeres,  655  Angleterre,  Thiers  to  Guizot,  June  16,  1840,  quoted  by  Hall, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  267-268.  Thiers  was  probably  influenced  by  the  reports  which  he 
had  received  from  Barante.  See  Guichen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  290292. 

108The  Viceroy,  determined  that  his  demands  should  be  conceded,  was 
preparing  actively  for  war.  See,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp.  682-683. 

109Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  p.  201.  Guizot  was  troubled  by  the  comma  which 
Thiers  inserted  after  the  word  "Syria"  and  wrote  to  him  asking  an  explanation. 
Thiers  replied,  June  30,  1840:  "'Ma  virgule  ne  signifiait  rien  .  .  .  je  voulais 
parler  de  1'Egypte  hereditaire  et  de  la  Syrie  hereditaire.'  " — Ibid.,  p.  203.  Thiers 
undoubtedly  was  led  by  his  reports  from  Cochelet  to  believe  that  the  Pasha 
would  not  accept  less  favorable  terms.  See  Guichen,  op.  cit.,  p.  297. 


479]  THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  JULY  15,   1840  153 

Regardless  of  the  fact  that  Baron  Brunnow  maintained  a  con- 
ciliatory attitude  towards  France  while  he  was  conversing  with 
M.  Guizot,  he  was  determined  that  the  final  arrangement  which 
the  Powers  should  enter  into  for  the  settlement  of  the  Turco- 
Egyptian  question  should  be  on  the  basis  of  the  Anglo-Russian 
terms.  It  was  preferable  even,  according  to  his  opinion,  to  do 
nothing  at  all  rather  than  to  conclude  a  bad  arrangement  like  the 
one  which  was  advocated  by  France.110 

Palmerston's  views  were  similar  to  those  of  the  Russian  Envoy 
Extraordinary.  When  the  Austrian  and  Prussian  diplomats, 
alarmed  by  the  reports  which  they  had  received  concerning  affairs 
in  Turkey,  had  talked  about  further  concessions,  he  had  talked 
about  delaying  and  had  persisted  in  the  belief  that  time  was 
"  'pour  le  Sultan?  "11X  On  June  12,  1840,  after  it  was  known  at 
London  that  Kosrew  Pasha  had  fallen  and  after  Brunnow  had  re- 
ceived instructions  from  St.  Petersburg  ordering  him  to  speed  up 
the  negotiations,  Palmerston,  who  then  must  also  have  been  willing 
that  matters  should  be  hurried  to  a  conclusion,  informed  Guizot 
that  he  wished  to  know  the  "  'positive  opinion  of  the  French 
government' "  upon  Neumann's  proposal  of  May  5  to  which 
he  (Palmerston)  had  given  his  consent.112  Guizot,  hesitating  to 
reply  on  his  own  responsibility,  transmitted  this  request  to  his 
superiors  at  Paris.113  Thiers,  answering  on  June  16,  declared: 
"  'We  could  not  suggest  it  [Neumann's  proposal]  to  Mehemet  AH; 
he  would  refuse  it,  and  we  could  not  refute  his  arguments  which 
we  should  ourselves  consider  to  be  sound  and  well  founded.'  "114 
Palmerston,  undoubtedly,  was  not  surprised  to  learn  that  the 
French  government  rejected  the  Austrian  proposition.  On  June 
15  he  had  received  a  despatch  written  by  Granville  on  the  I2th 
which  revealed  that  Thiers  continued  to  insist  upon  a  settlement 


""Vienna  Archives,  England  295,  Neumann  to  Metternich,  June  26,  1840, 
quoted  by  Hasenclever,  op.  cit.,  p.  157,  [footnote]. 

luBerlin  Archives,  vol.  II,  Billow  to  Frederick  William  III,  June  5,  1840, 
quoted  by  ibid.,  p.  152,  [footnote].  See  also,  Palmerston  to  Neumann,  June  II, 
1840,  quoted  by  Treitschke,  op.  cit.,  V.  p.  74. 

"'Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  199-200. 

™lbid.,  p.  200. 

U4Affaires  etrangeres,  655  Angleterre,  Thiers  to  Guizot,  June  16,  1840,  quoted 
by  Hall,  op.  cit.,  pp.  267-268. 


154  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [480 

which  Mehemet  AH  would  accept  willingly.115  "The  arrangement 
which  M.  Thiers  holds  out,"  he  remarked  dryly,  in  his  reply  to 
Granville,  .  .  .  "is  the  very  arrangement  which  has  actually  been 
in  existence  for  the  last  six  years."118 

At  the  same  time  when  it  was  becoming  apparent  that  France 
would  not  abandon  her  demand  for  a  settlement  which  would 
be  acceptable  to  the  Viceroy,  news  from  the  East  which  aided  in 
bringing  matters  to  a  climax,  arrived  at  London.  The  announce- 
ment of  the  downfall  of  Kosrew  Pasha  was  made  at  the  British 
capital  early  in  June.117  About  the  middle  of  the  month  Count 
Apponyi,  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  Paris,  learned  from  French 
sources  that  the  Viceroy  had  declared  to  Cochelet,  when  the  latter 
announced  the  dismissal  of  Kosrew  to  him,  that,  he  would  return 
the  Ottoman  fleet  to  the  Sultan  and  that  he  would  send  Sami  Bey 
upon  a  special  mission  to  Constantinople.  Apponyi  reported  this 
intelligence  to  Neumann  on  June  16,  the  same  day  on  which 
Thiers  forwarded  to  London  his  refusal  to  accept  the  Austrian 
proposal  to  divide  Syria  between  Mehemet  AH  and  the  Sultan.118 
Its  effect  was  immediate.  Lord  Palmerston  and  the  three  other 
plenipotentiaries,  according  to  Guizot,  saw  in  it  nothing  more,  or 
at  least  they  were  determined  that  they  had  a  right  to  see  in  it 
nothing  more  than  an  act  long  concerted  between  the  Pasha  and 
France.  They  looked  upon  the  step  which  Mehemet  AH  had  taken, 
and  its  success, — first,  as  threatening  the  ruin  of  the  note  of  July 
27,  1839,  and  of  the  common  action  of  the  five  Powers;  and 
secondly,  as  the  complete  and  personal  triumph  of  France  at 
Alexandria  and  Constantinople.119  "  '  .  .  .  those  who,  in  the  hope 
of  obtaining  the  common  action  of  the  five  Powers,' "  he  wrote  to 

U5Granville  to  Palmerston,  June  12,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  p.  665. 

"'Palmerston  to  Granville,  June  26,  1840,  ibid.,  pp.  666-667. 

"The  Russians  were  alarmed  greatly  by  the  fall  of  Kosrew.  See,  Nesselrode 
to  Meyendorff,  June  27,  1840,  Nesselrode,  op.  cit.,  VIII,  p.  29.  At  London 
Brunnow  declared  to  Neumann  and  Billow:  " 'qu'a  la  verite,  le  moment  pour- 
rait  prochainement  arriver,  ou  il  aurait  a  annoncer  que  le  cabinet  Imperial — 
voyant  que  la  negociation  de  Londres  ne  mene  a  aucun  resultat  et  que  la  crise 
augmente  en  Orient — se  reserve  la  faculte  d'agir  a  elle  seule,  selon  les  circon- 
stances.' " — Berlin  Archives,  vol.  n,  Billow  to  Frederick  William  III,  June  19, 
1840,  quoted  by  Hasenclever,  op.  cit.,  p.  154,  [footnote]. 

118Guizot  to  Thiers,  July  n,  1840,  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  p.  212. 

™Ibid.,  pp.  211-218. 


481]    THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  JULY  15,  1840     155 

Thiers,  "  'promoted  a  settlement  founded  on  the  concession  of 
Egypt  in  hereditary  sovereignty,  and  Syria  for  life  [to  Mehemet 
AH],  have  paused  in  their  endeavors,  and  seem  to  have  renounced 
them  entirely.'  "12°  The  despatch  from  which  this  extract  has 
been  copied  was  written  on  July  n,  1840.  It  was  not  the  first 
warning  which  Guizot  had  given  to  his  government.  As  early  as 
June  24,  he  had  stated  that  "  'Lord  Palmerston,  profiting  by 
the  disappointed  hopes  and  discontent  of  his  colleagues  and  the 
other  plenipotentiaries,  might  suddenly  reengage  them  in  his  sys- 
tem, and  induce  them  to  adopt,  all  four  together,  his  project  for 
withdrawing  Syria  from  the  Pasha,  and  the  employment,  if  neces- 
sary, of  coercive  measures.'  "121 

Thiers,  however,  believed  that  his  hope  of  seeing  a  direct  ar- 
rangement concluded  between  the  Sultan  and  the  Pasha  was  about 
to  be  realized.  On  June  30,  1840,  after  he  received  a  telegraphic 
despatch  from  Cochelet122  which  announced  that  Mehemet  AH, 
true  to  his  former  promises,  had  ordered  Sami  Bey  to  repair  to 
Constantinople  "  'to  offer  to  the  Sultan  the  homage  of  his  de- 
votion, and  to  request  his  orders  for  the  return  of  the  Turkish 
fleet,'"  the  President  of  the  French  Cabinet  wrote  to  Guizot: 
"  'We  must  [appear  to]  infer  from  this  intelligence,  without  too 
much  zeal  and  without  drawing  too  much  attention  to  it,  that  a 
spontaneous  arrangement  .  .  .  ,  between  the  sovereign  and  the 
vassal,  would  be  the  best  of  all  solutions.  The  Pasha  thinks  that 
the  impulse  of  feeling  to  which  he  yields  will  be  reciprocated,  and 
that  a  treaty  will  follow  immediately.  He  believes  .  .  .  that  the 
hereditary  rule  over  Egypt  and  Syria  will  be  granted  to  him;  he 
says  nothing  with  respect  to  Candia,  Adana,  [and]  the  Holy 
Cities,  and  when  told  he  must  make  sacrifices  in  order  to  obtain 
an  immediate  [and]  direct  settlement,  he  replies:  "Be  at  your 
ease,  everything  will  be  arranged."  ...  at  Constantinople,  it  was 
thought,  at  the  date  of  the  latest  news,  that  the  restoration  of  the 
fleet  would  produce  a  great  effect  upon  the  Divan,  and  that  liberal 
concessions  might  ensue  .  .  .  Such  a  state  of  affairs  ought  to  sug- 

"Ibid.,  p.  213. 

121Guizot  to  Thiers,  June  24,  1840,  quoted  by  ibid.,  p.  202. 
^A  telegraphic   despatch  from  Cochelet,  June   16,    1840,   quoted  by   ibid., 
p.  208. 


156  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [482 

gest     many     arguments     against    any     conclusive     decision     at 
London.'  "123 

Nevertheless,  Thiers  did  realize  that  it  was  necessary  to  act  with 
caution.  "  'I  have  written  to  Alexandria  and  to  Constantinople 
recommending  moderation  on  both  sides/  "  he  mentioned  in  his 
despatch  to  Guizot;  "  'but  I  have  given  advice  only,  and  have 
been  careful  to  restrain  our  agents  from  any  participation  on  their 
own  responsibility,  and  as  a  French  undertaking,  in  a  treaty  hav- 
ing for  its  object  this  direct  arrangement.  Should  such  an  attempt 
be  imputed  to  us,  you  may  deny  it.  Young  Eugene  Perier  has 
been  sent  to  Alexandria  to  remonstrate  most  urgently  with  the 
Pasha,  if  he  should  incline  to  pause,  and  if,  after  having  offered  the 
fleet,  he  should  retract  his  word,  and  become  unaccommodating 
in  the  general  conditions  of  the  treaty.  I  have  even  counseled  him 
[Mehemet  Ali]  to  accept  Egypt  hereditarily  and  Syria  for  life.'  "124 
In  another  despatch  written  on  June  30,  1840,  Thiers  remarked 
hesitatingly:  "'I  have  consulted  the  Cabinet;  they  deliberate, 
they  incline  a  little  towards  a  concession.  Meanwhile  we  shall  see. 
Delay  explaining  yourself.  We  must  wait  for  a  short  time.  Noth- 
ing is  decided.'  "125 

While  Thiers  and  Guizot  were  corresponding  thus  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  four  Powers,  being  alarmed  by  the  reports  con- 
cerning developments  in  the  Levant,  and,  in  addition,  being  dis- 
satisfied because  they  believed  Thiers  had  submitted  Neumann's 
proposal  of  May  5  to  Mehemet  Ali  before  he  had  answered  it,126 
were  preparing  for  action.  On  June  21  and  28,  two  successive 
Sundays,  they  met  secretly  at  Palmerston's  home  and  came  to 
terms  about  the  elements  of  a  treaty,  for  the  rescue  of  the  Sultan, 

™Ibid.,  pp.  208-209. 

™*Ibid.,  p.  210.  See  also,  Granville  to  Palmerston,  July  17,  1840,  Levant 
Correspondence,  II,  p.  7.  Perier  arrived  in  Egypt  July  15,  1840.  Mehemet  Ali 
refused  to  be  influenced  by  his  representations.  See,  Hodges  to  Palmerston,  July 
1 6,  23,  26,  1840,  ibid.,  pp.  70-72,  76-77.  The  Times,  Aug.  15,  20,  1840. 

mGuizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  p.  203. 

""On  July  21,  1840,  Palmerston  wrote  a  long  despatch  to  Granville  in  which 
he  defended  the  policy  followed  by  the  four  Powers.  In  that  despatch  he  pointed 
out:  "They  [Neumann,  Billow,  and  Brunnow]  said  that  this  [the  fact  referred 
to  above]  seemed  to  them  to  render  any  further  negotiation  with  France  on 
these  matters  impossible,  because  it  turned  out  that  it  was  not  France,  but 
Mehemet  Ali,  with  whom  the  negotiation  was  to  be  carried  on." — Levant 
Correspondence,  II,  pp.  8-10. 


483]  THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  JULY  15,   1840  157 

to  which  France  would  not  be  a  party.127  Still,  a  formal  decision 
was  postponed. 

Before  the  British  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  could  sign  a 
treaty  it  was  necessary  that  he  should  secure  the  consent  to  it  of 
his  colleagues  in  the  Cabinet.  Many  of  those  colleagues  were  un- 
willing that  England  should  enter  into  any  arrangement  which 
might  occasion  a  break  in  the  Anglo-French  alliance.  A  close 
understanding  with  the  government  of  Louis  Philippe,  they  be- 
lieved, was  an  essential  element  of  Britain's  foreign  policy.128 
Consequently,  they  balked  when  Palmerston  proposed  to  the 
Cabinet  that  England  should  join  with  the  three  Eastern  Courts 
without  France  to  conclude  with  the  Porte  a  convention  for  the 
pacification  of  the  Levant. 

Palmerston,  exasperated  because  of  the  objections  of  his  col- 
leagues, determined  that  he  either  would  carry  his  point  or  that 
he  would  resign.  "  'The  difference  of  opinion  which  seems  to  exist 
between  myself  and  some  members  of  the  Cabinet  upon  the  Tur- 
kish question,  and  the  extreme  importance  which  I  attach  to  that 
question,'"  he  stated  to  Melbourne,  July  5,  1840,  "'have  led  me, 
upon  full  consideration,  to  the  conviction  that  it  is  a  duty  which 
I  owe  to  myself  and  to  my  colleagues  to  relieve  you  and  others 
from  the  necessity  of  deciding  between  my  views  and  those  of 
other  members  of  the  Cabinet  on  these  matters,  by  placing,  as  I 
now  do,  my  office  at  your  disposal."'129  The  British  Minister 
recapitulated,  in  his  letter,  the  history  of  the  Turco-Egyptian  ques- 
tion, and  furthermore  explained  why  he  was  determined  that  his 

"7Hasenclever,  op.  cit.,  pp.  156-160.   Treitschke,  op.  cit.,  V,  p.  75. 

^Note  the  following  extract  from  Guizot's  Memoires:  "Parmi  les  collegues 
de  lord  Palmerston,  lord  Holland,  lord  Lansdowne,  lord  John  Russell  et  lord 
Minto  etaient  ceux  avec  qui  j'avais  les  relations  les  plus  frequentes  et  les  plus 
libres.  Lord  Holland,  d'un  esprit  charmant,  d'un  coeur  genereux  et  d'un  caractere 
aussi  aimable  que  son  esprit,  etait  1'ami  declare  de  la  France,  1'hote  bienveillant 
des  visiteurs  frangais  en  Angleterre,  le  partisan  perseverant  de  1'alliance  des  deux 
pays,  et  il  se  plaisait  a  manifester,  en  toute  occasion,  ses  sentiments  .  .  .  ce  fut 
a  Holland-House  que  j'allai  chercher  et  que  je  trouvai  les  plus  nobles  plaisirs 
de  la  conversation  et  de  la  vie  sociale.  Lord  Lansdowne  et  lord  John  Russell 
etaient  moins  expansifs,  mais  egalement  sinceres  dans  leurs  liberates  et  bien- 
villantes  dispositions  envers  la  France:" — Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  50-51.  See  also, 
ibid.,  pp.  67-68,  191-193.  Nesselrode  to  Meyendorff,  April  13,  June  27,  1840, 
Nesselrode,  op.  cit.,  VIII,  pp.  19-22,  29. 

""Palmerston  to  Melbourne,  July  5,  1840,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  356  ff. 


158  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [484 

policy  should  triumph.  "  'The  immediate  result  of  our  declining 
to  go  on  with  the  three  Powers  because  France  does  not  join  us/  " 
he  declared,  "  'will  be,  that  Russia  will  withdraw  her  offers  to 
unite  herself  with  the  other  Powers  for  a  settlement  of  the  affairs 
of  Turkey,  and  she  will  again  resiime  her  separate  and  isolated 
position  with  respect  to  those  affairs;  and  you  will  have  the 
Treaty  of  Unkiar  Skelessi  renewed  under  some  still  more  objection- 
able form.  We  shall  thus  lose  the  advantages  on  this  point  which 
it  has  required  long-continued  and  complicated  efforts  on  our  part 
to  gain,  and  England  will,  by  her  own  voluntary  and  deliberate 
act,  re-establish  that  separate  protectorship  of  Russia  over  Turkey, 
the  existence  of  which  has  long  been  the  object  of  well-founded 
jealousy  and  apprehension  to  the  other  Powers  of  Europe. 

"  'The  ultimate  results  of  such  a  decision  will  be  the  practical 
division  of  the  Turkish  empire  into  two  separate  and  independent 
states,  whereof  one  will  be  the  dependency  of  France,  and  the 
other  a  satellite  of  Russia;  and  in  both  of  which  our  political  in- 
fluence will  be  annulled,  and  our  commercial  interests  will  be 
sacrificed',  .  .  .' "13° 

Fortunately  for  the  success  of  Palmerston's  policy,  several 
despatches  from  Colonel  Hodges  were  received  at  London,  July 
5,  1840,  the  same  day  the  letter,  a  part  of  which  has  just  been 
quoted,  was  written,  announcing  that  a  revolt  against  the  author- 

™Ibid.,  pp.  359-360.  See  also  Appendix  B,  and  Palmerston  to  Melbourne, 
July  6,  1840,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  361-363.  It  is  interesting,  at  least,  that,  a 
few  days  before  Palmerston  wrote  these  letters  to  Melbourne,  an  article  appeared 
in  the  Morning  Chronicle,  Palmerston's  organ,  describing  a  project  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  extensive  steamship  communications  through  Egypt  to  India.  The 
following  is  an  extract  from  a  French  translation  of  it  which  appeared  in  the 
Journal  des  Debats,  July  4,  1840:  "  'On  parle  de  la  prochaine  formation  d'une 
compagnie  autorise'e  par  une  charte  royale  pour  etablir  une  communication,  au 
moyen  de  navires  a  vapeur,  entre  1'Angleterre  et  Calcutta,  Madras  et  Ceylan. 
Les  experiences  faites  par  la  compagnie  des  Indes  a  Bombay  ne  laissent  aucun 
doute  sur  la  reussite  du  plan  propose  qui  serait  d'une  importance  immense  pour 
notre  commerce  avec  1'Inde.  ...  la  compagnie  de  navigation  a  la  vapeur  avec 
PInde  propose  d'etablir  une  ligne  complete  de  communication  a  travers  PEgypte, 
de  1'Angleterre  a  Calcutta,  Madras  et  Ceylan;  .  .  .  Cette  nouvelle  compagnie 
se  propose  d'avoir  un  surintendant  et  des  agens  qui  resideront  en  Egypte,  pour 
expediar  les  passagers  a  travers  PEgypte.' " 


485]          THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  JULY  15,   1840  159 

ity  of  Mehemet  AH  had  broken  out  in  Syria.131  The  "Maronites, 
the  Druses,  and  the  Mutualis"  of  Mount  Lebanon  all  had  taken 
up  arms.132  The  Pasha  had  adopted  measures  to  quell  the  dis- 
turbances. He  was  ready  to  offer  concessions.  The  Maronites, 
Hodges  believed,  might  be  calmed  for  the  moment,  but  the  others 
"were  still  full  of  dissatisfaction."  This  news  arriving  at  a  most 
opportune  time  seemed  to  prove  that  Mehemet  Ali  would  not  be 
able  to  resist  seriously  the  fulfillment  of  the  terms  which  the 
plenipotentiaries  of  the  four  Powers  proposed  to  enforce  upon 
him.  Ibrahim  Pasha,  the  dissenting  members  of  the  British  Cab- 
inet must  have  foreseen,  would  not  dare  to  march  upon  Constan- 
tinople, for  with  Syria  in  revolt  and  the  Mediterranean  dominated 
by  an  Anglo-Austrian  fleet  it  would  be  impossible  for  him  to  ad- 
vance and  at  the  same  time  keep  open  his  necessary  communica- 
tions with  Egypt.  At  any  rate,  all  excepting  Lord  Holland  and 
Lord  Clarendon,  the  two  who  were  opposed  most  violently  to 
risking  a  break  with  France,133  consented  finally  to  agree  to  the 
conclusion  of  a  treaty134  as  outlined  by  Palmerston  and  the  repre- 
sentatives of  Austria,  Prussia,  and  Russia.135 

Guizot,  it  will  be  recalled,  had  realized,  when  it  became  known 
at  London  that  Kosrew  Pasha  had  fallen  and  that  Mehemet  Ali 
was  preparing  to  carry  on  negotiations  direct  with  the  Porte,  that 

131Hodges  to  Palmerston,  June  17,  19,  20,  1840.  Levant  Correspondence,  I, 
pp.  674-677,  678-679,  680-681,  681-682.  See  also,  Guizot  to  Mme.  Guizot,  July 
22,  1840,  DeWitt,  op.  cit.,  p.  199. 

""These  revolts,  it  appears,  were  occasioned  by  the  attempt  of  the  Egyp- 
tians to  enforce  conscription  upon  the  Syrians  and  by  the  intrigues  of  British 
agents.  See,  Hodges  to  Palmerston,  June  19,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  I, 
pp.  680-681.  Armagnac,  Nezib  et  Beyrouth,  souvenirs  d" Orient,  de  1833  a  1841, 
pp.  223-269.  A.  Laurent,  Relation  historique  des  affaires  de  Syrie,  depuis  1840 
jusqu'en  184.2,  I,  pp.  18-42.  Letter  from  Constantinople,  June  28,  1840,  The 
Times,  July  18,  1840. 

mGreville,  Memoirs  (Series  2),  I,  pp.  258-259,  261-262,  268. 

M4Much  credit  for  influencing  the  members  of  the  Cabinet  to  agree  to  Palm- 
erston's  proposal  was  due  to  Lord  John  Russell.  See,  Palmerston  to  Russell, 
Dec.  4,  1840,  S.  Walpole,  Life  of  Lord  John  Russell,  I,  p.  362.  J.  Russell, 
Recollections  and  Suggestions,  pp.  223-224. 

135On  July  8,  1840,  Palmerston  announced  to  the  plenipotentiaries  of  Aus- 
tria, Prussia,  and  Russia  that  he  had  won  the  consent  of  the  Cabinet  to  the 
plan  of  concluding  a  treaty  without  the  concurrence  of  France.  See,  Hasen- 
clever,  op.  cit.,  pp.  160-163.  Broughton,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  276-277. 


l6o  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [486 

the  envoys  of  the  four  Powers  might  abandon  all  hope  of  coming 
to  an  understanding  with  France  and  that  they  might  agree  to  act 
without  her.  He  saw  that  the  affair  was  "  'in  a  state  of  crisis,'  "18e 
but  he  did  not  see  that  it  was  nearing  a  conclusion.  "  'Extreme  re- 
serve has  been  practiced  for  some  days/  "  he  reported  to  Thiers, 
July  14,  " '.  .  .  I  know  that  Chekib  Effendi  has  had  several 
long  interviews  with  Lord  Palmerston,  particularly  one  on  Sunday. 
Propositions  are  preparing,  both  as  to  the  settlement  of  the  affair 
and  the  mode  of  action,  which  will  be  communicated  to  us  when 
all  is  arranged  (should  all  be  arranged)  to  obtain  either  our  ad- 
hesion or  refusal.'  "137  It  is  evident  that  he  was  imbued  with  the 
erroneous  belief  that  time  was  not  pressing,  that  France  ran  no 
risk  in  further  delay,  and  that  if  the  four  Powers  did  agree  upon 
some  course  of  action  they  at  least  would  go  through  the  form  of 
presenting  their  plans  to  France  for  her  "  'adhesion  or  refusal' " 
before  they  entered  into  them  formally.138 

While  Guizot  was  consoling  himself  with  a  false  impression  con- 
cerning the  situation  of  affairs,  the  plenipotentiaries  of  England, 
Austria,  Prussia,  and  Russia,  influenced  by  fresh  news  from  the 
Levant139  and  encouraged  by  the  victory  which  Palmerston  had 
won  over  his  dissenting  colleagues  in  the  Cabinet,  were  pushing 
forward  energetically  their  secret  negotiations.140  Finally,  on  July 

""Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  p.  216. 

™Ibid.,  pp.  219-220. 

138It  appears  that  Guizot's  friend,  the  Princess  de  Lieven,  who  had  arrived 
in  England  June  22  on  a  mission  "de  vendre  ses  diamants  et  de  voir  ses  amis" 
was  misled  in  a  conversation  which  she  had  with  von  Billow  to  believe  that  there 
was  no  danger  of  a  convention  being  concluded  by  the  four  Powers  immediately, 
and  that  "a  day  or  two  before  July  15,"  she  passed  this  mistaken  belief  on  to 
Guizot.  See,  DeWitt,  op.  cit.,  p.  195.  E.  Daudet,  Une  vie  d ' ambassadrice  au 
sitclf  dernier,  pp.  305-314.  Palmerston  to  Hobhouse,  July  27,  1843,  English  His- 
torical Review,  XVIII,  p.  129.  Duchesse  de  Dino,  Chronique  de  1831-1862,  II, 

PP-  347,  35I-352- 

138On  July  7,  10,  12,  1840,  additional  information  about  the  revolt  in  Syria 
was  received  at  London.  See,  Hodges  to  Palmerston,  June  6,  16,  1840;  Chekib  to 
Palmerston,  July  7,  1840;  Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  June  23,  1840;  Moore  to 
Ponsonby,  June  10,  1840;  Levant  Correspondence,  I,  pp.  671-674,  683-684, 
686-687. 

"The  following  was  Palmerston's  explanation  to  Hobhouse,  July  27,  1843, 
for  having  kept  these  negotiations  secret:  "...  when  at  last  we  found  it  cer- 
tain that  she  [France]  would  not  act  with  us  [the  four  Powers]  we  did  not 
think  it  prudent  to  let  her  into  our  counsels,  for  fear  she  should  thwart  us  by 


487]  THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  JULY  15,   1840  l6l 

15,  1840,  their  deliberations  having  proved  successful,  they 
signed,  without  consulting  the  representative  of  France,  a  conven- 
tion for  the  pacification  of  the  Levant.  That  convention,  which  in 
form  was  concluded  between  the  representatives  of  the  four  Pow- 
ers on  the  one  part  and  the  envoy  of  the  Sublime  Porte  on  the 
other,  consisted  of  five  articles  and  a  "Separate  Act,"  and  it  was 
accompanied  by  a  "Protocol"  and  a  "Reserved  Protocol."  The 
conditions  which  the  Powers  proposed  to  force  upon  the  Viceroy 
were  named  in  the  separate  act.  "His  Highness  [the  Sultan],"  it 
was  provided  therein,  "promises  to  grant  to  Mehemet  Ali,  for  him- 
self and  for  his  descendants  in  the  direct  line,  the  administration 
of  the  Pashalic  of  Egypt;  and  ...  to  grant  to  Mehemet  Ali  for 
his  life,  with  the  title  of  Pasha  of  Acre,  and  with  the  command  of 
the  fortress  of  St.  John  of  Acre,  the  administration  of  the  southern 
part  of  Syria,  .  .  . 

"The  Sultan,  however,  in  making  these  offers,  attaches  thereto 
the  condition,  that  Mehemet  Ali  shall  accept  them  within  the  space 
of  10  days  after  communication  thereof  shall  have  been  made  to 
him  at  Alexandria,  by  an  agent  of  His  Highness;  .  .  . 

"If  within  the  space  of  10  days,  fixed  as  above,  Mehemet  Ali 
should  not  accept  the  above-mentioned  arrangement,  the  Sultan 
will  then  withdraw  the  offer  of  the  life  administration  of  the  Pash- 
alic of  Acre;  but  His  Highness  will  still  consent  to  grant  to 
Mehemet  Ali,  for  himself  and  for  his  descendants  in  the  direct  line, 
the  administration  of  the  Pashalic  of  Egypt,  provided  such  offer  be 
accepted  within  the  space  of  the  10  days  next  following,  .  .  . 

"If,  at  the  expiration  of  20  days  after  the  communication  shall 
have  been  made  to  him  .  .  .  Mehemet  Ali  shall  not  accede  to  the 
proposed  arrangement,  and  shall  not  accept  the  hereditary  Pashalic 
of  Egypt,  the  Sultan  will  consider  himself  at  liberty  to  withdraw 
that  offer,  and  to  follow,  in  consequence,  such  ulterior  course  as  his 
own  interests  and  the  counsels  of  his  Allies  may  suggest  to  him." 
The  separate  act  provided  also  that  the  Pasha  should  surrender  at 
once  the  Turkish  fleet;  that  he  should  pay  to  his  overlord  tribute 
annually  proportionate  to  the  greater  or  less  amount  of  territory 

intriguing  in  Europe  and  by  sending  information  to  Egypt." — English  Historical 
Review,  XVIII,  p.  130.  See  also,  Metternich  to  Apponyi,  Aug.  4,  1840,  Metter- 
nich,  op.  cit.,  VI,  pp.  410-411.  For  an  account  of  the  final  negotiations  see 
Hasenclever,  op.  cit.,  pp.  163-170. 


1 62  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [488 

over  which  he  might  obtain  the  administration,  according  as  he 
accepted  "the  first  or  the  second  alternative;"  that  all  treaties  and 
all  laws  of  his  sovereign  should  be  applicable  to  the  pashalics  under 
his  control;  and  that  his  military  and  naval  forces,  forming  part  of 
the  forces  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  should  "always  be  considered 
as  maintained  for  the  service  of  the  State."141 

By  Articles  I,  II,  and  III,  of  the  convention  of  July  15,  1840,  the 
Powers  undertook  to  assist  the  Porte  actively  to  reduce  the  Pasha 
to  submission  in  case  he  should  refuse  to  accept  the  terms  which 
were  to  be  communicated  to  him  by  the  Sultan.  Great  Britain  and 
Austria  would,  in  the  meantime,  order  the  commanders  of  their 
fleets  to  assist  the  latter  in  cutting  off  the  communication  by  sea 
between  Syria  and  Egypt  and  to  afford,  "in  the  name  of  the  al- 
liance, all  the  support  and  assistance  in  their  power  to  those 
subjects"  of  his  in  Syria  who  might  "manifest  their  fidelity  and 
allegiance  to  their  sovereign."  Furthermore,  if  Mehemet  AH 
"should  direct  his  land  or  sea  forces  against  Constantinople,  the 
High  Contracting  Parties,  upon  the  express  demand  of  the  Sultan, 
addressed  to  their  representatives  at  Constantinople,"  would  "pro- 
vide for  the  defense  of  his  Throne  by  means  of  a  cooperation 
agreed  upon  by  mutual  consent,  for  the  purpose  of  placing  the  two 
Straits  of  the  Bosphorus  and  Dardanelles,  as  well  as  the  capi- 
tal of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  in  security  against  all  aggression." 

Finally,  by  Article  IV  of  the  convention,  the  Powers  agreed  that, 
although  in  the  existing  emergency  it  might  be  necessary  to  send 
military  and  naval  forces  to  defend  Constantinople,  in  the  future 
they  would  conform  to  "the  ancient  rule  of  the  Ottoman  Empire," 
in  virtue  of  which  it  had  "in  all  times  been  prohibited  for  Ships 
of  War  of  Foreign  Powers  to  enter  the  Straits  of  the  Dar- 
danelles and  of  the  Bosphorus."142  Thus,  almost  a  year  after  the 
European  diplomats  at  Constantinople  had  issued  their  famous 

141Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  1012-1015.  Staff  Papers,  XXVIII,  pp.  345  ff. 
Noradounghian,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  307  ff.  Martens,  Nouveau  recueil  general,  I,  pp. 
1 60  ff.  Annual  Register,  1840,  pp.  448  ff. 

142Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  1008-1012.  State  Papers,  XXVIII,  pp.  342  ff. 
Noradounghian,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  303  ff.  Martens,  N.  R.  G.,  I,  pp.  156  ff.  Annual 
Register,  1840,  pp.  446  ff.  In  the  protocol  of  July  15,  1840  it  was  explained  that 
the  Porte  reserved  to  itself,  as  theretofore,  to  deliver  passes  to  light  vessels 
under  flag  of  war,  which  might  be  employed  according  to  custom  "for  the 
service  of  the  correspondence  of  the  legations  of  friendly  Powers." — State 


489]     THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  JULY  15,  1840      163 

collective  note  to  the  Porte,  an  arrangement  for  the  solution  of  the 
Turco-Egyptian  question  was  concluded.  France,  however,  was 
not  a  party  to  that  arrangement,  nor  was  she  aware  even  of  its 
existence.  Hence  it  still  remained  to  be  seen,  not  only  whether 
Mehemet  Ali  would  accept  the  conditions  imposed  upon  him  by 
the  separate  act  of  the  convention  of  July  15,  1840,  and  whether 
the  four  Powers  would  be  able  to  coerce  him  effectively  in  case  he 
did  not,  but  also  what  course  the  government  of  France  would 
follow  when  it  became  aware  of  what  had  been  done. 


Papers,  XXVIII,  p.  347.  Martens,  N.  R.  G.,  I,  p.  162.  Annual  Register,  1840, 
p.  450.  In  the  reserved  protocol  it  was  laid  down  that  inasmuch  as  the  "state 
of  affairs  in  Syria,  the  interests  of  humanity,"  and  the  grave  considerations  of 
European  policy  made  it  imperious  that  as  far  as  possible  all  delay  should  be 
avoided  in  the  accomplishment  of  the  pacification  which  the  convention  was 
intended  to  effect,  the  "preliminary  measures"  to  be  taken  by  Austria  and 
Great  Britain  should  be  carried  into  execution  at  once  "without  waiting  for 
the  exchange  of  ratifications." — State  Papers,  XXVIII,  p.  347.  Martens, 
N.  R.  G.  I,  p.  163.  Annual  Register,  1840,  p.  451. 


CHAPTER  V 
THE  ISOLATION  OF  FRANCE 

On  July  17,  1840,  Palmerston  invited  Guizot  to  call  at  the 
British  foreign  office,  where  he  read  to  him  a  memorandum  ac- 
quainting him  with  the  convention  which  had  been  concluded. 
Palmerston  claimed  in  that  memorandum  that  the  Courts  of 
Austria,  Great  Britain,  Prussia,  and  Russia  had  given  to  the  gov- 
ernment of  France  throughout  the  whole  course  of  the  negotia- 
tions which  had  commenced  in  the  autumn  of  the  preceding  year, 
"the  most  reiterated,  manifest,  and  indisputable  proofs,"  not  only 
of  their  desire  to  arrive  at  a  perfect  understanding  with  it  in  regard 
to  the  arrangements  necessary  to  effect  the  pacification  of  the 
Levant,  but  also  of  the  great  importance  which  they  never  had 
failed  to  attach  to  the  moral  effect  accruing  from  the  union  and 
concurrence  of  the  five  Powers  in  a  matter  of  such  serious  interest 
and  so  intimately  connected  with  the  maintenance  of  peace  in 
Europe.  They  had  seen,  with  the  deepest  regret,  that  all  their 
efforts  to  obtain  the  desired  end  had  proved  fruitless.  Conse- 
quently they  had  adopted  the  resolution  of  proceeding  onward 
without  the  cooperation  of  France  and  had  concluded  with  the 
Sultan  a  convention  intended  to  solve  in  a  satisfactory  manner 
the  existing  complications  in  the  Levant.1 

After  Palmerston  had  finished  reading,  Guizot  immediately 
objected  to  the  arguments  advanced  in  the  memorandum  in  de- 
fense of  the  course  followed  by  the  concert  of  the  four  Powers.  In 
reply  to  the  Frenchman's  objections  the  British  Minister  contended 
that  the  plan  of  the  arrangement  which  the  plenipotentiaries 
had  signed  was  based  on  ideas  suggested  by  Count  Sebastiani  in 
September,  1839. 2  ^  Sebastiani  had  made  such  suggestions,  Guizot 
maintained,  he  had  done  so  in  his  own  "individual  capacity"  with- 
out instructions  or  authority  from  his  superiors  at  Paris,  for  no 
trace  of  them  could  be  found  in  the  records  of  the  French  em- 
bassy. They  were  made  in  a  formal  manner,  Palmerston  insisted. 

^Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp.  1-2.  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  221  ff.  Annual 
Register,  1840,  pp.  495  S. 

^Sebastiani  had  suggested  on  his  own  responsibility,  it  will  be  remembered, 
that  Syria  should  be  divided  between  Mehemet  Ali  and  the  Sultan.  See  above, 
footnote  15,  Chapter  IV. 

[I64] 


49 1  ]  THE  ISOLATION  OF  FRANCE  165 

The  mere  absence  of  evidence  concerning  them  in  the  published 
records  of  the  embassy  did  not  afford  conclusive  proof  that  the 
Count  had  had  no  authority  for  making  them.  Moreover,  he 
argued  that  it  was  impossible  to  separate  the  individual  and  the 
public  character  of  an  ambassador  in  the  manner  implied  by  M. 
Guizot,  especially  when  that  ambassador  was  speaking  to  a  secre- 
tary of  state  in  an  official  interview,  and  in  a  conversation  arising 
over  despatches  which  he  had  come  to  communicate  from  his 
court.3 

The  French  Cabinet,  on  receiving  intelligence  concerning  the 
Treaty  of  London,  felt  not  only  "discontented  and  vexed"  but  also 
"surprised  and  wounded."4  Thiers,  in  particular,  was  aroused  be- 
cause of  the  famous  arrangement  and  on  July  20,  1840,  in  answer 
to  a  question  that  Henry  Bulwer  asked  him  concerning  the  French 
fleet  which  had  just  sailed  for  Tunis,  he  declared:  "'This  is  not 
the  time  to  ask  or  to  give  explanations:  the  alliance  between 
England  and  France  is  at  an  end.  M.  Guizot  has  received  the 
official  intelligence,  that  an  agreement  has  been  come  to  by  the 
Four  Powers,  to  which  we  have  not  even  been  asked  to  accede  .  .  . 
I  cannot  understand  an  alliance  on  small  questions,  and  a  differ- 
ence on  great  ones.  Should  England  separate  from  us  on  the 
Eastern  Question,  such  a  separation  will  be  a  general  one.  France 
will,  as  I  have  already  said,  isolate  herself:  she  is  confident  in  her 
strength,  and  the  more  so  as  the  Government  has  on  this  subject 
the  whole  population  of  France  behind  it.  Should  an  occasion, 
therefore,  arise  on  which  the  dignity  or  the  interests  of  my  country 
call  upon  me  to  act,  I  will  do  so  without  fear  and  with  decision. 
I  regret  it  deeply;  but  I  cannot  but  see  in  the  state  of  affairs,  as 
now  announced  to  me,  eventualities  which  may  disturb  the  peace 
of  Europe.'  "5  A  day  later  Thiers  wrote  to  Guizot  admitting  that 

"Palmerston  to  Bulwer,  July  22,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp.  10-13. 

4Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  p.  228. 

5Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  July  20,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp.  7-8. 
Annual  Register,  1840,  p.  498.  On  July  26,  1840,  Bulwer  conferred  again  with 
Thiers.  Thiers  asked  the  British  charge  d'affaires  on  that  occasion  if  England 
wished  anything  for  herself  in  the  Levant.  In  Syria,  he  declared,  she  "might 
have  points  to  desire"  for  the  "sake  of  the  communication  with  the  East 
Indies,"  and  therefore  the  suspicion  of  the  French  people  concerning  the  inten- 
tions of  Great  Britain,  though  possibly  erroneous,  were  more  justifiable  [than 
those  which  the  English  people  entertained  in  regard  to  France]. — Bulwer  to 
Palmerston,  July  27,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp.  37-40. 


l66  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [492 

he  was  surprised  greatly  because  of  the  turn  which  affairs  had 
taken.  The  government,  he  stated,  had  expected  that  the  agitation 
which  for  several  days  had  manifested  itself  in  the  English  Cabinet 
would  end  in  a  proposition,  similar  to  the  one  which  Neumann  had 
suggested  on  June  12,  leaving  to  France  the  choice  of  associating 
herself  or  not  with  the  four  Powers  for  the  execution  of  that  pro- 
position.6 On  the  same  date  he  forwarded  to  the  French  Ambas- 
sador a  formal  note  in  reply  to  Palmerston's  memorandum  of 
July  17,  1840.  He  enumerated  in  that  note  problems  which  he 
believed  would  arise  when  the  four  Powers  attempted  to  carry  out 
the  provisions  of  the  treaty  of  July  15,  and  he  gave  warning 
that  henceforth  France  could  not  be  influenced  save  by  what  she 
owed  "to  peace"  and  "to  herself."  The  conduct  which  she  would 
maintain  in  the  serious  circumstances  in  which  the  four  Powers 
had  just  placed  Europe  would  depend  upon  the  solution  which 
would  "be  given  to  all  the  questions  which  she  had  pointed  out."7 
When  it  became  known  publicly  in  France  that  the  four  Powers 
had  concluded  a  convention  which  they  had  kept  secret  from  the 
Ministers  of  Louis  Philippe  a  wave  of  indignation  swept  through- 
out the  country.8  The  excitement  was  intense  particularly  in  the 
capital.  "Anger  and  surprise  run  mountain  high  in  Paris,"  a  cor- 
respondent of  an  English  journal  wrote  at  the  time.  "That  Eng- 
land should  join  hands  with  Russia,  though  but  for  a  special  pur- 
pose, and  in  a  direct  defiance  of  France,  was  an  event  that,  from 
M.  Thiers  down  to  the  shoe  black  at  the  corner  of  the  street,  no 
Frenchman  could  have  believed."9  The  Bourse  was  panic 
stricken10  and  almost  the  whole  of  the  public  press,  led  by  the 

*Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  p.  230.  See  also  Affaires  etrangeres  655  Angleterre, 
Thiers  to  Guizot  (undated)  quoted  by  Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  282. 

''Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp.  18-19.  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  231-235. 
Annual  Register,  1840,  pp.  498-500. 

80n  Aug.  10,  1840,  the  Duchesse  de  Dino  wrote  in  her  Chronique:  "Toutes 
mes  correspondances  sont  a  la  guerre,  d'une  fagon  qui  me  desole." — Dino,  op.  cit., 
II,  p.  347.  See  also  an  extract  from  a  letter,  Lavergne  to  Guizot,  July  30,  1840, 
quoted  by  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  p.  250.  Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  July  27,  1840, 
Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp.  41-42.  Raikes  to  Wellington,  July  31,  1840,  T. 
Raikes,  Private  Correspondence,  p.  142.  Leopold  to  Metternich,  Aug.,  1840, 
quoted  by  Corti,  op.  cit.,  p.  127. 

*The  Examiner,  Aug.  2,  1840,  p.  483. 

10The  rise  and  fall  of  the  French  Bourse  were  significant  for  those  variations 
were  due  largely  to  the  changes  in  public  sentiment  in  France.   See  Appendix  A. 


493]  THE  ISOLATION  OF  FRANCE  l6/ 

Constitutionnel  and  the  Courrier  Fran$ais,  both  ministerial  organs, 
maintained  that  the  Treaty  of  London  was  an  insult  and  an  outrage 
put  upon  their  nation,  and  they  called  loudly  for  war — "war  to  the 
knife" — with  "perfidious  Albion."11  Even  the  conservative  Journal 
des  Debats  spoke  defiantly.  Although  it  did  not  despair  for  the 
maintenance  of  peace,  it  did  not  shrink  back  from  the  possibility 
of  war.  The  French  singlehanded,  it  believed,  could  carry  on  hos- 
tilities to  advantage.  If  war  did  break  out  it  would  be  terrible,  but 
France,  who  had  not  provoked  it,  who  had  done  "all  that  her 
honor  would  permit  her  to  do  to  prevent  it,"  would  throw  herself 
into  the  struggle  "tout  entiere."12 

Thiers  and  Louis  Philippe,13  who  must  have  been  encouraged 
by  the  bellicose  clamor  which  was  raised  in  Prance,  determined 
directly  not  only  that  they  would  follow  a  policy  of  isolation  but 
also  that  they  would  make  extensive  preparations  for  war. 
"  '.  .  .  it  will  be  necessary  to  choose  the  moment  to  act  in  order  to 
throw  ourselves  into  a  cleft  and  to  break  up  the  coalition,'  "  Thiers 
informed  Guizot,  July  21,  1840,  "  '. . .  we  must  assume  our  position 
and  watch  events  with  coolness.  The  King  is  perfectly  calm;  we 
[the  Cabinet]  too  are  the  same.  Without  any  stir,  we  intend  to 
make  preparations  solid  rather  than  apparent.  We  shall  make 
them  apparent  if  the  situation  requires  it  and  if  respect  for  public 
opinion  renders  it  desirable.'  "14  Soon  thereafter  an  officer  was  ap- 
pointed to  draw  up  detailed  plans  for  the  fortification  of  Paris,15 
an  extraordinary  credit  of  8,120,000  francs  for  the  marine  was 
decreed16  and  the  men  belonging  to  the  classes  of  1836  and  1839 
were  called  into  military  service.17  Furthermore,  steps  were  taken 

uThe  Times,  July  31,  Aug.  i,  3,  10,  12,  13,  17,  1840.  Annual  Register,  1840, 
p.  [172]. 

u Journal  des  Debats,  July  29,  1840.  See  extracts  from  other  French  journals 
quoted  in  Guichen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  342-343. 

"Note  the  following  statement  which  was  written  Aug.  8,  1840:  "On  dit 
que,  dans  cette  question  [of  the  attitude  of  France  to  the  Treaty  of  London], 
le  Roi  des  Frangais  est  absolument  d'accord  avec  M.  Thiers,  et  qu'il  a  dit  qu'il 
preferait  la  guerre  a  la  revolution." — Dino,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  345. 

"Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  p.  251. 

KIbid.,  VI,  pp.  25-26. 

"Royal  Ordinance,  July  29-Aug.  5,  1840,  J.  B.  Duvergier,  Collection  complete 
des  lois,  decrets,  etc.,  XL,  pp.  263-264. 

"Royal  Ordinances,  July  29-Aug.  5,  1840,  ibid.,  p.  264.  Granville  to 
Palmerston,  Aug.  I,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  II,  p.  60. 


l68  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [494 

in  diplomacy  to  persuade  Austria  and  Prussia  to  refuse  to  ratify 
the  treaty  of  July  15,  i84o;18  Admiral  Pontois,  the  French  Am- 
bassador at  Constantinople,  was  instructed  to  make  energetic  re- 
presentations to  the  Porte  in  order  to  influence  it  to  grant  to  the 
Viceroy  terms  more  liberal  than  those  agreed  upon  by  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  four  Powers;19  and  Count  Walewski,  a  natural 
son  of  Napoleon,  was  sent  on  a  special  mission  to  Alexandria  with 
the  aim  of  inducing  the  Pasha,  on  his  part,  either  to  accept  terms 
which  it  was  thought  Pontois  would  succeed  in  persuading  the 
Porte  to  grant  or  to  give  to  the  government  of  France  power  to 
negotiate  in  his  behalf  with  the  concert  of  the  four  Powers.20 

Neither  the  threatening  attitude  of  the  French  government  nor 
the  blustering  of  the  Paris  press  had  any  noticeable  influence  upon 
Lord  Palmerston.  The  warlike  measures  which  the  former  had 
adopted  were  entirely  uncalled  for,  he  stated  in  a  despatch  to 
Granville,  August  4,  1840.  They  could  be  looked  upon  only  as  a 
gratuitous  affront  to  the  four  Powers.  Nevertheless,  Her  Majesty's 
government  did  not  intend  to  take  any  notice  of  them.  It  would 
not  ask  for  explanations;  nor  would  it  apply  to  Parliament  for  any 
additional  vote  of  credit.  To  do  either  one  or  the  other  would  be 
to  give  to  the  strange  proceedings  of  the  French  government  an 
importance  which  it  did  not  deserve.  The  British  naval  forces  in 
the  Mediterranean,  Palmerston  believed,  would  be  quite  strong 
enough  to  do  everything  which  could  be  required  of  them  in  pur- 
suance of  the  engagements  of  the  treaty  of  July  15,  1840.  The 

"Bloomfield  to  Palmerston,  Aug.  15,  1840,  ibid.,  p.  89.  See  also  No.  16, 
Appendix  D. 

"The  representations  which  Pontois  actually  made  to  the  Porte  were  later 
the  subject  of  a  controversy  between  the  French  and  allied  diplomats.  Ponsonby 
and  the  Austrian  envoy  Sturmer  accused  Pontois  of  having  directly  threatened 
the  Porte  that,  in  case  the  treaty  of  July  15  was  carried  into  execution  through 
armed  intervention  against  the  Pasha,  France  would  "join  its  efforts"  with 
Mehemet  AH  to  raise  the  populations  of  Asia  and  Europe  against  the  existing 
administration  of  Turkey,  of  which  the  French  government  proclaimed  itself  "the 
enemy."  Pontois  later  denied  that  he  had  indulged  in  such  threats,  and  both 
Guizot  and  Thiers,  when  questioned  by  British  and  Austrian  Ministers,  denied 
that  he  had  been  instructed  to  do  so.  See  Sturmer  to  Metternich,  Aug.  17, 
1840;  Palmerston  to  Ponsonby,  Sept.  4,  1840;  Palmerston  to  Guizot,  Sept.  9, 
1840;  Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  Sept.  7,  1840;  Guizot  to  Palmerston,  Sept.  18,  1840, 
Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp.  116-117,  125-126,  130,  131,  192-193. 

^See  Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  Sept.  18,   1840,  ibid.,  p.  198. 


495]  THE  ISOLATION  OF  FRANCE  169 

force  of  the  fleet  also  would  be  "abundantly  sufficient"  to  secure 
it  against  molestation  or  insult  from  any  squadron  which  France 
might  think  proper  to  send  to  the  Levant.21 

Count  Nesselrode  and  the  Emperor  Nicholas,  who  were  pleased 
greatly  when  they  learned  of  the  conclusion,  by  the  plenipotenti- 
aries of  the  four  Powers,  of  the  famous  Convention  of  London,22 
entertained  opinions  very  similar  to  those  of  the  British  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs.  The  former,  in  a  letter  to  Meyendorff,  written 
August  8,  1840,  in  which  he  announced  that  the  convention  had 
been  signed,  explained  that  it  was  only  when  she  was  supported 
by  England  that  France  was  able  to  be  truly  formidable  upon  the 
continent.  In  the  existing  circumstances,  he  believed,  once  that 
she  was  convinced  that  she  could  not  succeed  in  promoting  division 
within  the  ranks  of  the  allies,  she  would  submit.  It  was  his  opin- 
ion, he  declared,  that  she  would  hesitate  when  it  came  to  declar- 
ing war  upon  four  of  the  great  Powers.23 


"Palmerston  to  Granville,  Aug.  4,  1840,  ibid.,  pp.  62-63.  See  also,  Palmerston 
to  Hodges,  July  16,  18,  1840;  Palmerston  to  Ponsonby,  July  25,  1840,  ibid.,  pp. 
3-5,  22. 

"See  an  extract  of  a  despatch,  Thiers  to  Guizot,  Aug.  23,  1840,  quoted  by 
Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  292-293.  Note  also  the  following  extract  from  a  despatch, 
Nesselrode  to  Meyendorff,  Sept.  25,  1840:  "Dans  mes  depeches,  j'ai  en  plus 
particulierement  soin  de  faire  resortir  les  avantages  immenses  que  nous  offre, 
pour  1'avenir,  la  rupture  de  cette  funeste  alliance  anglo-frangaise,  avantages  qui 
ne  me  paraissent  pas  encore  assez  sentis  et  apprecies  a  Berlin  .  .  .  C'est  un 
grand  service  que  nous  avons  rendu  a  1'Europe;  on  le  comprendra  avec  le  temps; 
on  1'acceptera  comme  on  accepte  avec  avidit£  nos  secours  dans  les  grandes 
crises  sociales." — Nesselrode,  op.  cit.,  VIII,  pp.  39-40.  Note  also  the  following 
extract  from  Raikes'  Journal,  Aug.  12,  1840:  "Kisseleff,  the  first  Russian  secre- 
tary, held  high  language  to  me  about  the  treaty;  he  said,  We  must  have  the 
letter  of  the  bond,  and  no  tergiversation,  else  we  shall  march/ " — Raikes, 
Journal,  IV,  p.  42.  Lord  Broughton,  describing  a  cabinet  meeting  of  Aug.  9,  1840, 
wrote:  "Palmerston  also  informed  us  that  Brunnow  had  told  him  the  Emperor  of 
Russia  would  not  only  send  a  squadron  from  the  Black  Sea  to  help  us,  but  had 
offered  to  come  in  person,  commanding  his  Baltic  fleet,  to  defend  the  shores  of 
England.  At  this  we  all  laughed,  and  Palmerston  added  that  he  had  only  given 
civil  thanks  for  this  magnificent  offer." — Broughton,  op.  cit.,  V,  p.  290. 

"Ne'sselrode  to  Meyendorff,  Aug.  8,  1840,  Nesselrode,  op.  cit.,  VIII,  pp. 
35-37.  Nesselrode,  like  Palmerston,  did  not  believe  it  would  be  necessary  for 
Russia  to  send  forces  to  the  defense  of  Constantinople.  See,  Nesselrode  to 
Titow,  July,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp.  112-113.  See  also  Guichen, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  331-337- 


I7O  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [496 

At  Vienna  and  at  Berlin,  on  the  other  hand,  the  news  of  the 
warlike  activities  of  the  French  occasioned  alarm.  Prince  Metter- 
nich  talked  about  the  danger  of  a  revolution  in  France24  and  the 
new  King  of  Prussia,  Frederick  William  IV,  who  was  determined 
that  his  country  would  not  take  part  in  a  general  European  war  if 
one  should  break  out,  had  a  definite  declaration  sent  to  all  the 
Powers  that  he  adhered  firmly  to  his  father's  pacific  policy  and 
"demanded  that  the  neutrality  of  his  state  should  be  guaranteed 
formally."25 

Moreover,  in  Great  Britain,  although  the  public  remained  calm 
and  refused  to  believe  that  Thiers  would  recommend  war  "to 
support  the  tyrannical  and  rebellious  pasha  of  Egypt,"26  there 
were  many  who  doubted  if  it  would  be  wise  to  ignore  the  French 
protests  entirely.  Even  Lord  John  Russell  who  a  few  weeks  before 
had  exerted  himself  to  persuade  his  colleagues  to  accept  the  policy 
advocated  by  the  British  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  Lord 
Melbourne,  the  Prime  Minister,  were  disturbed  by  the  situation 
and  appeared  to  be  inclined  to  make  concessions.  "  'England  has 
no  wish  to  quarrel  with  France  or  to  unsettle  Europe,' "  the  latter 
stated  to  Guizot,  July  28,  1840.  "  'Austria  too  has  no  such  desire. 
This  affair  is  unfortunate  and  might  become  extremely  serious; 
but  we  can  arrest  it,  and  wish  to  do  so.  And  France  who  has  re- 

"Note  the  following  extract  from  a  letter,  Metternich  to  Apponyi,  Aug.  20, 
1840:  "Le  mal  de  la  France,  c'est  la  Revolution,  et  c'est  parce  que  M.  Thiers 
la  represente  que  seul  il  est  fort  .  .  .  le  parti  conservateur  et  celui  du  progres  ont, 
depuis  1'avenement  de  M.  Thiers,  chacun  un  chef  [the  King  and  Thiers];  la 
lutte  entre  ses  deux  partis  a  done  pris  un  caractere  qu'elle  n'avait  pas  anterieure- 
ment  aux  evenements  du  ier  Mars,  et  la  question  qui  reste  a  resoudre  est  de 
savoir  auquel  d'entre  eux  restera  la  victoire!" — Metternich,  op.  cit.,  VI,  pp. 
412-413. 

"Treitschke,   op.  cit.,  V,   p.   79.   See  also  Guichen,   op.  cit.,   pp.   326-331, 

348-349- 

MThe  Times,  Aug.  I,  3,  1840.  Note  the  following  extract  from  an  editorial 
in  The  Times,  Sept.  24,  1840:  "With  very  rare  exceptions,  the  English  journals 
have  treated  the  whole  Eastern  question  in  a  mild  and  conciliatory  spirit.  The 
petulance  of  French  presumption  and  asperity  has  been  met  throughout  Great 
Britain  by  calm  forbearance  .  .  .  They  have  threatened  us  without  retort,  and 
as  yet  with  impunity;  and  their  press  has  borne  down  upon  us,  almost  in  line 
of  battle,  without  even  a  signal  being  hoisted  in  any  part  of  the  British  empire 
that  there  was  an  enemy  in  sight."  Many  Englishmen,  it  seems,  believed  Louis 
Philippe  would  not  dare  to  begin  a  foreign  war  because  of  the  danger  of  revolu- 
tion at  home.  See  Guichen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  339-340. 


497]  THE  ISOLATION  OF  FRANCE  I/I 

fused  to  advance  with  the  four  Powers,  may  aid  them  to  halt.'  "2T 
The  government  of  France  being  aware  that  such  sentiments  were 
entertained  in  Great  Britain  and  in  Germany28  refused  to  despair 
for  the  success  of  its  policy  because  of  the  obstinacy  of  Palmerston 
and  the  Russians. 

July  31,  1840,  Guizot  was  summoned  to  the  Chateau  d'Eu  for 
a  conference  with  Louis  Philippe  and  M.  Thiers.  At  that  meet- 
ing, he  has  reported  in  his  Memoires,  he  found  the  King  "ani- 
mated in  words,"  but  promising  himself  that,  in  the  end,  the  peace 
of  Europe  would  not  be  disturbed,  and  Thiers  "also  desiring  the 
maintenance  of  peace,  [but]  much  preoccupied  with  the  chance  of 
war  and  the  means  of  meeting  it,"  if  events  should  drive  France  to 
that  alternative.29 

When  Guizot  departed  from  Eu  on  his  return  to  London  he 
carried  with  him  two  distinct  projects  for  the  settlement  of  the 
question  of  the  Near  East  which  would  bring  about  the  reconcilia- 
tion of  France  with  the  concert  of  the  four  Powers.  Both  of  these 
projects  assumed  the  willingness  of  the  latter  to  tear  up  the  docu- 
ments which  they  had  mutually  agreed  upon  July  15,  1840.  The 
first  provided  for  the  guaranteeing  of  the  status  quo.  According 
to  that  plan  the  five  Powers  would  guarantee  the  existing  state 
of  the  Ottoman  possessions  on  the  basis  of  the  arrangement  of 
Kutayah.  The  Pasha  would  have  no  hereditary  rights  and  if  he 
"  'or  anyone  else' "  should  invade  the  states  of  the  Sultan  the  five, 
including  France,  would  employ  their  forces  against  the  invader. 
The  second  project  provided  for  the  mediation  of  France,  on 
behalf  of  Mehemet  Ali,  with  the  Concert  of  Europe.  If  that  pro- 
posal should  be  accepted  France  would  insist  that  her  ally  should 
receive  the  hereditary  tenure  of  Egypt  and  the  government  for  life 
of  Syria.  It,  however,  was  not  to  be  proposed  unless  there  was  a 
strong  probability  of  its  being  accepted,  for  it  had  the  inconven- 
ience of  depending  upon  the  willingness  of  the  Pasha  to  request 
that  France  should  negotiate  for  him.30 


*TGuizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  p.  254.  Many  Englishmen,  undoubtedly,  questioned 
the  advisability  of  exchanging  a  French  for  a  Russian  alliance.  See  Guichen, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  344-346. 

^Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  254-255,  266-267. 

"Ibid.,  pp.  255-256,  264-266. 

MIbid.,  pp.  270-271. 


IJ2  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [498 

In  addition  to  these  two  proposals  Guizot  carried  back  to  Lon- 
don a  letter  from  Louis  Philippe  to  King  Leopold  of  Belgium,  who 
at  that  time  was  at  Windsor  Castle,  greatly  alarmed  by  the 
thought  of  a  war  being  declared  between  his  niece  and  his  father- 
in-law.  "  'The  situation  in  which  France  finds  herself,' "  the  King 
wrote,  "  'is  neither  of  her  choice  nor  of  her  creation.  .  .  .  The 
situation  is  particularly  painful  for  me  who  have  always  scouted 
the  notion  that  England  could  ever  enter  into  an  alliance  without 
France.  I  find  I  am  wrong.  For  the  present  we  can  only  wait  and 
see.  But  there  is  one  thing  we  must  do  and  that  is  to  arm,  and  we 
are  doing  so  vigorously.  Our  role  must  be  one  of  expectation.  We 
must  see  what  England  means  to  do,  before  deciding  what  France 
shall  do,  either  in  the  way  of  restoring  or  preserving  the  balance  of 
power.'  "31 

The  French  Ambassador,  very  soon  after  his  arrival  in  England, 
proceeded  to  Windsor,  where  he  delivered  Louis  Philippe's  letter 
and  at  the  same  time  explained  to  Leopold  the  French  project  for 
the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo.  The  latter,  who  previously 
had  advocated  that  a  "  'great  European  measure'  " — a  treaty  be- 
tween the  five  Powers  "  'to  guarantee  against  all  enemies  and 
dangers  the  existing  state  of  the  possessions  of  the  Porte' " — 
should  be  concluded  to  supersede  the  Convention  of  London,32 
readily  sanctioned  Guizot's  suggestions  and  promised  that  he 
would  urge  them  upon  Lord  Palmerston.33 

There  were  many  at  the  British  Court,  including  Melbourne, 
Neumann,  and  Biilow,  who  were  willing  to  consider  favorably  the 
Belgian  King's  proposals.34  Palmerston,  however,  was  not  one  of 
that  number.  "  'King  Leopold  has  mentioned  his  idea  to  me,' " 
he  informed  Guizot,  August  21,  1840;  "  'a  treaty  between  the  five 
Powers  which  might  guarantee  the  status  quo  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire  .  .  .  [That  is]  impossible  at  present.  A  treaty  has  been 
concluded  between  four  Powers,  not  with  a  general  and  permanent 
aim,  as  would  be  that  of  which  we  are  speaking,  but  with  a  special 

"Affaires  etrangeres,  655  Angleterre,  Louis  Philippe  to  the  King  of  the 
Belgians,  Aug.  13,  1840,  quoted  by  Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  285. 

"It  is  probable  that  the  idea  of  a  "  'great  European  measure' "  was  sug- 
gested first  by  Wellington.  See  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  278-279. 

"Ibid.,  pp.  278-282.    See  also  Guichen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  350-354. 

**Melbourne  to  Russell,  Aug.  21,  26,  1840,  Sanders,  Melbourne  Papers,  pp. 
462-464,  467-469- 


499]  THE  ISOLATION  OF  FRANCE  173 

and  momentary  view.  This  incidental  treaty  must  follow  its 
course,  and  when  accomplished,  the  general  treaty  may  well  take 
its  place.  Today  we  must  await  events.'  "35 

Instead  of  agreeing  to  concessions  which  might  have  conciliated 
the  French,  the  British  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  prepared  a 
note,  in  answer  to  Thiers'  memorandum  of  July  21,  1840,  in  which 
he  defended  in  a  most  elaborate  manner  the  course  which  he  had 
followed  during  the  entire  period  of  the  negotiations  preceding  the 
conclusion  of  the  Treaty  of  London.  No  one  but  the  French  gov- 
ernment itself  was  to  blame  for  the  isolated  position  of  France,  he 
declared.  France  had  no  right  to  expect  that  when  four  out  of 
the  five  Powers  found  themselves  agreed  upon  one  course  and 
when  the  fifth  had  determined  to  pursue  a  course  entirely  different 
"that  the  Four  should,  in  deference  to  the  Fifth,  give  up  opinions  in 
which  they  were  daily  more  and  more  confirmed,  and  which  related 
to  a  matter  of  vital  importance  to  the  great  and  permanent  inter- 
ests of  Europe."  It  was  only  in  one  of  the  concluding  paragraphs 
that  a  vague  hope  was  held  out  that,  when  the  four  should  have 
brought  about  such  an  arrangement  between  the  Porte  and  its 
subject  as  might  be  compatible  with  the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire  and  with  the  future  peace  of  Europe,  there  could  then  be 
nothing  to  prevent  France  from  concurring  with  them  in  such 
further  engagements  for  the  future  as  might  appear  to  be  neces- 
sary "in  order  to  give  due  stability  to  the  good  effects  of  the  inter- 
position of  the  four  Powers  in  favor  of  the  sultan;  and  to  secure 
the  Ottoman  empire  from  a  recurrence  of  danger."36 

It  is  evident  that  the  British  Minister's  determination  to  make 
no  concessions  was  due  to  the  fact  that  he  was  convinced  that  the 
French  would  not  dare  to  intervene  in  behalf  of  the  Viceroy  and 
that  the  policy  which  the  four  Powers  had  adopted  would  tri- 

*5Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  287-288.  Guizot  did  not  present  his  second  pro- 
ject to  the  British  government.  However,  on  Aug.  10,  1840,  Granville  reported 
to  Palmerston  that  Thiers  had  suggested  that  the  Pasha  might  request  the  inter- 
vention of  France.  Four  days  later  Palmerston  replied  that  it  was  needless  for 
him  to  point  out  that  in  the  situation  in  which  affairs  then  stood  it  would  be 
impossible  for  the  five  Powers  to  accept  the  interposition  of  France  between 
them  and  Mehemet  AH.  See  Granville  to  Palmerston,  Aug.  10,  1840,  Palmerston 
to  Granville,  Aug.  14,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp.  76,  80-8 1. 

s°Palmerston  to  Bulwer,  Aug.  31,  1840,  ibid.,  pp.  102-110.  Annual  Register, 
1840,  pp.  500-510. 


174  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [500 

umph  speedily.  He  persisted  in  his  opinions  even  in  spite  of  the 
reports  which  his  agents  at  Paris  forwarded  to  him  announcing 
that  the  French  were  continuing  actively  their  preparations  for 
war.37  "  'I  am  more  than  ever  confirmed/  "  he  wrote  to  Bulwer, 
August  23,  1840,  "  'in  my  belief  that  for  the  present  at  least  the 
French  will  remain  quiet,  and  that  there  will  be  no  war.  However 
inconsiderate  the  French  nation  may  be,  the  French  interests  grow- 
ing up  every  day  will  make  them  pause  before  they  begin  an  un- 
provoked and  aggressive  war  against  the  four  Powers. 

"  'Thiers,  therefore,  sooner  or  later  will  give  the  order  to  "cease 
firing;"  the  smoke  will  soon  blow  away  from  the  eyes  of  the 
French  people,  and  they  will  see  more  clearly  the  objects  which 
have  caused  their  false  alarm;  and  both  Thiers  and  Louis  Philippe 
will  take  care  to  keep  out  of  a  quarrel  which  nobody  means  to 
force  upon  them.'  "38 

In  the  meantime  news  of  the  conclusion  of  the  Convention  of 
London  had  arrived  in  the  Near  East.  The  Ottoman  Ministers 
who  received  this  intelligence  on  August  3,  1840,  proceeded  with- 
out loss  of  time  to  carry  out  their  part  of  the  agreement.39  Rifaat 
Bey,  accompanied  by  a  Mr.  Allison,  of  the  British  embassy,  was 
despatched  to  Alexandria  with  the  Sultan's  ultimatum  and 
measures  were  taken  promptly  for  the  sending  of  arms,  ammuni- 
tion, and  troops  to  the  aid  of  the  discontented  inhabitants  of 
Syria.40 

Rifaat  Bey  arrived  at  his  destination  on  August  n,  just  one 
day  in  advance  of  Count  Walewski,  the  agent  whom  Thiers  had 


"Granville  to  Palmerston,  Aug.  7,  10,  1840;  Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  Aug.  21, 
28,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp.  73-74,  76,  88,  93. 

Talmerston  to  Bulwer,  Aug.  23,  1840,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  320.  See  also, 
Greville,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  258-259.  Greville  to  Reeve,  Sept.  10,  1840,  A.  H.  Johnson 
(editor),  The  Letters  of  Charles  Greville  and  Henry  Reeve,  pp.  6-7. 

"Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  Aug.  5,  9,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp. 
91,  100. 

40The  revolts  of  June,  1840,  had  been  put  down  ruthlessly.  Nevertheless,  the 
spirit  of  the  rebels  was  not  broken.  On  July  25,  1840,  a  British  consul  wrote: 
"Lebanon  is  a  sleeping  volcano,  and  its  oppressed  and  exasperated  inhabitants 
are  only  waiting  a  favourable  moment  to  try  once  more  the  fortune  of  arms." — 
Moore  to  Ponsonby,  July  25,  1840,  ibid.,  p.  96.  See  also,  Paton,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  179. 


5Ol]  THE  ISOLATION  OF  FRANCE  175 

sent  to  persuade  the  Pasha  to  be  moderate  in  his  demands.41  Five 
days  later,  on  the  i6th,  he  informed  the  latter  officially  of  the 
terms  of  the  convention  of  July  15,  i84O.42  During  the  twenty 
days  that  followed  immediately  thereafter  the  Egyptian  metropolis 
rivaled  even  London  and  Paris  as  a  center  of  diplomatic  activity. 
At  first  the  Viceroy  was  defiant.  He  had  at  an  earlier  date,  after 
having  received  unofficial  information  concerning  what  had  oc- 
curred at  the  British  capital,  taken  steps  to  withdraw  all  of  his 
regular  troops  from  Arabia  and  had  ordered  that  the  preparations 
for  war  in  Egypt  and  in  Syria  should  be  pushed  forward  vigor- 
ously.43 Being  convinced  that  these  measures  would  be  adequate 
for  the  defense  of  the  territories  under  his  control,  he  announced 
forthwith  that  he  had  decided  to  resist  the  execution  of  the  terms 
of  the  famous  convention  and  that  all  efforts  to  induce  him  to 
change  his  opinion  would  be  in  vain.44  The  Consuls-General  of  the 
four  Powers,  in  reply,  remonstrated  with  him,  warning  him  that, 
if  he  did  not  accept  the  terms  which  Rifaat  had  offered,  the  allies 


41Hodges  to  Ponsonby,  Aug.  16,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp. 
147-148. 

^Report  of  Interview  between  Rifat  Bey  and  Mehemet  AH,  ibid.,  pp. 
149-152. 

^Letters  from  Alexandria,  Aug.  7,  1840,  The  Times,  Aug.  25,  Aug.  26,  1840 
Mehemet  Ali  was  acting  in  accord  with  the  advice  of  Thiers.  Note  the  following 
extract  from  a  despatch,  Thiers  to  Cochelet,  July  29,  1840,  quoted  by  Guichen, 
op.  cit.,  p.  359:  " 'Le  but  que  le  Vice-roi  et  le  gouvernment  frangais  doivent 
se  proposer,  disait  notre  ministre,  est  d'annuler  les  effets  que  les  quatre  Cours 
attendent  de  la  convention  qu'elles  ont  con  clue.  Le  moyen  le  plus  propre  a 
faire  atteindre  ce  but  est  la  soumission  de  la  Syrie.  .  .  La  France,  obligee  de 
veiller  a  son  honneur  et  de  pourvoir  a  ses  interets,  chercherait  un  champ  de 
bataille  moins  eloigne  d'elle  que  1'Orient.  Le  Vice-roi  qui  est  sur  le  premier  plan 
de  la  politique,  cesserait  d'y  etre.  A  cote  des  grands  interets  qu'elle  serait  appe!6e 
a  defendre  et  a  faire  triompher,  celui  de  Mehemet  Ali  deviendrait  bien  secondaire. 
Elle  se  trouverait  reduite  a  1'abandonner  a  lui-meme.  Livre  a  ses  propres  forces, 
serait-il  en  etat  de  resister  a  toute  la  puissance  anglaise,  engagee  serieusement 
dans  une  guerre  qui  aneantirait  en  Orient  et  en  Occident  tout  ce  qui  est  faible 
et  qui  lui  offrirait  1'attrait  d'une  si  belle  et  si  utile  conquete?' "  Cochelet  even 
went  so  far  as  to  urge  Mehemet  Ali  to  stir  up  a  holy  war  throughout  the  Near 
East.  See  ibid.,  p.  360. 

"Minute  of  Interview  between  the  Consuls-General  and  Mehemet  Ali,  Aug. 
17,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp.  154-155.  Letter  from  Alexandria,  Aug. 
20,  1840,  The  Times,  Sept.  8,  1840.  The  Examiner,  Sept.  13,  1840,  p.  583. 


1/6  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [502 

certainly  would  coerce  him  into  submission.45  Count  Walewski, 
on  the  other  hand,  refusing  to  advise  Mehemet  to  surrender  com- 
pletely because  of  the  demands  of  the  Porte,  urged  all  of  the 
parties  concerned  to  be  moderate.46  At  the  end  of  the  first  period 
of  ten  days  the  Viceroy  was  still  defiant.  "  'I  repeat,'  "  he  declared 
on  the  same  day  that  he  announced  that  he  was  determined  to 
continue  upon  the  course  which  he  had  been  following,"  'that  I  am 
only  responsible  to  Providence.'  "47  However,  before  the  close  of  a 
second  period  of  equal  length  he  consented  to  follow  the  advice 
of  the  French.48  Although  he  persisted  in  refusing  to  comply  with 
the  provisions  of  the  Sultan's  ultimatum,  he  had  it  announced  to 
Rifaat  Bey  and  the  Consuls-General  of  the  four  Powers  that 
he  would  be  satisfied  if  he  received  the  hereditary  possession  of 
Egypt  and  the  tenure  for  life  of  Syria.49 

"Memoir  addressed  by  Consuls-General  to  Mehemet  Ali,  Aug.  19,  1840, 
Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp.  161-163.  See  also,  ibid.,  pp.  174-180. 

^Walewski  urged  Col.  Hodges  to  use  his  endeavors  to  prevent  hostile 
operations  against  Egypt  and  Syria  on  the  part  of  the  British  naval  forces.  He 
was  instructed,  he  declared,  that  in  case  his  request  was  not  granted  he  should 
go  on  board  the  English  flag  ship  and  present  it  direct  to  Admiral  Stopford. — 
Hodges  to  Palmerston,  Aug.  19,  1840,  ibid.,  p.  157. 

"Minute  of  Interview,  Aug.  26,  1840,  ibid.,  p.  185-186. 

"On  Aug.  24,  1840,  Hodges  reported  that  the  Viceroy  had  made  a  formal 
application  to  France  for  its  protection  and  mediation.  That  report,  however, 
was  probably  incorrect.  On  the  same  day,  Mehemet  Ali  declared  to  the  Russian 
Consul-General  that  he  had  never  reckoned  on  the  assistance  of  France. 
"  'It  is  true,' "  he  stated,  "  'that  she  offered  it  me  three  times,  but  I  never 
trusted  it;  and  I  swear  to  you  that  my  decision  has  in  no  wise  been  influenced 
by  the  declarations  of  the  newspapers  and  the  language  of  M.  Thiers.  M. 
Perier  told  me  plainly  that  France  would  not  interfere  in  my  favour.' " — Hodges 
to  Palmerston,  Aug.  24,  1840;  Minute  of  Conversation,  Aug.  24,  1840;  ibid.,  pp. 
173,  178-180. 

48Mehemet  Ali  announced  his  willingness  to  make  concessions  on  Aug.  28, 
1840.  See  a  letter  from  Alexandria,  Aug.  29,  1840,  The  Times,  Sept.  19,  1840; 
ibid.,  Sept.  28,  1840.  It  is  said  that  on  Sept.  5,  1840,  the  twentieth  day  after 
the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  London  had  been  communicated  formally  to  the 
Pasha,  Sami  Bey  delivered  the  latter's  final  answer  to  Rifaat  Bey  and  the 
Consuls-General  of  the  four  Powers  in  the  following  language:  "His  Highness, 
my  master,  accepts  the  treaty  of  the  i$th  of  July  to  the  letter.  He  accepts  the 
hereditary  title  of  Egypt,  and  with  regard  to  Syria,  he  is  about  to  petition  the 
Sultan  that  that  administration  may  be  granted  him  in  his  old  age,  to  cease  at 
the  expiration  of  his  life.  The  fleet  shall  be  restored,  Arabia  has  been  evacuated, 
and  therefore  all  will  depend  on  the  Sultan's  orders." — Letter  from  "on  board 


503]  THE  ISOLATION  OF  FRANCE  177 

At  the  same  time  that  the  papers  relating  to  the  Treaty  of  London 
were  sent  to  Constantinople,  instructions  were  forwarded  to 
Admiral  Stopford,  the  commander  of  the  British  naval  forces 
in  the  Levant,  to  the  effect  that  all  communications  by  sea  be- 
tween Egypt  and  Syria  should  be  cut  off.80  In  order  to  execute 
these  instructions  Stopford  divided  his  fleet  into  two  divisions, 
sending  one  portion  under  command  of  Sir  Charles  Napier  to 
operate  along  the  coast  of  Syria51  and  taking  the  other  under  his 
own  direct  control  to  cruise  off  the  harbor  of  Alexandria.  As  long 
as  it  was  doubtful  whether  Mehemet  Ali  would  agree  to  accept 
the  terms  outlined  in  the  separate  act  of  the  Convention  of  Lon- 
don the  Admiral  and  the  Commodore  refrained  from  beginning 
actual  hostilities,  but  after  it  became  known  that  he  had  rejected 
them  they  at  once  adopted  an  aggressive  policy.  The  two  divisions 
of  the  fleet  were  reunited  September  9,  1840,  and  on  the  following 
night  a  landing  of  troops  was  effected  a  few  miles  to  the  north 
of  Beyrout  in  D'Jounie  Bay.52  Two  days  later  Admiral  Stopford, 
in  cooperation  with  Admiral  Bandeira,  who  with  two  Austrian 
frigates  had  joined  the  British  fleet,  sent  a  flag  of  truce  into 
Beyrout  with  a  summons  to  Suleiman  Pasha  (Colonel  Seves),  the 
commander  of  an  army  of  15,000  men  stationed  there,  to  withdraw 
his  troops.  Finding  the  latter's  reply  unsatisfactory,  the  Anglo- 
Austrian  squadron  promptly  opened  fire  upon  the  Egyptian  forti- 
fications within  the  town.53  No  attempt  was  made  immediately  to 
occupy  the  place  but  other  military  and  naval  operations  followed 

Turkish  Steamer  Tairi  Bahri,"  Sept.  5,  1840,  ibid.,  Sept.  30,  1840.  See  also  a 
copy  of  a  letter,  Mehemet  Ali  to  Grand  Vizier,  Sept.  5,  1840,  ibid.,  Journal  des 
Debats,  Oct.  3,  1840.  Minute  of  Interview,  Sept.  5,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence, 
II,  p.  246,  Guichen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  367-368. 

""Admiralty  (in  letters)  5503  Syria,  Palmerston  to  Admiralty,  July  16,  17, 
23,  1840,  cited  by  Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  289.  A.  Jochmus,  The  Syrian  War  and  the 
Decline  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  p.  XXIX. 

"Napier  not  only  intercepted  communications  between  Syria  and  Egypt  but 
also  cooperated  with  British  agents  who  were  encouraging  the  peoples  of  Mt. 
Lebanon  to  attempt  a  new  revolt.  See  Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp.  200-207, 
214-215.  Napier,  War  in  Syria,  I,  pp.  15  ff.  E.  Napier,  Life  and  Correspondence 
of  Admiral  Sir  Charles  Napier,  II,  pp.  6  ff. 

E2Napier  to  Stopford,  Sept.  16,  1840,  Annual  Register,  1840,  pp.  540-541. 
Napier,  War  in  Syria,  I,  pp.  48-54.  Napier,  Correspondence,  II,  p.  26-28. 

63Ibid.,  pp.  37-38.  Napier,  War  in  Syria,  I,  pp.  55-60.  Stopford  to  O'Ferrall, 
Sept.  20,  1840,  Annual  Register,  1840,  pp.  537-539. 


1/8  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [504 

in  rapid  succession  and  it  became  apparent  very  soon  that  the 
allied  forces  were  determined  to  compel  the  Viceroy  to  submit.54 
Reports  concerning  developments  which  resulted  in  the  Near 
East  after  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  London  became  known  there 
began  to  arrive  in  France  late  in  August,  1840.  The  first  of  these 
reports,  serving  merely  to  confirm  the  belief  which  the  French  en- 
tertained in  regard  to  the  attitude  of  Mehemet  AH,  did  not  oc- 
casion much  alarm.  Indeed  for  a  time  it  even  appeared  as  though 
that  in  spite  of  them  the  warlike  feelings  of  the  French  were 
"dying  away."55  The  Bourse  rallied  a  point  and  the  tone  of  the 
Paris  press  became  remarkably  moderate.56  This  period  of  com- 
parative quiet,  however,  was  only  the  calm  before  a  storm.  When 
it  was  announced  early  in  September  that  the  Anglo-Austrian  fleet 
had  cut  off  communications  between  Egypt  and  Syria  and  that  it 
was  preparing  to  engage  in  actual  hostilities  in  case  Mehemet  Ali 
should  not  submit  at  the  end  of  his  twenty  days  of  grace,  a  new 
wave  of  excitement  swept  throughout  the  country.57  The  French 
government,  as  well  as  its  subjects,  was  alarmed,  and  ordinances 
providing  for  the  fortification  of  Paris,58  and  for  calling  the 
classes  of  1834  and  1835  to  the  colors  were  decreed  in  rapid 
succession.59 


"From  the  base  at  D'Jounie  arms  were  distributed  among  the  mountaineers 
and  raids  were  made  into  the  interior.  On  Sept.  26,  1840,  Sidon  was  taken  by 
storm  and  on  Oct.  n  Beyrout  was  occupied;  see  Napier,  War  in  Syria,  I,  pp. 
61  ff.  Napier,  Correspondence,  II,  pp.  38  ff.  Jochmus,  op.  cit.,  p.  17. 

"Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  Sept.  4,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp. 
128-129. 

"See  comment  upon  the  attitude  of  the  French  journals,  The  Times,  Aug. 
22,  25,  26,  27,  Sept.  2,  1840.  Guizot  to  Mme.  Guizot,  Aug.  13,  1840,  De  Witt, 
op.  cit.,  p.  209. 

"Faucher  to  Reeve,  Sept.  13,  1840,  Faucher,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  97-98.  See  also, 
comment  upon  the  attitude  of  the  French  journals,  The  Times,  Sept.  12,  15,  17, 
19,  21,  29,  1840.  Between  September  i  and  September  15  the  French  3%'s 
dropped  from  80.10  to  73.  See  Appendix  A. 

""Louis  Philippe  and  the  Due  d'Orleans  were  strongly  in  favor  of  the  idea 
of  fortifying  Paris.  It  was  said  at  the  time  that  their  attitude  on  this  question 
was  due  to  their  fear  of  a  revolution.  See  Due  d'Orleans  to  Marie-Amelie  [his 
mother]  Aug.  18,  1840,  Flers,  Le  Roi  Louis  Philippe  vie  anecdotique,  pp.  378- 
380.  Metternich,  op.  cit.,  VI,  p.  390. 

*Royal  Ordinances,  Aug.  12-Sept.  16,  1840,  Sept.  2-16,  1840,  Sept.  10-16, 
1840,  Duvergier,  op.  cit.,  XL,  pp.  354-356. 


505]  THE  ISOLATION  OF  FRANCE  1/9 

On  September  18,  1840,  Bulwer,  who  for  several  days  past  had 
been  suspicious  concerning  the  intentions  of  Louis  Philippe  and 
his  ministers,60  called  upon  Thiers  at  his  residence  in  Auteuil.  He 
found  the  latter  "walking  up  and  down  in  a  long  room  or  gallery" 
evidently  much  disturbed.  The  President  of  the  Council,  it  soon 
developed,  had  received  despatches  from  Walewski  announcing 
that  Mehemet  AH,  through  Walewski's  mediation,  had  consented 
to  accept  a  settlement  on  the  basis  of  his  receiving  Egypt  heredi- 
tarily and  Syria  for  life.61  "  Trance,' "  Thiers  declared  after  ex- 
plaining this  news  to  Bulwer,  "  'thinks  these  conditions  reasonable 
and  just.  If  your  Government  will  act  with  us  in  persuading  the 
Sultan  and  the  other  Powers  to  accept  them,  there  is  once  more  a 
cordiale  entente  between  us.  If  not,  after  the  concessions  obtained 
through  our  influence  from  Mehemet  Ali,  we  are  bound  to  sup- 
port him.'  .  .  .  'Vous  comprenez,  mon  cher,  la  gravite  de  ce  que 
je  viens  de  dire!' "  "  'You  know,' "  the  Frenchman  added  later, 
however,  "  'what  I  have  been  saying  to  you'  ...  'is  said  as  M. 
Thiers,  not  as  President  of  the  Council.  I  have  to  consult  my 
colleagues,  the  King  also.  But  I  wish  you  to  understand  clearly 
the  tendency  of  my  own  personal  opinions.'  "62  The  same  day 
Bulwer  reported  to  Palmerston  that  he  was  convinced,  that  M. 
Thiers  had  wished  him  to  understand  that  he  was  anxious  that 
peace  should  be  maintained;  that  with  that  in  view  he  had  done 
all  in  his  power  to  persuade  Mehemet  Ali  to  be  reasonable  in  his 
conditions;  that  he  thought  that  the  terms  which  the  latter  had 
agreed  to  accept  were  reasonable;  and  that  if  they  were  granted 
the  impending  struggle  would  be  avoided.  But  if  they  were  re- 
fused, and  the  execution  of  the  treaty  rigorously  insisted  upon,  he, 
for  his  own  part,  without  giving  any  pledge  to  the  Pasha,  still 
felt  in  a  certain  degree  pledged  towards  him;  and  "that  hewascon- 


*°Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  Sept.  n,  14,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp. 
188-189. 

"See  a  copy  of  a  despatch  Walewski  to  Thiers,  Aug.  29,  1840,  quoted  by 
Haussonville,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  303-307.  This  despatch  must  have  been  one  of 
those  which  Thiers  had  received. 

"Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  324-325.  On  Sept.  25,  1840,  Thiers  declared  to  Lord 
Granville:  "'II  n'a  pas  de  extremite  que  je  ne  braverai  plutot  que  la  France 
soit  humiliee;' " — Granville  to  Palmerston,  Sept.  25,  1840,  Levant  Corres- 
pondence, II,  p.  226. 


iSO  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [506 

vinced,  putting  himself  out  of  the  question,  that  it  would  be  diffi- 
cult, if  not  impossible,  to  form  any  Government  which  would  re- 
main a  perfectly  passive  and  disinterested  spectator  of  the 
measures  to  be  pursued.  Consequently,  that  without  any  decided 
act  of  immediate  hostility,  or  any  positive  declaration  of  war,  such 
a  state  of  things  would  ensue,  as  must,  ere  long,  disturb  the  peace 
of  the  world."63 

The  "  'mysterious  threatening' "  in  which  Thiers  had  indulged 
failed  to  intimidate  the  British  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  "  '. .  .if 
Thiers  should  again  hold  to  you  the  language  of  menace,  however 
indistinctly  and  vaguely  shadowed  out',"  he  replied  to  Bulwer, 
September  22,  1840,  "  'pray  retort  upon  him  to  the  full  extent  of 
what  he  may  say  to  you,.,  .convey  to  him  in  the  most  friendly 
and  unoffensive  manner  possible,  that  if  France  throws  down  the 
gauntlet  we  shall  not  refuse  to  pick  it  up;  and  that  if  she  begins 
a  war,  she  will  to  a  certainty  lose  her  ships,  colonies,  and  com- 
merce before  she  sees  the  end  of  it;. .  .we  should  very  soon  have 
nearly  three  times  the  number  of  ships  that  France  could  put  to 
sea,  and  must,  therefore,  have  the  command  of  all  their  interests 
beyond  sea;  ....  These  considerations  perhaps  might  weigh  more 
with  Louis  Philippe  than  with  Thiers,  but  I  am  inclined  to  think 
that  they  will  weigh  with  somebody  or  other  at  Paris.  However, 
I  may' be  mistaken,  and  the  French  may  either  make  war,  in  spite 
of  their  assurances,  or  commit  some  violent  and  outrageous  act  of 
aggression  against  the  Sultan,  which  the  four  Powers  will  be 
obliged  to  resent;  in  that  case  France  must  take  the  consequences, 
and  her  Government  bear  the  responsibility'."64 

"Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  Sept.  18,  1840,  ibid.,  pp.  196-197.  Bulwer,  op.  cit., 
II,  pp.  428-430.  See  also,  an  extract  of  a  despatch,  Thiers  to  Guizot,  Sept.  17, 
1840,  quoted  by  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  311  ff.  Bulwer  wrote  several  other 
despatches  to  Palmerston  on  Sept.  18,  1840.  In  one  of  these  he  mentioned  that 
he  had  received  "two  or  three  visits  from  a  French  gentleman"  who  was  anxious  to 
arrive  at  some  settlement  of  the  Eastern  question.  "He  came  to  me  today," 
Bulwer  declared,  "and  said  he  had  seen  M.  Thiers,  and  that  he  was  convinced 
that  the  French  Government  would  agree,  moyennant  some  slight  concession,  to 
enter  into  the  Treaty  of  the  I5th  of  July,  and  to  coerce  the  Pasha,  if  he  did 
not  accede  to  the  terms  proposed  to  him.  ...  As  I  know  that  he  has  seen  many 
of  the  Ministers,  and  M.  Thiers  twice  within  these  few  days,  I  think  it  desir- 
able to  give  your  Lordship  the  substance  of  what  has  been  passed  between  us." — 
Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp.  197-198.  See  also,  ibid.,  pp.  199-200. 

"Palmerston  to  Bulwer,  Sept.  22,  1840,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  327-331. 


507]  THE  ISOLATION  OF  FRANCE  l8l 

Many  of  Palmerston's  countrymen,  including  even  some  of  his 
colleagues  in  the  Cabinet,  did  not  agree  with  him.  In  the  latter 
part  of  July,  1840,  it  will  be  remembered,  many  had  doubted  if 
it  would  be  wise  to  ignore  entirely  the  French  protests  against 
'the  Treaty  of  London.  Their  doubts  increased  with  the  passing  of 
time,  and  when  the  excitement  of  the  French  became  intense  in 
September,  1840,  they  became  so  alarmed  that  they*  demanded 
that  the  British  government  should  make  some  concession  in 
order  to  conciliate  its  former  ally.65  "The  more  we  consider  the 
propositions  which  Mehemet  Ali,  by  the  advice  of  France,  has 
been  induced  to  make  to  the  Porte,"  an  editorial  writer  stated  in 
The  Times,  "the  more  we  are  convinced  not  only  that  it  would 
be  madness  to  reject  them,  but  that  they  would  effect  a  more 
advantageous  settlement  of  the  Eastern  question,  even  for  Turkey 
herself,  than  could  be  obtained  by  the  most  complete  success  to 
the  military  operations  of  the  allies,  and  the  utter  discomfiture  of 
the  Pasha.  .  .  .  What  the  real  interests  of  Turkey  require  are 
security  for  her  European  provinces  against  Russia,  and  for  her 
Asiatic  [provinces]  against  Mehemet  Ali,  and  none  can  be  so 
complete  as  the  solemn  guarantee  of  all  the  other  Powers,  France 
included,  and  their  united  determination  to  defend  her  from  all 
aggression.  .  .  .  No  settlement  which  does  not  include  France  can 
be  safe,  satisfactory,  or  lasting.  Despite  the  miserable  insolence 
of  the  French  press  and  of  'Young  France:'  accept  the  mediation 
of  her  Government,  meet  her  half  way,  show  a  disposition,  not  to 
succumb  to  menace  or  defer  to  unreasonable  pretensions,  but  to 
act  in  a  fair  spirit  of  compromise,  with  a  frank  and  friendly  con- 
sideration of  the  feelings  of  the  French  nation  and  we  may  once 
more  return  to  those  relations  of  amity,  the  cordiality  of  which 

8SNote  the  following  extract  from  an  editorial  published  in  The  Times,  Aug. 
31,  1840:  "While  we  are  awaiting  the  events  in  the  East  which  may  give  a 
decided  turn  to  the  policy  of  England,  Russia,  or  France,  it  can  neither  be 
denied  nor  concealed  that  this  country  is  placed  in  the  most  unaccountable 
and  ambiguous  situation  which  was  ever  occupied  by  a  Power  of  first  rate 
magnitude.  ...  in  reality  England  has  been  placed  by  Lord  Palmerston's 
acquiescence  in  M.  de  Brunnow's  contrivance  in  the  position  of  a  second  rate 
Power.  ...  An  accidental  collision  between  a  French  and  English  brig  in  the 
Levant  may  suddenly  bring  down  on  us  a  declaration  of  war  from  France;  or 
the  slightest  indication  of  a  movement  on  the  part  of  Russia  may  require  the 
most  decided  and  rapid  measures  to  prevent  the  occupation  of  Constantinople." 
See  also,  similar  editorials  in  ibid.,  Aug.  29,  Sept.  8,  9,  1840. 


l82  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,  1832-184!  [508 

ought  never  to  have  been  interrupted,  and  on  the  continuation  of 
which  depend  the  peace  of  Europe  and  the  happiness  of  man- 
kind."66 Lord  John  Russell,  who  entertained  similar  opinions, 
wrote  to  Lord  Melbourne,  September  26,  1840,  that  the  whole 
aspect  of  affairs  was  changed  "by  the  language  of  Thiers  on  the 
1 8th."  "We  have  now  to  deal,"  he  stated,  "not  with  the  Pasha, 
but  with  the  Pasha  and  France.  ...  I  have  told  Palmerston  I 
think  we  ought  in  conference  to  tell  our  allies  we  are  ready  to 
accept  Walewski's  conditions,  provided  they  (the  allies)  agree, 
and  the  Syrian  insurgents  have  security  against  vengeance. 

"If  you  and  Palmerston  are  against  this  I  had  much  better 
retire."67 

Those  who  worked  to  secure  a  modification  of  the  terms  of  the 
Treaty  of  London  were  aided  greatly  in  their  efforts  by  the  attitude 


"'Ibid.,  Sept.  29,  1840.  At  an  earlier  date  Guizot  had  induced  Charles 
Greville  to  use  his  influence  in  getting  Barnes,  the  editor  of  The  Times,  to 
adopt  a  pro-French  attitude.  See  Greville  to  Reeve,  Sept.  10,  1840,  Johnson, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  5-7. 

"Russell  to  Melbourne,  Sept.  26,  1840,  Walpole,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  351.  The 
opposition  which  Palmerston  encountered  in  his  "own  camp"  was  formidable 
indeed.  Note  the  following  extract  from  a  letter,  Palmerston  to  Bulwer,  March 
14,  1846:  ..."  We  had  indeed  great  difficulties  to  surmount  in  accomplishing 
our  purpose  [in  1840-1841];  but  although  that  purpose  was  to  rescue  Europe 
from  a  perpetually-recurring  danger  of  war,  and  to  protect  British  interests 
from  injury  by  the  scarcely  disguised  encroachments  of  two  great  foreign 
Powers,  yet,  nevertheless,  the  greatest  difficulties  which  I  had  to  encounter  in 
the  whole  transaction  arose  from  the  unprincipled  intrigues  in  our  own  camp.' " 
Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  323  [footnote].  Palmerston  blamed  in  particular  Ellice, 
Holland,  and  Clarendon.  On  July  27,  1840,  he  wrote:  "  'Thiers  and  Guizot 
are  very  angry,  of  course,  because  they  had  persuaded  themselves  that  the 
English  Cabinet  never  would  be  induced  to  separate  itself  from  France  on  this 
question.  Ellice  had  misled  Thiers;  and  Guizot  had  been  deceived  by  the  foolish 
language  held  out  by  Holland  and  Clarendon,  who  went  talking  away  in  favour 
of  Mehemet  Ali.  However,  the  French  had  some  foundation  for  their  mistake; 
for  when  it  came  to  the  point,  I  found  such  resistance  on  the  part  of  Holland  and 
Clarendon,  and  such  lukewarmness  on  the  part  of  some  of  the  other  members  of 
the  Cabinet,  that  I  sent  in  my  resignation,  .  .  .  The  dissidents  upon  this  with- 
drew their  opposition,  and  the  waverers  came  round  to  my  views.'  " — Palmerston 
to  Temple,  July  27,  1840,  ibid.,  Ill,  pp.  42-43.  See  also  Broughton,  op.  cit.,  V, 
pp.  297-298. 


509]  THE  ISOLATION  OF  FRANCE  183 

which  the  Courts  of  Vienna  and  Berlin  maintained.  Prince  Met- 
ternich,  alarmed  at  the  possibility  of  a  European  war,68  had  for- 
warded to  Paris  on  August  31,  1840,  a  note  suggesting  a  plan 
whereby  France  might  become  reunited  with  the  concert  of  the 
four  Powers.  According  to  that  plan,  France  would  declare  anew 
her  adhesion  to  the  principles  of  the  collective  note  of  July  27, 
1839;  she  would  continue  her  refusal  to  agree  to  the  measures  of 
coercion  which  the  other  Powers  had  decided  upon,  explaining 
that  she  could  not  see  in  them  the  means  of  attaining  with  safety 
the  desired  object  [the  preservation  of  the  Ottoman  Empire] ;  and 
she  would  announce  that  in  case  of  the  failure  of  those  means  she 
then  would  be  ready  to  join  the  four  Powers  and  the  Sultan  in 
considering  "the  most  fitting  means"  for  assisting  the  Porte  and 
that  she  would  be  willing  to  aid  in  carrying  the  latter  means  into 
execution  "according  to  the  circumstances  of  the  moment."69  Met- 
ternich  followed  up  this  communication  to  the  government  of 
France  by  sending  to  it  others  which  were  also  very  conciliatory 
in  character.70  Baron  Werther,  the  Prussian  Prime  Minister, 


"Thiers,  who  must  have  known  of  Metternich's  alarm,  and  probably  wished 
to  encourage  it,  was  particularly  vivacious  in  his  attitude  towards  Apponyi,  the 
Austrian  Ambassador  at  Paris.  See  Metternich,  op.  cit.,  VI,  p.  390. 

""Substance  of  a  communication  stated  to  have  been  made  by  Prince 
Metternich  to  the  French  government;  Beauvale  to  Palmerston,  Aug.  30,  1840, 
Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp.  24.3,  126-127.  Greville,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  282 
[footnote].  Thiers  did  not  reply  to  Metternich's  suggestion.  See  Granville  to 
Palmerston,  Oct.  9,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp.  275-276.  Metternich 
was  in  a  most  difficult  position  it  seems.  His  prestige  both  abroad  and  at  home 
was  damaged.  Within  the  Hapsburg  monarchy  Count  Kolowrat,  Minister  of  the 
Interior,  influenced  probably  by  the  sharp  drop  in  the  Austrian  exchange  and 
the  bad  financial  situation  in  general,  was  leading  the  opposition  to  Metternich 
and  the  treaty  of  July  15.  According  to  Hasenclever,  Metternich  spent  his  time 
in  making  violent  tirades  against  Thiers,  in  warning  against  Russian  land  greed, 
and  in  defending  conservative  principles.  See  Hasenclever,  op.  cit.,  pp.  206-208. 
See  also  Metternich  to  Leopold,  Dec.  5,  1840,  quoted  by  Corti,  op.  cit., 
pp.  135-136. 

"Greville,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  266,  273,  281.  Granville  to  Palmerston,  Sept.  25, 
1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  II,  p.  227. 


184  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-1841  [5IO 

maintained  a  similar  policy.71  He  even  appeared  to  be  much 
pleased,  as  William  Russell,  the  British  envoy  at  Berlin,  reported 
on  September  23,  1840,  by  the  news  of  the  concessions  which 
Walewski  had  persuaded  Mehemet  Ali  to  make,  and  seemed  to 
think  that  a  basis  was  laid  thereby  on  which  a  final  and  satisfac- 
tory settlement  of  the  Oriental  question  might  be  formed.72 

At  a  Cabinet  meeting  held  on  October  i,  1840,  the  members  of 
the  British  ministry  who  were  opposed  to  the  complete  execution 
of  the  July  treaty,  encouraged  by  the  willingness  of  the  Austrian 
and  Prussian  governments  to  make  some  concessions  in  order  to 
conciliate  the  French,  forced  matters  to  a  crisis,  and  it  was  only 
through  the  efforts  of  Lord  Melbourne  that  a  compromise  between 
them  and  Palmerston  was  secured.73  In  that  compromise  the 
latter  consented  to  state  to  the  representatives  of  Austria,  Prussia, 
and  Russia  that  it  appeared  to  Her  Majesty's  government  to  be 
expedient  that  the  four  Powers  should  propose  to  the  government 
of  France  such  a  course  as  was  sketched  out  in  Metternich's  note 
of  August  31,  1840. 

Although  Palmerston  did  agree  to  take  the  step  suggested  by 
Melbourne  it  is  certain  that  he  still  was  determined  to  carry  his 
policy  into  execution.  It  is  probable,  as  Henry  Reeve  has  stated, 
that  he  was  aware  at  the  very  time  when  he  consented  to  make 

"Although  the  Prussian  government  was  anxious  to  preserve  peace  it  became 
so  alarmed  at  the  belligerent  activities  of  Thiers  that  it  also  began  preparing  for 
war.  Furthermore  a  distinct  reaction  to  the  warlike  clamor  in  France  took 
place  throughout  Germany.  It  was  at  this  time  that  Schneckenburger  composed 
the  famous  Die  Wacht  am  Rhein  and  that  Niklas  Becker  wrote  the  popular 
song: 

"Sie  sollen  ihn  nicht  haben,  den  freien  deutschen  Rhein, 
Ob  sie  wie  gier'ge  Raben  sich  heiser  darnach  schrei'n, 
So  lang  er  ruhig  wallend  sein  grimes  Kleid  noch  tragt, 
So  laflg  ein  Ruder  schallend  in  seine  Wagen  schlagt." 

See  Treitschke,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  80  ff.  Metternich,  op.  cit.,  VI,  pp.  465  ff.  Guichen, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  405-410,  413  ff. 

"Russell  to  Palmerston,  Sept.  23,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  II,  p.  229. 

"Walpole,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  354.  For  additional  information  concerning  the 
opposition  to  Palmerston's  policy  which  was  offered  in  Sept.,  1840,  by  certain 
members  of  the  British  Cabinet,  see  ibid.,  pp.  348-349,  352-353;  Sanders, 
Melbourne  Papers,  pp.  474  ff;  Victoria,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  231-232;  Bulwer,  op.  cit., 
II,  pp.  343-344;  The  Times,  Oct.  2,  Dec.  7,  1840;  Greville,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  261, 
263,  265,  267,  271-273,  276,  278-283. 


5ll]  THE  ISOLATION  OF  FRANCE  185 

such  a  proposal  to  the  representatives  of  the  three  Powers  that  at 
least  Brunnow  and  the  Emperor  of  Russia  would  not  concur  in  it, 
and  that  he  agreed  to  it  merely  for  the  purpose  of  gaining  time.74 
It  is  significant  in  this  connection  that  on  October  2,  the  very 
next  day  after  the  compromise  in  the  Cabinet  had  been  arranged, 
the  Morning  Chronicle,  a  journal  under  Palmerston's  influence, 
published  an  extremely  violent  article  against  the  French.75  Fur- 
thermore, it  is  also  worthy  of  note  that  on  October  3,  1840,  the 
British  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  declared  in  a  letter  which  he 
wrote  to  Bulwer  that  "  'If  the  four  Powers  were  to  give  way  to 
the  menaces  of  France,  they  would  soon  be  compelled  to  go  to 
war  with  her  to  resist  her  further  encroachments,  or  they  must  be 
prepared  to  submit  patiently  to  a  succession  of  aggressions  and 
insults.' "  "  'In  short,' "  he  stated  in  the  same  letter,  "  'without 
further  argument,  the  thing  [a  modification  of  the  terms  of  the 
Treaty  of  London]  is  impossible,  unless,  indeed  (which  I  cannot 
suppose),  Mehemet  Ali  was  to  turn  out  to  be  such  a  wonder  of 
the  world  as  to  be  able  to  beat  the  four  Powers  and  the  Sultan 
united.'  "76 

It  was  known  as  early  as  the  second  day  of  October  that  the 
Russian  and  Prussian  plenipotentiaries  would  refuse  to  make  a 
communication  to  France  in  conformity  with  the  British  Cabinet's 
suggestion  "without  reference  to  their  Courts  and  authority  from 
them."77  Nevertheless,  on  October  8,  1840,  Palmerston  sent  to  the 

™Ibid.,  p.  284    [footnote]. 

"Walpole,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  354.  See  a  French  translation  of  the  article  which 
was  published  in  the  Morning  Chronicle  on  Oct.  2,  1840,  in  Journal  des  Debats, 
Oct.  5,  1840.  The  Morning  Chronicle  rendered  invaluable  services  to  Palmerston. 
Note  the  following  extract  of  a  letter,  Melbourne  to  Victoria,  Jan.  17,  1842: 
"Your  Majesty  knows  very  well  that  Palmerston  has  long  had  much  communi- 
cation with  the  Morning  Chronicle  .  .  .  and  has  made  great  use  of  it  for  the 
purpose  of  maintaining  and  defending  his  own  policy.  ...  if  Palmerston  in  the 
Syrian  affair  had  not  had  as  devoted  an  assistant  as  the  Morning  Chronicle,  he 
would  hardly  have  been  able  to  maintain  his  course  or  carry  through  his 
measures."  — Victoria,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  374-375.  See  also,  extracts  copied  from 
the  Morning  Chronicle,  in  The  Examiner,  Sept.  6,  20,  Oct.  n,  25,  1840,  pp.  564, 
595,  641-645,  673;  and  in  the  Journal  des  Debats,  Aug.  I,  16,  Oct.  9,  Nov.  20, 
22,  1840.  See  also,  Laughton,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  122. 

"Palmerston  to  Bulwer,  Oct.  3,  1840,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  332.  See  also, 
Palmerston  to  Granville,  Oct.  5,  7,  1840,  ibid.,  pp.  333-334,  337-338. 

"Melbourne  to  Victoria,  Oct.  2,  1840,  Victoria,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  232-233. 


l86  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-1841  [512 

three  envoys  of  Austria,  Russia,  and  Prussia  formal  notes  iden- 
tical in  character  in  which  he  repeated  the  proposal  he  had  agreed 
to  make  to  them.78  Schleinitz,  the  Prussian  representative,  replied 
on  the  following  day,  and  Neumann,  the  Austrian,  returned  his 
answer  three  days  later.79  Both  announced  that  they  were  without 
instructions  concerning  such  a  question,  and  both  promised  to 
bring  it  to  the  attention  of  their  governments.  Baron  Brunnow, 
who  also  replied  on  October  12,  promised  likewise  that  he  would 
refer  the  matter  to  his  government,  but  the  language  which  he 
used  revealed  very  clearly  that  he  was  convinced  that  it  would  not 
be  received  favorably.80 

While  these  developments  were  taking  place  in  London  re- 
ports from  the  Levant  were  causing  the  excitement  in  France  to 
increase.  A  telegraphic  despatch  which  arrived  at  Paris  on  Octo- 
ber 2  stated  that  "after  a  bombardment  of  nine  days,  which 
had  reduced  the  town  [of  Beyrout]  to  ashes,  the  Egyptians  had 
evacuated  it  at  night  and  the  allies  had  taken  possession."81 
Soon  thereafter  it  became  known  that  the  Porte,  dissatisfied  with 
Mehemet  Ali's  answer  to  the  Sultan's  ultimatum  and  disregarding 
the  representations  of  the  French  agents  at  Constantinople,  had 
issued  a  firman,  September  14,  1840,  decreeing  the  deposition  of 
his  rebellious  vassal  and  the  placing  of  the  ports  of  Syria  and 
Egypt  in  a  state  of  blockade.82  The  Bourse  thereupon  experienced 

"Palmerston  to  Neumann,  Schleinitz,  and  Brunnow,  Oct.  8,  1840,  Levant 
Correspondence,  II,  p.  268. 

"Schleinitz  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  9,  1840;  Neumann  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  12, 
1840,  ibid.,  pp.  293-294,  296. 

^Brunnow  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  12,  1840,  ibid.,  pp.  294-295.  See  also,  Rauch 
to  Nicholas,  I,  Oct.  13,  1840;  Nesselrode  to  Meyendorff,  Oct.  24,  1840,  Nessel- 
rode,  op.  cit.,  VIII,  pp.  51-53,  55-60.  Nesselrode  was  uneasy  about  the  attitude 
of  Austria.  On  Oct.  10,  he  wrote  to  Meyendorff:  "La  nouvelle  de  la  destitution 
de  Mehemet  Ali  a  etc  un  coup  de  foudre  pour  Metternich;  II  a  commence1  a 
faiblir  et  il  n'a  tenu  qu'a  un  cheveu  que  1'Austriche  ne  nous  echappat  com- 
pletement. 

"Les  efforts  de  lord  Beauvale  et  du  comte  Maltzahn  1'ont,  grace  a  Dieu, 
maintenue  dans  nos  rangs,  n'est-ce  pas  curieux  que  ce  soit  le  ministre  de  Prusse 
qui  donne  du  courage  au  chancelier  d'Austriche?" — Ibid.,  p.  49. 

^Journal  des  Debats,  Oct.  3,  1840.   This  report,  of  course,  was  exaggerated. 

"'Ibid.,  Oct.  4,  6,  1840.  Lord  Ponsonby  probably  encouraged  the  Porte  to 
adopt  such  a  policy.  See  Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  Sept.  10,  14,  1840;  Ponsonby 
to  Stopford,  Sept.  17,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp.  230-232,  235-236, 
265.  Soon  after  Palmerston  learned  of  the  action  taken  by  the  Porte  on  Sept. 


513]  THE  ISOLATION  OF  FRANCE  1 87 

a  terrible  panic,  during  which  the  3%s  sank  as  low  as  65.25; 
enthusiastic  crowds  in  the  theaters  sang  the  Marseillaise,83  and  the 
"lower  orders"  exclaimed  in  the  streets :  "  'Guerre  aux  Anglais, 
Us  ont  pris  notre  Beyrout'  which,  from  the  rage  expressed  on  the 
subject  by  the  journals,  they  concluded  must  be  some  town  in 
Normandy  on  the  coast."84 

The  French  government,  on  its  part,  was  aroused  particularly 
because  of  the  deposition  of  Mehemet  Ali.  A  royal  ordinance  was 
issued  at  once  convoking  the  Chambers  to  meet  October  28, 
i84O,85  and  on  October  8,  Thiers  forwarded  to  Guizot  a  note  in 
which  he  declared:  "In  the  opinion  of  France,  the  Viceroy  of 
Egypt,  for  [par}  the  provinces  which  he  governs,  for  the  seas  over 
which  his  influence  extends,  is  necessary  to  secure  the  balance  of 
power  .  .  .  existing  between  the  different  states  of  the  world. 

"Impressed  with  this  conviction,  France,  equally  disinterested, 
with  respect  to  the  Eastern  Question,  as  the  four  Powers  who 
signed  the  protocol  of  September  I/,86  considers  herself  called 
upon  to  declare,  that  the  deprivation  of  the  Viceroy,  if  actually 

14,  1840,  he  sent  instructions  to  Stopford  explaining  that  the  British  ships  of 
war  should  not  enforce  a  commercial  blockade  of  the  ports  of  Egypt  and  Syria, 
and  he  wrote  to  Granville  stating  that  the  British  government  regarded  the 
deposition  of  Mehemet  Ali  only  as  a  measure  of  coercion  which  might  be  with- 
drawn if  Mehemet  should  at  an  early  date  accept  the  conditions  offered  him. 
See  Palmerston  to  Lords  Commissioners  of  Admiralty,  Oct.  6,  1840;  Palmerston 
to  Granville,  Oct.  2,  1840,  ibid.,  pp.  242,  238. 

"Raikes,  France  since  1830,  I,  p.  XLIX,  Mile.  D'Henin  to  Mrs.  Trollope, 
Oct.  8,  1840,  T.  A.  Trollope,  What  I  Remember,  II,  p.  48.  See  also,  Granville  to 
Palmerston,  Oct.  5,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp.  267-268.  Saint-Arnaud, 
Lettres,  I,  pp.  284-285. 

"Raikes,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  XLIX.  See  also,  Follett  to  Croker,  Oct.  6,  1840, 
L.  J.  Jennings,  The  Correspondence  and  Diaries  of  the  Late  .  .  .  John  Wilson 
Croker,  II,  pp.  367-368.  See  also  extracts  from  various  French  papers  quoted 
in  Guichen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  382-383,  395-396. 

85Royal  Ordinance,  Oct.  7-10,  1840,  Duvergier,  op.  cit.,  XL,  p.  405. 

""On  Sept.  17,  1840,  the  plenipotentiaries  of  the  four  Powers  signed  a  pro- 
tocol announcing  that  they,  after  having  exchanged  the  ratifications  of  the  con- 
vention concluded  on  July  15,  had  resolved  "to  declare  formally — 

"That  in  the  execution  of  the  engagements  resulting  to  the  contracting 
Powers  from  the  above  mentioned  convention,  those  Powers"  would  "seek  no 
augmentation  of  territory,  no  exclusive  influence,  no  commercial  advantage  for 
their  subjects,  which  those  of  every  other  nation"  might  not  equally  obtain. — 
Martens,  N.  R.  G.,  XV,  p.  488.  State  Papers,  XXVIII,  p.  348.  Annual  Register, 
1840,  p.  452. 


l88  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184! 

carried  into  execution,  would  in  her  eyes  be  a  blow  to  the  general 
balance  of  power.  The  question  respecting  the  limits  which  should 
separate  in  Syria  the  possessions  of  the  Sultan  and  those  of  the 
Viceroy  of  Egypt  might  be  left  to  the  chances  of  the  war  actually 
begun;  but  France  could  not  abandon  to  such  chances  the  exist- 
ence of  Mehemet  Ali  as  a  vassal  Prince  of  the  Empire.  Whatever 
may  be  the  territorial  limit  which,  in  consequence  of  the  events 
of  the  war,  shall  ultimately  separate  them,  their  two-fold  existence 
is  necessary  to  Europe;  and  France  cannot  allow  the  suppression 
of  either  one  or  the  other.  Disposed  as  she  is  to  be  a  party  to  any 
acceptable  arrangement,  founded  on  the  twofold  guarantee  of  the 
existence  of  the  Sultan  and  of  the  Viceroy  of  Egypt,  she  confines 
herself  at  present  to  declaring,  that,  for  her  part,  she  could  not 
consent  to  the  act  of  deprivation  decreed  at  Constantinople,  being 
carried  into  execution."87 

Guizot  communicated  Thiers'  famous  casus  belli  note  to  Lord 
Palmerston  on  October  10,  1840.  For  the  latter  that  communica- 
tion was  most  opportune.  "The  Cabinet  met  this  afternoon," 
Charles  Greville  wrote  on  the  date  mentioned  above.  "Lord  John 
Russell  was  to  have  taken  the  lead  and  developed  his  conciliatory 
notions,  but  a  new  turn  was  given  to  affairs  by  a  note  which  Guizot 
placed  in  Palmerston's  hands  .  .  .  Palmerston  brought  it  to  the 
Cabinet,  where  it  was  read,  and,  to  the  extreme  surprise  of  every- 
body, it  was  to  the  last  degree  moderate,  and  evincing  a  disposition 
to  be  very  easily  satisfied.  ...  It  would  now  appear  that  the 
French  government  would  be  well  enough  satisfied  if  the  original 
terms  offered  to  Mehemet  Ali  were  still  held  out  to  him,  .  .  . 
Palmerston  began  talking  of  leaving  him  Egypt  for  his  life,  which 
was,  however,  instantly  put  down  by  the  majority.  ...  On  the 
whole  the  result  was  satisfactory;  .  .  .  "88 


to  Guizot,  Oct.  8,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp.  270-272. 
Annual  Register,  1840,  pp.  514-516.  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  505-509.  Thiers  also 
forwarded  to  Guizot  on  Oct.  8,  an  elaborate  answer  to  Palmerston's  note  of 
Aug.  31,  1840.  See  Thiers  to  Guizot,  Oct.  3,  1840,  ibid.,  pp.  487-505,  Levant 
Correspondence,  II,  pp.  276-284.  Annual  Register,  1840,  pp.  517-529. 

^Greville,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  291-292.  See  also,  Melbourne  to  Victoria,  Oct.  10, 
II,  1840,  Victoria,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  237-239.  Lord  John  Russell  was  at  that  time 
on  the  point  of  forcing  a  new  crisis  in  the  Cabinet.  See  Walpole,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp. 
354-357-  Palmerston's  position  then  also  was  strengthened  by  the  publication  of 
his  note  of  Aug.  31,  1840.  See  The  Times,  Oct.  7,  10,  1840. 


515]  THE  ISOLATION  OF  FRANCE  189 

Thiers'  note  was  copied  promptly  by  the  press  and  in  both 
England  and  France  the  public  interpreted  it  as  signifying  identi- 
cally what  the  members  of  the  British  Cabinet  had  taken  it  to 
mean.89  "[It]  indirectly  announces,"  The  Times  stated  on  October 
17,  1840,  "that  the  final  requisition  of  France  in  favour  of  the 
Pasha  will  be  limited  to  that  of  which  none  but  the  shallow  brain 
of  Lord  Ponsonby  would  deprive  him — viz.,  the  possession  of 
Egypt  in  hereditary  sovereignty."90 

It  soon  became  apparent,  however,  that  the  President  of  the 
French  Council  was  imbued  with  far  less  pacific  intentions  than 
his  note  had  led  the  British  Cabinet  and  the  public  in  the  two 
countries  to  believe.91  If  negotiations  were  reopened  at  once  be- 
tween France  and  the  other  Powers,  he  informed  Lord  Granville 
on  October  15,  1840,  he  would  ask  of  the 'Chambers  when  they 
met  only  their  sanction  of  the  expense  which  had  been  theretofore 
incurred  in  putting  France  into  a  state  of  defense,  but  if  no  such 
negotiations  were  entered  into  he  would  then  request  the  granting 
of  supplies  sufficient  for  an  additional  increase  of  the  army  and 
for  the  putting  the  national  guards  "into  activity;"  he  would  recall 
a  considerable  portion  of  the  forces  in  Africa;  and  he  would 
assemble  "several  armies"  ready  to  act  on  the  frontiers.  These 
statements  Granville  reported  immediately  to  Palmerston,  com- 
menting that  they  evidently  were  intended  to  persuade  him  that 
war  was  inevitable  if  the  four  Powers  should  persist  in  refusing 
"to  enter  into  negotiation  with  France  relative  to  the  conditions 
of  peace  between  the  Sultan  and  Mehemet  AH,  and  refuse  to  make 

89The  radicals  in  France  were  highly  dissatisfied  with  the  apparent  modera- 
tion of  M.  Thiers.  See  comment  upon  articles  which  had  appeared  in  the  Com- 
merce, the  National,  and  the  Capitole  in  ibid.,  Oct.  16,  1840.  Raikes,  France 
since  1830,  I,  pp.  LIV-LV. 

wThe  Times,  Oct.  17,  1840.    See  ibid.,  Oct.  20,  1840. 

"In  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  o'n  Nov.  28,  1840,  Thiers  explained  the  mean- 
ing of  his  note  of  Oct.  8,  as  follows:  "La  note  ne  s'est  nullement  expliquee 
sur  la  limite  territoriale.  C'est  avec  intention  qu'elle  a  garde  a  cet  egard  le 
silence;  et  en  vous  1'addressant,  je  vous  ai  positivement  dit  que  le  cabinet,  pour 
son  compte,  n'admettait  pas  les  limites  du  traite  du  15  juillet.  Je  ne  pretends 
pas  que  cela  doive  determiner  aujourd'hui  une  autre  conduite;  mais  il  ne  faut 
pas  attribuer  a  la  Note  un  autre  sens  que  celui  que  je  lui  attribuais  le  8 
octobre." — Journal  des  Debats,  Nov.  29,  1840.  See  also,  accounts  of  speeches 
made  by  Thiers  before  the  Deputies,  Nov.  10,  25,  1840,  in  ibid.,  Nov.  n,  26,  1840. 
Thiers  declared  on  the  25th  that  if  he  had  remained  in  office  he  would  not 
have  permitted  the  execution  of  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  July  15,  1840. 


I9O  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-1841  [516 

concessions  to  obtain  the  concurrence  of  the  French  Government 
in  a  pacific  arrangement."92 

Palmerston,  as  on  former  occasions,  was  not  alarmed  by  Thiers' 
threats.  It  is  true  that  on  October  15,  1840,  he  wrote  to  Ponsonby 
stating  that  it  was  the  opinion  of  the  British  government  that  the 
representatives  at  Constantinople  of  the  four  Powers  should  state 
to  the  Sultan  that  their  respective  courts  recommended  strongly 
"that  if  Mehemet  Ali  should  at  an  early  period  make  his  submis- 
sion to  the  Sultan,  and  should  agree  to  restore  the  Turkish  fleet, 
and  to  withdraw  his  troops  from  the  whole  of  Syria,  from  Adana, 
Candia,  and  the  Holy  Cities,  the  Sultan  should  not  only  reinstate 
Mehemet  Ali  as  Pasha  of  Egypt,  but  should  also  give  him  an 
hereditary  tenure  in  that  Pashalic."93  That  step,  though,  probably 
was  taken  merely  to  satisfy  the  members  of  the  Cabinet  who  en- 
tertained opinions  different  from  those  of  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  in  regard  to  the  danger  of  war  with  France.94  At  any  rate 

*2Granville  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  15,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp. 
313-314.  Annual  Register,  1840,  pp.  529-530.  See  also,  Granville  to  Palmerston, 
Oct.  19,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  II,  p.  319.  On  Oct.  12,  Granville  had 
reported  that  Admiral  Hugon's  fleet  had  been  recalled  from  the  Levant  for  the 
purpose  of  seizing  one  or  more  of  the  Balearic  Isles.  France  would  explain  to 
Spain,  he  believed,  that  war  with  England  appeared  imminent  and  as  Spain  was 
not  strong  enough  to  protect  the  Isles,  it  was  necessary  that  a  French  fleet 
should  do  so.  See  Granville  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  12,  1840;  Palmerston  to  Aston, 
Oct.  15,  1840,  ibid.,  p.  298;  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  339-343.  In  pursuance  of 
his  plans  Thiers  attempted  to  draw  the  chief  Italian  states  into  an  alliance 
with  France.  See  Hall,  op.  cit.,  pp.  310-311. 

*sPalmerston  to  Ponsonby,  Oct.  15,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp. 
311-312.  Martens,  N.  R.  G.,  I,  p.  205. 

"Victoria  to  Leopold,  Oct.  16,  1840,  Victoria,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  242.  Walpole,  op. 
cit.,  I,  p.  358.  Melbourne  wrote  to  the  Queen  on  Oct.  12,  1840:  "The  worst  is 
that  Palmerston,  and  John  Russell,  with  now  the  greater  part  of  the  Cabinet, 
proceed  upon  principles,  opinions,  and  expectations  which  are  entirely  different 
from  one  another,  and  which  therefore  necessarily  lead  to  a  different  course  of 
action.  We  are  anxious  to  finish  the  business  speedily  because  we  fear  that 
there  is  danger  of  the  Government  of  France  being  forced  into  violent  measures 
by  popular  outcry.  Palmerston,  on  the  contrary,  thinks  that  there  is  no  danger 
of  war,  .  .  . 

"We  should  be  too  glad  to  see  the  matter  settled,  leaving  Mehemet  Ali  in 
possession  of  Egypt. 

"Palmerston  has  both  the  wish  and  the  hope  of  getting  him  out  of  Egypt 
as  well  as  Syria." — Victoria,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  240.  See  also,  Palmerston  to  Bulwer, 
Oct.  3,  1840.  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  333. 


5I/]  THE  ISOLATION  OF  FRANCE  19! 

on  October  20  when  Palmerston  replied  to  Granville  he  was 
careful  to  make  no  statement  in  which  hope  that  the  allies  would 
consent  to  grant  Thiers'  demands  could  be  founded.  M.  Thiers 
himself,  he  declared,  could  not  but  see  that  the  threatening  arma- 
ment, which  France  without  any  apparent  cause  had  already 
made,  had  caused  the  difficulties  to  be  solved  to  increase  instead 
of  to  diminish;  "and  if  the  course  indicated  by  M.  Thiers  should 
be  pursued,  and  if  still  more  extensive  armaments  should  be  made 
by  France,"  it  would  "be  impossible  that  Europe  should  not  be- 
lieve, that  .  .  .  the  real  intentions  and  designs  of  France"  were 
similar  to  those  which,  during  the  Republic  and  the  Empire,  had 
arrayed  Europe  in  resistance  to  her  aggressions;  and  thence  would 
follow  a  conviction  that  it  would  be  necessary  to  meet  those  de- 
signs by  the  same  combination  of  defensive  means  which  was 
"then  employed  to  protect  the  liberties  of  Europe."95 

Fortunately  for  the  preservation  of  peace  among  the  great 
Powers  the  exchange  of  warlike  sentiments  between  Palmerston 
and  Thiers  was  not  destined  to  be  continued  further. 

King  Louis  Philippe,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  revealed  to 
Guizot  at  the  conference  held  in  August,  1840,  at  the  Chateau 
d'Eu  that  he  was  anxious  to  avoid  war.  During  the  early  stages 
of  the  agitation  in  France  he  sanctioned  the  military  and  naval 
preparations  advocated  by  his  Cabinet,96  but  he  did  so  believing 
that  the  four  Powers  would  be  baffled  by  effectual  resistance  on 
the  part  of  Mehemet  AH,  that  an  arrangement  between  the  con- 
tending parties  in  the  Levant  would  be  concluded,  and  conse- 
quently that  the  peace  of  Europe  would  not  be  disturbed.97  Fur- 
thermore he  feared  that  if  he  should  attempt  to  oppose  the  clamor 
for  war  he  would  thereby  take  the  risk  of  stirring  up  a  revolution.98 

wPalmerston  to  Granville,  Oct.  20,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp. 
314-315.  Annual  Register,  1840,  pp.  530-531.  See  also,  Palmerston  to  Granville, 
Oct.  8,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp.  268-270. 

"Odilon  Barrot,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  351.  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  p.  384.  Although  the 
King  seemed  to  be  in  accord  with  the  war  party  in  France,  Palmerston  and 
many  others  realized  that  he  would  hesitate  long  before  he  would  consent  to 
engage  in  a  war  with  the  four  Powers.  See  Palmerston  to  Bulwer,  July  21,  1840, 
Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  318.  Greville,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  260-261.  Malmesbury, 
op.  cit.,  I,  p.  122. 

""Greville,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  384.    Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  349-350. 

"Dino,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  345. 


192  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,  1832-184! 

As  time  passed  it  became  apparent  that  the  allies  were  deter- 
mined to  see  their  policy  succeed  and  it  also  became  apparent 
that  revolutionary  ideas  were  spreading  in  proportion  as  the  pop- 
ulace was  becoming  more  and  more  aroused.  The  latter  fact 
became  particularly  obvious  early  in  October  after  it  was  known 
in  France  that  the  Anglo-Austrian  fleet  in  the  Levant  had  bom- 
barded Beyrout.  It  was  at  that  time  that  one  of  the  radical  Paris 
journals,  the  National,  realizing  that  the  King  was  opposed  to  war, 
stated:  "Old  men  and  babblers  are  the  great  scourges  of  a  gov- 
ernment. Old  men  wish  everything  to  be  stationary;  babblers 
prevent  everything  from  moving  on.  This  double  scourge  has 
particularly  afflicted  France.  .  .  .  Elective  governments  are  not 
subject  to  these  grave  evils.  When  a  man  has  served  out  his  time, 
or  age  has  frozen  or  impaired  his  faculties,  he  is  left  in  repose, 
which  is  for  him  at  once  a  necessity  and  a  duty."99  Moreover,  in 
another  column  of  the  same  issue,  "in  direct  juxtaposition  with 
this  article,"  the  editor  of  the  National  took  care  to  point  out: 
"King  Louis  Philippe  this  day  entered  his  69th  year."99  A  few 
days  later,  on  October  15,  1840,  an  attempt  to  assassinate  the 
King  was  made  by  a  revolutionist  named  Darmes.100  Louis 
Philippe,  believing  that  it  was  "la  paix  qu'on  a  voulu  tuer'  in 
him,101  became  alarmed  thoroughly  and  resolved  that  the  warlike 
policy  of  the  government  should  be  abandoned.102  Accordingly, 
when  Thiers  suggested  to  him,  October  20,  1840,  that  he  should 
deliver  at  the  opening  session  of  the  legislative  chambers  an  ad- 
dress breathing  defiance  and  calling  for  additional  means  for  pre- 


"An  extract  from  an  article  published  in  the  National  and  copied  in  The 
Examiner,  Oct.  n,  1840,  p.  648.  See  also,  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  pp.  391-392.  On  Oct. 
7,  1840,  Thos.  Raikes  wrote  from  Paris  to  Wellington:  "The  party  of  the 
National  have  now  begun  their  usual  mode  of  attack,  as  prelude  to  Revolu- 
tion. The  Marseillaise  is  sung  in  the  theatres,  emeutes  are  predicted,  and  the 
United  Societies  are  busy  in  sowing  sedition.  With  external  war  on  one  hand, 
and  internal  war  on  the  other,  the  chances  are  that  we  shall  be  involved  in 
both." — Raikes,  Correspondence,  p.  159. 

wThe  Times,  Oct.  19,  27,   1840.    Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  399-400. 

101Reeve  to  Mrs.  Reeve,  Oct.  18,  1840,  Laughton,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  132. 

102Dino,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  406.  The  attempt  of  Darmes  to  assassinate  the  King, 
which  aroused  others  in  France  beside  the  latter,  was  followed  by  a  reaction 
in  favor  of  peace.  See  an  extract  of  a  letter,  Duchatel  to  Guizot,  Oct.  19,  1840, 
quoted  by  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  402-404. 


519]  THE  ISOLATION  OF  FRANCE  IQ3 

paredness,103  he  refused  to  grant  his  consent.104  Thiers  and  his 
colleagues,  who  for  some  time  had  been  on  the  verge  of  retiring 
from  office,105  resigned  immediately.  The  King,  anxious  to  secure 
a  ministry  which  would  be  willing  to  adopt  a  pacific  policy  in 
regard  to  foreign  affairs,  appealed  again  to  Marshal  Soult.  The 
Marshal  was  not  willing  to  resume  full  responsibility  for  the  con- 
duct of  governmental  affairs,  but  he  did  consent  to  become  the 
nominal  President  of  the  Council  of  a  new  administration,  the  real 
head  of  which  was  to  be  M.  Guizot,  into  whose  hands  Louis 
Philippe  confided  the  portfolio  of  foreign  affairs. 

With  the  fall  of  Thiers  and  the  rise  of  Guizot  it  became 
apparent  that  the  government  of  France  was  resolved  to  make  a 
serious  effort  to  avoid  an  outbreak  of  hostilities  between  itself  and 
the  governments  of  the  other  four  great  Powers  of  Europe  over 
the  question  of  the  enforcement  of  the  Treaty  of  London.  At  the 
same  time,  all  danger  of  war  was  not  removed.  The  French  and 
German  peoples  still  were  greatly  excited;  the  Soult-Guizot  Min- 


1MSee  a  copy  of  the  address  proposed  by  Thiers,  in  ibid.,  pp.  510512. 

10*Louis  Philippe  may  have  been  influenced  to  some  extent  at  that  time  by 
a  threatening  remonstrance  which  Lord  Melbourne  sent  to  him  through  King 
Leopold  of  Belgium.  See  Sanders,  Melbourne  Papers,  p.  487.  At  various  times 
during  the  crisis  of  1840,  attempts  were  made  by  the  Courts  of  both  England 
and  France  to  influence  each  other  by  means  of  communications  carried  on 
through  the  Court  of  Belgium.  See  Louis  Philippe  to  Leopold,  Oct.  10,  Nov.  6, 
1840,  Taschereau,  op.  cit.,  pp.  363-365.  Leopold  to  Victoria,  Oct.  2,  6,  17,  20, 
1840;  Victoria  to  Leopold,  Oct.  13,  16,  23,  1840;  Victoria  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  12, 
1840,  Victoria,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  233-234,  235,  243-245,  241-243,  245,  239.  Greville, 
op.  cit.,  I,  p.  295.  Corti,  op.  cit.,  pp.  117  ff.  King  Leopold  was  very  much 
alarmed  by  the  Near  Eastern  crisis.  On  Nov.  5,  1840,  he  wrote  to  Metternich: 
"  'In  view  of  the  condition  of  social  sickliness  from  which  Europe  suffers,  the 
Communists  regarding  the  bourgeois  as  an  intolerable  burden,  quite  trivial  things, 
alterations  in  the  Treaty  itself,  might  bring  on  a  great  war,  which  would  turn 
into  a  war  of  opinions.  To  confine  it  to  Mehemed  would  be  impossible.  I  do 
not  say  it  in  order  to  strengthen  my  own  proposals,  but,  as  far  as  I  know 
Europe,  I  believe  that  its  entire  social  form  and  organization  would  be  trans- 
formed and  shattered  by  such  a  struggle.'  " — Quoted  by  ibid.,  p.  137.  Two  days 
later  he  wrote  even  more  alarmingly  to  Billow.  See  ibid.,  pp.  133-134. 

105Guizot,  op.  cit.,  V,  p.  383.  Follett  to  Croker,  Oct.  6,  1840,  Jennings,  op. 
cit.,  II,  p.  368.  Dino,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  391,  396.  Raikes,  France  since  1830, 
I,  p.  LII.  Reeve  to  Landsdowne,  Oct.  5,  1840.  Laughton,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  123. 
Malmesbury,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  125-126. 


194  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [520 

istry's  tenure  of  office  was  insecure;106  and  it  remained  to  be  seen 
what  terms,  if  any,  the  Porte  and  its  four  allies  would  ultimately 
consent  to  grant  to  Mehemet  AH. 


10*The  Austrian  Count  von  Beust  was  in  Paris  at  the  time  of  the  formation 
of  the  Soult-Guizot  Ministry.  At  a  later  date  he  stated,  concerning  the '  situa- 
tion in  the  French  capital  on  that  occasion,  that  "the  political  excitement  then 
prevalent  in  Paris  was  great;  the  French  felt  keenly  the  humiliation  they  had 
brought  upon  themselves,  and  Guizot  .  .  .  did  not  lie  on  a  bed  of  roses."  "I 
remember,"  he  continued,  "having  heard  it  said  more  than  once:  //  en  a  pour 
trois  semaines.  But  the  three  weeks  became  seven  years." — Beust,  Memoirs  of 
Frederick  Ferdinand  Count  von  Beust,  I,  p.  33.  For  additional  information  on 
public  opinion  in  France,  and  England  also,  in  October,  1840,  see  Johnson,  op.  cit., 
pp.  8  ff. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE   TURCO-EGYPTIAN   QUESTION   CONCLUDED: 

FRANCE  AND  THE  FOUR  POWERS 

RECONCILED 

The  new  Ministers  in  France  did  not  abandon  immediately  all 
hope  of  being  able  to  secure  a  modification  of  the  terms  of  the 
Treaty  of  London.  The  Powers  ought  to  modify  those  terms, 
Guizot  intimated  to  Palmerston  on  the  day  of  his  departure  from 
London,  in  order  to  satisfy  French  amour-propre  and  in  order  to 
assist  the  French  government  to  maintain  peace.1  Later,  after  he 
had  entered  upon  his  ministerial  duties,  he  made  a  similar  ad- 
vance to  Lord  Granville.  He  suggested  then  that  the  four  Powers 
and  France  should  agree  to  a  suspension  of  hostilities  in  the 
Levant  on  a  certain  date.  According  to  his  plan  the  status  quo 
in  Syria  at  that  particular  time  would  be  the  basis  of  the  arrange- 
ment which  would  be  made  between  the  Sultan  and  the  Viceroy, 
and  if  the  latter  should  be  required  to  give  up  any  Syrian  terri- 
tory which  he  still  retained  he  would  be  compensated  for  it  else- 
where— in  Crete  for  example.2 

Palmerston,  however,  was  no  more  inclined  to  grant  what 
M.  Guizot  pleaded  for  than  he  had  been  to  grant  that  which  M. 
Thiers  had  attempted  to  secure  by  threat  of  armed  intervention. 
"  'We  withstood  the  threats  of  Thiers,' "  he  wrote,  October  29, 
1840,  "'because  what  he  asked  could  not  be  granted  without 
great  injury  to  the  interests  of  Europe;  and  we  cannot  expose 
those  interests  to  injury  out  of  complaisance  to  Louis  Philippe 

Palmerston   to   Granville,   Oct.   27,    1840,   Levant   Correspondence,   II,   pp. 

336-337- 

"Granville  to  Palmerston,  Nov.  6,  1840,  Parl.  Papers,  1841,  Session  2, 
VIII,  Correspondence  relative  to  the  Levant,  III,  pp.  1-2.  See  also,  Granville  to 
Palmerston,  Nov.  13,  1840,  ibid.,  pp.  24-25.  Greville,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  305,  309. 
King  Louis  Philippe  made  similar  suggestions  to  King  Leopold  of  Belgium.  See 
Louis  Philippe  to  Leopold,  Nov.  6,  16,  1840,  Taschereau,  op.  cit.,  pp.  364-366. 
The  King  was  alarmed  greatly  by  the  situation  of  affairs.  Note  the  following 
extract  from  a  letter,  Raikes  to  Wellington,  Nov.  7,  1840;  "His  Majesty  [Louis 
Philippe]  is  become  such  an  ardent  admirer  of  peace,  that,  if  he  were  not  with- 
held by  certain  cogent  apprehensions,  I  believe  he  would  now  not  only  sacrifice 
Egypt  and  the  Pasha,  but  even  Toulon  and  Marseilles,  if  necessary  to  accom- 
plish his  desired  object." — Raikes,  Correspondence,  p.  183.  See  also  Raikes, 
Journal,  IV,  pp.  85-86. 

[195] 


196  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [522 

or  Guizot  any  more  than  out  of  fear  for  Thiers;  ...  if  we  were 
to  give  way,  the  French  nation  would  believe  that  we  gave  way 
to  their  menaces,  and  not  to  the  entreaties  of  Louis  Philippe.'  "3 

Four  days  later  Palmerston  forwarded  to  Paris  a  reply  to 
the  famous  casus  belli  note  of  October  8,  1840.  In  that  reply  he 
went  so  far  as  to  deny  that  the  Pasha  of  Egypt  was  an  essential 
element  of  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe.  It  was  the  opinion 
of  the  Turkish  government,  he  pointed  out,  that  the  continuance 
of  Mehemet  All  in  his  existing  state  of  military  power  and  with 
his  hostile  intentions  towards  the  Sultan  was  "incompatible  with 
the  internal  peace  and  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  and  de- 
structive of  the  independence  of  the  Sultan  as  regards  his  rela- 
tions with  foreign  Powers :...."  The  extent  of  the  limits  within 
which  it  might  be  necessary  to  confine  the  delegated  authority  of 
Mehemet  AH,  in  order  to  make  it  probable  that  for  the  future  he 
would  be  an  obedient  subject,  was  a  point  on  which  opinion 
might  differ.  Her  Majesty's  government  believed  that  whatever 
might  be  the  views  entertained  on  the  subject  by  foreign  Powers, 
such  views  could  only  serve  to  regulate  the  advice  which  those 
Powers  might  tender  to  the  Sultan.  It  remained  with  the  latter, 
as  sovereign  of  the  Turkish  Empire,  to  decide  which  of  his  sub- 
jects should  be  appointed  by  him  to  govern  particular  portions 
of  his  own  dominions,  and  no  foreign  state  had  a  right  to  control 
him  "in  the  discretionary  exercise  of  one  of  the  inherent  and 
essential  attributes  of  independent  sovereignty."4 

M.  Guizot,  who  hoped  that  the  British  government  would  "do 
or  say  something  to  assist  him"  in  his  struggle  against  the  war 
party  in  France,  was  greatly  disappointed  by  Palmerston's  note 
of  November  2,  1840.  The  new  administration's  tenure  of  office, 
it  should  be  remembered,  was  by  no  means  secure,  and  among 
the  Deputies  who  were  finally  convened  on  November  4,  just 
one  day  before  Granville  delivered  the  British  Minister's  note  to 
the  government  of  France,5  the  effect  produced  by  that  commu- 

'Palmerston  to  Granville,  Oct.  29,  1840,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  347. 

*Palmerston  to  Granville,  Nov.  2,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  II,  pp. 
338-340.  Annual  Register,  1840,  pp.  531-533. 

The  first  real  test  of  the  parlimentary  strength  of  the  Soult-Guizot  Ministry 
came  on  Nov.  6,  1840,  when  its  candidate,  M.  Sauzet,  was  elected  President  of 
the  Chamber  of  Deputies.  Sauzet  received  220  votes  while  M.  Odilon  Barrot, 
his  chief  opponent,  received  154.  See  Journal  des  Debats,  Nov.  7,  1840. 


523]  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION  CONCLUDED  197 

nication  was  "markedly  favorable  to  M.  Thiers,"  the  leader  of 
the  opposition.6  "The  note  of  November  2nd,"  Guizot  wrote  to 
Henry  Reeve,  "has  seriously  injured  my  position  and  increased 
the  difficulties  which  surround  me.  ...  I  am  engaged  in  a  great 
struggle  for  the  cause  of  peace,  of  civilization,  of  a  straightfor- 
ward and  moderate  policy.  I  am  striving  for  the  general  good. 
Nothing  shall  discourage  me.  I  do  not  know  if  I  shall  succeed, 
but  if  I  do,  I  shall  owe  no  gratitude  to  anyone;  at  least  I  have 
the  right  to  say  so,  at  present."7 

Even  the  Conservatives  in  England  believed  that  the  position 
taken  by  Palmerston  in  his  famous  note  was  too  uncompromising. 
"It  is  ...  a  subject  of  great  regret,"  The  Times  stated,  Novem- 
ber 13,  1840,  "that  in  Lord  Palmerston's  first  despatch  to  be  laid 
before  M.-  Guizot,  his  Lordship  could  put  forward  no  more 
conciliatory  and  more  straightforward  principles  for  future  agree- 
ment, .  .  .  the  publication  of  this  document  is  certainly  rather 
calculated  to  strengthen  the  suspicions  we  have  already  expressed 
of  Lord  Palmerston's  wilful  opposition  to  every  species  of  con- 
cession than  to  encourage  those  hopes  of  an  amicable  arrangement, 
which  are  so  warmly  and  generally  entertained  in  this  country."8 


'Letter  from  Paris,  Nov.  13,  1840,  The  Times,  Nov.  16,  1840.  Note  also  the 
following  extract  from  the  Journal  of  Thos.  Raikes,  who  was  then  residing  in 
France:  "Nov.  14,  1840  ...  I  am  very  much  afraid  that  this  unfortunate 
note  of  the  2nd,  in  the  papers,  will  undo  all  the  good  that  we  had  hoped  to 
gain  by  the  change  of  Ministry." — Raikes,  Journal,  IV,  p.  90. 

'Guizot  to  Reeve,  Nov.  20,  1840,  Laughton,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  138.  See  also, 
Guizot,  op.  cit.,  VI,  p.  44. 

*The  Times,  Nov.  13,  1840.  In  the  House  of  Commons  Palmerston 
explained  in  the  following  terms  why  he  sent  to  Guizot  his  reply  to  Thiers'  note 
of  Oct.  8,  1840:  "All  I  can  say  is  that  circumstances  prevented  me  from  writ- 
ing that  answer  sooner;  and  it  did  not  appear  to  me  that  the  fact  of  a  change 
of  Government  in  France  was  any  reason  for  preventing  me  from  putting  an 
answer  on  record  to  arguments  which  I  could  not  admit,  and  to  which  it  was 
extremely  important  that  there  should  be  a  recorded  reply." — Parl.  Deb.,  LVI, 
p.  113.  See  also,  Palmerston  to  Bulwer,  Aug.  17,  1841,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp. 
380-381.  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  VI,  pp.  414-415.  Guizot  objected  particularly  because 
Palmerston  permitted  his  note  to  be  published  by  the  public  press.  It  is  prob- 
able that  Palmerston's  purpose  in  so  doing  was  to  combat  the  ideas  advanced 
by  the  "Friends  of  Peace"  who  were  holding  meetings  in  Manchester  and  other 
important  British  cities.  See  Palmerston  to  Fox  Maule,  Oct.  31,  1840,  G. 
Douglas  and  G.  Ramsay,  The  Panmure  Papers,  I,  pp.  19-20. 


198  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-1841  [524 

Palmerston's  note  caused  many  to  doubt  if  the  allies  would 
really  attempt  to  induce  the  Porte  to  reinstate  Mehemet  Ali  in  the 
governorship  of  Egypt.9  Those  doubts,  however,  were  not  destined 
to  be  realized.  On  November  9,  1840,  despatches  from  Vienna 
arrived  at  London,  and  in  them  it  was  intimated  that  Prince 
Metternich  was  in  favor  of  leaving  Egypt  in  hereditary  possession 
to  Mehemet  Ali  on  condition  that  the  latter  should  agree  promptly 
to  submit  to  his  overlord.10  A  day  later  Palmerston  received  a 
note  from  Bloomfield,  the  British  charge  d'affaires  at  St.  Peters- 
burg, announcing  that  Count  Nesselrode  had  decided  to  send  to 
Titow,  the  Tsar's  representative  at  Constantinople,  instructions 
similar  to  those  which  the  British  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs  had 
forwarded  to  Ponsonby,  October  15,  I84O.11  Soon  after  these 
communications  reached  the  English  capital,  on  November  14, 
1840,  the  plenipotentiaries  of  the  four  Powers  signed  a  memoran- 
dum in  which  they  declared  that  their  courts  would  advise  the 
Porte  to  grant  its  pardon  to  Mehemet  Ali  and  to  reinstate  him  in 
the  Pashalic  of  Egypt  provided  that  he,  on  his  part,  should  first 
offer  his  submission  to  the  Sultan.12  Furthermore,  on  the  same 
date  that  the  memorandum  was  signed,  Palmerston  instructed  the 
Lords  Commissioners  of  the  Admiralty  that  they  should  order 
Admiral  Stopford  to  send  a  "competent  officer"  to  Alexandria  to 
demand  from  the  Pasha  the  restoration  of  the  Turkish  fleet  and 
the  evacuation  of  Syria,  Adana,  Candia,  Arabia,  and  the  Holy 
Cities.  The  officer,  he  directed,  should  give  the  Viceroy  three 
days  in  which  to  answer  those  demands,  promising  him  that  in 
case  he  submitted  to  them  the  four  Powers  would  advise  the  Porte 
to  reinstate  him  in  Egypt.  If  the  Viceroy  should  do  as  he  was 
ordered  and  write  an  unsealed  engagement  to  the  Porte  to  that 
effect,  the  former  should  immediately  carry  it  to  Constantinople 
and  present  it  to  the  Ministers  of  the  Sultan,  but  he  should  decline 
to  carry  any  message  in  which  Mehemet  did  not  comply  with  the 
above  named  conditions.13 

*Granville  to  Palmerston,  Nov.  13,  184.0,  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  p.  25. 

10Beauvale  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  28,  1840,  ibid.,  pp.  14-15,  15. 

"Bloomfield  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  31,  1840,  ibid.,  p.  17. 

"Ibid.,  pp.  21-22.   Documents  Diplomatique -s  relatifs  a  la  question  d'Orient. 

"Palmerston  to  Lords  Commissioners  of  Admiralty,  Nov.  14,  1840,  Levant 
Correspondence,  III,  p.  23.  On  the  same  date  Palmerston  forwarded  two  other 
communications  to  the  Lords  Commissioners.  In  one  he  explained  that,  in  case 


525]  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION  CONCLUDED  199 

At  the  time  when  Palmerston  and  the  representatives  of  Austria, 
Prussia,  and  Russia  were  outlining  conditions  which  they  intended 
to  enforce  upon  Mehemet  Ali  the  allied  military  and  naval  opera- 
tions were  being  carried  forward  rapidly  in  the  Levant.  "I  believe 
history  does  not  record  such  unexampled  successes  gained  in  so 
short  a  time  by  so  small  a  force,"  Sir  Charles  Napier  has  stated 
with,  evident  pride  in  his  War  in  Syria.  "We  landed  on  the  loth 
of  September  at  D'Jounie,  with  5300  Turks,  1500  marines,  and 
about  100  Austrians;  by  the  loth  of  October  we  had  managed  to 
storm  and  take  Sidon,  defeat  the  Egyptians  at  Ornagacuan, 
Ibrahim  Pacha  at  Boharsof,  and  .  .  .  between  prisoners  and  de- 
serters, get  possession  of  10,000  men,  had  freed  all  Lebanon,  and 
forced  Ibrahim  to  withdraw  his  troops  from  Tripoli  and  Latakia, 
abandon  the  passes  of  the  Taurus,  and  concentrate  the  whole  of 
his  army  at  Zachle  and  Damascus  [jic]."14 

Soon  after  the  successes  in  upper  Syria,  which  Napier  men- 
tioned, had  been  achieved,  Admiral  Stopford  received  orders  from 
England  to  the  effect  that  the  allied  fleet  should  attack  the  famous 
fortress  of  St.  Jean  d'Acre.15  Accordingly  on  the  afternoon  of 
November  3,  1840,  a  heavy  bombardment  of  the  place  was  begun. 
The  firing  of  the  British,  Austrian,  and  Turkish  gunners  must  have 
been  very  effective  indeed.  Great  confusion  resulted  immediately 
among  the  defenders;  at  about  4  p.  m.,  the  fort's  magazine  blew 
up,  and  before  nightfall  practically  all  of  the  shore  batteries  were 
silenced.  The  Egyptians,  realizing  that  they  would  not  be  able  to 
continue  successfully  the  defense  of  their  positions,  withdrew  forth- 
with under  cover  of  darkness,  and  on  the  morning  of  November 
4,  forces  from  the  fleet  took  possession  both  of  the  fortress  and 
of  the  town.16 

Mehemet  Ali,  in  his  written  engagement  to  the  Porte,  should  express  a  desire 
that  he  should  be  given  the  hereditary  possession  of  Egypt,  the  officer  should 
not  on  that  account  refuse  to  carry  it  to  Constantinople.  In  the  other  he 
ordered  that  Stopford  should  push  forward  with  vigor  the  military  and  naval 
operations  on  the  coasts  of  Syria  and  Egypt  until  he  heard  from  Constantinople 
that  an  arrangement  had  been  made  with  Mehemet  Ali.  See  ibid.,  p.  24. 

"Napier,  War  in  Syria,  I,  p.  173. 

"Ibid.,  p.  1 86. 

"Stopford  to  O'Ferrall,  Oct.  31,  Nov.  4,  8,  1840,  Annual  Register,  1840,  pp. 
546-549.  Ibid.,  pp.  [i92]-[i93].  Napier,  War  in  Syria,  I,  pp.  197  ff.  Napier, 
Correspondence,  II,  pp.  93  ff.  Barker,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  238-239.  Paton,  op.  cit., 
II,  p.  196. 


2OO  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [526 

The  victory  of  the  allies  at  Acre  was  in  reality  the  most  impor- 
tant event  of  all  the  military  and  naval  operations  in  the  Levant 
during  the  war  of  1840.  Before  the  date  of  that  victory  Mehemet 
AH  had  declared  persistently  that  he  would  not  submit  unless  his 
overlord  granted  to  him,  in  tenure  for  life  at  least,  the  whole  of 
Syria  as  well  as  the  hereditary  possession  of  Egypt.17  But,  on 
November  n,  1840,  two  days  after  the  fall  of  Acre  had  been 
announced  at  Alexandria,18  he  wrote  to  the  King  of  the  French 
stating  that  he  would  "be  satisfied"  if  he  were  granted,  in  addition 
to  Egypt,  only  the  Pashalic  of  Acre.19  Ten  days  later  a  British 
fleet  of  six  sail  of  the  line  under  command  of  Commodore  Napier 
took  up  a  position  off  the  harbor  of  the  Egyptian  metropolis.20 
This  threatening  move  on  the  part  of  his  opponents  added  to  what 
had  taken  place  previously  must  have  convinced  the  Pasha  thor- 
oughly that  any  further  resistance  on  his  part  would  be  useless, 
for  when  Napier  suggested  to  him  that  he  should  agree  to  accept 
terms  which  would  be  in  harmony  with  the  ideas  advanced  by 
Lord  Palmerston,  in  his  note  of  October  15,  1840,  to  Ponsonby, 
he  did  not  object  to  following  such  a  course.21  In  fact  on  Novem- 
ber 27,  1840,  he  even  signed  with  the  British  Commodore  a  con- 
vention in  which  he  engaged  to  order  his  son  Ibrahim  to  proceed 
at  once  to  the  evacuation  of  Syria  and  promised  to  restore  the 
Ottoman  fleet  to  the  Sultan  as  soon  as  he  should  receive  official 
notification  that  the  Sublime  Porte  had  granted  to  him  the  hered- 
itary government  of  Egypt,  which  concession  was  to  be  and  remain 

"Letter    from  Alexandria,  Oct.  28,  29,  1840,  The  Times,  Nov.  12,  n,  1840. 

"Letters  from  Alexandria,  Nov.  9,  1840,  ibid.,  Dec.  I,  1840. 

^Levant  Correspondence,  III,  pp.  92-93.  According  to  an  Austrian  report 
from  Alexandria,  Nov.  15,  1840,  Mehemet  AH  was  ready  to  offer  his  complete 
submission,  but  Cochelet  and  Walewski,  who  had  returned  to  Egypt  after  his 
failure  to  induce  the  Porte  to  accept  the  Viceroy's  terms,  had  influenced  him  to 
refrain  from  doing  so.  See  ibid.,  pp.  98-100.  See  also  Letter  from  Alexandria, 
Nov.  u,  1840,  The  Times,  Dec.  I,  1840. 

*°Napier,  Correspondence,  II,  p.  103.  Napier,  War  in  Syria,  I,  p.  249.  A 
smaller  British  squadron  had  been  stationed  off  Alexandria  for  some  time.  See 
The  Times,  Nov.  2,  II,  17,  1840. 

"Napier  received  a  copy  of  Palmerston's  note  of  Oct.  15,  1840,  on  the  day 
that  he  arrived  off  Alexandria.  See  Napier,  War  in  Syria,  I,  pp.  249-252.  His 
correspondence  with  Mehemet  AH  began  on  Nov.  22,  1840.  For  the  letters 
which  were  interchanged  see  ibid.,  pp.  254  ff.  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  pp. 
72-81.  The  Times,  Dec.  15,  1840. 


527]  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION  CONCLUDED  2OI 

"  'guaranteed  by  the  Powers.' "  Napier,  in  turn,  engaged  "  'to 
suspend  hostilities  on  the  part  of  the  British  forces  against  Alex- 
andria, or  any  other  portion  of  the  Egyptian  territory/ "  and 
promised  that  the  Egyptian  army  should  "  'have  the  liberty  of 
retiring  from  Syria  with  its  artillery,  arms,  horses,  ammunition, 
baggage,  and  in  general  everything'  "  that  constituted  "  'the  stores 
of  an  army.'  "22 

It  is  true  that  Commodore  Napier  and  Mehemet  Ali  were  able 
thus  to  agree  upon  an  arrangement  which  seemed  to  settle  the 
most  important  problems  at  issue  in  the  Levant.  But  Napier  in 
his  negotiations  with  the  Viceroy  had  acted  without  instructions 
either  from  the  British  Cabinet  or  from  Admiral  Stopford,  his 
superior  in  command.23  When  Stopford  learned  of  the  existence 
of  the  convention  of  November  27,  1840,  he  was,  to  say  the  least, 
greatly  dissatisfied.  "  'I  am  sorry',"  he  stated  in  a  letter  to  the 
Commodore,  December  2,  1840,  "  'to  say  that  I  cannot  ratify,  or 
approve  of  this  measure:  setting  aside  the  unauthorized  manner 
and  the  unnecessary  haste  with  which  so  important  a  document 
was  executed,  with  the  Commander-in-Chief  within  two  days'  sail 
of  you,  the  articles  of  that  Convention,  if  carried  into  execution, 
in  the  present  state  of  affairs  in  Syria,  would  be  productive  of 
much  more  evil  than  good,  and  occasion  much  embarrassment.'  "24 

On  the  same  date  when  Stopford  wrote  to  Napier  disapproving 
of  the  arrangement  of  November  27  he  also  wrote  similarly  to 
Mehemet  Ali.25  Soon  thereafter,  however,  he  received  from  Lon- 
don copies  of  the  memorandum  of  November  14,  1840,  and  the 
instructions  which  Palmerston  had  directed  the  Lords  Commis- 
sioners of  the  Admiralty  to  forward  to  him.  The  admiralty  instruc- 
tions, it  will  be  remembered,  provided  for  the  sending  of  an  officer 
to  Alexandria  with  the  purpose  of  persuading  the  Pasha  to  consent 
to  accept  terms  which  resembled,  in  some  respects  at  least,  those 
defined  in  the  Napier  convention.  Hence  it  was  necessary  for 
Stopford  to  adopt  a  policy  similar  to  the  one  which  he  had  just 
condemned. 

"Ibid.,  Martens,  A'.  R.  G.,  XV,  p.  489.  Napier,  War  in  Syria,  I,  pp.  282- 
283.  Laurent,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  202-205. 

^For  Napier's  explanation  of  his  conduct,  see  Napier,  War  in  Syria,  I,  pp. 
253-254. 

"Ibid.,  II,  pp.  3-4. 

KIbid.,  pp.  H-I2. 


2O2  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [528 

Captain  Fanshawe,  the  officer  whom  the  Admiral  chose  to  carry 
out  his  instructions,  set  out  on  his  mission  December  6,  i84o,26 
and  arrived  at  Alexandria  two  days  later.  He  found  the  Viceroy 
dissatisfied  because  of  Stopford's  refusal  to  ratify  the  convention 
of  November  27,  but  unwilling,  nevertheless,  to  refuse  to  comply 
with  the  modified  British  demands.27  Accordingly,  on  December 
II,  1840,  after  a  very  brief  period  of  negotiation,  the  Captain 
received  from  His  Highness  an  unsealed  letter  to  the  Porte  in 
which  Mehemet  AH  announced  his  "most  humble  submission"  to 
his  overlord  and  declared  that  on  the  receipt  of  a  firman,  making 
known  in  what  manner  it  should  please  His  Imperial  Majesty  that 
the  fleet  should  "be  delivered  up  and  despatched"  from  Alexan- 
dria, he  would  hasten  to  conform  to  the  sovereign  will  by  carrying 
that  firman  into  execution.  Furthermore,  as  he  was  ready  to 
withdraw  all  of  the  Egyptian  authorities  who  were  "in  the  Island 
of  Candia,  in  the  Hedjaz,  and  in  the  two  Holy  Cities,  on  the 
arrival  of  His  Imperial  Majesty's  firman  in  that  respect,"  the 
above  mentioned  places  would  be  evacuated  without  delay.28 
Fanshawe,  believing  that  this  letter  met  the  demands  outlined  in 
the  instructions  which  Stopford  had  passed  on  to  him,  returned 
immediately  to  the  fleet,  and  "after  delivering  the  Pacha's  reply 


Z6See  Instructions  for  Fanshawe  on  his  Mission  to  Alexandria,  Dec.  6,  1840, 
ibid.,  pp.  316-317.  The  most  important  difference  between  the  terms  which 
Napier  had  promised  to  the  Pasha  and  those  which  Fanshawe  was  about  to 
suggest  lay  in  the  fact  that  in  the  latter  terms  it  was  not  guaranteed  that  the 
Sultan  would  grant  to  Mehemet  AH  the  hereditary  possession  of  Egypt. 

27For  accounts  of  Fanshawe's  negotiations  at  Alexandria,  see  Fanshawe  to 
Stopford,  Dec.  12,  1840,  ibid.,  pp.  21-27.  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  pp.  124- 
126.  Larking  to  Palmerston,  Dec.  22,  1840,  ibid.,  pp.  128-129.  Letters  from 
Alexandria,  Dec.  9,  12,  1840.  The  Times,  Dec.  29,  1840.  It  appears  that  in 
Nov.,  1840,  Guizot  sent  a  despatch  to  Cochelet  ordering  him  to  advise  the 
Viceroy  to  submit  to  the  terms  outlined  in  the  memorandum  of  Nov.  14,  1840, 
and  that  that  despatch  reached  Alexandria  before  the  date  of  the  negotia- 
tions between  Fanshawe  and  Mehemet  Ali.  See  Granville  to  Palmerston,  Nov. 
20,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  p.  35.  Metternich  to  Sainte-Aulaire,  Dec. 
30,  1840,  Metternich,  op.  cit.,  VI,  p.  428. 

^Mehemet  Ali  to  Grand  Vizier,  Dec.  n,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  III, 
pp.  148-149.  Napier,  War  in  Syria,  II,  pp.  29-31.  See  also,  Mehemet  Ali  to 
Muhafiz  of  Candia,  Dec.  n,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  pp.  150-151. 


529]  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION  CONCLUDED  2C>3 

to  the  Admiral,"  proceeded  with  Mehemet  Ali's  submissive  com- 
munication to  Constantinople.29 

On  December  18,  1840,  soon  after  the  British  Captain  arrived 
at  the  Ottoman  capital,  he  had  an  interview  with  the  Grand  Vizier 
during  which  he  narrated  the  chief  events  of  his  mission  to  the 
Egyptian  metropolis,  and  delivered  up  Mehemet  Ali's  letter  of 
December  n.  In  his  reply  the  Turkish  Minister  avoided  prom- 
ising that  the  Viceroy  would  be  pardoned  and  reinstated  in  the 
governorship  of  Egypt.  The  question  at  issue,  he  declared,  was 
one  of  foreign  policy,  belonging  entirely  to  the  department  of 
foreign  affairs.  The  Porte  would  take  it  into  consideration  with 
the  representatives  of  the  allied  Courts,  and  His  Excellency  the 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  would  make  known  the  intentions  of 
the  Porte.  At  the  same  time  he  did  not  hesitate  to  reveal  the 
sentiments  which  he  personally  entertained.  When  Fanshawe 
spoke  about  the  conclusion  of  peace  he  exclaimed:  "'Peace  is 
made  between  two  Governments,  and  not  between  a  Soverign  and 
one  of  his  rebel  subjects.'  "  "  'The  fleet  is  ours;' "  he  declared  on 
another  occasion  during  the  interview,  "  'Alexandria  is  our  coun- 
try; we  are  perfectly  sure  of  having  the  fleet  sooner  or  later.'"30 

Although  the  Ministers  of  the  Sultan,  encouraged  by  Lord  Pon- 
sonby,  probably  did  hope  to  secure  the  complete  ruin  of  the 
Pasha31  they  hesitated  to  take  any  further  action  without  being 
assured  of  the  cooperation  of  their  sovereign's  allies.  Therefore,  on 
December  20,  1840,  in  accordance  with  the  Grand  Vizier's  promise 
to  Captain  Fanshawe,  Reschid  Pasha,  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  called  together  the  representatives  of  Austria,  Great 
Britain,  Prussia,  and  Russia,  and  after  mentioning  that  the  Porte 
had  received  copies  of  Mehemet  Ali's  letter  dated  December  u, 

"Napier,  War  in  Syria,  II,  p.  28.  See  also,  Mehemet  AH  to  Stopford  [no 
date  given],  ibid.,  pp.  20-21.  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  p.  130. 

•  30Pisani  to  Ponsonby,  Dec.  18,  1840;  Fanshawe  to  Stopford,  Dec.  18,  1840, 
ibid.,  pp.  136-137,  168.  Napier,  War  in  Syria,  II,  pp.  33-35. 

31See  a  copy  of  a  despatch  which  the  Porte  forwarded  to  Chekib  Effendi, 
Dec.  8,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  pp.  115-116.  Both  Lord  Ponsonby 
and  the  Ottoman  Ministers  condemned  Napier's  convention.  See  Ponsonby  to 
Palmerston,  Dec.  8,  15,  1840,  ibid.,  pp.  112,  134-135.  Ponsonby  to  Napier,  Dec. 
7,  1840,  Napier,  War  in  Syria,  II,  pp.  7-8,  12. 


2O4  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-1841  [530 

1840,  and  the  memorandum  dated  November   14,    1840,  asked 
them  if  the  Pasha  by  his  letter  had  complied  with  the  spirit  of  the 
memorandum  and  if  his  submission  ought  to  be  considered  as 
real.    Lord  Ponsonby  replied  evasively  that  it  belonged  to  the 
Sultan  alone  to  decide  this  point.    "I  have  precise  orders,"  he 
declared,  "to  advise  the  Porte  to  grant  [the]  hereditary  succession 
to,  Mehemet  Ali,  so  soon  as  it  shall  apprize  us  that  the  Sultan  is 
satisfied  with  the  submission  of  Mehemet  Ali;  but  such  advice  can 
only  be  conditional;  I  have  not  the  right  to  judge  of  the  reality 
of  the  submission,  and  I  must  wait,  before  giving  it,  for  the  Sultan 
to  pronounce  himself  on  the  fact  of  the  submission."   "I  declare," 
he  continued  later,  "that,  in  my  opinion,  Mehemet  Ali  has  now 
no  right;  that  the  Sultan  is  master  to  take  the  course  which  he 
shall  consider  fitting,  and  that  we  can  only  afford  him  our  ad- 
vice." The  representatives  of  the  three  eastern  Powers,  taking  a 
different  stand  concerning  the  question,  intimated  that  the  Porte 
should  trust  Mehemet  Ali  and  act  with  moderation  towards  him. 
"The  letter  is  a  commencement  of  submission,"  the  Internuncio 
of  Austria  stated.  "If  the  Sublime  Porte  demands  the  delivery  of 
the  fleet,  if  Mehemet  Ali  restores  it,  and  if  he  evacuates  the  coun- 
tries specified  in  the  Memorandum,  his  submission  will  certainly 
be  then  complete."32 

The  difference  of  opinion  existing  between  Ponsonby  and  the 
other  allied  diplomats,  which  was  revealed  at  the  conference  held 
on  December  20,  must  have  encouraged  Reschid  Pasha  and  his 
colleagues,  who  wished  to  enforce  severe  terms  upon  the  Viceroy, 
to  hope  for  ultimate  success.  Nevertheless,  they  were  careful  to 
make  it  appear  that  the  Porte  was  ready  to  act  in  accord  with  the 
policy  outlined  in  the  memorandum  of  November  14,  1840.  "His 
Imperial  Majesty,"  Reschid  Pasha  informed  Ponsonby,  December 
27,  "wishing  to  prove  by  a  fresh  act  the  moderation  of  his 
sentiments,  is  disposed  to  accept  the  submission  of  Mehemet  Ali, 
and  only  awaits  the  fulfilment  of  the  conditions  imposed  upon 

"Protocol  of  the  Conference  held  at  the  House  of  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  of  the  Sublime  Porte,  the  20th  of  December,  1840,  between  the  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  on  one  part,  and  the  representatives  of  Austria,  Great 
Britain,  Prussia,  and  Russia,  on  the  other,  ibid.,  pp.  318-329.  Levant  Corres- 
pondence, III,  pp.  140-144.  N.  Bordeano,  L'Egypte  d'apres  les  traites  de  1840- 

1841,  pp.  47-55. 


53  I  ]  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION  CONCLUDED  2O5 

him  by  the  Memorandum  of  the  I4th  of  November,  to  consider 
that  submission  as  complete,  and  to  confirm  Mehemet  Ali  in  the 
Pashalic  of  Egypt. 

"With  the  view  of  hastening  that  fulfilment,  and  of  thus  prov- 
ing more  clearly  his  desire  to  lend  himself,  as  far  as  is  in  his 
power,  to  the  views  of  his  august  Allies,  the  Sultan  has  decided 
that  Yaver  Pacha  (Admiral  Walker)  and  Mazloum  Bey  shall 
proceed  immediately  to  Egypt  as  his  Commissioners  to  receive 
the  Ottoman  fleet,  and  to  ascertain  that  the  places  described  in 
the  Memorandum  of  the  I4th  of  November  are  evacuated  by  the 
troops  of  Mehemet  Ali."33 

In  the  meantime  the  danger  of  a  war  breaking  out  between 
France  and  the  four  Powers  because  of  the  execution  of  the  treaty 
of  July  15,  1840,  had  practically  disappeared.  It  is  true  that  the 
situation  in  France  remained  uncertain  for  some  time  after  the 
resignation  of  Thiers  and  his  colleagues.34  The  press,  with  very 
few  exceptions,  continued  its  demand  for  the  adoption  of  an 
aggressive  policy,35  and  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  the  radicals 
were  able  to  carry  on  a  formidable  struggle  with  those  who  de- 
fended the  policy  of  the  Soult-Guizot  administration.36  Never- 
theless, it  became  apparent  before  the  close  of  the  month  of 


"Rechid  Pasha  to  Ponsonby,  Dec.  27,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  III, 
p.  156.  Napier,  War  in  Syria,  II,  pp.  39-40.  Bordeano,  op.  cit.,  pp.  56-57. 
Guichen,  op.  cit.,  p.  461. 

**On  Nov.  6,  1840,  Henry  Reeve,  who  was  familiar  with  conditions  in 
France,  wrote  to  Lansdowne:  'The  French  Government  is  on  the  slope  of 
revolution;  the  silence,  the  morne  attitude  of  the  populace  yesterday  at  the 
opening  of  the  Chambers,  is  the  most  frightful  of  all  symptoms  in  France;  it 
accompanied  Louis  XVI  from  Versailles  and  from  Varennes;  it  followed 
Charles  X  to  Cherbourg." — Laughton,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  135.  See  also  Reeve  to  Mrs. 
Reeve,  Nov.  7,  1840,  ibid.,  pp.  136-137. 

"See  extracts  copied  from  the  National  and  Univers,  in  The  Times,  Nov. 
2,  1840.  See  also  ibid.,  Nov.  5,  6,  Dec.  9,  1840.  On  Nov.  3  The  Times  stated: 
"...  up  to  the  present  moment  the  Journal  des  Debats  is  the  only  newspaper 
published  in  Paris  that  defends  the  new  Ministry." 

"For  summaries  of  the  exciting  debates  in  the  French  Chambers  during  the 
latter  part  of  November  and  the  early  part  of  December,  see  Journal  des  Debats, 
Nov.  19,  26,  27,  28,  29,  Dec.  i,  2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  1840.  On  Dec.  5,  1840,  a  pacific 
address  to  the  King  was  adopted  by  the  Deputies  by  a  vote  of  247-161.  Sum- 
maries of  the  French  debates  will  also  be  found  in  The  Times.  A  discussion  of 
them  will  be  found  in  Guichen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  451  ff. 


2O6  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [532 

November  that  Louis  Philippe's  new  Cabinet,  supported  mainly 
by  elements  determined  to  avoid  war,  was  gaining  ground.37  After 
news  of  the  decisive  engagement  fought  at  Acre  on  November  3, 
1840,  reached  western  Europe,38  Palmerston's  British  critics  even 
recognized  that  fact  and  admitted  that  the  policy  which  the 
Queen's  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  his  allies  had  adopted, 
and  which  he  and  the  Russian  Ministers  had  refused  obstinately 
to  abandon,39  was  sure  to  triumph.  "From  all  that  has  now  been 
said  and  published,"  Henry  Reeve  wrote  to  Charles  Greville, 
November  24,  1840,  "it  results  that  I,  for  one,  have  been  in  great 
part  mistaken;  mistaken  as  to  the  danger  of  Russian  interference, 
mistaken  as  to  the  result  of  the  operations  in  Syria,  and  mistaken 
as  to  the  real  policy  and  feeling  of  France."40  Greville,  who  enter- 
tained opinions  similar  to  those  of  Reeve,  wrote  in  his  journal, 
December  4,  1840:  "In  the  course  of  the  last  three  weeks,  .  .  . 
a  mighty  change  has  taken  place;  we  have  had  the  capture  of 
St.  Jean  d'Acre  and  the  debate  in  the  French  Chambers.  Palm- 
erston  is  triumphant;  everything  has  turned  out  well  for  him.  .  .  . 
His  colleagues  have  nothing  more  to  say;  and  as  Guizot  makes  a 
sort  of  common  cause  with  him  in  the  Chamber  [of  Deputies], 
and  Thiers  makes  out  a  case  for  himself  by  declaring  objects  and 
designs  which  justify  Palmerston's  policy  and  acts,  and  as  the 
Pasha  is  now  reduced  to  the  necessity  of  submission,  the  contest 
is  at  an  end."41 


37See  Reeve  to  Mrs.  Reeve,  Nov.  13,  1840,  Laughton,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  137.  The 
decline  in  the  strength  of  the  French  war  party  became  still  more  obvious  in 
Dec.,  1840.  That  party  hoped  to  be  able  to  make  a  great  demonstration  when 
Napoleon's  body  was  brought  to  Paris.  But  their  efforts  to  do  so,  when  the 
event  occurred,  Dec.  15,  1840,  failed  miserably.  See  Journal  des  Debats,  Dec. 
16,  1840,  The  Times,  Dec.  18,  1840.  The  Examiner,  Dec.  27,  1840.  Guizot,  op. 
cit.,  VI,  p.  19.  Malmesbury,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  128. 

38See  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  VI,  p.  47.  Disraeli  to  Disraeli,  Nov.  21,  1840,  W.  F. 
Monypenny,  The  Life  of  Benjamin  Disraeli,  II,  p.  96. 

39Palmerston  to  Bloomfield,  Nov.  26,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  p.  35. 

40Laughton,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  140.  See  also  Reeve  to  Greville,  Nov.  29,  1840, 
Johnson,  op.  cit.,  p.  48. 

"Greville,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  308-309.  On  Nov.  15,  1840,  Palmerston  wrote  to 
Granville:  "  'Remusat  has  let  the  cat  out  of  the  bag  by  declaring  that  France, 
in  protecting  Mehemet  Ali,  meant  to  establish  a  new  second-rate  maritime 
Power  in  the  Mediterranean,  whose  fleet  might  unite  with  that  of  France  for 


533]  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION  CONCLUDED  2O7 

The  dangerous  stages  of  the  crisis  of  1840,  in  fact,  had  been 
passed  by.  The  French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  however,  was 
not  satisfied  merely  to  prevent  war  from  breaking  out  between  his 
country  and  the  four  Powers  which  had  signed  the  convention  of 
July  15,  1840.  In  addition,  he  was  anxious  to  discover  some  means 
by  which  France  might  escape  from  her  isolated  position  and 
secure  a  reestablishment  of  the  concert  of  the  five  Powers.  When 
he  entered  office,  be  it  remembered,  he  had  hoped  to  secure  this 
end  through  a  modification  of  the  terms  which  the  four  Powers 
had  taken  steps  to  enforce  upon  the  Viceroy.  He  clung  to  that 
idea  for  some  time  even  after  Granville  had  communicated  to  him 
Palmerston's  note  of  November  2.42  Late  in  November,  with 
that  idea  still  in  view,  he  sent  Baron  Mounier  upon  an  unofficial 
mission  to  England  to  observe  "la  disposition  des  esprits,"  to  talk 
freely  with  men  of  affairs,  and  to  estimate  thus  without  prejudice 
"the  chances  for  the  future."43  At  London  the  Baron  found  "the 
most  sincere  partisans  of  peace"  convinced  that  it  would  be  neces- 
sary for  Mehemet  Ali  to  submit  to  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of 
July  15." 

After  Guizot  had  received  from  Mounier  reports  concerning  the 
attitude  of  the  British  and  after  he  had  learned  of  the  fall  of  Acre, 
he  finally  gave  up  all  hope  of  securing  a  modification  in  the  terms 

the  purpose  of  serving  as  a  counterpoise  to  that  of  England.  That  is  plain- 
spoken,  at  all  events. 

"  'If  the  French  scheme  for  the  Levant  had  succeeded,  we  should  infallibly 
have  had  war  before  long,  and  growing  out  of  those  very  affairs  on  which  we 
should  have  made  concessions  in  order  to  preserve  peace.  The  moral  and  diplo- 
matic contest  we  have  had  with  France  now  will  probably  tend  to  keep  the  two 
nations  without  war  for  some  years  to  come.' "  Twelve  days  later  he  wrote: 
"  'This  is  indeed  glorious  news  from  Syria;  and  our  fleet  has  maintained  its  old 
reputation.  This  exploit  [the  capture  of  Acre]  must  settle  the  Eastern 
question,  .  .  . 

"  This  result  will  also  render  Guizot's  task  more  easy;  for  nobody  can 
think  in  France  of  going  to  war  now  to  revive  a  dead  man.' " — Palmerston  to 
Granville,  Nov.  15,  27,  1840,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  351,  365. 

"Guizot  to  Reeve,  Nov.  20,  1840,  Laughton,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  138.  Greville, 
op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  302-306,  309.  Palmerston  to  Granville,  Nov.  30,  1840,  Bulwer, 
op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  365-366.  Faucher  to  Reeve,  Nov.  12,  1840,  Faucher,  op.  cit., 
I,  p.  100. 

43Guizot,  op.  cit.,  VI,  p.  49.  Letter  from  Paris,  Nov.  20,  1840,  The  Times, 
Nov.  24,  1840.  Greville,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  310. 

"Guizot,  op.  cit.,  VI,  p.  50.    The  Examiner,  Jan.  10,  1841,  p.  19. 


2O8  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [534 

of  the  Treaty  of  London.  He  did  not  give  up,  though,  his  hope  of 
finding  means  whereby  France  might  reenter  the  Concert  of  Europe. 
The  French  government,  he  maintained  December  18,  1840,  in  a 
letter  to  Bourqueney,  who  was  still  Louis  Philippe's  charge  d'af- 
faires at  London,  had  remained  foreign  to  the  treaty  of  July  15, 
1840,  that  is  to  say  it  had  taken  no  part  in  the  adjustment  of  the 
relations  of  the  Sultan  and  of  the  Pasha  through  the  intervention 
of  Europe,  because  it  had  not  been  pleased  either  by  the  territorial 
basis  of  that  adjustment  or  by  the  methods  of  coercion  employed 
to  secure  its  success.  It  would  not  offer  opposition  "  cau  fait'," 
but  at  the  same  time  it  would  not  associate  itself  with  the  four 
Powers  in  order  "  'to  render  homage' "  to  the  arrangement  which 
they  were  enforcing  in  the  Levant  nor  would  it  guarantee  the 
stability  of  that  arrangement.  It  would  remain  therefore,  "  'en 
dehors  du  treaty  of  July  15  and  of  the  coalition  which  had  signed 
it.' "  Nevertheless,  after  the  purpose  of  that  treaty  had  been 
secured  there  would  remain  "  'the  great  question,  the  question  of 
the  relations  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  with  Europe.'  "  The  relations 
of  the  Sultan  and  the  Pasha  formed,  for  the  Ottoman  Empire,  an 
"  'internal  question' "  upon  which  France  and  "  'her  allies' "  had 
separated  from  each  other.  The  relations  of  the  Ottoman  Empire 
with  Europe  formed  an  "  'external  question,' "  general  and  per- 
manent in  character,  which  it  would  be  impossible  to  regulate 
effectively  or  definitely  without  the  cooperation  of  France  with 
the  other  Powers.  Besides  this  great  question  exterieure  there 
would  remain  also  the  question  of  giving  guarantees  against  op- 
pression to  the  Syrians,  especially  the  Christians  of  Mt.  Lebanon, 
over  whom  the  direct  authority  of  the  Porte  was  being  reestab- 
lished.45 

"  'Far    .    .    .    from  desiring  to  persist  in  our  isolation,'  "  Guizot 
declared,  "  'we  have  always  in  view  the  reestablishment  of  the 

4SGuizot,  op.  cit.,  VI,  pp.  54-55.  On  Dec.  13,  1840,  Guizot  wrote  to  Barante: 
"Nous  n'avons  nul  dessein  de  raster  etrangers  aux  affaires  generates  de  1'Europe. 
Nous  croyons  qu'il  nous  est  bon  d'en  etre,  qu'il  est  bon  pour  tous  que  nous  y  ren- 
trerons.  La  France  est  trap  grande  pour  qu'on  ne  sente  pas  bientot  le  vide 
de  son  absence.  Nous  attendons  qu'on  le  sente  en  effet,  et  qu'on  nous  le  dise. 
J'ai  un  degout  immense  de  la  fanfaronnade,  mais  la  tranquillite  de  1'attente  et 
la  liberte  du  choix  nous  conviennent  bien." — De  Witt,  op.  cit.,  p.  217. 


535]  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION  CONCLUDED  2CX) 

Concert  of  Europe,  and  we  know  by  what  openings,  great  and 
small,  we  are  able  to  return  to  it. 

"  'We  know  also  that  many  desire  us  to  return,  and  we  believe 
that  they  are  right.  Our  isolation  does  nothing  for  anyone.  We 
are  obliged,  both  for  our  safety  and  for  the  satisfying  of  the  spirit 
[prevailing]  in  France,  to  maintain  our  present  armaments.  We 
have  stopped  those  armaments  at  the  limit  which  they  had  attained 
when  the  Cabinet  was  formed.  The  Cabinet  precedent  wished  to 
push  them  further;  we  have  declared  that  we  will  not  do  so;  .  .  . 
When  a  door  conveniently  opens  before  us  for  an  escape  from  this 
situation,  we  shall  not  stubbornly  insist  on  remaining  [where  we 
are].'"46 

The  course  followed  by  Guizot  pleased  the  Austrian  and  Prus- 
sian governments  greatly.  They  had  been  alarmed,  it  will  be 
recalled,  by  the  situation  of  affairs  in  France  and  they  were  ex- 
tremely anxious  to  escape  from  the  critical  position  into  which 
they  had  been  drawn  through  their  having  signed  the  convention 
of  July  15,  i84o.47  After  the  fall  of  Acre  had  been  announced  at 
Vienna,  it  is  true,  Metternich  wrote  to  Neumann  instructing  him 
to  prevent  the  French  from  being  under  illusions  about  Syria. 
"  'Syria  is  lost  irrevocably,  lost  tout  entiere,' "  he  declared. 
" '.  .  .  there  is  not  a  moment  to  be  sacrificed  in  persuading 
Mehemet  All  to  submit.'  "48  But  soon  thereafter  he  took  care  to 
let  Count  Sainte-Aulaire,  the  French  Ambassador  at  the  Court  of 
the  Emperor  Francis,  understand  that  Austria  would  abstain  from 
an  attack  upon  Egypt  and  that  she  would  do  so  because  of  her 
regard  for  the  feelings  of  France.  "  'If  M.  Guizot',"  he  stated  on 
that  occasion,  "  'should  find  some  advantage  in  making  this  truth 
known  in  the  [Legislative]  Chambers,  he  may  proclaim  it  [there] 
with  the  assurance  that  it  will  not  be  denied  by  me.'  "49  Further- 

"Guizot,  op.  cit.,  VI,  pp.  55-56. 

*7Granville  to  Palmerston,  Nov.  2,  16,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  III, 
pp.  i,  31.  Greville,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  304.  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  VI,  pp.  40  if. 

**Ibid.,  p.  47.  See  also  Greville,  op.  cit.,  VI,  pp.  305,  307.  Chreptowitch  to 
Nesselrode,  Nov.  17,  1840,  Nesselrode,  op.  cit.,  VIII,  pp.  73-76.  Metternich,  op. 
cit.,  VI,  pp.  484-485. 

"Guizot,  op.  cit.,  VI,  p.  51.  See  also,  Metternich  to  Apponyi,  Dec.  21,  30, 
1840;  Metternich  to  Sainte-Aulaire,  Dec.  24,  30,  1840.  Metternich,  op.  cit.,  VI, 
pp.  425-429- 


2IO  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [536 

more,  when  he  learned  that  the  Porte,  encouraged  by  Lord  Pon- 
sonby,50  had  rejected  the  Napier  convention,  he  became  so  aroused 
that  he  requested  Beauvale,  the  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to 
inform  Palmerston  that  if  the  Porte  hesitated  to  accept  the  recom- 
mendation of  the  allied  Powers  who  had  urged  it  to  grant  the 
hereditary  government  of  Egypt  to  Mehemet  Ali  the  Austrian 
Court  could  not  admit  that  the  allied  Powers  should  allow  them- 
selves to  be  compromised  by  such  hesitation.51  No  less  concil- 
iatory were  the  utterances  of  Baron  Werther,  the  Prussian  Chief 
Minister.  Indeed,  he  even  maintained  that  "Upon  no  account 
would  Prussia  participate  in  the  destruction  of  Mehemet  Ali; 
[for]  her  aim  must  be  to  preserve  the  Osmanli  Empire  with  the 
cooperation  of  France."82 

Although  Lord  Palmerston  was  less  disturbed  by  the  situation 
in  the  Levant  than  were  the  Austrian  and  Prussian  statesmen,  he 
did  not  intend,  it  appears,  to  adopt  a  policy  which  would  prevent 
a  reconciliation  between  France  and  the  four  Powers  or  an  imme- 
diate termination  of  the  Turco-Egyptian  question.  "It  has  been 
reported,"  he  wrote  to  Ponsonby,  December  17,  1840,  "but  upon 
what  authority  is  not  known,  that  the  Porte  was,  towards  the  end 

"Note  the  following  extract  from  the  diary  of  the  Princess  Metternich,  Jan. 
6,  1841:  "Clemens  erhielt  Depeschen  aus  Constantinopel.  Ponsonby  will  dur- 
chaus  nicht,  dass  man  sich  mit  Mehemed  Ali  verstandigt,  und  steigert  hiedurch 
die  Verwirrung  immer  mehr."  Ibid.,  pp.  486-487.  Others  were  irritated  by 
Ponsonby's  conduct.  Reeve  wrote  to  Greville,  Oct.  27,  1840:  "Admiral  Roussin 
told  me  such  things  of  Ponsonby's  behaviour  to  him,  especially  before  the  battle 
of  Nezib,  that  my  hair  stood  on  end.  Even  now  if  one  could  but  get  him 
recalled  all  might  go  well:  but  Lord  Alvanley  is,  or  has  been,  at  Constantinople 
writing  the  warmest  letters  to  everybody  in  his  favour." — Johnson,  op.  cit.,  p.  44. 

"Beauvale  to  Palmerston,  Jan.  3,  1841,  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  p.  151. 
Guizot,  op.  cit.,  VI,  p.  60.  Nesselrode,  op.  cit.,  VIII,  pp.  115-116. 

52Treitschke,  op.  cit.,  V.  p.  ill.  See  also  Guichen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  427-428,  449- 
450,  462,  465-466.  Wheaton,  the  American,  wrote  from  Berlin,  Feb.  3,  1841: 
"The  successful  military  execution  of  the  quintuple  treaty  has  left  so  many 
points  of  oriental  policy  unsettled,  that  the  great  German  Powers  probably  begin  to 
regret  having  supported  the  views  of  Great  Britain,  in  becoming  parties  to  the 
arrangement,  which  has  brought  upon  them  unforseen  perils  without  adequate 
equivalent  advantages.  Russia  has  also  been  disappointed  in  her  expectation  of 
being  called  on  to  assist  in  the  consummation  of  the  work;  but  she  has  at 
least  the  satisfaction  of  having  produced  a  breach  between  Franch  and  Great 
Britain  which  leaves  her  more  free  to  act  in  pursuing  her  own  exclusive  ends." — 
State  Dept.  Prussia,  II,  Wheaton  to  Forsyth,  No.  169,  Feb.  3,  1841. 


53?]  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION  CONCLUDED  211 

of  November,  but  before  it  had  heard  of  the  submission  of 
Mehemet  Ali,  disinclined  to  revoke  the  decree  which  had  deprived 
him  of  the  Government  of  Egypt.  It  is  not  unnatural  that  such 
a  feeling  should  have  existed  at  that  time  in  the  mind  of  the 
Turkish  Government,  but  Her  Majesty's  Government  hopes  that 
subsequent  events,  and  the  unanimous  advice  of  the  Four  Powers, 
will  have  removed  these  objections  on  the  part  of  the  Porte,  and 
will  have  led  the  Porte  to  accept  the  settlement  effected  by  Com- 
modore Napier's  arrangement,  or  by  the  subsequent  more  ample 
submission  of  Mehemet  Ali."53  It  is  true  that  as  long  as  Guizot 
had  attempted  to  secure  a  reestablishment  of  the  concert  of  the 
five  Powers  on  the  basis  of  a  modification  in  the  terms  of  the 
Treaty  of  London,  Palmerston  had  opposed  his  effort.54  But,  when 
it  became  apparent  to  the  British  Secretary  that  the  Frenchman 
had  abandoned  those  attempts,  he  assumed  a  more  friendly  atti- 
tude in  regard  to  the  question  at  issue.  On  January  5,  1841,  he 
received  a  despatch  from  Granville  which  revealed  that  Guizot 
on  January  i,  had  made  to  the  Queen's  Ambassador  at  Paris 
statements  almost  identical  in  meaning  to  those  which  he  had 
written  to  Bourqueney,  December  18,  i84O,65  and,  two  days  later, 
the  French  charge  d'affaires  at  London  was  able  to  write  that,  in 
his  opinion,  Palmerston  "  'was  really  anxious  to  discover  some 
way  of  bringing  back  France  into  the  concert,  although  he  was 
still  undecided  as  to  the  manner  in  which  it  should  be  effected.'  "60 


"Palmerston  to  Ponsonby,  Dec.  17,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  pp. 
88-89.  Napier,  War  in  Syria,  II,  pp.  51-53.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  on 
Dec.  15,  1840,  Palmerston  informed  the  Lords  of  the  Admiralty  that  they  should 
convey  to  Commodore  Napier  the  approval  by  Her  Majesty's  government  of 
the  steps  taken  by  him  on  Nov.  27.  The  four  Powers,  he  stated,  could  not 
guarantee  to  the  Viceroy,  as  it  was  promised  in  Article  I  of  the  Napier  Conven- 
tion, the  grant  of  the  hereditary  government  of  Egypt,  but,  he  assured,  they 
would  "recommend  to  the  Porte  to  make  the  concession  specified  in  the  com- 
munication" which  Stopford  had  been  instructed  on  Nov.  14,  1840,  "to  convey 
to  Mehemet  Ali." — Palmerston  to  Lords  of  Admiralty,  Dec.  15,  1840,  Levant 
Correspondence,  III,  pp.  87-88.  Napier,  War  in  Syria,  II,  pp.  49-51. 

"Palmerston  to  Bloomfield,  Dec.  2,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  p.  54. 
Palmerston  to  Granville,  Nov.  30,  1840,  Bulwer,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  365-366. 

"Granville  to  Palmerston,  Jan.  I,  1841,  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  p.  120. 

" Affaires  etrangeres,  657  Angleterre,  Bourqueney  to  Guizot,  Jan.  7,  1841, 
quoted  by  Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  322. 


212  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [538 

Even  the  Court  of  St.  Petersburg  seemed  willing  to  enter  into 
an  arrangement — if  it  was  drawn  up  in  accord  with  Russian 
views — whereby  France  and  the  four  Powers  would  be  reconciled. 
Such  an  arrangement,  in  which  the  principle  of  the  closure  of  the 
Straits  would  be  set  forth,  Brunnow  pointed  out  in  one  of  his 
despatches,  would  have  the  "  ''advantage  indubitable'  "  of  inducing 
France  to  recognize  explicitly  that  principle  which,  by  Article  IV 
of  the  Convention  of  London,  the  four  Powers  had  agreed  to 
accept.57  Nesselrode,  like  Brunnow,  was  willing  that  the  concert 
of  the  five  Powers  should  be  reestablished  on  the  basis  of  the 
closure  of  the  Straits.58  At  the  same  time,  however,  believing  that 
Russia  had  won  a  great  triumph  through  the  conclusion  of  the 
treaty  of  July  15,  1840,  he  was  particularly  anxious  both  to  render 
permanent  the  friendship  which  had  been  established  between 
England  and  the  three  absolute  Courts,59  and  to  prevent  the  resur- 
rection of  the  detested  Anglo-French  alliance.60 

On  January  13,  1841,  Guizot,  encouraged  by  the  willingness  of 
the  four  Powers  to  enter  into  an  arrangement  to  which  France 
would  be  a  party,  wrote  to  Count  Saint-Aulaire  stating  that  while 
France  remained  foreign  "  lapres  comme  avant' "  to  the  treaty  of 
July  15,  1840,  she  was  ready  to  resume  in  Levantine  affairs, 
which  were  of  general  interest  for  Europe,  the  place  which  be- 
longed to  her,  and  also  to  reenter,  through  some  convenient  open- 

"Goriainow,  op.  cit.,  p.  83. 

"Clanricarde  to  Palmerston,  Dec.  22,  1840;  Nesselrode  to  Brunnow,  Dec. 
10/22,  1840,  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  pp.  121,  121-122. 

wHall,  op.  cit.,  pp.  319-320. 

*°On  Dec.  28,  1840,  Nesselrode  wrote  to  Meyendorff:  "Tout  ce  que  nous 
demandons  a  ces  deux  cours  [Prussia  and  Austria],  c'est  de  ne  pas  rapprocher 
de  nouveau  1'Angleterre  et  la  France,  ce  qui  est  bien  plus  encore  dans  leur 
interet  que  dans  le  notre.  Au  reste,  je  ne  sais,  en  verite,  ce  qu'il  faudra  atten- 
dre  ou  craindre  dans  1'avenir  de  la  Prusse." — Nesselrode,  op.  cit.,  VIII,  pp. 
102-106.  On  Jan.  27,  1841,  Cambreling,  the  American  representative  at  St. 
Petersburg,  wrote:  "It  is  understood  here,  altho  I  have  no  official  information  on 
the  subject,  that  Prince  Metternich  has  proposed  to  the  late  Min[ister]  of 
Turkey,  another  conference — to  which  it  was  proposed  to  invite  France — for  the 
purpose  of  deciding  upon  'eventualities'  or  the  position  and  destiny  of  Turkey, 
Syria  and  Egypt,  to  which  the  Emperor  has  replied  in  his  laconic  style,  'Pourquoi 
— c'est  tres  bien  faite — et  vite — c'est  finie' — and  that,  not  perceiving  the  neces- 
sity for  any  further  interference,  he  has  declined  the  proposition." — State  Dept. 
Russia,  XIV,  Cambreling  to  Forsyth,  No.  10,  Jan.  27,  1841. 


539]  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION  CONCLUDED  213 

ing,  into  the  Concert  of  Europe.61  In  the  same  communication  he 
outlined  a  series  of  five  "  'points' "  which  he  believed  should  form 
the  basis  of  a  "  'general  act' "  which  the  five  Powers  should  sign 
"  'in  order  to  terminate  in  common  the  affairs  of  the  Orient/  "62 
Those  five  points  in  substance  were  as  follows: 

(1)  The  declaration  of  the  closure  of  the  two  Straits. 

(2)  The  recognition  of  the  status  quo  of  the  Ottoman  Empire, 
"  'in  its  independence  and  its  integrity.'  " 

(3)  The  securing  of  guarantees  from  the  Porte  for  the  Christian 
population  of  Syria. 

(4)  "  'Certain  stipulations  in  favor  of  Jerusalem.'  "63 

(5)  Stipulations  for  the  "  'general  freedom,  and  perhaps  for  the 
positive  neutrality' "  of  the  commercial  routes  both  between  the 
Mediterranean  and  the  Red  Sea,  across  the  Isthmus  of  Suez,  and 
between  the  Mediterranean  and  the  Persian  Gulf  by  way  of  Syria 
and  the  Euphrates  river."64 

The  plenipotentiaries  of  the  four  Powers  at  London  reassembled 
soon  but  they  were  not  willing  to  state  their  views  as  clearly  as 
had  Guizot.65  Consequently  negotiations  for  securing  the  return 
of  France  to  the  Concert  of  Europe  progressed  very  slowly.  "  'I 
firmly  believe  that  they  [the  four  Powers]  will  join  with  us  upon 
the  general  question,' "  Bourqueney  wrote  to  his  superior  at 

"Guizot,  op  clt.,  VI,  p.  72. 
"Ibid.,  p.  74- 

""Concerning  this  point  Guizot  stated:  "  'Cette  idee  s'est  elevee  et  commence 
a  preoccuper  assez  vivement  les  esprits  chretiens.  Je  ne  sais  ce  qui  est  possible, 
ni  sous  quelles  formes  et  dans  quelles  limites  1'intervention  europeenne  serait  en 
mesure  de  procurer  a  Jerusalem  un  peu  de  securite  et  de  dignite  ;  mais  les  gouv- 
ernements,  qui  se  plaignent  avec  raison  de  1'affaiblissement  des  croyances  des 
peuples,  devraient  bien,  quand  1'occasion  s'en  presente,  donner  eux-memes  a 
croyances  quelque  marque  eclatante  d'adhesion  et  d'interet.  Que  1'Europe  et  la 
politique  de  1'Europe  reprennent  la  figure  chretienne;  personne  ne  peut  mesurer 
aujourd'hui  tout  ce  que  1'ordre  et  le  pouvoir  ont  a  y  gagner.' " — Ibid.,  pp.  73-74. 

"Guizot  spoke  of  those  two  routes,  "  'qui  sont  pour  toute  1'Europe  d'un 
grand  interet,  et  qui  poseraient,  pour  les  relations  si  rapidement  croissantes  de 
1'Europe  avec  1'Asie,  des  principes  excellents  que  jamais  peut-etre  on  ne  trou- 
vera  une  si  bonne  occasion  de  faire  prevaloir.'  " — Ibid.,  p.  74.  The  "road  to 
India"  was  becoming  a  source  of  keen  rivalry  between  England  and  France. 
See  Guichen  op.  cit.,  pp.  490-491. 

"Guizot,  op.  cit.,  p.  74. 


214  THB  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-1841  [S4° 

Paris,  "  'but  will  they  join  upon  ground  as  extensive  as  we  desire? 
I  am  a  little  uncertain  about  this  matter.'  "66 

At  the  time  when  the  negotiations  at  London  were  progressing 
slowly,  the  situation  in  the  Near  East  was  improving  with  vary- 
ing degrees  of  rapidity.  Mazloum  Bey  and  Admiral  Walker, 
whom,  according  to  Reschid  Pasha's  communication  to  Ponsonby, 
December  27,  1840,  were  to  "proceed  immediately  to  Egypt  .  .  . 
to  receive  the  Ottoman  fleet  and  to  ascertain  that  the  places  de- 
scribed in  the  memorandum  of  the  I4th  of  November"  were 
evacuated  by  Mehemet  Ali,  did  not  depart  from  the  Ottoman 
capital  until  January  6,  i84i,67  and  even  then  they  were  not  em- 
powered to  promise  to  the  Pasha  that  he  would  receive  Egypt  in 
hereditary  tenure,  nor  were  they  authorized  to  order  a  suspension 
of  hostilities  in  Syria.  Instead,  they  carried  with  them  instructions 
for  General  Jochmus,  the  commander  of  the  allied  forces,  to  de- 
mand the  surrender  of  the  arms  and  guns  of  Ibrahim  Pasha's 
army.68 

Baron  Sturmer,  who  probably  had  received  instructions  from 
Vienna  similar  in  meaning  to  the  language  which  Beauvale  re- 
ported on  January  3,  1841,  that  Metternich  had  used  in  a  conver- 
sation with  him,  discovered  directly  that  the  Turkish  commis- 
sioners had  not  been  authorized  to  assure  Mehemet  Ali  of  his 
receiving  the  hereditary  title  to  Egypt,  and  at  once  called  the 
attention  of  the  other  diplomatic  agents  at  Constantinople  to  the 
matter.69  Also,  he  wrote  to  Reschid  Pasha  "earnestly"  proposing 


MIbid.,  pp.  74-75.  The  hesitation  of  the  allied  diplomats  may  have  been 
due  partially  to  the  refusal  of  the  French  to  disarm.  The  French  Chambers, 
it  should  be  noted,  voted,  237  to  162  and  147  to  85,  on  Feb.  i,  and  April  i, 
1841,  respectively,  for  the  building  of  extensive  fortifications  around  Paris.  See 
Journal  des  Debats,  Jan.  14,  22,  Feb.  2,  March  17,  24,  April  2,  1841.  The  Times, 
Jan.  9,  15,  16,  Feb.  13,  1841.  Gentleman's  Magazine,  March,  1841,  Series  3,  XIV, 
p.  308.  Beust,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  34.  Odilon-Barrot.  op.  tit.,  I,  pp.  360-362.  Guizot, 
op.  tit.,  VI,  pp.  28  ff.  Broughton,  op.  tit.,  VI,  p.  I. 

"Napier,  War  in  Syria,  II,  p.  44.  Palmerston  claimed  on  Jan.  26,  1841, 
that  the  delay  of  the  Turkish  commissioners  had  been  due  to  their  failure  to 
get  a  boat  for  passage.  See  Palmerston  to  Beauvale,  Jan.  26,  1841,  Levant  Cor- 
respondence, III,  pp.  160-161.  See  also,  a  copy  of  a  letter  which  the  commis- 
sioners carried  from  the  Grand  Vizier  to  Mehemet  Ali,  ibid.,  p.  182. 

""Napier,  War  in  Syria,  II,  p.  44. 

"Ibid.,  pp.  44-45.  Sturmer  to  Ponsonby,  Jan.  7,  1841,  Levant  Corres- 
pondence, III,  pp.  183-184. 


54 1  ]  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION  CONCLUDED  21$ 

that  he  devise,  as  soon  as  possible,  means  to  arrest  the  conse- 
quences which  would  surely  result  from,  the  policy  that  the  Porte 
had  adopted  and  suggesting  that  a  steamboat  should  be  sent  to 
Alexandria  with  additional  instructions  on  this  point  to  Mazloum 
Bey.70  Koenigsmarck  and  Titow,  the  Prussian  and  Russian  rep- 
resentatives, supported  Sturmer  in  his  contentions.71  At  first, 
Ponsonby  refused  to  do  likewise.72  When  he  heard  that  the  Porte 
was  fully  satisfied  with  the  submission  of  Mehemet  AH  (as  he 
repeated  to  Reschid,  January  9,  1841)  he  would,  acting  in  accord- 
ance with  his  instructions,  recommend  the  granting  of  the  heredi- 
tary possession  of  Egypt  to  the  Pasha,  but  not  before  then.73 
A  day  later,  however,  he  received  Palmerston's  instructions  of 
December  17,  1840,  and  thereupon  he  too  consented  to  advise 
formally  in  the  name  of  his  court  that  the  Porte  should  grant 
Egypt  hereditarily  to  Mehemet  Ali.74 

Reschid  Pasha,  in  a  "message"  which  he  gave  on  January  9, 
1841,  "late  in  the  day,"  to  M.  Pisani,  the  British  dragoman,  stated 
that  if  the  Porte  did  grant  Egypt  in  perpetuity  to  the  Viceroy 
and  his  descendants  it  would  be  done  only  "conditionally"  and  not 
in  "simple  form."75  But  on  January  12  after  he  was  aware  that 
Ponsonby  had  joined  with  the  representatives  of  the  absolute 
Courts,  he  forwarded  to  the  four  a  Hatti-Sheriff  announcing  the 
definite  intention  of  the  Porte  to  confer  the  hereditary  right  to 
Egypt  upon  Mehemet  Ali  when  his  submission  should  be  com- 
plete.76 

Although  the  Porte  was  not  aware  of  the  fact,  the  Viceroy  had 
already  adopted  measures  to  make  his  submission  complete.  Two 

TOSturmer  to  Rechid,  Jan.  7,  1841,  ibid.,  p.  184. 

71Titow  to  Ponsonby,  Dec.  27,  i84O/Jan.  8,  1841;  Konigsmarck  to  Pon- 
sonby, Jan.  8,  1841,  ibid.,  pp.  186-187,  J92-  Th£  instructions  which  Nesselrode 
sent  to  Titow,  Jan.  4,  1841,  were  similar  to  those  which  Palmerston  sent  to 
Ponsonby  Dec.  17,  1840.  See  Nesselrode  to  Titow,  Dec.  23,  i84O/Jan.  4,  1841, 
ibid.,  pp.  152-154. 

"Ponsonby  to  Sturmer,  Jan.  7,  1841;  Ponsonby  to  Titow,  Jan.  7,  8,  1841, 
Ponsonby  to  Konigsmarck,  Jan.  8,  1841,  ibid.,  pp.  185-186,  188-189,  I92- 

"Ponsonby  to  Rechid,  Jan.  9,  1841,  ibid.,  p.  193. 

"Ponsonby  to  Titow,  Sturmer,  and  Konigsmarck,  Jan.  10,  1841,  Ponsonby 
to  Pisani,  Jan.  10,  1841,  ibid.,  p.  194. 

"IMf,  p.  193. 

78Hatti-Sheriff  of  Jan.  12,  1841,  ibid.,  p.  195.  See  also,  Grand  Vizier  to 
Mazloum  Bey,  Jan.  12,  1841,  ibid.,  p.  196. 


2l6  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN   QUESTION,   1832-184!  [542 

days  before  the  above  mentioned  Hatti-Sheriff  had  been  issued 
Mazloum  Bey  and  Admiral  Walker  arrived  at  their  destination.77 
Even  before  that  date  Mehemet  AH  had  arranged  for  the  surren- 
der of  the  Ottoman  fleet  and  for  ordering  the  evacuation  of  Syria. 
He  made  those  arrangements  with  Admiral  Napier,  who  had  been 
sent  to  Egypt  on  a  mission  similar  to  that  of  the  Sultan's  com- 
missioners and  who  had  preceded  the  latter  to  Alexandria  by 
approximately  forty-eight  hours.78 

After  the  arrival  of  the  commissioners  at  the  Egyptian  metrop- 
olis the  arrangements  for  the  Pasha's  formal  submission  were  put 
into  execution  immediately.  In  fact,  on  the  very  day  of  their 
arrival,  January  10,  1841,  Hamid  Bey,  one  of  Mehemet  Ali's 
officers,  and  Lieutenant  Loring,  one  of  Napier's  subordinates, 
departed  from  Alexandria  for  Syria  carrying  with  them  instruc- 
tions addressed  to  Ibrahim  Pasha  directing  him  to  retreat  with 
his  army  to  Egypt.79  Hamid  Bey  and  Lieutenant  Loring,  it  is 
true,  failed  to  locate  Ibrahim  Pasha.80  The  Egyptian  forces,  never- 
theless, were  in  full  retreat  even  before  those  agents  started  on 
their  mission.81  Moreover,  on  January  20,  1841,  Admiral  Walker, 
in  command  of  the  Ottoman  war  vessels,  which  he  had  received 
formally  from  Mehemet  Ali,  January  u,82  sailed  for  Marma- 
rice,  a  "beautiful  landlocked  anchorage  on  the  coast  of  Cara- 
mana,"83  and  three  days  later,  after  the  provisions  of  the  Hatti- 
Sheriff  of  January  12  were  known  at  Alexandria,  the  Viceroy 

"Napier,  War  in  Syria,  II,  p.  71. 

mlbid.,  pp.  61  ff.  During  his  stay  in  Egypt  Napier  secured  from  the  Vice- 
roy his  promise  that  in  the  future  he  would  put  in  force  in  the  territory  under 
his  control  the  terms  of  the  Anglo-Turkish  commercial  treaty  of  Aug.  16,  1838. 
See  ibid.,  pp.  74-75.  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  pp.  199-200.  In  1838,  after 
that  treaty  had  been  signed,  Mehemet  Ali  had  declared  that  he  would  not 
object  to  its  provisions.  It  seems,  nevertheless,  that  he  did  not  carry  them 
into  execution.  See  Larking  to  Palmerston,  Jan.  21,  1841;  Palmerston  to 
Larking,  Feb.  n,  1841,  ibid.,  pp.  179-180,  181. 

"Napier,  War  in  Syria,  II,  p.  68. 

*°Jochmus  to  Stopford,  Jan.  30,  1841,  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  p.  298. 

"Napier,  War  in  Syria,  II,  pp.  97  ff.  On  Jan.  31,  1841,  Ibrahim  Pasha  ar- 
rived, with  the  major  part  of  his  army,  at  Gaza.  Before  the  end  of  Feb.,  1841, 
the  evacuation  of  Syria  by  the  Egyptians  was  completed.  See  ibid.,  pp.  141, 
191  ff. 

"Ibid.,  p.  71. 

Taton,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  215. 


543]  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION  CONCLUDED  217 

himself  wrote  to  the  Grand  Vizier  announcing  that  he  had  executed 
"to  the  letter"  the  conditions  required  of  him.  "I  wait,"  he  de- 
clared, "for  the  accomplishment  of  his  [the  Sultan's]  sovereign 
promise."84 

Meanwhile,  reports  concerning  the  hesitation,  late  in  December, 

1840,  of  the  Sultan's  Ministers  to  grant  to  Mehemet  Ali  the  hered- 
itary possession  of  Egypt  had  reached  Vienna,  whereupon  Prince 
Metternich,  becoming  greatly  aroused,  declared  that  Austria  would 
remain  firm  in  her  pledge  to  obtain  the  hereditary  title  for  the 
Viceroy  and  that  the  refusal  of  the  Sultan  to  grant  it  would  cause 
her  to  withdraw  her  moral  and  material  support  from  him.85  Also, 
he  wrote  to  Sturmer  ordering  him  to  make  known  to  his  colleagues 
the  attitude  of  the  Austrian  Cabinet  and  to  urge  them  to  concur 
in  measures  calculated  to  give  effect  to  the  steps  taken  at  Lon- 
don as   stated  in  Palmerston's  note  of  December   17,   1840,  to 
Ponsonby.   If  those  colleagues  did  not  all  agree  to  concur  in  such 
measures    he    (the   Internuncio)    should   make   independently    a 
statement  to  the  Divan  explaining  the  determinations  of  Austria, 
leaving  it  open  to  the  other  ministers,  should  they  think  it  fit,  to 
do  likewise.86 

On  or  very  near  the  same  date  when  Metternich  wrote  thus  to 
Sturmer,  he  complained,  according  to  a  report  which  Beauvale 
forwarded  to  Palmerston,  January  17,  1841,  that  the  British  gov- 
ernment had  not  used  the  means  in  its  power  to  induce  the  Sultan 
to  confer  Egypt  hereditarily  upon  Mehemet  Ali.87  Palmerston, 
replying  to  Beauvale,  January  26,  1841,  claimed  that  the  Prince's 
charges  in  regard  to  the  policy  followed  by  the  Queen's  govern- 
ment in  the  past  were  unjust.88  Be  that  as  it  may,  it  is  certain 
that  soon  after  the  latter  date  the  English  Secretary  of  Foreign 
Affairs  intimated  in  a  despatch  written  to  Ponsonby  that  if  the 
Porte  insisted  on  refusing  to  grant  to  the  Pasha  the  hereditary 
possession  of  Egypt,  the  four  Powers  would  in  turn  refuse  to 

"Mehemet  Ali  to  Grand  Vizier,  Jan.  23,  1841,  Levant  Correspondence,  III, 
pp.   230-231.    Bordeano,  op.  cit.,  pp.   64-65.    Letter  from  Alexandria,  Jan.   22, 

1841,  The  Times,  Feb.  6,  1841. 

"Beauvale  to  Palmerston,  Jan.  17,  1841,  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  p.  159. 
Guizot,  op.  cit.,  VI,  p.  60. 

"Beauvale  to  Palmerston,  Jan.  17,  1841,  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  p.  160. 
"Beauvale  to  Palmerston,  Jan.  17,  1841,  ibid.,  p.  160. 
^Palmerston  to  Beauvale,  Jan.  26,  1841,  ibid.,  pp.  161-162. 


2l8  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [544 

support  its  demands,  thus  forcing  it  to  yield  "with  a  bad  grace."89 
It  is  certain,  also,  that  on  January  30  Palmerston  joined  with  the 
plenipotentiaries  of  Austria,  Prussia,  and  Russia  in  presenting  to 
Chekib  EfFendi  a  note  announcing  it  as  the  opinion  of  the  four 
Powers  that  the  Sultan  should  manifest  clemency  and  generosity 
towards  the  Viceroy  by  revoking  the  "Act  of  deprivation"  which 
had  been  decreed  against  him  and  by  confirming  him  in  the 
hereditary  control  of  Egypt.  ".  .  .  his  [Mehemet  Ali's]  descend- 
ants in  the  direct  line,"  it  was  stated  in  the  note,  "shall  be  suc- 
cessively named  by  the  Sultan  to  the  Pashalic  of  Egypt,  every 
time  that  that  post  shall  become  vacant  by  the  death  of  the  pre- 
ceding Pasha."90 

At  Constantinople,  even  before  the  date  when  the  collective 
note  addressed  to  Chekib  Effendi  was  signed,  plans  were  being 
laid  by  the  Porte,  in  consultation  with  the  representatives  of  its 
allies,91  to  name  conditions  on  which  the  hereditary  right  to  Egypt 
would  be  conferred  upon  Mehemet  Ali.  Those  plans,  after  being 
completed,  were  embodied  in  the  famous  firman  of  investiture 
which  was  proclaimed  on  February  13,  1841,  and  which  provided: 

(1)  That  Mehemet  Ali  should  receive  the  coveted  right  to 
Egypt  but  that  the  Sultan  should  retain  permanently  the  privilege 
of  choosing  the  successors  to  the  governorship  from  among  the 
viceroy's  descendants  in  any  of  the  direct  male  lines. 

(2)  That  the  person  so  chosen  must  repair  to  Constantinople 
to  receive  in  person  the  investiture. 

(3)  That  the  viceroys  of  Egypt  should  be  permitted  to  use  no 
ceremonials,  titles,  etc.,  other  than  those  which  were  permitted  to 
the  "other  Viziers"  of  the  Sublime  Porte. 

(4)  That  the  provisions  of  the  Hatti-Sheriff  of  Gulhane,92  as 

**Palmerston  to  Ponsonby,  Jan.  29,  1841,  ibid.,  pp.  169-170. 

"Ibid.,  pp.  171-172.   Documents  Diplomatiques. 

wLord  Ponsonby  was  accused  by  his  contemporaries  of  being  responsible 
for  the  policy  adopted  by  the  Porte  early  in  February,  1841.  See  Dino,  op.  cit., 
Ill,  p.  47.  The  Examiner,  March  14,  1841.  The  Times,  March  n,  12,  13,  15,  19, 
1841.  It  is  obvious  that  Ponsonby  did  exert  his  influence  at  Constantinople  to 
secure  the  enactment  of  harsh  conditions  to  be  enforced  upon  Mehemet  Ali.  See 
a  series  of  letters  and  other  documents  which  Ponsonby  forwarded  to  Palmer- 
ston, Feb.  I,  4,  1841,  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  pp.  207-229. 

*2For  a  copy  of  the  Hatti-Sheriff  of  Gulhane  and  a  discussion  of  its  terms 
see  Ed.  Englehardt,  La  Turquie  et  le  tanzimat  ou  histoire  des  reformes  dans 
I'empire  Ottoman,  I,  pp.  257-261,  35  ff. 


545]  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION  CONCLUDED 

well  as  all  laws  and  treaties,  either  past,  present,  or  future,  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire  should  be  executed  "en  entier"  in  Egypt. 

(5)  That  all  imposts   and  revenues   should  be  levied  in  the 
Sultan's  name,  and  that  the  "tenths,  duties   [droits],  and  other 
imposts"  should  be  in  conformity  with  the  principles  in  force  in  the 
other  provinces  of  the  empire. 

(6)  That  a  quarter  part  of  the  gross  revenue  should  be  paid  to 
the  Porte. 

(7)  That  coinage  should  be  struck  only  with  the  permission  of 
the  Sultan,  and  that  it  should  be  identical  [pareilles]  "to  that  of 
Constantinople." 

(8)  That  the  Egyptian  army  in  times  of  peace  should  be  lim- 
ited to  18,000  men. 

(9)  That  the  governors  of  Egypt  should  appoint  military  offi- 
cers up  to  and  including  the  rank  of  kol  aghassi   (major),  but 
that  the  superior  ranks  should  be  conferred  by  the  Sultan,  "sur  la 
proposition  des  dits  Gouverneurs"  And, 

(10)  That  ships  of  war  were  to  be  built  by  the  said  governors 
only  with  the  express  permission  of  the  Sublime  Porte.93 

On  the  same  day  that  the  firman  of  investiture  was  issued  the  Porte 
addressed  to  the  French  Ambassador,  Admiral  Pontois,  and  to 
the  representatives  at  Constantinople  of  the  four  allied  Powers  a 
circular  announcing,  prematurely  it  is  true,  "the  final  settlement" 
of  the  Turco-Egyptian  question.94 

When  Mehemet  Ali  learned  of  the  terms  which  his  overlord 
proposed  to  grant  to  him  he  protested  loudly  and  called  attention 
to  important  parts  of  those  terms  which  he  declared  that  it  would 
be  impossible  for  him  to  accept.  "  'The  first  article  [of  the 
firman],'"  Commodore  Napier  wrote  from  Alexandria,  February 
23,  1841,  "  'he  [the  Viceroy]  considers  quite  inadmissible,  as  it 
would  not  be  acceded  to  by  Ibrahim  Pacha,  would  cause  discord 

^Levant  Correspondence,  III,  p.  247.  Bulwer,  op.  at.,  II,  431-434.  On 
the  same  day  that  the  firman  of  investiture  was  issued,  a  second  was  addressed 
to  Mehemet  Ali  "conferring  upon  him  the  Government  of  Nubia,  Darfour, 
Kordufan,  and  Senaar,  and  enjoining  him  to  abolish  the  Negro-hunts,  etc."  See 
ibid.,  pp.  435-436.  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  pp.  250-251.  See  also,  Grand 
Vizier  to  Mehemet  Ali,  Feb.  13,  1841,  ibid.,  p.  252. 

"Ibid.,  p.  254.  Also  on  Feb.  13,  1841,  the  Porte  forwarded  to  the  Inter- 
nuncio  of  Austria  a  request  for  the  aid  of  the  Powers  in  case  Mehemet  Ali 
rejected  the  terms  offered  him  in  the  firman  of  investiture.  See  ibid.,  pp.  253-254. 


22O  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [546 

in  his  family,  and  a  civil  war  at  his  death.  He  also  objects  to  the 
part  of  Article  6  which  relates  to  the  appointment  of  officers; 
hitherto  they  have  all  been  appointed  by  him,  with  the  exception 
of  General  of  Division,  and  a  sudden  deviation  from  that  system 
would  disorganize  the  army,  and  bring  his  authority  into  con- 
tempt/ "95  In  addition,  there  were  two  other  parts  of  the  firman 
which  Mehemet  AH  declared  that  he  could  not  accept.  The  sen- 
tence in  which  it  was  stated  that  one-fourth  of  the  gross  revenue 
of  Egypt  should  be  paid  to  the  Porte  constituted  one  of  those 
parts  and  the  portion  of  an  article  providing  that  the  Hatti-Sheriff 
of  Gulhane  and  all  treaties  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  should  be 
executed  in  Egypt  constituted  the  other.96 

The  news  of  the  refusal  of  Mehemet  AH  to  accept  all  of  the 
terms  of  the  firman  of  investiture  reached  Constantinople  about 
the  middle  of  March,  1841,  and  gave  occasion  there  for  a  renewal 
of  negotiations  between  the  Ministers  of  the  Porte  and  the  envoys 
of  the  four  Powers.  Reschid  Pasha,  who  had  always  favored  the 
enforcement  of  severe  terms  upon  the  Viceroy,  took  the  initiative 
in  those  negotiations,  writing  to  Lord  Ponsonby,  March  15: 
"The  hesitation  of  Mehemet  AH  Pasha  to  accept  these  moderate 
conditions  [named  in  the  firman]  is  scarcely  compatible  with  the 
character  of  a  subject,  and  it  is  no  less  clear  that  to  grant  the 
demands  as  made  by  him,  is  a  thing  as  injurious  as  it  is  opposed 
to  the  rights  of  the  Sultan's  sovereignty."97  Lord  Ponsonby  in  his 
reply  to  the  Ottoman  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  declared  that  his 
opinion  coincided  entirely  with  the  opinion  expressed  by  the  latter. 
The  Porte,  he  advised,  should  remain  inactive  and  consult  its 


.  "Napier  to  Palmerston,  Feb.  23,  1841,  quoted  by  Napier,  War  in  Syria,  II, 
p.  236.  See  also  ibid.,  pp.  233-234.  Napier  agreed  with  the  Pasha  that  some  of 
the  provisions  of  the  firman  were  unjust.  See  ibid.,  pp.  234-235.  Napier, 
Correspondence,  II,  pp.  142-143. 

**Mehemet  AH  to  Grand  Vizier,  March  7,  1841,  Levant  Correspondence,  III, 
pp.  341-344.  The  Viceroy  talked  about  renewing  the  war  with  his  overlord  and 
did  actually  adopt  measures  to  improve  his  means  of  defense.  See  Ponsonby  to 
Palmerston,  March  27,  1841,  ibid.,  p.  376.  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  VI,  pp.  92-97.  Letters 
from  Alexandria,  March  i,  16,  25,  May  22,  26,  1841,  The  Times,  March  29,  April 
9,  June  4,  23,  1841.  Gentleman's  Magazine,  April,  May,  1841,  Series  3,  XV,  pp. 
420,  530. 

"Rechid  to  Ponsonby,  March  15,  1841,  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  p.  352. 


54?]  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION  CONCLUDED  221 

"faithful  friend  and  Ally  [Great  Britain]."98  Sturmer,  Koenigs- 
marck  and  Titow,  to  whom  Reschid  forwarded  communications 
similar  to  the  one  which  he  sent  to  Ponsonby,  were  more  cautious 
in  their  replies.  The  Internuncio  announced  that  he  could  not 
reply  in  his  "own  name"  to  the  note  which  he  had  received,"  the 
Prussian  claimed  that  he  was  not  authorized  to  offer  advice  to  the 
Porte,100  and  the  Russian  also  found  means  of  excusing  him- 
self.101 At  the  same  time  all  three  promised  that  the  matter  would 
be  brought  to  the  attention  of  their  "august  courts." 

While  the  Viceroy,  the  Porte,  and  the  representatives  at  Con- 
stantinople of  the  four  Powers  were  debating  and  corresponding 
in  regard  to  the  conditions  which  the  Sultan  should  attach  to  his 
grant  to  Mehemet  Ali,  of  the  hereditary  title  to  Egypt,  the  diplo- 
mats in  western  Europe  were  continuing  their  negotiations  for  the 
conclusion  of  an  arrangement  whereby  the  Concert  of  Europe  could 
be  reestablished.  In  January,  1841,  it  will  be  remembered,  nego- 
tiations to  secure  such  an  arrangement  had  been  initiated  by  the 
French  but  no  appreciable  results  had  been  attained.  The  progress 
made  during  the  following  month  was  more  satisfactory,  for  it 
was  known  in  the  west  at  that  time  that  the  Viceroy  had  surren- 
dered the  Turkish  fleet  and  that  the  Porte  had  announced  it  would 
grant  Egypt  hereditarily  to  Mehemet  Ali  as  soon  as  his  submission 
was  complete.102  But  even  then  it  was  impossible  to  secure  an 
agreement  upon  the  basis  of  the  points  which  Guizot  had  sug- 
gested in  his  despatch  to  Sainte-Aulaire,  January  13, 1841.  Guizot's 
proposal  relative  to  the  Isthmus  of  Suez,  Lord  Palmerston  claimed, 
was  "  'not  a  suitable  subject  for  a  provision  in  a  treaty.'  "  The  Brit- 
ish Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  objected  also  to  the  idea  of  including 
in  the  arrangement  to  be  signed  by  the  five  Powers,  a  stipulation 
for  the  protection  of  the  Christian  subjects  of  Syria.  This  matter, 
he  declared,  could  be  taken  care  of  better  in  a  special  note  urging 

^Ponsonby  to  Rechid,  March  18,  1841,  ibid.,  pp.  371-372.  See  also  Ponsonby 
to  Palmerston,  March  27,  1841,  ibid.,  p.  371. 

"Sturmer  to  Rechid,  March  18,  1841,  ibid.,  pp.  372-373. 

100Konigsmarck  to  Rechid,  March  17,  1841,  ibid.,  p.  374. 

101Titow  to  Rechid,  March  7/19,  1841,  ibid.,  pp.  374-375. 

102Both  King  Louis  Philippe  and  Guizot  were  very  anxious  at  that  time 
to  secure  the  return  of  France  to  the  Concert  of  Europe.  See  Louis  Philippe  to 
Leopold,  Feb.  4,  1841,  Taschereau,  op.  cit.,  p.  366. 


222  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [548 

the  Sultan  to  declare  for  religious  toleration.  Furthermore,  both 
he  (Palmerston)  and  Brunnow  were  opposed  to  the  Frenchman's 
suggestion  in  regard  to  guaranteeing  the  independence  and  the 
integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.103  In  fact,  the  only  point  con- 
cerning which  the  diplomats  were  able  to  agree  was  the  one  pro- 
viding for  a  declaration  of  the  closure  of  the  Straits.104 

At  length,  late  in  February,  1841,  a  plan  of  an  arrangement, 
which,  it  appeared,  each  of  the  five  great  Powers  would  accept 
immediately  was  perfected.  According  to  that  plan  the  representa- 
tives of  the  four  Powers  and  the  Porte  would  sign  a  protocol  "de 
cloture"  announcing  that  the  Turco-Egyptian  question  had  been 
solved,  and  inviting  France  to  return  to  the  Concert  of  Europe. 
After  that  had  been  done,  the  representatives  of  the  allied  Powers 
and  the  charge  d'affaires  of  France  would  in  turn  sign  a  conven- 
tion proclaiming  the  closure  of  the  Bosphorus  and  the  Dardanelles 
to  the  warships  of  all  nations.105  At  this  time,  however,  a  new 
difficulty  arose.  Chekib  Effendi  declared  that  he  could  not  affix 
his  signature  to  the  protocol  de  cloture  until  after  he  had  been 
notified  officially  that  Mehemet  Ali  had  accepted  the  firman  of 
investiture,  and  Guizot,  on  the  other  hand,  refused  to  permit 
Bourqueney  to  accept  the  convention  while  the  protocol  de  cloture 
remained  unsigned.106 

Through  the  influence  of  the  envoys  of  Austria  and  Prussia, 
who  were  extremely  anxious  to  secure  a  final  settlement  of  the 
question  at  issue,107  an  attempt  was  made  to  secure  a  compromise. 
On  March  5,  1841,  the  representatives  of  the  four  Powers  signed 
a  protocol  listing  the  "desired  events"  which  had  occurred  in  the 
Near  East  and  announcing  that  their  consuls-general  would  at 
once  return  to  Alexandria,  thus  implying  that  the  Turco-Egyptian 
difficulties  had  been  terminated.108  They  offered,  in  addition,  to 

10IRohan-Chabot's  report  to  Guizot  (no  date  given);  Bourqueney  to  Guizot, 
Feb.  21,  1841,  quoted  by  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  VI,  pp.  75-78,  84-87.  See  also  Guichen, 
op  cit.,  pp.  468-472. 

10*On  Feb.  12,  1841,  Bourqueney  was  very  much  discouraged  because  of 
the  situation  of  affairs.  See  Bourqueney  to  Guizot,  Feb.  12,  1841,  quoted  by 
Guizot,  op  cit.,  VI,  pp.  79-80. 

105Bourqueney  to  Guizot,  Feb.  26,  1841,  quoted  by  ibid.,  p.  89. 

™Ibid.,  pp.  89-90. 

107Greville,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  328,  329,  333.   Hasenclever,  op.  cit.,  pp.  269-270. 

108Guizot,  op.  cit.,  p.  91.   Levant  Correspondence,  III,  pp.  235-236. 


549]  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION  CONCLUDED  223 

sign  a  second  protocol  by  which  France  would  be  invited  to  return 
to  the  European  concert  but  in  which  no  mention  of  the  "question 
de  cloture"  would  be  made.109  Baron  Bourqueney  was  in  favor 
of  accepting  this  proposed  arrangement  and  he  wrote  to  Guizot 
urging  that  he  [Bourqueney]  should  be  authorized  to  enter  into 
it.110  Guizot,  however,  although  he  was  anxious  that  France  should 
escape  from  her  isolated  position,  believed  that  his  country  should 
avoid  a  union  with  the  four  Powers  until  after  the  alliance  of 
those  Powers  with  the  Porte  had  been  dissolved  through  their 
having  declared  that  the  purposes  of  the  treaty  of  July  15,  1840, 
had  been  realized,  and  hence  refused  to  grant  the  powers  which 
Bourqueney  requested.111 

It  is  true  that  soon  after  Guizot  refused  to  accept  the  compro- 
mise plan  he  authorized  the  French  charge  d'affaires  at  London  to 
"initial"  a  copy  of  the  convention  in  which  the  closure  of  the 
Straits  was  declared.112  The  German  plenipotentiaries,  it  is  also 
true,  continued  their  search  for  a  mode  of  procedure,  by  which  the 
return  of  France  to  the  Concert  of  Europe  could  be  secured 
directly.113  Nevertheless,  as  Guizot  persisted  in  his  refusal  to 
permit  Bourqueney  to  enter  formally  into  an  arrangement  with 
the  representatives  of  the  allied  Powers  before  those  representa- 
tives had  announced  that  the  Turco-Egyptian  question  was 
solved,114  and  as  Chekib  Effendi,  supported  by  Lord  Palmerston,115 

"•Guizot,  op.  dt.,  VI,  p.  91. 

110Bourqueney  to  Guizot  (no  date  given),  quoted  by  ibid.,  p.  91. 

1VLIbid.,  pp.  91-93. 

"'Both  the  protocol  de  cloture  and  the  convention  for  the  closure  of  the 
straits  were  "initialed"  on  March  15,  1841.  See  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  p. 
321-323. 

mGuizot,  op.  cit.,  pp.  103-104. 

"4Granville  to  Palmerston,  March  15,  1841,  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  p. 
328.  On  April  16,  1841,  Bulwer  reported  to  Palmerston  that  Guizot  had  made  the 
following  statement  to  him:  "I  do  not  wish  to  be  mixed  up  in  it  [the  settle- 
ment to  be  arranged  between  the  Porte  and  Mehemet  AH],  or  to  appear  in  any 
way  in  it.  I  have  no  conditions  to  make  for  Mehemet  Ali;  I  have  nothing  to 
do  with  him  or  the  conditions  he  may  accept.  I  only  say,  that  until  the  affairs 
in  the  East  shall  have  been  settled,  I  cannot  sign  a  document  which  begins  by 
declaring  that  they  are  so." — Ibid.,  pp.  382-384.  Guizot,  however,  did  intimate 
to  Bulwer  that  he  thought  some  of  the  Viceroy's  objections  to  the  firman  of 
investiture  were  reasonable.  See  ibid. 

U5Bourqueney  to  Guizot,  March  I,  1841,  quoted  by  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  VI,  p. 
89.  Greville,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  332-333. 


224  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [550 

persisted  in  his  refusal  to  sign  a  protocol  de  cloture,  a  delay  in 
the  securing  of  a  final  settlement  was  inevitable. 

Although  Palmerston  supported  Chekib  in  regard  to  the  "ques- 
tion de  cloture" — especially  after  it  was  announced  in  western 
Europe  that  Mehemet  Ali  had  rejected  parts  of  the  firman  of  in- 
vestiture— he  did  not  intend  to  aid  the  Porte  in  securing  from  the 
Viceroy  his  acceptance  of  all  of  the  conditions  which  it  wished  to 
impose  upon  him.  On  March  13,  1841,  he  joined  with  the  repre- 
sentatives of  Austria,  Prussia,  and  Russia  for  the  purpose  of  issu- 
ing to  Chekib  Effendi  a  formal  communication.  In  that  commu- 
nication it  was  admitted  that  the  new  difficulty  which  had  arisen 
between  the  Sultan  and  his  vassal  was  one  of  internal  administra- 
tion, but  at  the  same  time  care  was  taken  to  call  the  attention  of 
the  Ottoman  Ambassador  to  the  principles  which  had  been  set 
forth  in  the  collective  note  of  January  30,  i84i.116  Three  days 
later  Palmerston  wrote  to  Ponsonby  stating  that  the  Sultan  should 
make  it  clear  that  in  the  appointment  of  the  governors  of  Egypt 
the  rule  of  primogeniture  would  always  be  followed  unless  in 
case  of  infancy  or  physical  incapacity.117  Again  on  April  10,  1841, 
in  a  similar  despatch  to  the  British  Ambassador  at  Constantinople 
he  explained  that  it  was  extremely  important  that  the  matters  in 
dispute  between  the  Sultan  and  Mehemet  Ali  should  be  settled 
"as  soon  as  possible."  Furthermore,  admitting  that  on  some  of 
the  points  at  issue  the  Viceroy  was  in  the  right,  he  went  so  far  as 
to  instruct  Ponsonby  definitely  to  urge  the  Porte  to  modify  such 
parts  of  the  firman  of  investiture  as  were  "open  to  reasonable 
objections."118 

The  chief  Ministers  of  Russia,  Austria,  and  Prussia  were  like- 
wise unwilling  to  support  all  of  the  demands  of  the  Porte.  Count 

""Plenipotentiaries  of  the  Four  Powers  to  Chekib  Effendi,  March  13,  1841, 
Levant  Correspondence,  III,  pp.  263-264.  The  Times,  April  15,  1841. 

"TPalmerston  to  Ponsonby,  March  16,  1841,  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  pp. 
326-327.  See  also,  Palmerston  to  Ponsonby,  April  2,  1841,  ibid.,  p.  350. 

"^Palmerston  to  Ponsonby,  April  10,  ibid.,  pp.  364-365.  Palmerston  did  not 
defend  all  of  Mehemet  Ali's  demands.  The  Hatti-Sheriff  of  Gulhane  and  the 
treaties  of  the  Porte,  he  declared,  must  necessarily  be  carried  into  effect.  See 
Palmerston  to  Ponsonby,  March  30,  1841;  Palmerston  to  Beauvale,  April  2,  1841, 
ibid.,  pp.  337,  346-349. 


55  I  ]  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION  CONCLUDED  225 

Nesselrode,  as  usual,  "highly"  approved  of  the  attitude  taken  by 
the  British  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.119  Prince  Metternich,  ex- 
asperated because  of  the  delay  occasioned  by  the  dispute  over  the 
conditions  which  the  Ottoman  Ministers  wished  to  attach  to  the 
grant  of  Egypt  in  hereditary  possession  to  Mehemet  Ali,  assumed 
an  attitude  more  aggressive  than  that  of  the  British  and  Russian 
statesmen.  In  a  despatch  which  he  wrote  to  Sturmer,  April  2, 
1840,  it  should  be  noted,  he  ordered  the  latter  to  warn  the  Porte 
that  if  it  did  not  adopt  the  modifications  to  the  firman  of  investi- 
ture recommended  by  the  Congress  of  London,  His  Imperial 
Majesty  the  Emperor  would  consider  himself  released  from  the 
obligation  which  he  had  contracted  on  July  15,  i84O.120  Baron 
Werther's  attitude  was  similar  to  that  of  the  Austrian  Chancellor. 
Since  King  Frederick  William  IV's  Minister  at  Queen  Victoria's 
Court  had  initialed  the  convention  for  the  closure  of  the  Straits, 
he  informed  William  Russell,  the  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin, 
that  "the  Government  [of  Prussia]  looked  upon  the  Treaty  of 
July  as  terminated."121 

The  fact  that  the  four  Powers  favored  a  modification  of  some 
of  the  terms  which  the  Porte  had  offered  to  Mehemet  Ali,  Feb- 
ruary 13,  1841,  became  known  at  Constantinople  late  in  March, 
and  so  strong  an  impression  was  produced  immediately  among 
the  Turks  that  Reschid  Pasha  and  Achmed  Fethi  Pacha,  two  mem- 
bers of  the  Ottoman  Cabinet  who  were  extremely  hostile  to 
Mehemet  Ali  and  who  probably  had  had  much  to  do  with  the 


luClanricarde  to  Palmerston,  April  6,  1841,  ibid.,  p.  381.  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  VI, 
p.  102. 

""Metternich  to  Sturmer,  April  2,  1841;  Beauvale  to  Palmerston,  April  9, 
1841,  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  pp.  378-380,  378.  See  also,  Guizot,  of.  cit., 
VI,  p.  101.  The  Times,  April  13,  1841. 

^Russell  to  Palmerston,  April  14,  1841,  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  p.  382. 
On  April  21,  1841,  Palmerston,  in  reply  to  Russell,  denied  that  a  question 
could  really  be  "finished"  by  merely  declaring  it  so.  Prussia,  he  stated,  was 
bound  by  the  treaty  of  July  "to  determine"  Mehemet  Ali  to  accept  the  ar- 
rangement specified  in  that  treaty.  By  the  last  letter  which  Mehemet  Ali  had 
written  to  the  Grand  Vizier,  he  continued,  it  appeared  that  the  Viceroy  ob- 
jected to  some  of  the  fundamental  points  specified  in  the  treaty  of  July.  See- 
Palmerston  to  Russell.  April  21,  1841,  ibid.,  pp.  384-385. 


226  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [552 

preparation  of  the  famous  firman  of  February  13,  were  obliged 
to  resign  from  their  official  positions.122 

However,  even  after  the  fall  of  Reschid  Pasha  and  Achmed 
Fethi  Pasha,  the  Porte  hesitated  to  modify  the  terms  of  the  firman 
of  investiture.  Reschid's  place  at  the  Sultan's  foreign  office  was 
taken  by  Rifaat  Pasha,  a  statesman  who,  indeed,  was  more  in- 
clined than  his  predecessor  had  been  to  make  concessions  in  favor 
of  the  Viceroy.123  But  on  April  i,  1841,  soon  after  Rifaat  had 
been  vested  with  ministerial  power,  instructions  were  forwarded 
in  the  name  of  the  Porte  to  Chekib  Effendi,  directing  him  to  lay 
before  the  British  Cabinet  arguments  defending  the  parts  of  the 
famous  firman  which  Mehemet  Ali  had  declared  he  would  not 
accept,  and  ordering  him  to  forward  to  his  home  government  "as 
soon  as  possible"  the  "official  communications  which  the  British 
Government"  would  make  to  him  in  reply.124  Nineteen  days  later, 
before  those  instructions  had  reached  London,  the  Porte  an- 
nounced in  a  memorandum  which  was  presented  to  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  four  Powers  at  Constantinople,  that  it  had 
decided  that  the  succession  to  the  governorship  of  Egypt  should 
be  regulated  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  primogeniture, 
that  Mehemet  Ali  should  have  the  right  to  appoint  officers  to  any 
rank  below  that  of  general  of  brigade,  and  that  the  tribute  should 

mGuizot,  op.  cit.,  p.  105.  The  Times,  April  23,  1841.  Brown,  the  U.  S. 
Dragoman,  referring  to  the  dismissal  of  the  two  Turkish  officials,  wrote  in  a 
letter  to  Porter  that  it  was  ''conveyed  in  very  moderate  expressions."  "Rechid 
Pacha,"  he  stated,  "paid  a  visit  a  day  or  two  after  his  dismissal  to  Rifaat  Bey, 
now  Pacha,  and  it  is  said  that  the  Sultan  has  written  him  a  letter  of  thanks  for 
his  services  with  his  own  hand.  Report  says  that  he  is  soon  to  be  appointed 
Grand  Vizier." — State  Dept.  Turkey,  IX.  Brown  to  Porter,  April  7,  1841. 
Wheaton  wrote  from  Berlin,  May  5:  "The  ascendancy  of  Reschid  Pasha  in  the 
councils  of  the  Divan  has  been  overthrown  by  Austrian  influence  in  order  to 
compel  the  Sultan  to  accord  such  conditions  to  the  Pacha  of  Egypt  as  the  latter 
would  be  willing  to  accept." — State  Dept.  Prussia,  II,  Wheaton  to  Webster,  No. 
180,  May  5,  1841. 

""Note  the  following  extract  from  a  letter  "from  the  Turkish  Frontiers," 
April  12,  1841:  "Ever  since  the  dismissal  of  Reschid  Pasha  from  his  post,  the 
state  of  feeling  in  the  Divan  has  been  very  favorable  to  Mehemet  Ali." — The 
Times,  April  28,  1841. 

^Instructions  transmitted  by  Sublime  Porte  to  Chekib  Effendi,  April  I, 
1841,  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  pp.  389-390. 


553]  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION  CONCLUDED  22/ 

be  settled  at  a  fixed  amount.125  These  concessions,  however,  were 
not  at  once  embodied  in  a  new  firman.  The  Porte  on  that  occa- 
sion, it  appears,  had  resolved  to  await  an  answer  from  Chekib 
EfFendi  before  carrying  its  promises  into  execution.126 

It  was  not  until  the  month  of  May,  1841,  that  events  moved 
rapidly  towards  a  final  settlement  of  the  Turco-Egyptian  ques- 
tion. Chekib  EfFendi  transmitted  a  copy  of  his  instructions,  dated 
April  i,  1841,  to  Lord  Palmerston  on  April  27.127  The  British 
government  did  not  reply  independently  in  "official  communica- 
tions," but  the  plenipotentiaries  of  the  four  Powers  forwarded  to 
Chekib,  May  10,  1841,  a  formal  note  advising  the  Porte  to  make 
modifications,  in  the  terms  of  the  firman  of  investiture,  almost 
identically  the  same  as  those  which  the  Porte  had  itself  suggested 
on  April  i9.128  Even  before  time  sufficient  for  the  advice  of  the 
allied  diplomats  to  reach  Constantinople  had  elapsed,  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  four  Powers  at  the  Court  of  the  Grand  Seignior 
had  succeeded  in  persuading  the  Ottoman  authorities  to  agree  to 
make  the  modifications,  in  the  terms  to  be  granted  to  the  Pasha, 
which  were  favored  by  the  allied  diplomats,129  and  finally  on  June 
i,  1841,  a  new  firman  which  embodied  those  modifications  and 
which  took  precedence  over  the  arrangement  of  February  13,  1841, 


"'Memorandum  from  Sublime  Porte  to  Representatives  of  Four  Powers, 
April  19,  1841,  ibid.,  pp.  419-420.  See  also,  Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  April  14, 
1841,  ibid.,  p.  419.  It  seems  that  the  action  taken  by  the  Porte  on  April  19 
was  due,  to  a  large  extent  at  least,  to  the  influence  of  Austria  at  Constanti- 
nople. See  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  VI,  pp.  108-110.  Napier,  War  in  Syria,  II,  pp. 
267  ff. 

"*Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  May  12,  1841,  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  p. 
433.  It  is  said  that  the  Porte  hoped  to  secure,  in  return  for  concessions  in 
regard  to  the  terms  of  the  firman  of  investiture,  an  official  guarantee  from 
Europe  of  its  independence  and  integrity.  See  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  VI,  p.  108.  Not 
only  Palmerston  and  the  Russians,  but  also  Prince  Metternich  was  opposed 
to  giving  such  a  guarantee  to  the  Porte.  See  Metternich  to  Sturmer,  April  20, 
1841,  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  p.  400-401. 

"'Chekib  to  Palmerston,  April  27,  1841,  ibid.,  p.  388. 

"^Plenipotentiaries  of  Austria,  Great  Britain,  Prussia,  and  Russia  to  Chekib, 
May  10,  1841,  ibid.,  pp.  404-406.  See  also,  Palmerston  to  Ponsonby,  May  n, 
1841,  ibid.,  p.  409. 

""Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  May  12,  22,  1841,  ibid.,  pp.  433,  435.  See  also 
ibid.,  pp.  435-440. 


228  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [554 

was  promulgated.  "Henceforth,"  it  was  declared  in  the  new  docu- 
ment, "Egypt  shall  descend  in  a  direct  line,  from  the  elder  to  the 
elder,  in  the  male  race  among  the  sons  and  grandsons.  As  re- 
gards their  nomination,  that  shall  be  made  by  my  sublime 
Porte."130 

The  fact  that  the  Porte  was  ready  to  make  the  desired  modifi- 
cations in  the  firman  of  investiture  was  known  at  London  on  June 
I2.131  On  the  8th  of  the  following  month  it  was  announced 
officially  at  the  British  capital  that  Mehemet  Ali  had  accepted  the 
hereditary  title  to  Egypt  upon  the  revised  conditions  offered  by 
his  overlord.132  Consequently,  as  there  was  no  occasion  for  further 
delay,  the  representatives  of  the  allied  Powers — including  the  Am- 
bassador of  Turkey — attached  their  signatures,  July  10,  1841,  to 
the  protocol  de  cloture  thereby  acknowledging  formally  that  the 
"difficulties  in  which  His  Highness  the  Sultan  [had]  found  him- 
self placed"  had  "been  smoothed,"  and  stating  that  the  British 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  "in  agreement  with  the  Plenipoten- 
tiaries of  the  four  Powers"  undertook  to  invite  the  government  of 
France  "to  share  in  the  Act  by  which  the  Sultan,  on  the  one  part," 
would  declare  his  firm  resolution  to  maintain  in  the  future  the 

™Parl.  Papers,  1879,  Egypt,  No.  4,  p.  36.  T.  E.  Holland,  The  European 
Concert  in  the  Eastern  Question,  pp.  110-113.  In  the  firman  of  June  I,  1841, 
it  was  provided  that  the  governor  of  Egypt  should  appoint  "the  officers  of  the 
land  and  sea  forces  up  to  the  rank  of  Colonel."  Officers  of  higher  rank  were  to 
be  appointed  by  the  Porte.  A  firman  issued  late  in  May,  1841,  fixed  the 
amount  of  the  annual  tribute  at  80,000  purses  (ca.  £363,635).  See  ibid.,  p.  114. 
Martens,  N.  R.  G.,  XV,  p.  490.  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  pp.  444,  459-461, 
463-464. 

™Ibid.,  pp.  435-440.  In  May  and  June,  1841,  after  the  term  of  the  Forte's 
memorandum  of  April  19  were  known  in  western  Europe  the  French,  supported 
by  the  Austrians  and  Prussians,  advocated  that  the  protocol  and  the  conven- 
tion should  be  signed  immediately.  The  British  and  the  Russians,  however, 
opposed  such  a  move,  contending  that  the  Turco-Egyptian  question  could  not 
be  declared  closed  until  after  Mehemet  Ali  had  announced  that  he  would  accept 
the  new  terms  offered  by  the  Sultan.  See  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  VI,  p.  108  ff. 
Nesselrode  to  Meyendorff,  June,  1841,  Nesselrode.  op.  cit.,  VIII,  pp.  142-144. 
Bloomfield  to  Palmerston,  June  19,  1841,  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  p.  471. 

"2Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  June  21,  1841;  Chasseaud  to  Ponsonby,  June  IO, 
1841,  ibid.,  p.  472.  See  also,  Rohan-Chabot  to  Guizot,  June  12,  1841,  Guizot, 
op.  cit.,  VI,  pp.  120-121.  Unofficial  news  of  the  willingness  of  Mehemet  Ali  to 
accept  the  terms  offered  him  in  the  firman  of  June  I,  1841,  reached  London  June 
30,  1841.  See  The  Times,  June  30,  1841.  See  also,  ibid.,  June  28,  July  5,  1841. 


555]  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION  CONCLUDED  229 

principle  of  the  closure  of  the  Straits  "and  the  five  Powers,  on  the 
other  part,  would  announce  their  unanimous  determination  to 
respect  this  principle  and  to  conform  themselves  to  it."133  Three 
days  later  the  French  charge  d'affaires  at  the  Court  of  St.  James 
joined  with  the  representatives  of  the  allied  Powers  in  signing  the 
above  mentioned  "act,"  which  has  come  to  be  known  as  the  Straits 
Convention.134  Thereupon,  the  reconciliation  of  France  with  the 
Concert  of  Europe,  as  well  as  the  termination  of  the  Turco-Egyp- 
tian  question,  was  complete. 

The  termination  of  the  Turco-Egyptian  question  and  the  re- 
establishment  of  the  concert  of  the  five  Powers  were  events  of 
great  immediate  significance  in  European  diplomatic  relations. 

The  government  of  Louis  Philippe  had  been  taught  a  lesson,  so 
to  speak.  In  his  Memoires  Guizot  consoled  himself  by  declaring 
that  "Mehemet  Ali,  driven  from  Syria,  [and]  menaced  even  in 
Egypt,  was  established  there  [in  Egypt]  with  the  hereditary  title 
and  on  equitable  conditions,  not  because  of  his  own  strength,  but 
through  consideration  for  France  and  because  the  Powers  which  had 
signed  the  treaty  of  July  15,  did  not  wish  to  run  the  risk  either  of 
being  disunited  or  of  seeing  new  complications  arise."135  At  the 
same  time  he  admitted  that  after  what  he  had  seen  and  learned 
during  his  mission  to  England  he  had  "reentered  into  affairs  de- 
termined never  to  subject  the  foreign  policy  of  France  to  the 
whims,  and  to  the  mistaken  ideas  of  the  day."136  "  'Evade  nothing 
and  seek  nothing,'  "  he  wrote  to  Count  Sainte-Aulaire  a  few  weeks 
after  the  signing  of  the  Straits  Convention.  "  'It  has  been  our  cus- 
tom to  be  confident,  vainglorious,  [and]  insistent.  We  have  in- 
toxicated ourselves  by  our  desires  as  if  they  were  always  our  right 
and  our  power;  we  have  been  fond  of  the  appearance  rather  than 
of  the  reality.  I  am  convinced  that,  in  order  to  reestablish  and  to 
extend  our  influence  in  Europe,  it  is  necessary  to  follow  the  oppo- 
site method.  I  am  determined  everywhere  and  on  all  occasions  to 

^Levant  Correspondence,  III,  p.  473.  Holland,  op.  cit.,  p.  99.  Noradoungh- 
ian,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  341-342.  Martens,  N.  R.  G.,  II,  p.  126. 

134Noradounghian,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  342-344.  State  Papers,  XXIX,  pp.  703  ff. 
Holland,  op.  cit.,  pp.  100  ff.  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  1024  ff.  Martens,  N.  R.  G., 
II,  pp.  128  ff.  The  documents  which  were  signed  on  July  10,  13,  1841,  were 
practically  identical  to  those  which  were  "initialed"  on  March  15,  1841. 

"5Guizot,  op.  cit.,  VI,  p.  128. 

™Ibid.,  p.  129. 


23O  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [556 

sacrifice  le  bruit  au  fait,  the  appearance  to  the  reality,  the  first 
moment  to  the  last.  We  shall  risk  less  and  we  shall  gain  more. 
And  besides,  il  n'y  a  de  dignite  que  la,'  "13T 

Russia,  on  the  other  hand,  was  for  the  moment  triumphant.138 
It  is  true,  she  had  given  up  the  rights  confirmed  to  her  by  the 
Treaty  of  Unkiar  Skelessi.  But,  according  to  Nesselrode,  she  be- 
lieved she  had  lost  nothing  which  was  of  any  real  value  to  her. 
She  had  secured  from  France,  through  the  settlement  of  1841,  the 
latter's  recognition  of  the  principle  of  the  closure  of  the  Straits, 
she  had  avoided  entering  into  an  arrangement  guaranteeing  the 
independence  and  the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  and  she 
had  the  satisfaction  of  knowing  that  the  Anglo-French  alliance,  as 
it  had  existed  formerly  at  least,  had  not  been  reestablished.139 

™lbid.,  p.  129.  Sainte-Aulaire  had  just  received  appointment  as  French 
Ambassador  to  England. 

^Note  the  following  extract  from  a  memorial  concerning  the  foreign  policy 
of  Russia  during  the  years  from  1825  to  1850,  issued  by  Count  Nesselrode 
to  Nicholas  I,  Nov.  20  (old  style),  1850:  "Deux  fois  a  six  ans  d'intervalle, 
assailli  par  Pambition  d'un  vassal  revoke,  1'Empire  Ottoman  s'est  vu  menace 
d'une  dissolution  presque  inevitable.  Deux  fois  il  a  du  son  salut  a  1'intervention 
decisive  de  V.  M.  La  premiere  de  ces  deux  crises  a  donne  au  monde  un  spectacle 
inou'i  dans  1'histoire:  ...  La  seconde,  moins  brillante  peut-etre,  a  produit 
des  resultats  plus  solides.  Elle  a  expulse  de  la  Syrie,  pour  la  confinir  desormais 
dans  les  limites  restreintes  de  1'Egypte,  cette  nouvelle  puissance  Arabe  que  les 
ennemis  de  la  Russie  avaient  un  moment  songe  a  substituer  sur  le  Bosphore  au 
pouvoir  dechu  de  la  Porte  Ottomane,  pour  en  faire  dans  1'avenir  un  tete  de 
pont  centre  nous.  Le  traite  d'Unkiar-Skelessi,  centre  lequel  avaient  en  vain  pro- 
teste  la  France  et  1'Angleterre,  annule  en  apparence,  a  etc  perpetue  reelement 
sous  une  autre  forme.  En  interdisant  1'entree  des  Dardanelles  aux  vaisseaux  de 
guerre  etrangers,  le  nouvel  acte  qui  1'a  remplace,  reconnu  par  toutes  les 
Puissances,  nous  assure  dorenavant  centre  toute  attaque  maritime.  Enfin,  un 
re"sultat  des  plus  importants  pour  nous  a  cette  epoque  est  sorti  de  cette  complica- 
tion d'Orient.  C'est  la  dissolution  de  cette  Alliance  Anglo-Frangaise,  si  hostile  a 
nos  interets  politiques,  si  fatale  pour  la  situation  des  gouvernements  conserva- 
teurs.  Rompue  sous  les  Whigs  en  1840,  renouee  plus  tard  avec  effort  par  le 
Ministere  Tory,  elle  n'a  plus  traine  des  lorsqu'une  vie  precaire  et  inoffensive  et 
n'a  vegete  quelque  temps  sous  le  nom  specieux  d'entente  cordiale,  que  pour  se 
briser  de  nouveau  avec  plus  d'eclat  encore,  centre  la  question  des  mariages 
Espagnols." — Quoted  by  Treitschke,  op.  cit.,  V,  pp.  758-759. 

""See  Nesselrode  to  Meyendorff,  Nov.  10,  1841,  Nesselrode,  op.  cit.,  VIII, 
pp.  147-150.  Note  also  the  following  extract  from  a  letter,  Dmitri  de  Nesselrode 
[Chancellor  Nesselrode's  son]  to  Meyendorff,  Nov.  29,  1841:  "La  politique 
etrangere  continue  a  etre  dans  un  etat  satisfaisant;  tous  les  jours  on  se  felicite 


55?]  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION  CONCLUDED  23  I 

England  also,  it  appeared,  had  triumphed,  and  indeed  her  pres- 
tige in  Europe  was  great.  A  famous  British  statesman  has  even 
gone  so  far  as  to  declare,  concerning  the  Near  Eastern  policy  fol- 
lowed by  the  Queen's  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  during  the 
period  1839-1841,  that,  ".  .  .  it  is  difficult  to  fix  upon  a  page  in 
the  history  of  this  country  [England]  which  records  a  superior 
instance  of  moral  intrepidity.  The  bold  conception  and  the  bril- 
liant performance  were  worthy  of  Chatham;  but  the  domestic 
difficulties  with  which  Lord  Palmerston  had  to  struggle  place 
the  exploit  far  beyond  the  happiest  achievement  of  the  elder 
Pitt."140  Furthermore,  a  recent  writer  of  history  has  stated  that 
Palmerston's  "rare  skill  and  determination"  in  carrying  out  his 
plans  "must  command  universal  admiration."141  Palmerston,  it 

davantage  des  heureuses  consequences  du  traite  du  15  juillet,  et  mon  pere 
compte  beaucoup  sur  votre  eloquence  pour  faire  revenir  les  Prussians  de  leur 
antipathic  centre  les  Anglais.  Medem  sera  appele  a  s'acquitter  de  la  meme 
tache  aupres  du  prince  Metternich." — Ibid.,  pp.  150-151.  A  marked  coolness 
existed  between  England  and  France  as  long  as  Palmerston  remained  in  office. 
See  Guizot,  op.  cit.,  VI,  pp.  112-113,  116-117,  124-125,  130  ff.,  412-417.  Bulwer, 
op.  cit.,  VI,  pp.  375-383. 

140B.  Disraeli,  Tancred,  III,  Chap.  6,  quoted  by  Monypenny,  op.  cit.,  II, 
P-  95- 

141Hall,  op.  cit.,  p.  329.  Hasenclever  was  also  enthusiastic  about  the  triumph 
of  Palmerston.  In  his  conclusions  he  declared  in  part:  "Wenn  wir  jedoch  die 
englische  Politik  als  Ganzes  iiberschauen,  wenn  wir  die  damals  allerdings  kaum 
geweckten  imperialistischen  Gedanken  mit  in  Rechnung  setzen,  so  miissen  wir 
bekennen,  das  Palmerston  die  Bahn  zur  Grosse  Englands  richtig  empfunden, 
vorausgeahnt  hat.  Den  kiirzesten  Weg  nach  Indien  hat  er  vor  plotzlichen 
Uberfallen  durch  die  russische  Flotte  vom  Schwarzen  Meer  aus  freigehalten; 
durch  die  Verdrangung  Frankreichs  aus  Agypten,  durch  die  Beschrankuug 
Mehemed  Alis  auf  das  Pharaonenland  hat  er  auch  diese  wichtigste  Etappe  auf 
der  grossen,  die  Volker  verbindenden  Strasse  nach  Indien  und  dem  fernen  Osten 
dem  englischen  Einfluss  offen  gehalten. 

"Palmerston's  diplomatische  Kunst  mag  hie  und  da  wegen  der  vonihm 
angewandten  Mittel  anfechtbar  sein;  seine  Politik  war  jedoch  trotz  scheinbarger 
Schwankungen  durchaus  folgerichtig;  sie  entsfrach  in  jeder  Hinsicht  den  Bediirf- 
nissen  und  den  Interessen  seines  Landes.  .  .  .  Was  ihn  vorwarts  trieb,  was  all 
sein  Handeln  einzig  und  allein  bestimmte  und  leitete,  war  das  Interesse  Englands, 
die  Grosse  seines  Vaterlandes:  der  unbezahmbare  Drang,  als  Staatsmann  in  der 
auswartigen  Politik  sich  geltend  zu  machen  und  ungeachtet  aller  Widerstande 
sich  durchzusetzen,  iiber  wiegt  in  ihm  bei  weitem  die  Freude  an  einer  fur  das 
grosse  Ganze  oft  nurzu  unfruchtbaren  inneren  parteipolitischen  Betatigung." — 
Hasenclever,  op.  cit.,  pp.  311-312.  Guichen,  as  one  might  expect,  has  not  been  so 


232  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [558 

must  be  admitted,  had  contributed  greatly  to  the  defeat  of  Russia's 
policy  of  peaceful  penetration  in  Turkey  and  he  had  contributed 
likewise  to  the  defeat  of  French  peaceful  penetration  in  Egypt. 
In  other  words,  he  had  defended  Constantinople  from  the  Tsar 
and  Alexandria  from  Louis  Philippe.  From  the  British  Imperialist 
point  of  mew,  it  is  true,  he  had  accomplished  much. 

While  the  termination  of  the  Turco-Egyptian  question  was  of 
immediate  significance,  it  by  no  means  implied  a  permanent  solu- 
tion of  the  general  question  of  the  Near  East.  In  less  than  a 
decade  France  was  destined  to  return  to  an  aggressive  foreign 
policy  in  the  Levant;  in  less  than  a  decade  and  a  half  Russia  was 
destined,  not  only  to  witness  the  reunion  of  England  and  France, 
but  also  to  experience  their  open  hostility  and  to  lose  much  of 
what  she  had  gained  previously  at  the  expense  of  the  Porte;  and 
within  three-quarters  of  a  century  England,  despairing  perhaps 
of  ever  finding  a  permanent  solution  of  the  question  of  the  Near 
East,  was  destined  to  abandon  her  attempts  to  preserve  the  inde- 
pendence and  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  instead,  in 
order  to  protect  the  route  across  the  Isthmus  of  Suez  to  India,  to 
secure  under  her  own  control,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  Egypt, 
Arabia,  and  Palestine — the  major  part  of  the  territory  claimed 
by  Mehemet  AH  in  i839.142  Indeed  the  termination  of  the  Turco- 
Egyptian  dispute  of  1832-1841  marked  only  the  end  of  the  first 
phase  of  a  question  which  was  destined — and  may  still  be  today — 
long  to  play  a  major  role  in  the  rivalries  of  the  great  Powers. 

impressed  by  the  triumph  of  Lord  Palmerston.  According  to  him  one  of  the 
chief  consequences  of  the  crisis  of  1839  to  1841,  and  particularly  of  the  excite- 
ment which  accompanied  it  in  France,  was  the  accentuation  of  the  movement 
for  German  unity  which  was  "pour  le  plus  grand  malheur  de  la  France,  de 
1'Europe  et  du  monde."  See  Guichen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  533-539. 

"There  were  Englishmen  who  advocated  a  similar  policy  in  1841.  Note  the 
following  extract  from  a  letter,  Napier  to  Minto,  Feb.  5,  1841:  "'I  dined  with 
the  Pasha  yesterday;  .  .  .  He  looks  to  England  to  protect  him,  and  if  we  do,  he 
will  become  our  vassal  if  we  wish  it;  in  fact,  there  is  nothing  we  can  ask  in 
reason  that  he  will  not  do.  Next  to  Egypt  being  a  colony  of  England,  it  is 
best  that  it  should  be  an  independent  power,  paying  tribute  to  the  Porte. 
Our  commerce  to  India  will  become  very  extensive;  and  the  facility  of  traveling 
become  easier  every  day.  He  intends  putting  a  lock  from  the  canal  into  the 
Nile,  to  enable  passengers  to  go  from  hence  to  Cairo  without  moving  from  the 
steam-boats  that  are  to  be  established,  and  I  have  no  doubt  ere  long  a  rail- 
road will  be  made  from  Cairo  to  Suez;" ' — Quoted  by  Napier,  War  in  Syria, 
II,  pp.  179-180.  See  also  Appendix  C. 


APPENDIX  A 
THE  FRENCH  BOURSE,  JANUARY,  1840,  to  AUGUST,  1841 

The  figures  given  below,  which  are  the  closing  quotations  for 
the  particular  days  cited,  have  been  taken  from  the  Journal  des 
Debats. 


3%  F  in  courant 

5%  F  in  courant 


Jan.  2, 
1840 

Mch.  i, 
1840 

May  2, 
1840 

July  i, 
1840 

July  15, 
1840 

80.70 
111.90 

82.40 
"3-95 

8445 
114.40 

8545 
118.30 

86.10 
1  1  8.80 

July  25, 
1840    . 

Aug.  i, 
1840 

Aug.  14, 
1840 

Sept.  i, 
1840 

Sept.  15, 
1840 

85.70 
1  1  8.60 

82.00 
1  14.00 

79-35 
112.95 

80.10 
113-70 

73-oo 
104.80 

Oct.  i, 
1840 

Oct.  6, 
1840 

Oct.  15, 
1840 

Nov.  i, 
1840 

Nov.  14, 
1840 

70.95 
104.50 

65-25 

100.50 

72.00 
106.00 

75-75 
108.85 

78.70 
110.50 

Dec.  i, 

1840 

Jan.  2, 
1841 

Mch.   i, 
1841 

June  i, 
1841 

Aug.  2, 
1841 

79.60 
in.  20 

76.80 
110.60 

77-50 
11340 

78.80 
H4-7S 

77.25 
116.75 

233 


APPENDIX  B 

FRANCE  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION:  AN  EXTRACT 

FROM  AN  ARTICLE  WHICH  WAS  PUBLISHED  IN 

THE  EXAMINER,  AUGUST  23,  1840,  P.  531. 

(From  our  own  Correspondent.} 

".  .  .  Whichever  country,  France  or  England,  really  desires  to 
have  an  open  quarrel,  there  is  cause  and  pretext  enough.  There 
has  been  a  deviation  from  the  alliance  on  both  sides;  and  the  true 
reason  is,  that  the  interests  of  the  countries  are  diametrically  oppo- 
site. France  feels  herself  oppressed  by  the  superior  maritime  force 
of  Great  Britain,  and  she  is  making  a  bold  effort  to  be  mistress  of 
the  whole  south  and  east  coast  of  the  Mediterranean,  from  Ceuta 
to  where  the  Taurus  dips  into  the  sea. .  She  may  talk  of  Mehemet 
being  independent,  of  his  making  part  and  parcel  of  the  Ottoman 
empire,  and  supporting  its  integrity;  but  this  is  all  nonsense,  and 
she  knows  it.  The  new  joint  empire  of  Egypt,  Syria,  and  Arabia, 
exists  by  French  support,  and  cannot  refuse  a  French  command. 


Note. — The  charges  against  the  French  made  by  the  writer  of  this  article 
were  perhaps  overdrawn.  Nevertheless  it  appears  that  there  was  some  founda- 
tion for  them.  Note,  in  this  connection,  the  following  extract  from  a  summary 
of  a  speech  delivered  by  Thiers  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  April  13,  1841: 
"  .  .  .  Un  Ministre  etranger,  meilleur  juge  que  nous-memes  de  nos  interets, 
disait  a  1'ambassadeur  de  France: 

"  'Nous  voyons  bien  au  fond  quelle  est  la  politique  de  la  France  dans  la 
question  d'Orient;  cette  politique  n'est  pas  europeene.  La  France  possede  le 
nord  de  1'Afrique;  elle  y  a  une  armde  de  70,000  hommes.  Tout  pres  d'elle  se 
trouvent  le  pacha  de  Tunis  et  le  pacha  de  Tripoli;  qu'est-ce?  presque  rien:  de 
malhereux  princes  musulmans  qui  tremblent  devant  la  France.  Mais  un  peu  au 
dela  il  y  a  le  pacha  d'Egypte,  qui  possede  la  mer  Rouge  et  1'Euphrate.  Ainsi, 
directement  par  le  nord  de  1'Afrique,  indirectement  par  son  alliance  \s\c\  avec 
le  pacha  d'Egypte,  la  France  domine  depuis  1'entree  la  Mediterranee  et  du  detroit 
de  Gibraltar  jusqu'a  la  mer  Rouge  et  1'Euphrate;  cela  ne  peut  pas  nous 
convenir.' 

"Voila  ce  que  disait  un  ministre  etranger,  parlant  a  un  ambassadeur  de 
France;  et  assurement  vous  m'accorderez  bien  que  ces  deux  personnages  etaient 
fort  competens,  que  ces  deux  personages  n'auraient  pas  echange  entre  eux  des 
idees  pueriles. 

"Ainsi,  a  1'etranger,  nos  interets  en  Orient  etaient  appr£ci6s  comme  des 
interets  considerables." — Journal  des  Debats,  Apr.  14,  1841.  See  also,  Bulwer  to 
Palmerston,  Apr.  16,  1841,  Levant  Correspondence,  III,  p.  382. 

[234] 


561]  APPENDIX  235 

And  this  empire  stands  astride  the  Red  Sea  and  the  Euphrates, 
now  the  only  modes  of  communication  with  the  East.  M.  Lamar- 
tine  said  in  January  last,  in  the  debate  of  the  French  Chamber, 
'England  will  wage  a  war  of  a  hundred  years,  and  spend  her  last 
shilling,  rather  than  suffer  this.'  M.  Lamartine  knows  both  Eng- 
land and  the  Levant.  For  my  part,  long  as  I  have  cherished  the 
idea  of  a  French  and  English  alliance,  I  believe  this  alliance  im- 
possible as  long  as  France  holds  the  pretensions  and  the  views  she 
does  in  the  Levant.  As  for  the  views  of  England,  she  cannot  waive 
them,  for  they  are  identical  with  her  very  existence.  And  France 
not  abandoning  those  views,  then  a  war,  and  a  fierce  war,  with 
a  full  trial  of  the  maritime  strength  of  the  two  countries,  becomes 
inevitable,  sooner  or  later.  French  Statesmen  are  fully  aware 
of  this,  and  no  doubt  regret  it.  They  would  willingly  content 
themselves  with  preventing  England  or  any  Power  from  monopo- 
lizing the  shores  of  the  Mediterranean,  without  seeking  to  seize 
influence  there  for  France,  directly  or  indirectly.  But  public 
opinion  in  France  has  espoused  the  Pasha,  seeing  nothing  less 
than  a  Frenchman  in  him;  and  Ministers  and  Chambers,  in 
obedience  to  a  general  opinion  so  vaguely  founded,  have  not  only 
renounced  the  English  alliance,  but  converted  England  into  a  foe." 


APPENDIX  C 

EXTRACTS  FROM  THE  CONCLUSIONS  DRAWN  BY  COM- 
MODORE NAPIER  IN  HIS  WAR  IN  SYRIA, 
II,  PP.  277,  278-279,  280. 

".  .  .  No  power  in  Europe  is  so  much  interested  in  keeping 
well  with  Mehemet  Ali  as  Great  Britain,  and  no  power  is  more 
aware  of  that  than  France;  .  .  .  France  had  opened  a  consider- 
able trade  with  Egypt,  and  she  entertained  great  fears  that  English 
enterprise  would  supplant  her;  no  wonder,  then,  that  she  should 
have  befriended  the  Pacha  in  every  possible  way.  France  is  as 
well  aware  as  we  are,  that  steam  navigation  having  got  to  such 
perfection,  Egypt  has  become  almost  necessary  to  England  as  the 
half-way  house  to  India,  and  indeed  ought  to  be  an  English  colony. 
Now  if  we  wished  to  weaken  Mehemet  Ali,  with  a  view,  in  the 
event  of  the  breakup  of  the  Turkish  empire,  which  is  not  far 
distant,  to  have  seized  Egypt  as  our  share  of  the  spoil,  we  were 
perfectly  right  in  our  policy;  or  even,  had  we  not  looked  so  far 
ahead,  it  might,  perhaps,  have  been  politic  to  have  confined 
Mehemet  Ali  to  Egypt,  so  that  in  the  event  of  his  stopping  the 
road  to  India  by  Suez,  we  might  have  the  road  of  the  Euphrates 
open,  one  remaining  in  the  possession  of  the  Ottoman  empire,  and 
the  other  in  that  of  the  Pacha  of  Egypt.  It  is  not,  however,  usual 
for  a  Government  to  quarrel  with  their  own  interests,  and  it  is  so 
decidedly  the  advantage  of  the  Pacha  of  Egypt  to  facilitate  by 
every  possible  means,  the  passage  across  the  Isthmus  of  Suez, 
that  on  the  whole  I  believe  the  soundest  policy  of  Great  Britain 
would  have  been  to  have  supported  Mehemet  Ali,  and  I  have  not 
the  smallest  doubt  that  when  France  saw  we  were  committed 
against  him,  she  seized  that  opportunity  of  quitting  the  alliance 
in  order  to  make  the  Pacha  her  firm  friend.  .  .  . 

".  .  .  By  raising  Mehemet  Ali  the  Porte  would  have  been 
strengthened;  and  indeed,  the  Pacha,  in  possession  of  Syria  and 
Egypt,  would  have  been  as  much  interested  in  controlling  the 
power  of  Russia  as  the  Sultan  himself.  Who  then  was  to  gain  by 
reducing  the  power  of  Mehemet  Ali?  Russia!  and  Russia  alone." 

Note. — France  as  well  as  England  was  interested  in  the  establishment  of 
steam  communication  through  Egypt  to  the  East.  See  an  account  of  plans  for 
the  establishment  of  a  steam  line  from  Marseilles  through  Alexandria  and  Suez 
to  the  Isle  of  Bourbon,  in  the  Journal  des  Debats,  April  20,  1841. 

[236] 


APPENDIX  D 

EXTRACTS  FROM  THE  INFORMATION  AND  OPINIONS 

OF  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  AGENTS  RELATIVE 

TO  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION 

i.  Vail  to  Livingston,  No.  52,  Jan.  30,  1833,  U.  S.  Department 
of  State  Archives,  England,  Vol.  XL. 

''The  great  motive  for  the  hostile  array  of  the  absolute  Monarchies  of 
Europe  will  never  cease  to  exist  as  long  as  liberal  principles  and  the  constitu- 
tional forms  of  Government  shall  occupy,  in  France,  the  place  of  divine  rights 
and  legitimacy;  but,  within  a  short  time,  various  causes  have  transpired  to  post- 
pone the  execution  of  military  designs  upon  that  country,  and  to  draw  the 
attention  of  the  Powers  by  whom  they  were  entertained  to  other  matters  more 
nearly  affecting  them.  The  cordial  co-operation  of  England  in  effecting  the  organ- 
ization of  the  new  kingdom  of  Belgium: — the  little  prospect  of  neutralizing  the 
former  so  long  as  that  object  is  not  accomplished: — the  triumph  of  the  liberal, 
over  the  Aristocratic  party  in  Great  Britain,  as  exhibited  in  the  late  elections: — 
the  strength  acquired  by  the  French  Administration  through  the  harmony  which 
subsists  between  it  and  the  Chambers: — the  failure  of  the  Duchess  of  Bern,  and 
other  Carlists  to  excite  internal  disturbances,  and  the  restoration  of  order,  con- 
fidence and  business  throughout  the  Kingdom,  have  opened  the  eyes  of  the 
Northern  Allies  upon  the  ability  of  their  intended  prey  to  struggle  for  life,  while 
they  began  to  feel  that  their  own  weapons  were  too  heavy  to  be  borne  much 
longer  without  using  them.  On  the  other  hand,  each  of  the  three  Powers  has 
felt  that  there  were  causes  at  home  likely  to  paralyze  its  energies.  Prussia  has 
to  keep  down  liberalism  among  the  German  States:  Austria  has  never  been  easy 
since  the  French  have  held,  at  Ancona,  the  brand  which  may  set  her  Italian 
Provinces  in  a  blaze;  and  Russia,  though  daily  loading  the  Poles  with  new  chains, 
needs  her  best  army  to  curb  the  indignant  spirit  of  that  heroic  people.  But 
another  cause  seems  to  be  growing  out  of  very  recent  occurrences  in  the  East, 
more  powerful  than  all  these  together,  to  break  that  tyrannical  influence  which 
has  been  so  perniciously  extended  over  the  communities  of  inferior  rank:  and 
that  is,  Discord  among  the  members  of  the  alliance. 

''The  rapid  advance  of  the  Egyptian  Pacha  to  the  conquest  of  Turkey  and 
Constantinople  seems  to  have  opened  the  eyes  of  Russia  to  the  danger,  for  her 
southern  Provinces,  of  allowing  an  ambitious  and  powerful  chief  to  substitute 
himself  in  the  place  of  the  humble  and  weak  Sultan;  and,  if  appearances  are  not 
misunderstood,  Russian  diplomacy  has  been  busy  in  preparing  the  European 
Governments  for  the  intervention  of  Russian  arms  in  preventing  the  completion 
of  the  conquest  of  Turkey.  Hence,  perhaps,  the  visit  of  Pozzo  di  Borgo  to  London 
to  confront  the  Turkish  Ambassador  Namik  Pacha,  whose  mission  cannot  be 
supposed  to  have  had  any  other  object  than  that  of  craving  British  aid  to  super- 
sede the  necessity  of  Russian  intervention,  which  is  said  to  be  unpopular  at 
Constantinople,  and  the  ultimate  object  of  which  is  suspected,  at  Vienna,  to  be 
the  possession  of  Moldavia  and  Wallachia, — perhaps  of  Greece;  and,  at  London, 

[237] 


2j8  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [564 

the  establishment  of  naval  stations  and  supremacy  in  the  Mediterranean.  These 
suspicions  are  authorized  by  the  efforts  known  to  be  making  to  increase  the 
Russian  Navy,  and  by  the  organization  of  a  military  expedition  at  Sebastopol 
under  General  Mouravieff,  who  is  said  to  have  discretionary  orders  to  move 
forwards.  If  these  suppositions  be  correct — and  many  see  in  impending  events, 
confirmation  of  their  correctness — the  consequences  must  be  a  separation  of,  per- 
haps Prussia,  but  certainly  Austria,  who,  once  before,  arrested  the  conquering 
army  of  Diebitsch  at  the  gates  of  Constantinople,  from  their  great  ally,  and  a 
combination  of  interests  between  them,  France  and  England,  and  Bavaria  who 
has  lately  undertaken  to  give  independence  and  a  Sovereign  to  Greece.  Whether 
these  speculations  have  any  foundation  in  reality  or  not,  it  would  be  hazardous  to 
affirm;  but  it  is  certain  that  they  are  the  subject  of  much  conjecture  here  and 
in  the  other  Capitals  of  Europe;  and  it  is  equally  certain  that,  although  much 
time  is  devoted,  in  Downing  Street,  to  the  still  and  ever  pending  Belgian  ques- 
tion, the  Ministers  hold  frequent  Cabinet  Councils  at  which  the  domestic  affairs 
of  the  Kingdom  are  understood  not  to  be  the  exclusive  subject  of  deliberation." 

2.  Vail  to  Livingston,  No.  58,  March  22,  1833,  U.  S.  Depart- 
ment of  State  Archives,  England,  Vol.  XL. 

"I  enclose,  by  desire  of  Mr.  Buchanan,  an  extract  from  the  Journal  of 
St.  Petersburg  containing  an  article  upon  the  Russian  interference  in  the  affairs 
of  Turkey.  The  papers  have  given  news  from  Constantinople  of  a  more  recent 
date,  from  which  it  appears  that  the  Russian  fleet  had  actually  anchored  in  the 
Bosphorus.  The  new  French  Ambassador,  Admiral  Roussin,  who  arrived  about 
the  same  time,  had  persuaded  the  Sultan  to  decline  the  further  aid  of  the 
Emperor,  and  engaged  to  arrest  the  advance  of  the  Egyptian  troops.  But,  in  the 
meantime,  the  fleet  remained,  and  the  Russian  Army  of  thirty  thousand  men  was 
on  its  way  from  the  banks  of  the  Danube  to  Constantinople.  Whether  the  Sultan 
will,  in  reality,  place  more  confidence  in  the  diplomacy  of  Admiral  Roussin,  un- 
supported as  it  is  by  any  semblance  of  phisical  [sic]  power  immediately  at 
command,  than  in  the  combined  naval  and  military  force  of  Russia  to  save  his 
crown,  and  perhaps  his  head,  is,  with  reason,  I  think,  doubted  here:  And,  besides 
that  the  Czar  and  the  Grand  Turk  have  some  pecuniary  accounts,  growing  out 
of  the  peace  of  Adrianople,  still  left  unsettled,  many  accidental  causes  may  arise 
to  afford  a  pretext  for  not  immediately  withdrawing  the  imperial  protection  from 
the  Turkish  Capital.  In  that  case,  conjecture  will  set  itself  at  work  to  divine  the 
effects  of  the  delay  upon  the  general  politics  of  Europe,  and  reports  are  already 
afloat  of  a  coolness  between  Russia  and  France,  whose  jealousy  of  each  other  in 
that  quarter  is  now  beginning  to  show  itself  more  openly  than  it  has  hitherto 
done,  in  this  seeming  eagerness  to  save  the  tottering  empire  of  the  Ottomans  from 
impending  ruin.  From  the  apparent  inaction  of  Great  Britain  on  this  occasion 
it  would  appear  that  her  diplomacy  was  caught  asleep  at  Constantinople.  Perhaps 
it  may  have  been  lulled  into  security,  as  to  events  abroad,  by  the  presence  at 
the  Court  of  St.  James,  of  Namik  Pacha,  who,  during  his  stay  here,  seemed  to 
divide  his  time  between  Downing  Street  and  the  Russian  Embassy.  That 
minister,  who,  as  Prince  Lieven  informed  me,  was  merely  the  bearer  of  a  letter 
from  the  Porte  to  the  British  Government,  with  orders  to  take  back  the  answer, 


. 


565]  APPENDIX  239 

left  England  a  few  days  ago,  on  his  way  home,  leaving,  as  Resident  here,  Mr. 
Maurojeni,  a  Greek  long  employed  in  the  diplomatic  service  of  Turkey." 

3.  Livingston  to  McLane,  No.  15,  Dec.  2,  1833,  U.  S.  Depart- 
ment of  State  Archives,  France,  Vol.  XXVII. 

"I  have  lately  in  confidence  been  suffered  to  peruse  the  notes  which  were 
presented  by  the  Ministers  of  France  and  England  at  St.  Petersburg,  to  the 
Emperor.  .  .  .  The  answer  to  these  two  notes  expresses  surprise.  .  .  .  When  the 
notes  were  transmitted  from  St.  Petersburg  to  this  place,  a  conference  was  had 
by  the  Ambassador  with  one  of  the  Ministers  here  on  the  subject,  when  the 
latter  to  excuse  the  peremptory  language  of  the  note,  said  it  had  not  been  so 
worded  at  first,  but  that  it  had  been  altered  by  the  counsel  as  he  supposed  of  the 
English  Cabinet.  This  last  circumstance  shows  the  ascendancy  of  England,  and 
the  avowal  produced  the  natural  but  not  very  courteous  reply,  'You  ought  not, 
Sir,  to  have  made  such  a  confession.'  Although  this  was  given  to  me  in  confidence, 
I  had  leave  to  communicate  it  to  you  in  the  same  manner,  and  I  pray  you  Sir, 
to  take  particular  care  that  nothing  contained  in  my  despatches  of  this  nature 
be  made  public,  or  what  is  the  same  thing,  shall  either  confidentially  or  otherwise, 
be  communicated  to  Congress." 

4.  Livingston  to  McLane,  No.  16,  Dec.  u,  1833,  U.  S.  Depart- 
ment of  State  Archives,  France,  Vol.  XXVII. 

"By  my  last,  No.  15  I  informed  you  of  the  contents  of  a  correspondance 
which  had  been  confidently  communicated  to  me  with  leave  to  inform  you  of  its 
tenour.  I  have  now  the  honour  to  give  you  some  of  the  results  communicated 
from  the  same  source,  and  on  the  same  condition.  It  appears  that  the  answer 
excited  much  higher  feelings  in  one  of  the  parties  than  in  the  other.  France 
seems  to  consider  the  concluding  phrase  of  the  answer  as  a  fair  reply  to  the  same 
phrase  in  the  note,  and  is  inclined  to  let  the  matter  rest  until  Russia  shall  commit 
some  act  hostile  to  her  interest  in  the  East.  Great  Britain  on  the  contrary  takes 
the  matter  in  high  dudgeon,  and  it  is  believed,  is  now  fitting  out  a  strong  re- 
enforcement  for  her  Mediterranean  fleet.  Talleyrand  will  leave  this  on  Sunday 
for  London:  his  object  will  be  to  allay  the  spirit  that  animates  the  English 
Cabinet,  and  prevent  any  measure  that  may  lead  to  an  immediate  rupture.  In 
the  meantime  another  note  is  preparing  here  to  be  presented  to  the  Emperor, 
asking  for  the  explanation  of  his  intentions,  but  in  a  more  moderate  form. 
Whether  England  will  assent  to  this  measure  is  considered  as  doubtful.  If  she 
should,  the  answer  of  the  Emperor  will  be  substantially  the  same;  that  his  object 
is  to  defend  the  Sultan,  and  that  none  of  the  other  powers  have  a  right  to  make 
any  objections  to  it,  more  especially  those  who  profess  to  have  the  same  object. 
If,  however,  the  explanation  should  be  demanded  in  the  tone  which  the  present 
feeling  of  the  British  Cabinet  seems  to  indicate,  I  [have]  been  given  to  under- 
stand that  no  concession  will  be  made,  and  that  any  event  less  'untoward'  even 
than  the  attack  on  the  Turkish  fleet  at  Navarino  may  bring  about  a  war,  which 
in  the  present  state  of  Europe  cannot  fail  to  be  a  general  one.  If  on  the  other 
hand  the  Emperor  should  find  that  he  is  not  ready  for  the  struggle,  and  amicable 
explanations  should  procrastinate  the  crisis,  it  cannot  be  for  a  long  period.  The 


240  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [566 

policy  of  Russia  is  apparent;  She  is  extending  her  possessions  on  the  Caspian, 
and  approaching  in  that  direction  to  India,  not  probably  with  any  serious  inten- 
tion of  undertaking  so  hazardous  an  attempt,  but  for  the  same  purpose  that 
Napoleon  threatened  the  invasion  of  England.  In  the  meantime  she  is  creating 
a  naval  force  on  the  Black  Sea,  which  the  late  treaty  with  the  Porte  defends 
against  the  entrance  of  any  other  power  who  might  interrupt  them.  All  the  terri- 
tory of  Turkey  in  Europe  is  within  their  grasp;  and  although  it  is  not  their  inten- 
tion to  take  any  violent  measure  at  present  to  secure  this  prize;  yet  the  moment 
insurrection,  assassination,  or  any  other  event  shall  take  off  their  Good  Ally, 
the  Ottoman  Empire  is  at  an  end.  The  powers  whose  interest  it  would  be  to 
prevent  this  aggrandizement,  and  whose  united  power  might  enable  them  to  do  it, 
will  be  bought  off.  Austria  by  an  increase  of  dominion  in  Italy  and  in  the  East. 
Prussia  by  procuring  its  aggrandizement  in  Germany.  Sardinia  has  been  long 
subservient  to  Russian  policy;  Bavaria  will  be  kept  in  check  by  its  family  interest 
in  Greece,  and  the  rest  of  Germany  are  distinctly  powerless.  The  only  powers 
then  to  stop  these  great  strides  to  uncontrolable  power  are  England  and  France. 
The  debt  of  the  one  and  the  unsettled  dynasty  of  the  other  may  incline  both  to 
tempori[z]e.  But  still  the  ease  with  which  England  may  shut  up  the  entrance 
to  the  Black  Sea  and  the  Baltic  may  induce  them  to  meet  the  contingency  with 
their  accustomed  energy.  I  have  thought  it  my  duty  to  give  you  as  well  my 
impressions,  as  the  facts  which  produced  them,  and  to  suggest  the  propriety  of 
being  prepared  with  a  naval  force  to  make  our  neutrality  respected,  if  events 
should  occur  which  are  by  no  means  impossible  that  may  produce  a  general 
European  war.  It  will  be  quite  as  necessary  in  such  a  conflict  as  it  ever  has  been, 
and  perhaps  more  so.  In  the  discussions  which  have  taken  place  on  this  subject, 
(and  they  have  been  very  warm)  the  answer  to  an  observation  that  the  Russian 
commerce  would  be  destroyed  by  the  blockade  I  have  mentioned;  was,  'Tht 
Americans  will  carry  on  our  trade.' " 

5.  Vail  to  McLane,  No.  104,  Dec.  30,  1833,  U.  S.  Department 
of  State  Archives,  England,  Vol.  XLI. 

"Looking  now  towards  the  East,  it  must  be  confessed  that  the  political  horizon 
there  exhibits  dark  specks  which,  either  accident  or  the  jealousies  and  antipathies, 
for  the  indulgence  of  which  that  quarter  of  the  Globe  affords  so  wide  a  field, 
may  blow  into  a  tempest  which  would  shake  Europe  to  its  foundation.  The  Pacha 
of  Egypt,  though  induced  to  pause  in  his  career  of  conquests,  is  not  subdued, 
and  has  just  shown,  by  his  refusal  to  pay  a  stipulated  tribute  to  the  Sultan  that 
his  submission  was  but  a  measure  of  policy,  his  allegiance  a  mere  matter  of 
form,  and  that  his  independence  from  the  Porte  is  absolute.  The  possessions 
he  retains  in  Syria  still  open  to  him  the  road  to  all  the  Asiatic  provinces  of  the 
Sultan,  if  not  to  Constantinople;  and  he  does  not  relax  in  his  warlike  spirit  or 
preparations.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Emperor  of  Russia,  still  holding  the 
European  districts  of  Turkey,  and  maintaining  a  large  fleet  on  the  Euxine,  is 
equally  ready,  at,  or  even  without,  the  call  of  the  Sultan  who  is  utterly  powerless, 
for  assistance  under  the  late  Treaty  between  them,  to  march  to  Constantinople 
on  the  least  appearance,  either  real  or  pretended,  of  danger,  overrun  all  the 
Turkish  Provinces  on  both  shores  of  the  Euxine,  line  the  Bosphorus  with  his 


567]  APPENDIX  241 

troops  and  fleets,  garrison  the  forts  along  the  Dardanelles,  and,  carrying  into 
effect  the  secret  stipulations  of  the  Treaty  which,  under  such  a  contingency  forbid 
the  entrance  of  foreign  ships,  make  himself  as  completely  master  of  all  the 
strong  points  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  as  if  it  were  a  Russian  province.  These 
are  all  events  brought  within  the  pale  of  possibility  by  the  occurrences  of  this 
year,  to  which  it  might  be  practical,  by  some  further  partition  of  Poland,  or 
other  expedients  to  be  discussed  at  Vienna,  to  reconcile  Prussia  and  Austria, 
hitherto  hostile  to  any  Russian  aggrandizement  in  that  quarter;  and  if  there  be 
truth  in  the  imputation  of  ambitious  projects  attaching  to  the  Czar,  the  oppor- 
tunity would  seem  a  fit  one  for  their  easy  and  final  accomplishment,  were  it  not 
for  the  decided  opposition  they  would  have  to  encounter  on  the  part  of  England 
and  France  who  unite  in  watching  the  course  of  events  with  a  determination  not 
to  allow  them  to  add  to  the  territorial  or  political  power  of  the  Russian  Empire. 
That  some  apprehension  of  an  attempt  to  effect  this  is  entertained  at  Paris  and 
London,  is  evident  from  the  activity  which  prevails  in  the  French  and  English 
.arsenals  and  dock-yards.  At  Toulon,  a  fleet  capable  of  carrying  an  army  of 
thirty  thousand  men  is  nearly  equipped,  destined,  it  is  said,  for  new  conquests 
on  the  African  coast;  and  orders  have  been  issued  to  the  different  naval  stations 
in  Great  Britain  to  put  in  commission  a  number  of  large  ships  which  are  now 
fitting  out  with  great  expedition.  That  the  latter  is  intended  to  re-inforce  the 
British  fleet  now  collected  in  the  Levant  is  not  attempted  to  be  concealed;  nor 
can  it  be  doubted  that  the  French  expedition  may,  on  any  emergency,  be 
diverted  from  its  original  purpose  and  likewise  sent  up  the  Mediterranean. 
These,  which  are  matters  of  fact,  leave  but  little  room  for  conjecture,  and  may 
serve  to  give  confirmation  to  the  reports,  that  Russia  having,  notwithstanding 
the  representations  of  the  British  and  French  cabinets,  avowed  her  determina- 
tion to  execute  her  Treaty  with  Turkey,  in  the  event  of  the  latter  being  menaced 
from  without,  has  been  given  to  understand  that  the  stipulations  of  that 
Treaty  shall,  in  no  event  be  regarded,  and  their  execution  opposed  by  force.  If 
all  this  be  true,  the  peace  of  Europe  would  hang  upon  the  contingency  of  the 
march  of  a  few  Egyptian  regiments,  which  a  word  from  any  Power  desirous  to 
bring  on  the  commencement  of  hostilities  might  easily  set  in  motion.  But  this  is 
not  the  first  time,  since  the  French  revolution  of  1830,  that  peace  would  have 
been  preserved  by  a  display  of  warlike  preparations;  and  convinced  that  England 
and  France  are  as  anxious  as  ever  that  the  repose  of  Europe  should  not  be 
disturbed,  I  believe  that  it  is  with  the  same  view  that  the  expedient  is  resorted 
to  on  this  occasion.  The  question,  therefore,  would,  under  this  hypothesis,  be, 
whether  the  Czar,  even  supposing  him  assisted  by  his  German  allies,  would  feel 
strong  enough  to  meet  the  combined  naval  and  military  force  of  Great  Britain 
and  France.  Their  decided  superiority  by  sea,  and  the  ease  with  which  France 
might,  by  flinging  her  tricolored  flag  amidst  the  discontented  masses  in  Germany, 
Italy,  and  perhaps  Russia,  revolutionize  the  whole  Continent  of  Europe,  are 
obstacles  which  the  Russian  Monarch  cannot  but  appreciate,  and  which,  I 
would  incline  to  think,  would  prevent  his  doing  anything  to  provoke  a  contest 
likely  to  endanger  the  stability  of  his  throne,  and  the  existence  of  the  domestic 
institutions  of  his  own  Empire  and  those  of  his  allies.  Reasoning  thus,  un- 
prejudiced observers  of  events  still  withhold  their  belief  of  the  immediate 


242  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [568 

approach  of  war,  as  inevitably  to  grow  out  of  the  state  of  things  here  alluded  to; 
but  there  is  always  the  chapter  of  accidents  which  no  foresight  can  reach;  and 
it  should  ever  be  borne  in  mind  that,  with  so  many  elements  of  discord  and 
strife,  and  so  ready  to  be  put  in  motion  the  general  peace  stands  in  constant 
danger  of  being  interrupted.  It  is  no  doubt  with  a  view  to  be  prepared  for  such 
an  event,  as  well  as  to  avert,  by  showing  themselves  ready  to  meet,  it,  that 
most  nations  in  Europe  at  all  likely  to  be  called  upon  to  take  an  active  part, 
preserve  their  military  resources  unimpaired,  and,  in  some  instances,  are  consid- 
erably adding  to  them." 

6.  Porter  to  McLane,  No.  235,  Aug.  12,  1834,  U.  S.  Depart- 
ment of  State,  Turkey,  Vol.  IV. 

"The  communications  of  a  later  date  from  Alexandria  and  Syria  show  a 
different  state  of  things  from  that  communicated  by  Boghos  Bey  to  the  foreign 
Consuls,  and  from  the  measures  taken  here  to  profit  by  the  reverses  which  Ibra- 
him has  met  with,  there  can  scarcely  be  a  doubt  that  Syria  ere  long  will  be  in 
the  hands  of  its  legitimate  master,  the  Grand  Seignor. 

'We  have  information  that  the  French  force  in  the  Levant  is  to  be  increased, 
and  if  this  is  the  case  it  is  hard  to  determine  what  will  be  the  policy  of  France 
in  this  crisis,  but  as  all  her  measures  are  directed  towards  the  maintainance  of  her 
ascendency  in  the  Levant  she  will  no  doubt  do  that  which  is  most  likely  to 
secure  it.  If  it  should  be  to  her  interest  that  Syria  and  Egypt  should  return 
under  the  Dominion  of  the  Grand  Seignor  she  will  do  all  in  her  power  to  pro- 
mote their  subjection,  but  if  not  Mehemed  Alii  will  receive  the  assistance  of 
France,  and  as  heretofore  be  excited  to  resist  the  efforts  of  the  Grand  Seignor  to 
conquer  them. 

"The  commerce  of  France  with  Egypt,  as  may  be  seen  by  the  returns  ol 
our  Consular  Agent  is  immense.  She  has  scarcely  a  competitor,  and  nearly  the 
same  may  be  said  of  other  places  within  the  limits  of  Mehemet  Alli's  govern- 
ment, from  which  I  have  been  able  to  obtain  returns,  and  as  this  state  of  things, 
it  is  most  likely,  would  not  exist  if  Egypt  and  Syria  were  to  return  to  their 
former  master,  there  can  scarcely  be  a  doubt  that  every  means  will  be  resorted 
to  by  the  French  Government  to  prevent  their  return  and  thus  secure  to  herself 
a  commerce  so  very  lucrative.  Every  article  that  France  can  produce  from  her 
soil,  and  manufactures,  is  imported  in  large  quantities  into  Egypt,  and  every 
article  produced  in  Egypt,  and  coming  through  it  from  other  countries  is  im- 
ported into  France,  to  the  exclusion  of  almost  all  other  nations  from  a  participa- 
tion in  the  commerce." 

7.  Clay  to  Forsythe,  No.  34,  Sept.  3,  1834,  U.  S.  Department 
of  State  Archives,  Russia,  Vol.  XII. 

"The  news  received  here  in  the  month  of  July,  of  the  arrival  of  an  English 
squadron  at  Napoli  and  a  report,  that  France  was  also  fitting  out  a  fleet  for  the 
same  destination  excited  the  suspicion  of  the  Imperial  Cabinet  so  much,  as 
to  induce  Count  Nesselrode  to  demand  explanations  thereon  from  Mareschal 
Maison.  The  Ambassador  replied,  that  his  Government  had  no  intention  of 
sending  a  fleet  to  that  part  of  the  Mediterranean,  and,  that  he  supposed  the 


569]  APPENDIX  243 

British  squadron  was  placed  there,  more  for  the  purpose  of  supporting  the  Whig 
Ministry  in  Parliament,  than  for  any  other  motive.  Sometime  afterwards  the 
Vice  Chancellor  asked  for  further  explanations,  when  the  Mareschal,  after  repeat- 
ing what  he  had  said  before,  assured  him,  that  France  considered  the  Turkish 
question  as  settled  for  the  present,  and,  that  if  the  Cabinet  of  St.  James  should 
create  any  difficulties,  which  he  very  much  doubted  since  the  commercial  interests 
of  Great  Britain  would  be  injured  thereby,  the  French  Ministry  would  certainly 
take  no  part  in  the  affair. 

"On  the  I4th  of  August,  a  Courier  arrived  from  Constantinople,  bringing  the 
news,  that  the  Sultan,  having  heard  that  all  Syria  was  in  open  revolt  and  that 
Ibrahim  Pacha  had  been  defeated,  determined  to  take  advantage  of  the  circum- 
stances to  diminish  the  power  of  the  Pacha  of  Egypt.  Orders  were  accordingly 
issued  for  the  Turkish  fleet  to  hold  itself  ready  to  put  to  sea.  I  am  informed 
that  the  English  and  French  Ambassadors  at  Constantinople  protested  separately 
against  the  resolution  of  the  Sultan  and  declared,  that  if  it  were  carried  into 
execution,  their  governments,  as  the  protectors,  of  the  Pacha  of  Egypt,  would 
consider  it  equivalent  to  a  declaration  of  war. 

"The  report  which  had  reached  Constantinople,  that  Ibrahim  had  been  made 
prisoner,  only  confirmed  the  Sultan  in  his  design  of  recovering  some  of  his  lost 
provinces,  notwithstanding  the  representations  of  the  English  and  French 
Ambassadors. 

''The  Russian  charge  d'affaires  also  used  his  influence  to  induce  the  Sultan 
to  abandon  this  hazardous  enterprise  and  finally  made  a  formal  protest  against 
the  measures.  I  am  told,  that  Baron  Ruchmann  stated  to  the  Divan,  that,  by 
the  Treaty  of  Alliance  of  the  8  July  1833,  the  Imperial  government  had  stipulated 
to  support  the  Porte  in  case  of  an  attack  made  upon  it  by  a  third  Power;  but 
that  if  the  Sultan  should  seek  to  bring  about  a  war  by  unreasonable  conduct, 
Russia  could  not  consider  herself  obliged  to  interfere  and  afford  armed  assistance. 
Count  Nesselrode,  it  is  said,  not  only  approved  of  Mr.  de  Ruckmann's  protest, 
but  charged  the  Ambassador  Mr.  Boutenieff,  who  has  returned  to  his  post,  to 
reiterate  the  declaration. 

"The  last  news  from  Constantinople  is,  that  Ibrahim  Pacha  has  been  obliged 
to  shut  himself  up  in  Jerusalem  to  await  the  arrival  of  the  troops  sent  to  his 
assistance  by  Mehemet  Alii. 

"It  appears  from  Mr.  de  Ruckmann's  despatches  of  the  2nd  August,  that 
Lord  Ponsonby  and  Admiral  Roussin  have  altered  their  tone,  and,  instead  of 
protesting  against  the  expedition  of  the  Turkish  fleet,  have  told  the  Sublime 
Porte,  that  their  Governments  would  not  interfere  if  it  succeeded  in  conquering 
the  revolted  provinces  of  the  Pacha  in  a  short  time,  (it  is  said  one  month  was  the 
period  mentioned).  Nevertheless,  the  Russian  charge  d'affaires  did  not  change 
his  language,  but  renewed  the  declaration  that  the  present  was  not  a  'casus 
foederis,'  and,  that,  consequently,  Russia  would  not  be  bound  to  come  to  the 
assistance  of  the  Porte,  in  case  it  involved  itself  in  difficulties  of  its  own  seeking. 
These  observations  had  not  induced  the  Sultan  to  abandon  his  project;  however 
his  fleet  remained  at  Constantinople  at  the  last  dates. 

"It  is  thought,  that  France  and  England  abandoned  their  policy  in  regard 
to  the  protests  so  suddenly,  with  the  hopes  that  the  Sultan  might  easily  reconquer 


244  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-1841 

his  lost  provinces  and  thus  place  his  Empire  in  a  condition  to  act  independently 
of  the  Russian  Cabinet." 

8.  Vail  to  Forsyth,  No.  168,  Jan.  22,  1835,  U.  S.  Department 
of  State,  England,  Vol.  XLII. 

"In  the  East,  likewise,  where  events  have,  more  than  once,  conducted  the 
most  powerful  nations  of  Europe  to  the  brink  of  violent  contention,  present 
appearances  are  of  a  more  pacific  character  than  they  had  been  for  some  time 
before.  Although  the  relative  positions  of  the  parties  are  not  materially  altered, 
some  approximation  is  stated  to  have  been  made — if  not  towards  a  final  adjust- 
ment of  causes  of  dispute,  at  least,  towards  an  understanding  of  each  other's 
views.  Private  accounts  of  recent  date,  and  well  entitled  to  credit,  have  been 
communicated  to  me,  and  announce  the  removal  of  the  difficulties  which  had 
hitherto  stood  in  the  way  of  an  arrangement  between  the  Sultan  and  the  Pacha 
of  Egypt,  as  the  result  of  a  Turkish  Embassy  to  Cairo.  The  Pacha  had  agreed 
to  evacuate  those  territories  which  had  not  been  ceded  to  him,  and  to  pay  to  the 
Sultan  the  stipulated  tribute.  Should  this  agreement  prove  a  pledge  of  lasting 
friendship  between  the  two  rivals,  it  will  remove  all  pretexts  for  the  hostile 
attitude  assumed  and  still  preserved  by  England,  France  and  Russia,  and  greatly 
diminish  the  chances  of  war  in  that  quarter.  It  is  confidently  reported  that 
the  British  Ambassador  had  addressed  to  the  Porte  a  note  requiring  a  categorical 
answer  to  the  question,  whether,  in  the  event  of  a  war  between  England  and 
Russia,  the  Porte  would  allow  the  free  passage  of  the  Dardanelles  to  the  fleets 
of  both  Powers,  or  confine  that  privilige  to  Russian  ships,  alone;  declaring,  at  the 
same  time,  that,  in  the  latter  case,  England  would,  if  deemed  necessary,  enforce 
the  extension  of  the  privilege  to  herself,  also.  This  declaration — the  first  so 
distinctly  expressed  by  Great  Britain,  has  created  considerable  alarm  in  the 
Turkish  capital." 

9.  Porter  to  Forsyth,  No.  293,  March  20,  1835,  U.  S.  Depart- 
ment of  State,  Turkey,  Vol.  V. 

"The  events  of  the  most  importance,  are,  that  the  Sultan  is  collecting  in 
Anatolia,  near  Syria,  a  most  formidable  army,  it  is  supposed  and  cannot  be 
doubted  for  the  invasion  of  Syria;  Troops  are  drawn  from  every  part  of  the 
Empire  to  reinforce  it,  and  artillery  and  munitions  of  war  are  collected  there  in 
large  quantities.  The  militia  is  organizing  for  the  protection  of  the  Capital  during 
the  absence  of  the  regular  troops;  the  entire  fleet  of  the  Sultan  is  ready  for  sea  at 
a  moment's  warning;  that  the  Emperor  of  Russia,  with  a  large  body  of  troops, 
on  the  Black  Sea,  are  ready  for  whatever  may  be  intended  by  him.  On  the  other 
hand  the  fleet  of  Mehemet  Alii,  his  main  reliance,  with  him  on  board,  is  ready 
for  sea,  the  advance  squadron  has  arrived  at  Candia,  and  he  has  said  publicly 
that  he  intends  to  command  in  person,  and  if  he  can  bring  that  of  the  Grand 
Signer  to  action,  he  intends  to  attempt  to  carry  it  by  boarding  with  his  Arabs. 
Egypt  is  exhausted  of  its  resources,  and  means  of  supplying  troops,  and  Syria 
is  in  a  state  of  great  discontent  from  the  cruel  and  violent  measures  pursued 
against  the  population  by  Ibrahim  Pacha;  the  same  discontent  prevails  in  Yemen, 
where  the  army  of  Mehemet  Alii,  sent  to  subject  the  Arabs,  has  been  destroyed 
by  sickness,  fatigue  and  frequent  skirmishing. 


57 1  ]  APPENDIX  245 

"The  avarice  of  France  to  engross  all  the  advantages  of  the  commerce  of 
Egypt,  and  the  desire  of  England  to  secure  the  advantages  of  a  communication 
with  India  across  the  Isthmus  of  Suez,  induce  them  to  give  support  to  Mehemet 
Alii  against  the  Sultan,  by  furnishing  him  with  the  means  of  keeping  up  his 
fleet,  while  the  desire  of  Russia  to  deprive  France  of  these  advantages  and  cut 
of[f]  the  communication  between  England  and  her  East  India  possession,  induces 
Russia  to  keep  a  large  fleet  in  the  Black  Sea,  which  both  England  and  France 
wish  to  prevent  passing  the  Dardanelles,  but  which  with  the  Army  assembled 
there,  is  ready  to  act  in  any  emergency  to  assist  the  Sultan  or  further  the  views 
of  the  Emperor  of  Russia. 

"England  and  France  it  would  appear  have  no  views  hostile  to  the  Sultan, 
or  otherwise  friendly  to  Mehemet  Alii,  than  their  respective  interests  are  con- 
cerned, and  the  same  may  be  said  in  regard  to  the  Emperor  of  Russia  in  his 
relations  with  the  Sultan  and  feelings  towards  Mehemet  Alii,  but  the  apparent, 
and  indeed,  undoubted  design  of  Russia  to  extend  her  Empire  far  East,  excites 
the  apprehension  of  England  for  her  India  possessions,  and  the  aid  given  by 
Russia,  which  may  enable  the  Sultan  to  recover  Egypt,  and  deprive  France  of 
her  lucrative  commerce,  thence  causes  her  to  act  in  unison  with  England  in  all 
the  affaires  of  the  Levant.  Russia  in  the  meantime  protected  in  the  Black  Sea 
by  the  strong  castles  of  Dardanelles,  from  which  she  has  free  egress,  is  encreasing 
in  strength  without  pledging  herself  to  any  party,  and  holds  herself  in  readiness 
to  act  as  her  interest  may  prompt;  a  course  which  compels  England  and  France 
to  keep  up  large  and  expensive  fleets  in  the  Levant  which  the  interests  they  have 
to  protect  will  scarcely  justify. 

"These  contending  interests  serve  greatly  to  retard  and  embarrass  the  Grand 
Signor  in  executing  his  design  of  reannexing  Egypt  and  Syria  to  his  Empire, 
from  which  they  have  been  separated  by  Mehemet  Alii.  A  great  effort  is  now 
about  being  made  to  recover  these  possessions,  and  a  few  months  will  determine 
whether  Mehemet  Alii  and  his  son  Ibrahim  Pacha  are  to  continue  to  rule  in 
Egypt  and  Syria,  which  have  been  scourged  so  long  by  their  cruelties  and 
extortions." 

10.  Vail  to  Forsyth,  No.  209,  October  22,  1835,  U.  S.  Depart- 
ment of  State  Archives,  England,  Vol.  XLIII. 

"The  mission  of  Lord  Durham,  the  lately  appointed  Ambassador  to  the  Court 
of  the  Czar,  has  supplied  matter  for  endless  speculation;  .... 

"As  the  political  scenes  enacting  in  the  East  are  those  which,  at  present, 
chiefly  attract  attention,  and  the  only  ones  in  which  any  germ  of  disturbance — 
remote  as  it  be — can  now  be  discerned,  the  circumstances  to  which  I  have 
alluded  [regarding  the  Durham  mission  to  Russia]  appeared  to  me  to  possess 
sufficient  interest  to  justify  my  seeking,  for  your  Department,  information 
respecting  them  on  the  correctness  of  which  some  reliance  might  be  placed.  With 
that  view,  I  called  upon  Count  Pozzo  di  Borgo,  the  Russian  Ambassador  here,  who, 
on  my  mentioning  the  subject,  expressed  a  desire  that  my  Government  should  be 
possessed  of  the  means  of  forming  a  correct  estimate  of  the  real  state  of  the  case. 
He  said  that  no  credit  was  to  be  given  to  the  statements  that  had  been  put  forth, 
either  as  to  the  pretended  designs  of  Great  Britain  in  sending  Lord  Durham  to 


246  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-1841  [S72 

St.  Petersburg  and  Constantinople,  or  as  to  the  jealousy  with  which  the  Russian 
Government  is  said  to  look  upon  that  appointment:  That,  on  the  contrary, 
Lord  Durham  had,  before  his  departure,  freely  conversed  with  him  regarding  his 
mission,  the  principal  object  of  which  was  to  secure  a  continuance  of  peace  and 
harmony  between  the  leading  European  Powers;  particularly  with  reference  to 
the  affairs  of  the  East;  and  that,  under  this  conviction,  the  Emperor  looked 
upon  it  with  the  most  ^  favorable  eye,  and  had  given  orders  that  all  facilities 
should  be  given  it  by  his  agents  abroad.  To  show  me  that  those  dispositions  had 
been  properly  seconded,  the  Count  submitted  for  my  perusal  a  despatch  he  had 
received  a  few  days  before  from  Mr.  Butinieff,  the  Russian  Ambassador  at 
Constantinople,  from  which  it  appeared  that  the  visit  of  Lord  Durham  there  was 
anticipated  in  the  most  friendly  spirit;  and  that  all  measures  to  facilitate  its 
object  had  been  taken  at  the  Russian  Embassy.  With  reference  to  the  addresses 
exchanged  by  Lord  Durham  and  the  Sultan,  Count  Pozzo  said  that  both  their 
spirit  and  language  had  been  misrepresented:  that  they  were  a  mere  interchange 
of  the  civilities  shown  on  all  such  occasions:  that  they  contained  nothing  that 
could  give  the  least  umbrage  to  the  Imperial  Court;  and  that  the  Sultan,  instead 
of  inviting  Lord  Durham  to  become  a  mediator  between  him  and  the  Czar,  had 
merely  expressed,  in  the  usual  diplomatic  language,  a  desire  that  he 
might  be,  at  St.  Petersburg,  the  interpreter  of  the  friendly  sentiments  of  the  Porte. 
He  stated  further  that  Lord  Durham  would  be  received  at  St.  Petersburg  with 
no  other  than  friendly  dispositions,  and  that  nothing  was  anticipated  from  his 
mission  but  the  means  of  consolidating  the  peace  of  Europe  and  mutual  good 
understanding  and  confidence  between  its  leading  Powers.  '  At  the  Count's 
request,  I  promised  that  I  would  communicate  to  you  an  account  of  our 
conversation. 

"Whatever  may  be  the  secret  or  ultimate  designs  of  Russia  upon  the  Otto- 
man dominions,  the  times  do  not  favor  their  execution;  and  her  rulers  cannot  but 
see  it.  She  is  suspected  of  striving,  by  covert  diplomatic  approaches,  to  prepare 
the  way  for  ulterior  movements;  and  the  suspicion  is  probably  not  altogether 
unfounded,  notwithstanding  the  earnest  disclaimer  of  all  views  of  aggrandisement 
so  often  put  forth  by  her  Agents.  But  Russia  is  too  well  aware  of  the  eager- 
ness with  which  her  conduct  is  watched,  and  of  the  determination  formed  to 
counteract  all  such  views — not  only  by  England,  but  by  other  Powers  in  closer 
friendship  with  her — to  attempt  anything  calculated  to  justify  the  suspicions 
entertained  of  her  designs.  Her  representative  here  does  not  conceal  the  solicitude 
with  which  the  Emperor  regards  the  condition  of  the  Porte,  nor  his  determina- 
tion that  she  shall  not  become  a  prey  to  conquest,  nor  fall  under  influences 
inimical  to  his  interests  in  the  shores  of  the  Black  Sea.  He  says  that  with  that 
view,  alone,  the  invasion  of  the  Pacha  of  Egypt  was  prevented;  and  that  the 
Emperor  proved  the  honesty  of  his  intentions  by  withdrawing  his  forces  after 
that  object  had  been  accomplished  and  the  Sultan  again  placed  in  a  situation 
to  maintain  his  independence.  In  a  word,  that  he  had  no  desire  of  becoming 
the  possessor  of  the  Bosphorus;  but  that,  at  the  same  time,  he  could  not  consent 
to  its  falling  into  the  hands  of  any  Power  by  any  means  capable  of  controlling 
his  establishments  on  the  Black  Sea.  There  are,  perhaps,  in  that  determination 
sufficient  motives  for  the  late  Russian  interference  in  behalf  of  the  Sultan;  and 


573]  APPENDIX  247 

if  the  other  Powers  could  be  convinced  that  the  Emperor's  policy  stops  there, 
they  could  have  but  little  reason  to  object  to  it.  The  fact,  however,  cannot  be 
concealed  that  every  fresh  instance  of  active  friendship  on  his  part  towards  Turkey 
has  extended  his  influence  in  that  quarter;  and  hence  the  jealous  fear  entertained 
by  all  the  nations  of  Europe  that  the  Porte  is  doomed  to  become  a  Russian 
Province.  The  no  longer  secret  treaty  of  Unkiar  Skelessi,  by  which  the  Sultan 
bound  himself  to  close  the  Dardanelles  against  the  ships  of  foreign  nations  when- 
ever Russia  should  deem  such  a  measure  necessary  to  give  effect  to  her  protectorship 
of  the  Ottoman  dominions,  could  not  but  give  umbrage  to  Great  Britain;  and 
a  remonstrance  against  the  provisions  of  that  compact  is  believed  to  be  one  of 
the  objects  of  Lord  Durham's  embassy.  The  Turkish  question,  as  between  Great 
Britain  and  Russia  resolves  itself,  at  present,  into  a  common  desire  to  preserve 
the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  with  a  view,  on  the  part  of  the  former,  to 
prevent  the  Emperor  from  possessing  himself  of  the  means  of  opening  the 
Mediterranean  to  his  naval  forces,  and  of  disputing  with  her  the  supremacy 'in 
that  sea;  and,  on  the  part  of  Russia,  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  the  establish- 
ment at  Constantinople  of  a  Power  which  might  prove  a  barrier  to  her  views  of 
aggrandisement  beyond  her  present  territorial  limits,  both  in  Europe  and  Asia. 
A  permanence  of  the  statu  quo  is  probably  all  that  either  party  seeks  for  the 
present.  It  is  possible  that  the  diplomacy  of  Lord  Durham  may  prove  successful 
in  attaining  such  an  object;  but  it  cannot  be  disguised  that  the  more  efficient 
negotiator  on  the  side  of  Great  Britain  is  the  large  naval  force  kept  up  by  her 
on  the  Mediterranean  station." 

ii.  Clay  to  Forsyth,  No.  10,  Aug.  i,  1836,  U.  S.  Department 
of  State  Archives,  Russia,  Vol.  XIII. 

"Whenever  an  editor  of  a  newspaper  in  Paris  or  London  writes  an  article 
in  which  the  name  of  the  Emperor  of  Russia  appears,  or  his  policy  is  considered, 
it  is  generally  to  present  him  to  the  reader  personally  as  a  heartless  Despot  and 
politically  as  a  grasping  and  crafty  Sovereign,  whose  only  aim,  with  regard  to  the 
Sultan,  is  to  appropriate  to  himself  as  large  a  portion  of  Turkey  as  he  can  with- 
out disturbing  the  peace  of  Europe  by  an  overt  act  of  hostility;  and  who  is 
constantly  setting  traps  to  catch  his  unfortunate  neighbor  [Turkey] — the 
exertions  of  France  and  England  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding. 

"In  my  opinion  injustice  is  done  not  only  to  the  character  of  the  Emperor 
Nicholas,  but  also  to  his  views.  There  is  no  good  reason  to  believe  that  his 
conduct  towards  Mahmoud  is  influenced  by  any  hope  of  adding  more  territory 
to  the  Russian  Empire,  for  the  Tsar  must  be  aware  that  his  dominions  are  now 
as  extensive  as  they  can  be  for  all  the  purposes  of  good  government  and  that 
any  increase  of  them  would  only  create  embarrassments — internal  and  external — 
without  being  productive  of  any  corresponding  advantages.  What  then  are  the 
intentions  of  Russia  with  regards  to  the  Porte  and  what  interest  has  the  Emperor 
to  endeavour  to  exercise  an  exclusive  influence  over  the  Turkish  Cabinet?  The 
answer  is  simple  and  would  probably  suggest  itself  to  many  could  they  but  divest 
themselves  of  the  idea  that  the  policy  of  Nicholas  I  must  naturally  be  the  same 
as  that  of  Catherine  II.  In  the  first  place,  Russia,  under  existing  treaties  enjoys 
particular  commercial  privileges  in  the  Turkish  dominions.  Her  commerce  is 


248  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [574 

daily  increasing  and  must  continue  to  do  so  unless  interrupted  by  a  war  between 
the  two  countries.  This  reason  alone,  would  be  sufficient  to  justify  a  wish  to 
have  a  predominant  weight  in  the  Ottoman  councils;  at  the  same  time,  the 
knowledge  of  such  a  design  cannot  authorize  the  feelings  of  jealousy  it  has 
engendered  in  the  West  of  Europe.  Secondly — The  relative  positions  of  Russia 
and  Turkey,  bordering  on  each  other,  and  the  local  interests  which  grow  out 
of  this  continguity  must  give  birth  to  many  transactions  between  them,  that 
do  not  necessarily  concern  other  states  and  which,  surely,  may  be  carried  on 
without  third  Powers  having  the  right,  on  any  ground,  of  demanding  explana- 
tions respecting  the  different  measures  that  may  be  resolved  on  to  promote  the 
prosperity  of  the  two  Empires.  Again,  as  the  Bosphorus  is  the  only  outlet  of 
the  Black  Sea,  it  is  apparent  that,  unless  Turkey  be  friendly,  not  only  the  com- 
mercial, but  every  other  interest  of  the  southern  provinces  of  Russia  must  suffer. 
The  agricultural  especially,  for  the  grain  of  the  Tauride  and  the  adjoining  govern- 
ments only  find  vent  through  that  channel. 

"The  conduct  of  the  Emperor  therefore,  in  reference  to  Turkey,  is  founded 
on  considerations  of  convenience,  carried  on  with  motives  purely  national  and 
designed  to  redound  to  the  prosperity  of  his  Empire;  not  by  encroaching  upon  the 
political  rights  of  other  Powers,  or  abstracting  from  them  any  commercial 
privileges,  or  lawful  claims  they  may  have  in  the  eyes  of  the  Divan:  but  by 
entering  fairly  into  competition  with  them  for  such  advantages  as  international 
transactions  may  yield. 

"The  residence  of  Lord  Durham,  the  British  Ambassador,  in  St.  Petersburg 
has  enabled  him  to  appreciate  the  policy  of  the  Emperor  towards  Turkey,  and 
to  see  that  His  Majesty,  so  far  from  endeavoring  to  sow  dissention,  is  desirous 
of  peace  and  aware  that  the  maintenance  of  it  is  necessary  to  the  improvement 
of  his  Empire  and  to  recruit  the  Imperial  treasury.  The  efforts  of  Lord  Durham 
to  convey  those  ideas  to  Lord  Palmerston  and  the  success  which  has,  up  to  the 
present  time,  attended  his  negotiations  to  bring  about  a  good  understanding 
between  England  and  Russia  have  rendered  him  very  popular  at  court,  and  no 
foreign  representative  is  treated  with  as  much  favour  as  he  is.  Nevertheless,  it 
seems  as  if  his  representations  have  not  entirely  convinced  Lord  Palmerston,  that 
the  designs  of  Russia  are  not  hostile  to  British  interests  in  Turkey,  for  Lord 
Ponsonby's  acts  at  Constantinople  betray  a  jealousy  of  the  influence  enjoyed  by 
the  Russian  Minister  in  that  capital,  and  it  is  more  than  probable  that  the  case 
of  Mr.  Churchill  was  seized  upon  by  his  Lordship,  rather  as  a  pretext  to  obtain 
the  dismission  of  Akif-Effendi  and  thus  to  get  rid  of  a  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  unfavorably  inclined  towards  England,  than  as  an  amends  for  injuries 
sustained  by  a  British  subject.  This  view  of  the  matter,  I  may  add,  is  taken 
by  other  Diplomatic  Representatives  in  St.  Petersburg." 

12.  Wheaton  to  Forsyth,  No.  87,  Dec.  5,  1838,  U.  S.  Depart- 
ment of  State  Archives,  Prussia,  Vol.  I. 

"As  the  Eastern  question  still  continues  to  attract  the  attention  of  the 
Governments  and  People  of  the  old  world  as  that  on  which  its  future  destinies 
depend  (although  its  solution  seems  to  be  momentarily  suspended  by  the  advan- 
tages obtained  by  British  diplomacy  over  the  Russian,  and  by  the  energetic 


575]  APPENDIX  249 

demonstrations  of  British  naval  and  military  power  in  the  Levant  and  on  the 
frontiers  of  India),  I  beg  leave  to  communicate  the  following  authentic  informa- 
tion relating  to  that  subject.  .  .  . 

''Some  intimation  received  by  the  British  from  the  Russian  Government 
that  in  case  Mahomet  Ali  should  openly  throw  off  his  allegiance  to  the  Porte, 
Russia  might  think  it  necessary  to  intervene  by  force  of  arms,  induced  Lord 
Palmerston,  some  time  since,  to  propose  to  the  Russian  cabinet  a  conference  of 
the  five  great  European  powers  in  order  to  concert  the  measures  they  would 
jointly  adopt  in  case  the  Pasha  of  Egypt  should  declare  himself  independent. 
Count  Nesselrode  returned  an  answer  to  this  proposition,  during  the  stay  of  the 
emperor  at  this  Capital  in  September  last,  declining  to  accede  to  it  upon  the 
ground  that  the  joint  action  of  the  five  Powers  to  prevent  Mahomet  Ali  from 
taking  such  a  step  was  already  secured  by  their  actual  correspondent  conduct, 
and  that  the  remonstrances  of  their  agents  having  hitherto  proved  sufficient  for 
that  object,  it  was  unnecessary  to  provide  for  a  hypothetical  case  which  might, 
and  probably  never  would  occur.  Count  Pozzo  de  Borgo  communicated  this 
reply  to  Lord  Palmerston,  who  after  reading  it,  observed  that  the  necessity  for 
such  a  mutual  understanding  among  the  five  Powers  was  not  obviated  by  the 
reasons  stated  by  Count  Nesselrode  since  the  want  of  it  would  leave  anyone  of 
them  force  to  act  according  to  its  own  views  of  its  own  interests  in  the  case 
supposed,  which  the  others  could  not  passively  suffer  as  it  might  involve  the 
undue  aggrandisement  of  that  one  which  should  interefere  by  force  of  arms 
between  the  Sultan  and  his  revolted  vassal.  Experience  had  already  shown  that  a 
Power  might  enter  upon  such  an  intervention  with  the  most  sincere  desire  to 
avoid  acquiring  any  selfish  advantages  for  itself,  and  yet  might  be  tempted  by 
circumstances  to  accept  of  such  advantages  when  in  the  course  of  events  they 
presented  themselves  to  view.  Thus  Russia  had  declared  on  the  breaking  out 
of  the  war  between  that  Empire  and  Turkey  in  1828,  that  she  did  not  seek  and 
would  not  accept  any  increase  of  territory  as  the  object  of  the  war.  Yet  it  was 
notorious  that  the  treaty  of  peace  by  which  it  was  terminated  embraced  cessions 
of  valuable  territory  by  which  the  limits  of  the  Russian  empire  were  extended 
in  Asia.  So  also  when  Russia  came  to  the  assistance  of  the  Porte  against 
Mahomet  Ali  in  1833,  she  professed  the  most  disinterested  views,  yet  her  armed 
intervention  ended  by  the  treaty  of  Unkiar  Skelessi  the  object  of  which  was  to 
shut  the  entrance  of  the  Dardanelles  and  the  Bosphorus  against  the  enemies  of 
Russia.  It  therefore  became  necessary  for  those  Powers  which  had  a  common 
interest  in  maintaining  the  independence  of  the  Porte  and  the  integrity  of  its 
territory  to  declare  prospectively  that  they  would  not  see  with  indifference  any 
future  separate  intervention  which  might  again  lead  to  the  aggrandisement  of 
any  one  Power  at  the  expense  of  Turkey  and  to  the  manifest  injury  of  all  the 
others.  That  Great  Britain,  above  all,  had  the  deepest  interest  in  preventing 
any  such  intervention,  but  desired  to  prevent  it  by  pacific  means  and  had  there- 
fore proposed  the  intended  conference. 

"It  is  not  stated  what  reply  Count  Pozzo  de  Borgo  made  to  this  declaration, 
but  it  may  fairly  be  inferred  from  it  that  the  British  Government  considers  itself 
at  liberty  to  concert  separately  with  its  allies  who  are  interested  in  maintaining 
the  national  existence  of  Turkey  the  measures  which  may  become  necessary  for 


25O  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [576 

that  purpose.  Among  these  allies  she  may  safely  reckon  on  the  cooperation  of 
Austria,  and  I  think  even  of  France  as  any  approximation  between  Russia  and 
France  for  the  purpose  of  dismembering  the  Turkish  empire  seems  to  be  rendered 
nearly  impossible  by  the  invincible  repugnance  of  the  Sovereign  of  the  one 
country  and  the  People  of  the  other  to  any  close  connection.  We  have  recently 
seen  in  the  adhesion  of  France  to  the  commercial  Treaty  concluded  by  England 
with  the  Porte,  an  arrangement  admirably  adopted  to  develop  the  natural 
resources  of  Turkey,  that  whatever  desire  the  French  Government  may  feel  to 
countenance  the  usurpation  of  Mahomet  Ali  with  the  ultimate  view  of  extending 
its  own  establishments  in  Africa  further  east,  it  is  inevitably  compelled  by  the 
force  of  circumstances  to  unite  in  a  measure  adopted  to  give  increased  political 
strength  to  the  Turkish  Government,  to  enable  it  to  grapple  with  its  natural 
enemy,  and  at  the  same  time  entirely  inconsistent  with  the  notion  of  the 
independance  of  Egypt  and  Syria." 

13.  Wheaton  to  Forsyth,  No.  117,  June  26,  1839,  U.  S.  Depart- 
ment of  State  Archives,  Prussia,  Vol.  II. 

"Since  my  last  Despatch  on  the  Oriental  Question,  (No.  114,)  I  have  had 
an  opportunity  of  seeing  a  communication  made  on  the  24th  April  to  Lord 
Ponsonby  by  Nourri  Effendi,  which,  although  of  a  date  much  older  than  the 
other  French  and  English  Despatches  which  I  have  seen,  throws  considerable 
light  upon  the  causes  which  have  so  suddenly  disturbed  the  status  quo  in 
the  East. 

"In  this  communication  Nourri  Effendi  recites  at  some  length  the  answers 
which  he  had  already  given,  by  order  of  the  Sultan,  to  the  Austrian  internuncio, 
remarking  upon  an  insinuation  of  Prince  Meternich  that  the  Sublime  Porte 
ought  to  endeavor  to  find  out  some  mezzo  termino,  in  its  relations  with  the  Pacha 
of  Egypt,  in  order  to  avoid  the  certain  evils  and  uncertain  result  of  war.  This 
answer  stated  that  the  Sultan  did  not  desire  war,  nor  was  such  a  result  to  be 
apprehended  unless  from  the  continued  encroachments  of  the  person  'styling  him- 
self the  Pacha  of  Egypt,'  whose  audacious  pretentions  the  great  Christian  powers 
ought  to  unite  in  endeavoring  to  restrain. — That  Prince  Metternich  was  doubtless 
a  very  wise  and  benevolent  man,  but  (intimating  in  pretty  intelligable  terms) 
that  Austria  would  better  manifest  her  friendship  for  the  Porte  by  discounten- 
ancing the  pretentions  of  Mehemet  Ali  who  refused  to  perform  the  duties  he 
owed  to  his  lawful  sovereign.  That  all  the  Turkish  provinces,  which  he  had 
seized  and  which  had  been  secured  to  him  by  the  treaty  of  Kuteyah,  upon  the 
express  conditions  that  he  should  pay  tribute,  and  confine  himself  strictly  within 
the  limits  marked  out  by  that  treaty,  had  been  inherited  by  the  Sultan  from  his 
forefathers;  and,  Mehemet  Ali  having  failed  to  perform  these  conditions,  these 
countries  might  justly  be  considered  as  reverting  from  the  vassal  to  his  liege 
lord; — but  that  the  Sublime  Porte  was  willing  to  leave  him  in  the  possession  of 
Egypt,  provided  he  would  evacuate  Syria,  the  continued  possession  of  which  by 
him  endangered  the  security  of  the  other  Turkish  provinces  in  Asia  Minor, 
Mehemet  Ali  having  fortified  the  passes  of  the  Taurus  chain  of  mountains  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  keep  the  way  always  open  preparatory  to  a  fresh  invasion 
of  Anatolia,  whilst  the  Porte  had  only  recently  thought  of  creating  defensive 
works,  which  it  had  established  far  from  the  frontier  at  Koniah. 


57?]  APPENDIX  251 

"The  note  from  Nourri  Effendi  to  Lord  Ponsonby  closed  with  a  distinct 
proposition  to  the  British  government  to  conclude  a  treaty  of  alliance  with  the 
Porte,  the  object  of  which  should  be  to  compel  Mehemet  AH  to  evacuate  all  the 
Pashalics  of  Syria  and,  in  other  respects,  to  perform  his. duties  as  a  faithful  vassal 
and  tributary  of  the  Ottoman  Empire." 

14.  Clay  to  Forsyth,  (Without  number)  Oct.  i,  1839,  U.  S. 
Department  of  State  Archives,  Austria,  Vol.  I. 

''The  departure  of  Prince  Metternich  has  produced  no  perceptible  effect  upon 
the  affairs  of  the  Empire  and  but  little  impression  on  the  public  mind;  it  is 
possible,  therefore,  that  even  his  death  would  affect  the  condition  of  Austria  and 
its  relations  with  the  other  states  of  Europe  only  so  far  as  to  cause  a  slight  fall 
in  the  Government  stocks.  The  complicate  question  of  arranging  the  matters  in 
dispute  between  the  Sultan  and  the  Pacha  of  Egypt  occupies  the  attention  of 
the  Austrian  Cabinet  almost  to  the  exclusion  of  every  other  subject  and  the 
interest  taken  in  it  by  the  Ministry  has  been  communicated  to  the  public.  It  is 
astonishing  to  see  the  eagerness — to  learn  the  last  news  from  Constantinople — 
shewn  by  persons,  of  all  classes  except  the  lowest,  who  have  no  voice  in  the 
Government,  who  have  not  even  a  vote  at  the  municipal  elections  and  whose 
opinions  would  have  not  the  least  weight  with  any  member  of  the  Cabinet. 

"The  decisions  made  in  the  conference  of  the  Representatives  of  the  five 
Powers  at  Constantinople  are  probably  communicated  regularly  to  the  Depart- 
ment by  the  Minister  of  the  United  States  at  the  Sublime  Porte.  Those 
decisions,  however,  are  influenced,  in  a  great  degree,  by  the  negotiations  which 
take  place  at  Vienna,  between  the  Austrian  Cabinet,  the  Ambassadors  of  Great 
Britain,  Russia  and  France  and  the  Prussian  minister  under  instructions  received 
from  their  different  Governments.  Austria,  in  fact,  appears  to  act  the  part  of  a 
mediator  in  the  whole  business  and  to  use  her  influence  to  calm  the  jealousies 
and  suspicion  known  to  exist,  in  all  matters  relating  to  Turkey,  between  the 
English,  French,  and  Russian  Governments.  It  is  this  character  which  gives  to 
Austria  the  great  weight  she  possesses  in  the  conferences  and  which  has  enabled 
her  to  make  the  Powers  less  distrustful  of  each  other  and  to  induce  them  to  act 
with  a  certain  degree  of  unity  in  the  important  and  over-agitated  question.  That 
Austria  will  succeed  in  the  endeavor  to  maintain  the  peace  of  Europe  appears  to 
me  evident  from  two  facts  which  have  come  to  my  knowledge.  The  first  is  that 
the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  has  received  instructions  from 
St.  Petersburg  to  act  more  in  concert  with  the  other  Representatives  and  to 
consent  to  coerce  the  Pacha  of  Egypt  if  a  resort  to  forcible  means  should  become 
necessary.  The  second  circumstance  is  that,  after  a  conference  held  in  this  city 
a  few  days  since,  despatches  were  sent  from  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs 
to  the  Austrian  Internuncio  and  by  the  Representatives  of  Great  Britain,  Russia, 
France  and  Prussia  at  this  Court — each  writing  separately  to  their  colleagues  at 
Constantinople — instructing  them  to  inform  the  Pacha,  through  the  Consuls  of 
their  respective  Governments  at  Alexandria,  that  unless  he  consented  to  the 
arbitrement  of  the  questions,  between  the  Sultan  and  himself,  by  the  five  Powers 
they  were  determined  to  compel  him  to  come  to  terms  and,  if  obliged  by  his 
refusal  to  resort  to  force,  the  guarantees  which  they  had  offered  to  give  him 


252  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [578 

would  be  withdrawn  and  he  would  be  left  to  contend  with  them  single  handed. 
Much  will  depend  upon  the  answer  of  Mehemet  Ali  to  these  menaces.  That  able 
and  wily  Prince  can  scarcely  be  brought  to  believe  that  there  will  be  any 
concord  in  the  actions  of  Powers  whose  interests  are  so  opposite  and  who  have 
little  confidence  in  each  other.  Under  different  circumstances  the  Pacha  would 
be  right  in  his  conjecture  but,  at  present,  it  would  seem  to  be  erroneous  for 
reasons  which  may  be  briefly  referred  to. 

The  acquisitions  of  territory,  from  Turkey,  made  by  Russia  under  different 
pretenses  during  the  last  half  century  have  excited  the  suspicion  of  the  other 
European  Cabinets  with  regard  to  the  ulterior  objects  of  Russia  and  induced 
them  to  watch  more  closely  her  policy  in  connection  with  the  Turkish  Empire. 
They  have  at  length  discovered,  that  the  Treaty  of  Unkiar  Skelessi  and  the 
occupation  of  the  island  of  Soulima,  give  to  Russia  the  complete  control  of  the 
Commerce  of  the  Black  Sea  and  the  navigation  of  the  Danube  at  any  moment 
she  may  choose  to  exercise  it.  Being  unable,  therefore,  to  remedy  their  past 
errors  the  other  Powers  of  Europe  seem  for  the  moment  resolved  to  prevent  any 
further  encroachments  on  the  part  of  Russia.  Her  statesmen  are  aware  that  this 
feeling  exists  to  a  greater  degree  than  at  any  former  time  and  Russia  is  more- 
over occupied  just  now  with  the  subjugation  of  Circassia  which,  together  with 
the  dissatisfaction  prevailing  among  the  Cossacks  would  render  it  dangerous  for 
her  to  risk  the  chances  of  a  war.  She  will  consequently,  rather  than  embroil 
herself  with  England  and  France,  assent  to  the  measures  proposed  in  the  con- 
ferences at  Constantinople  and  make  a  merit  of  what  in  fact  is  the  necessity  of 
yielding  to  circumstances  which  she  cannot  evade.  Whatever  she  consents  to 
will,  I  am  convinced,  extend  no  further  than  is  requisite  to  arrange  the  question 
between  the  Sultan  and  Mehemet  Ali;  Russia  will  make  no  treaty  stipulations 
which  will  be  binding  on  her  for  the  future  or  which  she  cannot  find  a  plausible 
pretext,  at  any  time,  to  annul.  She  may  cease  apparently  her  machinations 
against  Turkish  independence  for  the  moment  and  claim  credit  for  her  forbear- 
ance, but  let  other  events  take  place  in  Europe  to  draw  off  the  attention  of  the 
great  Powers,  or  let  war  be  declared  between  any  of  them  and  Russia  remain 
neutral,  the  powerful  machinery  which  is  destined,  in  all  probability,  one  day  to 
overthrow  the  Ottoman  Empire  will  be  again  set  in  motion  and  the  nations  most 
interest  in  upholding  the  'integrity'  of  Turkey  will  be  unable  to  arrest  it. 

"The  Pacha  of  Egypt  has  little  to  hope  for  form  dissensions  among  the  five 
Powers  and,  if  he  refuse  to  submit  to  their  arbitrement,  they  will  force  him  to 
do  so.  But,  although  Russia  may  consent  to  such  compulsion,  the  active  part — 
the  brunt — will  be  borne  by  England  and  France;  not  a  Russian  ship  will  be 
engaged,  nor  a  Russian  subject  be  injured  in  the  contest.  The  settlement  of  the 
affairs  of  Turkey  will  not  be  final — it  will  not  probably  last  more  than  five  years. 
Such  at  least  is  my  impression  and  it  is  founded  on  the  fact  that  the  policy  of 
Russia  is  directed  to  the  future  whereas  that  of  England  and  France  is  shaped 
to  suit  the  present. 

"The  measures  taken  by  England  in  relation  to  the  Turkish  question  where 
not  energetic  until  lately;  the  British  Ministry  appears  to  have  relied,  for  some 
years,  upon  the  moral  power  given  by  the  rememberance  of  former  greatness  and 
to  have  left  unheeded  the  important  fact  that  the  glory  of  past  achievements  is 


579]  APPENDIX  253 

fast  fading  whilst  the  Countries  she  once  subsidized,  some  of  which  she  even 
saved  from  destruction,  have  acquired  strength  sufficient  to  render  them  power- 
ful rivals  and  dangerous  enemies." 

15.  Wheaton  to  [Forsyth],  No.  153,  July  i,  1840,  Confidential, 
U.  S.  Department  of  State  Archives,  Prussia,  Vol.  II. 

"Since  my  last  on  that  subject  the  question  of  the  East,  and  the  East  itself 
remain  in  statu  quo.  The  Ottoman  Empire  is  crumbling  to  pieces.  The  great 
Christian  Powers  after  arresting  the  direct  negotiation  between  the  Porte  and 
the  Pacha  of  Egypt,  have  not  been  able  to  agree  on  any  plan  of  settlement.  The 
British  Cabinet  itself  is  divided  on  the  question.  Various  projects  of  partitioning 
Syria  by  a  line  to  be  drawn  between  St.  Jean  d'  Arce  or  Beyrout  and  the  Persian 
gulf,  leaving  to  the  Pacha  Egypt  and  Arabia  with  the  southern  part  of  Syria, 
have  been  suggested  between  Austria,  Great  Britain  and  Russia.  But  Mehemet 
AH  laughs  at  these  plans,  being  certain  of  the  neutrality,  if  not  the  support  of 
France  in  case  of  any  attempt  to  coerce  him.  Russia  is  very  much  weakened  by 
her  recent  defeat  in  Circassia,  and  the  demoralized  state  of  her  army — Austria  by 
the  deficit  in  her  finances;  and  the  Porte  itself  has  nearly  exhausted  all  its 
resources  in  men  and  money. — The  conclusion  would  seem  to  be  that  this  problem 
must  at  last  be  solved  by  time  and  the  death  of  Mehemet  AH  alone,  unless 
indeed  he  should  be  unwilling  to  wait  leaving  such  a  precarious  inheritance  to 
his  children.  In  that  case  he  may  at  any  time  bring  on  the  necessity  of  Russian 
intervention,  and  perhaps  a  general  conflagration  by  ordering  Ibrahim  Pacha  to 
march  on  Constantinople." 

16.  Wheaton  to  Forsyth,  No.  158,  Aug.  5,  1840,  U.  S.  Depart- 
ment of  State  Archives,  Prussia,  Vol.  II. 

"Count  Bresson,  the  French  Minister  at  this  court,  has  remonstrated  in  the 
strongest  manner  against  the  ratification  of  the  Convention  [of  July  15,  1840]  by 
the  Prussian  Government.  He  has  stated  that  Prussia  was  putting  all  at  stake, 
as  she  had  no  direct  interest  in  the  question  at  issue,  could  gain  nothing  in  the 
scramble  for  the  spoils  of  the  East  which  must  ultimately  arise  between  G. 
Britain  and  Russia  (as  it  could  not  be  supposed  that  these  two  powers  would 
remain  permanently  united  in  policy  and  councils,)  whilst  Prussia  might  lose  her 
newly  acquainted  Provinces  of  the  Rhine  where  France  must  necessarily  seek 
her  indemnity  for  the  further  aggrandizement  of  the  other  Powers.  He  has 
urged  the  danger  of  kindling  anew  the  passion  for  military  glory  and  conquest 
which  is  characteristic  of  the  French  nation;  and  the  honor  which  would  redound 
to  the  Prussian  monarch,  at  the  commencement  of  his  reign,  from  arresting  the 
progress  of  this  new  source  of  discord  among  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe,  by 
suspending  his  ratification  in  order  to  give  further  time  for  consultation  on  a 
matter  on  which  the  peace  of  the  world  might  be  said  to  depend.  He  has  added 
that  the  King  of  the  French  perfectly  concurs  with  his  present  ministry  in 
resenting  the  course  of  the  Plenipotentiaries  of  the  four  Powers  in  London  as 
equally  derogatory  to  the  interests  and  honor  of  France,  and  that  the  nation 
would  be  ready  to  second  its  Government  in  arming  upon  an  extensive  scale  in 
order  to  be  prepared  for  any  and  every  eventuality. 


254  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,  1832-184!  [580 

"The  Prussian  Cabinet  has  replied  to  these  energetic  remonstrances  that  how- 
ever much  Prussia  regretted  to  see  France  separate  herself  from  the  other  great 
Christian  Powers  on  this  question,  she  (Prussia)  could  not  separate  herself  from 
her  allies  by  refusing  her  assent  to  the  decision  of  the  Conference  of  London, 
although  the  King  had  given  no  special  instructions  to  his  minister  authorizing 
him  to  sign  this  particular  convention." 


APPENDIX  E 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 
I.  BIBLIOGRAPHIES  AND  GENERAL  HISTORIES 

I.  Bibliographies 

BENGESCO,  GEORGES:  Essai  d'une  notice  Bibliographiqut  sur  la  question  d'Orient 
.  .  .  1821-1897.  Bruxelles  et  Paris,  1897.  An  extensive  list  of  French 
works  dealing  with  the  question  of  the  Near  East.  It  contains  the  titles  of  a 
number  of  contemporary  French  books  and  pamphlets  not  listed  in  this  biblio- 
graphy. 

IBRAHIM-HILMY,  PRINCE:  Literature  of  Egypt  and  the  Soudan.  A  bibliography  from 
the  earliest  times  to  the  year  1885,  inclusive.  2  vols.  London,  1 886. 

2.  General  Histories 

ACTON,  LORD  (Editor):   Cambridge  Modern  History,  Vol.  X.   Cambridge,  1907. 
BLANC,  Louis:  Histoire  de  dix  ans,  1830-1840.    5  vols.  Paris,  1849. 
BLED,  VICTOR  DU:  Histoire  de  la  monarchic  de  jut/let de  1830  a  184.8.  2  vols.  Paris, 

1877-1879. 
BOUDIN,  M.  AMEDEE:  Histoire  de  Louis-Philippe  rot  des  Fran  fats.   2  vols.  Paris, 

f  1847- 

BREHIER,  Louis:  L'Egypte  de  1708  a  /poo.  Paris,  1900. 

CAMERON,  D.  A.:   Egypt  in  the  Nineteenth  Century,  or  Mehemet  Ali  and  his  suc- 
cessors until  the  British  occupation  in  1882.   London,  1898. 
CHARLETY,  S.:     La  monarchic  de  juillet.     (Vol.  V  in  Histoire  de  France  contem- 

poraine.)  Paris,  1921. 
CREHANGE,  GASTON:    Histoire  de  la  Russie  depuis  la  mart  de  Paul  i"  jusqu'a 

ravtnement  de  Nicolas  II,  (1801-1804).   Paris,  1896. 
DEBIDOUR,  ANTONIN:  Histoire  diplomatique  de  /'Europe  depuis  Fouverture  du  con- 

gres  de  Vienne  jusqu'a  lafermeture  du  congres  de  Berlin,  (1814-1878).   2  vols. 

Paris,  1891. 
GOUIN,  EDOUARD:   L'Egypte  au  XIX*  siecle.   Histoire  militarie  et  politique,  anec- 

dotique  et  pittoresque  de  Mehemet- Ali,  Ibrahim,  Pacha,  Soliman  Pacha.   Paris, 

1847. 

HAMONT,  P.  N.:  L'Egypte  sous  Mehemet-Ali.   2  vols.  Paris,  1843. 
HILLEBRAND,  KARL:  Geschichte  Frankreichs  von  der  Thronbesteigung  Louis  Philipp's 

bis  zum  Falle  Napoleon's  HI.   2  vols.   Gotha,  1879-1881. 

JOCHMUS,  BARON  AUGUSTUS:    The  Syrian  War  and  the  Decline  oj  the  Ottoman  Em- 
pire, 1840-1848.   Berlin,  1883. 
JORGA,  N.:    Geschichte  des  Osmanischen  Reiches.    Nach  den  Quellen  Dargestellt.    5 

vols.   Gotha,  1908-1913. 
JUCHEREAU  DE  SAINT-DENIS:    Histoire  de  r empire  ottoman  depuis  1702  jusqu'en 

1844.   4  vols.   Paris,  1844. 
LAVALLEE,  THEOPHILE:    Histoire  de  /'empire  ottoman  depuis  les  temps   anciens 

jusqu'a  nos  jours.    Paris,  1855. 
LAVISSE,  ERNEST,  ET  RAMBAUD,  ALFRED:    Histoire  gentrale  du  IV*  sihle  a  nos 

jours.  Vol.  X.   Paris,  1909. 
MCCARTHY,  JUSTIN:    A  History  of  our  own  Times  from  the  Accession  of  Queen 

Victoria  to  the  Berlin  Congress.  4  vols.  London,  1 879. 

[2551 


256  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [582 

ENGELHARDT,  ED.:  La  Turquie  et  le  Tanzimat  ou  histoire  des  reformes  dans  r empire 

Ottoman  depuis  1826  jusqu  a  nos  jours.   2  vols.  Paris,  1882. 
MENGIN,  F.:    Histoire  sommaire  de  I'Egypte  sous  le  gouvernement  de  Mohammed 

Aly,  ou  recit  des  principaux  evenements  qui  ont  eu  lieu  de  fan  1823  a  fan  1836. 

Paris,  1839. 
MERRUAU,  PAUL:    L'Egypte  contemporaine  de  Mehemet-Ali  a  Said  Pacha.    Paris, 

1864. 

MILLER,  WILLIAM:    The  Ottoman  Empire,  1801-1913.   Cambridge,  1913. 
MOURIEZ,  PAUL:   Histoire  de  Mehemet-Ali,  vice-rot  d'Egypte.   4  vols.   Paris,  1858. 

A  detailed  work  but  one  which  must  be  read  very  critically. 
NOLTE,   FREDERICK.:    L'Europe  militaire  et  diplomatique  au  dix-neuvieme  siecle, 

1815-1884.     4  vols.   Paris,  1884. 
NOUVION,  VICTOR  DE:    Histoire  du  regne  de  Louis  Philippe  Ier  rot  des  Fran  fats, 

1830-1848.   4  vols.   Paris,  1857-1861.   The  views  set  forth  by  M.  Nouvion  in 

this  work  are  very  strongly  "pro-French." 
PATON,  A.  A.:  A  History  of  the  Egyptian  Revolution,  from  the  Period  of  the  Memelukes 

to  the  death  of  Mohammed  Ali.    2  vols.    London,  1870.    Paton  was  private 

secretary  to  Col.  Hodges  while  the  latter  was  British  Consul-General  at  Alex- 
andria in  1839-1840.   His  account  of  the  events  which  occurred  in  the  Levant 

during  that  period  is  of  value. 

RAIKES,  THOMAS:  France,  since  1830.    2  vols.   London,  1841. 
RANKE,  LEOPOLD  VON:    Serbien  und  die  Turkei  im  Neunzehnten  Jahrhundert.    In 

Sdmmtliche  Werke.    Dritte  Gesammtausgabe.    Leipzig,  1879. 
REGNAULT,  ELIAS:  Histoire  de  huit  ans,  1840-1848.  3  vols.   Paris,  1878. 
SCHIEMANN,  THEODOR:    Geschichte  Russlands  unter  Kaiser  Nikolaus  I.    4  vols. 

Berlin,  1904-1919.  Vols.  Ill  and  IV  cover  the  period  1830-1840. 
STERN,  ALFRED:   Geschichte  Europas  sett  den  Vertrdgen  von  1815  bis  zum  Frankfurter 

Frieden  von  1871.   Vol.  V.   Stuttgart  and  Berlin,  1911. 
THUREAU-DANGIN,  PAUL:  Histoire  de  la  monarchic  de  juillet.   7  vols.   Paris,  1888- 

1892.  Thureau-Dangin  has  drawn  conclusions  in  this  work  which  are  somewhat 

prejudiced  in  favor  of  the  French.  Nevertheless  the  work  is  both  detailed  and 

valuable. 
TREITSCHKE,  H.  VON:    Deutsche  Geschichte  im  neunzehnten  Jahrhundert.    5  vols. 

Leipzig. 
VAULABELLE,  A.  DE:    Histoire  moderne  de  I'Egypte,  1801  a  1833.    2  vols.    Paris, 

1830-1836. 
WARD,  SIR  A.  W.,  AND  GOOCH,  G.  P.  (Editors):    The  Cambridge  History  of  British 

Foreign  Policy,  1783-1910.   Vol.  II.   New  York,  1923. 
WEIGALL,  ARTHUR  E.  P.  BROME:  A  History  of  Events  in  Egypt  from  1708  to  1914. 

New  York,  1915. 

II.  SPECIAL  SECONDARY  STUDIES 

BEER,  ADOLF:  Die  Orientalische  Politik  Oesterreichs  seit  1774.  Prag,  1883. 
BORDEANO,  N.:  L'Egypte  d'apres  les  trait  es  de  1840-1841.   Constantinople,  1869. 
'CAHUET,  ALBERIC:   La  question  d'Orient  dans  fhistoire  contemporaine,  1821-1005. 

Paris,  1905. 


583]  APPENDIX  257 

DASCOVICI,  N.:   La  question  du  Bosphore  et  des  Dardanelles,  Geneve,  1915. 

DRIAULT,  E.:  La  question  d' Orient  depuis  ses  origines  jusqu  &  nos  jours.  Paris,  1898. 

DUGGAN,  STEPHEN  PIERCE  HAYDEN:  The  Eastern  Question.  A  Study  in  Diplomacy. 
New  York,  1902. 

English  Historical  Review.  January,  1903;  April,  1912.  Vols.  XVIII,  XXVII. 
London,  1903. 

FREYCINET,  C.  DE:  La  question  d'Egypt.  Paris,  1905. 

GORIAINOW,  SERGI:  Le  Bosphore  et  les  Dardanelles.  Paris,  1910.  An  excellent  mono- 
graph which  has  been  based,  almost  entirely,  upon  Russian  sources. 

GUICHEN,  VICOMTE  DE:  La  crise  d'Orient  de  1839  A  1841  et  I' Europe.  Paris,  1922. 
A  study,  strongly  pro-French  in  its  sympathy,  but  based  almost  entirely  upon 
materials  found  in  the  archives  of  various  European  capitals — especially  Paris 
and  London. 

HALL,  MAJOR  JOHN:  England  and  the  Orleans  Monarchy.  New  York.  1912. 
Hall  bases  his  work,  to  a  large  extent,  upon  material  found  among  the  records 
of  the  British  foreign  office. 

HASENCLEVER,  ADOLF:  Die  Orientalische  Frage  in  den  Jahren  1838-1841.  Leipzig, 
1914.  This  is  an  excellent  study  which  is  based,  to  a  large  extent,  upon  the 
results  of  research  carried  on  in  the  Berlin  and  Vienna  record  offices. 

HAUSSONVILLE,  M.  O.  D':  Histoire  de  la  politique  exterieure  du  gouvernement 
/ran  fats,  2830-1848.  2  vols.  Paris,  1850. 

HOLLAND,  THOMAS  ERSKINE:  The  European  Concert  in  the  Eastern  Question.  Ox- 
ford, 1885. 

KUNTZE,  HEINRICH:  Die  Dardanellenfrage.  Ein  volkerrechtliche  Studie.  Rostock, 
1909. 

LATIMER,  ELIZABETH  WORMELEY:  Russia  and  Turkey  in  the  Nineteenth  Century. 
Chicago,  1895. 

MARRIOTT,  J.  A.  R.:  The  Eastern  Question.  An  historical  study  in  European  Di- 
plomacy. Oxford,  1917. 

MISCHEF,  P.  H.:  La  mer  noire  et  les  detroits  de  Constantinople.  Paris,  1899. 

MORPURGO,  VICTOR:   Politique  de  la  Russie  en  Orient,  etc.   Paris,  1854. 

PHILLIPSON,  COLEMAN,  and  BUXTON,  NOEL:  The  Question  of  the  Bosphorus  and 
Dardanelles.  London,  1917. 

RAWLINSON,  SIR  HENRY:  England  and  Russia  in  the  East.  London,  1875. 

Revue  Historique.    May-Aug.,  1911.   Vol.  CVII.   Paris. 

WURM,  CHRISTIAN  FRIEDRICH:  Die  Orientalische  Frage  in  ihrer  geschichtlichen 
Entwickelung.  Leipzig,  1856. 

:  Diplomatische  Geschichte  der  Orientalischen  Frage.  Leipzig,  1858. 

III.  BIOGRAPHIES,  MEMOIRS,  RECOLLECTIONS,  DIARIES,  AND  PRIVATE  LETTERS 

ARMAGNAC,  BARON  D':  Nezib  et  Beyrouth,  souvenirs  d'Orient,  de  1833  h  1841.  Paris, 
1844. 

BARANTE,  BARON  DE:  Souvenirs  du  Baron  de  Barante,  1782-1866.  Public's  par 
Claude  de  Barante.  8  vols.  Paris,  1890-1901.  Vols.  V  and  VI  cover  the  period 
1832-1841.  Barante  was  for  a  considerable  period  of  time  French  Ambassador 
to  Russia.  Many  of  his  letters  throw  light  upon  the  policies  followed  by  the 
Tsar  Nicholas  I  and  his  chief  ministers. 


258  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-1841  [584 

BARKER,  J.:    Syria  and  Egypt  under  the  last  five  Sultans  of  Turkey.    Experiences, 

during  fifty  years,  of  Mr.  Consul-Genera/  Barker.    Edited  by  his  son  Edward 

B.  B.  Barker.   2  vols.   London,  1876.   Barker  was  the  British  Consul-General 

at  Alexandria  in  1833.  Later  he  held  a  similar  position  at  Aleppo.  His  account 

reveals  many  interesting  facts  concerning  Mehemet  Ali's  regime  in  both  Egypt 

and  Syria. 
BEUST,  COUNT  VON:  Memoirs  of  Frederick  Ferdinand  Count  von  Beust.    Written  by 

himself,  with  an  introduction  by  Baron  Henry  de  Worms.    2  vols.    London, 

1887. 
BROUOHTON,  LORD  (John  Cam  Hobhouse):  Recollections  of  a  Long  Life,  1786-1852. 

Edited  by  his  daughter,  Lady  Dorchester.    6  vols.     London,  1909-1911. 
BULWER,  SIR  HENRY  LYTTON  E.  (Lord  Bailing):    The  Life  of  Henry  John  Temple, 

Viscount  Palmerston;  with  Selections  from  his  Diaries  and  Correspondence. 

3  vols.    London,  1870-1874.    Bulwer  quotes  extensively  from  Palmerston's 

private  correspondence, 

CAMPBELL,  JOHN  G.  E.  H.  D.  S.:    Viscount  Palmerston.  London,  1892. 
CHESNEY,  FRANCIS   RAWDON:    Narrative  of  the  Euphrates  Expedition.     .     .    . 

carried  on  by  order  of  the  British  government  in  1835,  1836,  1837.    London, 

1868. 
CHESNEY,  L.  F.  AND  O'DONNELL,  J.  C.:  The  Life  of  the  Late  General  F.  R.  Chesney, 

by  his  Wife  and  Daughter.   Edited  by  Stanley  Lane-Poole.   London,  1885. 
CORTI,  DR.  EGON  CAESAR:   Leopold  I  of  Belgium   Secret  Pages   of  European 

History  .Translated  by  Joseph  McCabe.     London,  1923. 
CROZALS,  J.  DE:  Guizot.  Paris,  1901. 
DAUDET,  ERNEST:    Une  vie  d' ambassadrice  au  siecle  dernier;  la  princesse  de  Lieven. 

Paris,  1904. 
DEWITT,  MME.  NEE  GUIZOT:    Monsieur  Guizot  dans  sa  famille  et  avec  ses  amis. 

Paris,  1880. 

:  Lettres  de  M.  Guizot  a  sa  famille  et  &  ses  amis.  Paris,  1884. 

DINO,  DUCHESSE  DE:    Chronique  de  1831-1862,  public^  par  la  princesse  Radziwill, 

ne'e  Castellane.   4  vols.   Paris,  1909-1910. 
DOUGLAS,  SIR  GEORGE,  AND  RAMSAY,  SIR  GEORGE  DALHOUSIE:    The  Panmure 

Papers,  being  a  Selection  from  the  Correspondence  of  Fox  Maule,  Second  Baron 

Panmure,  afterwards  Eleventh  Earl  of  Dalhousie.  i  vols.   London,  1908. 
FAUCHER,  LEON:  Biographie  et  c orrespondance.  Vol.1.  Paris,  1888.  Faucher  was  a 

French  journalist  who  corresponded  frequently  with  Henry  Reeve  and  other 

members  of  the  "pro-French"  party  in  England.    His  letters  for  the  period 

between  July,  1840,  and  December,  1840,  reveal  sentiments  entertained  in 

France  at  that  time. 
FLERS,  LE  MARQUIS  DE:  Le  Roi  Louis-Philippe,  vie  anecdotique,  1773-1850.   Paris, 

1891. 
GREVILLE,  CHARLES  CAVENDISH  FULKE:    The  Greville  Memoirs.   A  "Journal  of  the 

Reigns  of  King  George  IV  and  King  William  IV.    Edited  by  Henry  Reeve. 

3  vols.  London,  1875. 
:   The  Greville  Memoirs;  A  Journal  of  the  Reigns  of  King  George  IV  and 

King  William  IV.    Edited  by  Richard  Henry  Stoddard.   New  York,  1875. 


585]  APPENDIX  259 

:  The  Greville  Memoirs;  A  Journal  of  the  Reign  of  Queen  Victoria  from 

1837  to  1852.  Edited  by  Henry  Reeve.  2  vols.  New  York,  1885.  These 
memoirs  constitute  a  valuable  source  but  they  must  be  read  critically.  Greville 
was  strongly  opposed  to  Palmerston's  Levantine  policy  and  at  times  he  per- 
mitted his  prejudices  to  influence  his  writing. 

GUIZOT,  FRANCOIS  PIERRE  GUILLAUME:  Memoires  pour  servir  a  I'histoire  de  mon 
temps.  8  vols.  Paris,  1858-1867.  Vols.  IV-VI  cover  the  period  1832-1842. 
Guizot  quotes  extensively  from  letters  and  despatches  which  have  not  been 
published  elsewhere. 

HEINE,  HEINRICH:  French  Affairs;  Letters  from  Paris.  (In  the  Works  of  Heinrich 
Heine  translated  by  Charles  Godfrey  Leland.  Vols.  VII  and  VIII.)  London, 
1893. 

JENNINGS,  Louis  J.:  The  Correspondence  and  Diaries  of  the  late  Right  Honorable 
John  Wilson  Croker.  3  vols.  London,  1884. 

JOHNSON,  REV.  A.  H.  (Editor):  The  Letters  of  Charles  Greville  and  Henry  Reeve. 
1836-1865.  London,  1924. 

LANGEL,  AUGUSTE:  Lord  Palmer ston  et  Lord  Russell.  Paris,  1877. 

LAUGHTON,  JOHN  KNOX:  Memoirs  of  the  Life  and  Correspondence  of  Henry  Reeve. 
2  vols.  London,  1898. 

MALMESBURY,  EARL  OF:  Memoirs  of  an  Ex-Minister.  An  Autobiography.  2  vols. 
London, 1884. 

MAXWELL,  SIR  HERBERT  (Editor):  The  Creevey  Papers.  A  selection  from  the  Cor- 
respondence and  Diaries  of  the  late  Thomas  Creevey.  London,  1904. 

METTERNICH,  PRINCE  CLEMENS:  Aus  Metternictis  nachgelassenen  Papieren. 
Herausgegeben  von  dem  Sohne  des  Staatskanzlers  Fursten  Richard  Metter- 
nich-Winneburg.  Etc.  8  vols.  Vienna,  1880-1884.  A  source  revealing  the 
attitude  of  the  government  of  Austria. 

MOLTKE,  HELMUTH  C.  B.  VON:  Briefe  iiber  Zustdnde  und  Begebenheiten  in  der 
Tiirkei  aus  den  Jahren  1835  ^is  1839.  Berlin,  1841. 

MONYPENNY,  WILLIAM  FLAVELLE:  The  Life  of  Benjamin  Disraeli,  Earl  of  Beacons- 
field.  Vol.  II.  New  York,  1913. 

MULLER,  F.  MAX  (Editor):  Memoirs  of  Baron  Stockmar,  by  his  Son  Baron  E.  von 
Stockmar.  2  vols.  London,  1872. 

NAPIER,  MAJOR-GENERAL  ELERS:  The  Life  and  Correspondence  of  Admiral  Sir 
Charles  Napier.  2  vols.  London,  1862. 

NESSELRODE,  COMTE  CHARLES  DE:  Lettres  et  papiers  du  chancelier  comte  de 
Nesselrode,  1760-1856.  Public's  par  le  comte  A.  de  Nesselrode.  n  vols.  Paris, 
1904-1912.  Vols.  VII  and  VIII  cover  the  period  1829-1846.  Nesselrode's 
letters  to  Meyendorff,  which  are  published  herein,  reveal  clearly  the  attitude 
of  Russia,  especially  during  the  period  1839-1841. 

ODILON,  BARROT:  Memoires  posthumes  de  Odilon  Bairot.  4  vols.  Paris,  1875-1876. 
Vol.  I  covers  the  period  1791-1848. 

PARIS,  COMTE  DE,  ET  CHARTRES,  Due  DE:  Due  d'Orltans.  Lettres  1825-1842. 
Paris,  1889. 

PROKESCH-OSTEN,  ANTON  VON:  Briefwechsel  mit  Herrn  von  Gentz  und  Fursten 
Metternich.  Edited  by  Count  Anton  Prokesch-Osten,  the  Younger.  2  vols. 
Vienna,  1881. 


260  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-184!  [586 

PROK.ESCH-OSTEN,  GRAFEN  VON:  Mehmed-Ali  Vize-Kbnig  von  Aegypten.  Aus 
meinem  Tagebuche,  1826-1841.  Wien,  1877. 

PuCKLER-MusKAU,  HERMANN  VON:  Aus  Mehemed  All's  Reich.   Stuttgart,  1844. 

RAIK.ES,  THOMAS:  A  Portion  of  the  Journal  kept  by  Thomas  Rat kes  from  1831  to 
1847.  4  vols.  London,  1856-1858.  Raikes  spent  much  time  in  France  during 
the  period  1833-1841,  and  in  his  journal  he  comments  frequently  concerning 
the  political  situation  there. 

:  Private  Correspondence  with  the  Duke  of  Wellington  and  ether  distin- 
guished Contemporaries.  Edited  by  his  daughter,  Harriet  Raikes.  London,  1 86 1. 

REID,  STUART  j.:  Life  and  Letters  of  the  First  Earl  of  Durham,  1792-1840.  2  vols. 
London,  1906.  Reid  quotes  extracts  from  a  number  of  letters  which  were 
exchanged  between  Palmerston  and  Durham  while  the  latter  was  British  Minis- 
ter to  Russia. 

ROBINSON,  GERTRUDE:  David  Urquhart.  Some  Chapters  in  the  Life  of  a  Victorian 
Knight-Errant  of  Justice  and  Liberty.  Oxford,  1920. 

RUSSELL,  JOHN  EARL:   Recollections  and  Suggestions,  1813-1873.  London,  1875. 

RUSSELL,  ROLLO:  Early  Correspondence  of  Lord  John  Russell,  1805-1840.  2  vols. 
London,  1913. 

SAINT-ARNAUD,  MARECHAL  DE:  Lettres  du  martchal  de  Saint-Arnaud.  2  vols. 
Paris,  1855. 

SANDERS,  LLOYD  CHARLES:   Life  of  discount  Palmerston.   Philadelphia,  1888. 

:  Lord  Melbourne's  Papers.  London,  1889.  The  extracts  which  San- 
ders quotes  from  Melbourne's  private  letters  —  particularly  for  the  period 
Aug.-Nov.,  1840 — are  valuable. 

SENIOR,  NASSAU:  Conversations  and  Journals  in  Egypt  and  Malta.  Edited  by  Mrs. 
M.  C.  M.  Senior  Simpson.  2  vols.  London,  1882. 

TASCHEREAU,  J.  (Editor) :  Revue  retrospective  ou  archives  secretes  du  dernier  pouverne- 
ment,  1830-1848.  Recueil  non  periodique.  Paris,  1848.  A  collection  of  some  of 
Louis  Philippe's  private  letters  and  other  papers.  His  letters  to  King  Leopold 
of  Belgium,  which  are  published  in  this  collection,  are  of  particular  value  for 
this  study. 

TOCQUEVILLE,  ALEXIS  DE:  Memoirs,  Letters,  and  Remains.  Translated  from  the 
French  by  the  translator  of  Napoleon's  correspondence  with  King  Joseph. 
Vol.  II.  Boston,  1862. 

TROLLOPE,  THOMAS  ADOLPHUS:  What  I  Remember.  Vol.11.  London,  1887. 

VERON,  LE  DR.  Louis:   Mtmoires  d'un  bourgeois  de  Paris.   5  vols.   Paris,  1856. 

VICTORIA,  QUEEN  OF  ENGLAND:  The  Letters  of  ^ue  e  n  Victoria.  A  selection  from  Her 
Majesty's  Correspondence  between  the  years  1837  and  1861.  Edited  by  A.  C. 
Benson  and  Viscount  Esher.  3  vols.  London,  1908. 

VINTRINIER,  A.:  Soliman  Pacha — colonel S eve — gtneralissimedesarmeesEgyptiennes, 
ou,  histoire  des  guerre s  de  I'Egypte  de  1820  a  1860.  Paris,  1 886. 

WALPOLE,  SPENCER:  The  Life  of  Lord  John  Russell.  2  vols.  London,  1889.  In  this 
work  Walpole  has  quoted  extensively  from  the  letters  of  Lord  John  Russell. 

WALSH,  REV.  R.:  A  Residence  at  Constantinople,  during  a  period  including  the  Com- 
mencement, Progress,  and  Termination  of  the  Greek  and  Turkish  Revolutions,  i 
vols.  London,  1836. 

WILLIAMS,  H.  NOEL:    The  Life  and  Letters  of  Sir  Charles  Napier.   London,  1917. 


587]  APPENDIX  26l 

IV.   CONTEMPORARY  PUBLICATIONS 
I.  Newspapers,  Periodicals  and  Annals 

The  Annual  Register,  or  a  View  of  History,  Politics,  and  Literature.  1832-1841. 
London,  1833-1842.  Many  of  the  important  despatches  published  in  the 
Levant  Correspondence  have  been  copied  in  the  volume  of  the  Annual  Register 
for  1840. 

The  Athenaeum  Journal  of  Literature,  Science  and  the  Fine  Arts.  1833-1841.  London. 

Biackwood's  Edinburgh  Magazine,  1833-1841.   Edinburgh  and  London. 

The  Examiner,  A  Sunday  Paper,  on  Politics,  Literature,  and  the  Fine  Arts.  London. 
The  volumes  for  1838,  1840,  and  1841  have  been  consulted.  The  Examiner 
was  a  Whig  paper  but  it  did  not  always  support  the  policies  of  Lord  Palmerston. 

The  Gentleman's  Magazine  and  Historical  Chronicle.  1832-1841.  Series  2,  Vols. 
XXV-XXVI;  Series  3,  Vols.  I  XVI.  London. 

IRVING,  JOSEPH:    The  Annals  of  our  Time,  London,  1869. 

Journal  des  Debats,  politiques  et  litteraires,  1832-1841.  Paris.  This  was  the  leading 
organ  of  the  Doctrinaires. 

LESUR,  C.  L.:  Annuaire  Historique,  ann6es  1830-1840.  Paris. 

The  Monthly  Review,  1833-1844.  Vols.  CCXI-CCXLV.  London.  This  source  con- 
tains numerous  reviews  of  current  books  and  pamphlets.  Many  of  these 
reviews  are  excellent. 

The  Poor  Man's  Guardian.   A  weekly  Paper  for  the  People.    1833-1835. 

Revue  des  deux  Mondes.  Paris.  The  issues  for  the  years  1832  to  1841,  and  for 
Aug.  i,  1852,  Nov.  i,  15,  1891,  and  June  i,  1895,  have  been  examined. 

The  Spectator.  A  weekly  journal  of  News,  Politics,  Literature,  and  Science,  1832- 
1841.  London. 

Tail's  Edinburgh  Magazine.    1832-1841.   Edinburgh. 

The  Times.  1832-1841.  London.  The  Times  has  three  features  valuable  for  the 
present  study:  its  editorials,  its  letters  from  correspondents  in  fore  gn  coun- 
tries— particularly  France  and  Turkey — and  its  extracts  copied  from  foreign 
journals. 

The  Westminster  Review.    1832-1842.    London. 

2.  Contemporary  Books  and  Pamphlets 

AUBIGNOSC,  L.  P.  B.  D':  La  Turquie  nouvelle  jugee  au  point  ou  Pont  amenee  Its 
r /formes  du  Sultan  Mahmoud.  2  vols.  Paris,  1 839. 

CADALVENE,  E.  DE,  ET  BARRAULT,  E.:  Deux  annees  de  I'histoire  d'Orient,  1839- 
1840.  Paris,  1840. 

:    Histoire  de  la  guerre  de  Mehemed-Ali  contre  la  Porte  Ottomane,  en 

Syrie  et  en  Asie-Mineure,  1831-1833.   Paris,  1837. 

CARGILL,  WILLIAM:  Mehemet  Alt,  Lord  Palmerston,  Russia,  and  France.  London, 
1840. 

CLOT,  A.  B.  (Clot  Bey):  Aper(u  general sur  I 'Egypte.  Paris,  1840. 

COBDEN,  RICHARD:  Russia.  "By  a  Manchester  Manufacturer."  Edinburgh, 
1836. 

EDWARDS,  RICHARD:   La  Syrie,  1840-1862.   Paris,  1862. 

ELLIOTT,  C.  B.  Travels  in  the  Three  Great  Empires  of  Austria,  Russia,  and  Turkey. 
2  vols.  Philadelphia,  1839. 


262  THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,   1832-1841  [588 

FOURCADE,  RAYMOND  HENRI:  Notice  sur  la  question  d'Orient  et  sur  la  possession 
d'Alger.  Paris,  1836. 

FRANKLAND,  CAPTAIN  CHARLES  COLVILLE:  Travels  to  and  from  Constantinople,  in 
in  the  Years  1827  and  1828.  i  vols.  London,  1829. 

GILSON,  ADRIAN  :  The  Czar  and  the  Sultan:  or,  Nicholas  and  Abdul  Medjid.  London, 
1852. 

JOMARD,  EDME  FRANCOIS  :  Coup-d'Oeil  impartial  sur  I'etat  present  de  I'Egypte,  com- 
pare a  sa  situation  anterieure.  Paris,  1 836. 

LAGROIX,  FREDERIC:    Question  a"  Orient.   Paris,  1839. 

LAMARTINE,  ALPHONSE:  Souvenirs,  impressions,  pensees  et  paysages,  pendant  un 
voyage  en  Orient,  1832-1833.  4  vols.  Paris,  1835. 

LAURENT,  ACHILLE:  Relation  historique  des  affaires  de  Syrie,  depuis  1840  jusquen 
1842.  2  vols.  Paris,  1846. 

MALORTIE,  BARON  DE:    Egypt:   Native  Rulers  and  Foreign  Interference.    London, 

1833. 
MARMONT,  MARSHAL  (Due  de  Raguse):    The  Present  State  of  the  Turkish  Empire. 

Translated  with  notes  and  observations  on  the  relations  of  England  with 

Turkey  and  Russia  by  Lt.-Col.  Sir  Frederic  Smith,  London,  1839. 
MICHELSEN,  EDWARD  H.:    The  Ottoman  Empire  and  its  Resources.   London,  1853. 
NAPIER,  COMMODORE  SIR  CHARLES:    The  War  in  Syria.    1  vols.    London,  1842. 

Napier  wrote  his  work  evidently  for  the  purpose  of  justifying  his  conduct  in 

the  Near  East  in  1840  and  1841.    Nevertheless,  it  contains  much  valuable 

material. 

NUGENT,  LORD:  Lands,  Classical  and  Sacred.   2  vols.   London,  1845. 
POUJOULAT,  M.  BAPTISTIN:   Voyage  dans  I'Asie  Mineure.   2  vols.   Paris,  1841. 
QUIN,  MICHAEL  J.:  A  Steam  Voyage  down  the  Danube.   2  vols.  London,  1836. 
REID,  JOHN:   Turkey  and  the  Turks:  Being  the  Present  State  of  the  Ottoman  Empire. 

London,  1840. 

Ross,  DAVID.  Opinion  of  the  European  Press  on  the  Eastern  Question.  London,  1836. 
ST.  JOHN,  JAMES  AUGUSTUS:  Egypt  and  Nubia.  London,  1845. 
:    Egypt,  and  Mohammed  Ali;  or,  Travels  in  the  Valley  of  the  Nile. 

2  vols.    London,  1834. 
SCHOTT,  FRIEDRICH:    Die  Orientalische  Frage  und  ihre  Losung  aus  dem  Gesicht- 

spunkte  der  Civilization.   Leipzig,  ^839. 

SCOTT,  C.  R.:  Rambles  in  Egypt  and  Candia:  etc.   2  vols.  London,  1837. 
STEPHENS,  JOHN  LLOYD:   Incidents  of  Travel  in  the  Russian  and  Turkish  Empires. 

2  vols.    London,  1839. 
Turkey  and  Russia;  or  Observations  on  their  Political  and  Commercial  Relations  with 

England.   By  a  Merchant.   London,  1835. 
URO.UHART,  DAVID.    Diplomatic  Transactions  in  Central  Asia,  from  1834-1839. 

London,  1841. 

:   Le  sultan  et  le  pacha  d'Egypte.   Paris,  1839. 

:   La  crise.   La  France  devant  les  quatre  puissances.   Paris,  1840. 

:   The  Mystery  of  the  Danube.    Showing  how  through  secret  Diplomacy, 

that  River  has  been  closed,  etc.   London,  1851. 

(Editor):     The  Portfolio;  or  a  Collection  of  State  Papers,  etc.    Series  !. 


5  vols.   London,  1836-1837. 


589]  APPENDIX  263 

V.  PUBLISHED  GOVERNMENTAL  DOCUMENTS 
I.  State  Papers,  Treaties,  Reports,  Etc. 

British  and  Foreign  State  Papers.  Vols.  XX-XXX.   1832-1 842.  London,  1 836- 1 8  5  8. 

British  Parliamentary  Papers.  1833-1841.  London.  One  of  the  chief  sources  for 
this  study.  The  Correspondence  relative  to  the  Affairs  of  the  Levant,  pub- 
lished in  Par!.  Papers  1841,  XXIX,  and  1841,  Session  2,  VIII,  was  found  to 
be  particularly  valuable. 

CHESNEY,  FRANCIS  RAWDON:  The  Expedition  for  the  Survey  of  the  Rivers  Euphrates 
and  Tigris.  ...  4  vols.  London,  1850. 

Documents  diplomatiques  relatifs  a  la  question  d 'Orient.  Du  8  octobre  1840  au  13 
juillet  1841.  Paris,  1842. 

DUVERGIER,  J.  B.:  Collection  complete  des  lois,  decrets,  ordonnances,  reglemens  et 
avis  du  conseil-d"  etat,  .  .  .  Annee  1840.  Vol.  XL.  Paris,  1841. 

HERTS  LET,  EDWARD:  The  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty;  etc.  4  vols.  London,  1875- 
1891.  Vol.  II  covers  the  period  1828-1863. 

MARTENS,  GEO.  FRED:  Nouoeau  recueil  de  traitts,  etc.    1808-1839.    16  vols. 
Goettingue,  1817-1842. 

:    Nouveau  supplemens  au  recueil  de  traites,  etc.    1761-1839.    3  vols. 

Goettingue,  1843-1875. 

:  Nouveau  recueil  general  de  traites,  etc.    1840-1874.   20  vols.   Goettin- 


gue, 1843-1875. 
NORADOUNGHIAN,  GABRIEL:    Recueil  d'actes  intemationaux  de  fEmpire  Ottoman. 

4  vols.   Paris,  1897-1903. 

2.  Parliamentary  Speeches 
Archives  Parlementaires  de  1789  a  1860.    Recueil  complet  des  debats  Idgislatifs  et 

politiques  des  chambres  francaises.    Paris,  1862-1913.  Vols.  LXXIX-CXXVII 

cover  the  period  i833-July  17,  1839. 
GUIZOT,  FRANC/OIS  PIERRE  GUILLAUME:  Histoire  parlementaire  de  France.   Recueil 

complet  des  discours  prononces  dans  les  chambres  de  1819  a  1848.    5  vols. 

Paris,  1863-1864. 
Hansard's  Parliamentary  Debates:   Forming  a  continuation  of  "The  Parliamentary 

History  of  England,  from  the  earliest  Period  to  the  Year  1803."    London. 

Third  series,  Vols.  XV  to  LXV  cover  the  period  from  1833  to  1842. 

VI.    UNPUBLISHED   MATERIALS 

United  States  Department  of  State  Archives. 

(i).  Austria,  Vol.  I. 

(2).  England,  Vols.  XL — XLVIII.  Aaron  Vail  frequently  commented  upon 
European  affairs  in  his  despatches  for  the  period  1833-1835. 

(3).  France,  Vols.  XXVI— XXIX. 

(4).  Prussia,  Vols.  I — II.  Henry  Wheaton  followed  very  closely  and  quite  ac- 
curately the  development  of  the  Turco-Egyptian  Question,  1838-1841. 

(5).  Russia,  Vols.  XII— XIV. 

(6).  Turkey,  Vols.  II — IX.  These  volumes  contain  extensive  material  relative 
to  the  commercial  affairs  of  the  Near  East. 

(7).   Consular  Letters,  Constantinople,  Vol.  II. 


INDEX 


A  jew  Remarks  on  Our  Foreign  Policy, 
English  pamphlet,  on  foreign  policy, 
70  n. 

Abdallah  Pasha,  Turkish  governor  of 
Acre,  13. 

Abd-ul-Mejid,  Sultan,  104;  firman  of 
deposing  Mehemet  Ali  (1840),  186. 

Achmed  Fethi  Pasha,  Turkish  diplo- 
matist and  Minister  of  Commerce, 
76,  225-226. 

Achmet  Pasha,  Turkish  naval  com- 
mander, 42,  104-105. 

Acre,  English  capture  of  (1840),  199. 

Adana,  Turkish  pashalic,  22,  23-24. 

Aden,  occupied  by  English  (1838),  60, 
60  n. 

Adrianopole,  Treaty  of  modified  (1834), 
42,  42  n. 

Akif  Effendi,  Turkish  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs*  248. 

Aleppo,  government  of  granted  to  Me- 
hemet Ali  (1833),  23. 

Alexander,  Grand  Duke  (later  Tsar 
Alexander  II),  100. 

Alexandria,  question  of,  79  ff,  79  n. 

Algiers,  French  in,  36  n,  64. 

Allison,  English  agent  at  Constantino- 
ple, 174. 

Apponyi,  Count  Anton,  Austrian  Am- 
bassador to  France,  154. 

Austria,  Near  Eastern  policy  of  (1833), 
27,  32-33;  (1839),  80,  80  n,  118-119, 
118  n;  interest  of  in  steam  naviga- 
tion on  Danube,  74  n;  public  of  in- 
terested in  Turco-Egyptian  question 
(1839),  251;  appears  to  act  as  me- 
diator, 251;  financial  conditions  in 
(1840),  253;  representatives  of  eager 
to  secure  settlement  of  Turco-Egyp- 
tian question  (1841),  222-223,  228 
n;  influence  of  at  Constantinople, 
227  n. 

Bandiera,  Baron  Franz,  Austrian  naval 
commander  in  Levant,  177. 

Barante,  Baron  William  Prosper  de, 
French  Ambassador  to  Russia,  71; 
on  Tsar's  attitude  regarding  Vienna 
conference  (1839),  no  n;  claimed 
Prussia  and  Austria  were  hostile  to 
Anglo-French  alliance,  132  n. 

Barnes,  Thomas,  editor  of  The  Times, 
182  n. 

Barton,  Thomas  P.,  U.  S.  diplomatic 
agent  at  Paris,  on  French  policy 
(1835),  65  n. 


Beauvale,  Frederick  Lamb,  Lord,  Eng- 
lish Ambassador  to  Austria,  on  dip- 
lomatic conferences  at  Vienna  (1839), 
107-108,  107  n;  report  of  on  attitude 
of  Metternich  (1841),  217. 

Becker,  Niklas,  German  poet,  184  n. 

Bentinck,  Lord  William,  Governor- 
General  of  India,  50  n,  58  n; 
on  steam  communication  between 
Europe  and  India  (1835),  39. 

Berlin,  Treaty  of  (1833),  32  n. 

Beust,  Count  Frederick  Ferdinand 
von,  Saxon  (later  Austro-Hungarian) 
statesman,  on  political  situation  in 
France  (1840),  194  n. 

Beyrout,  bombardment  of  reported  at 
Paris  (1840),  186. 

Bligh,  English  charge  d'affaires  at  St. 
Petersburg,  34. 

Bloomfield,  Lord  John  A.,  English 
charge  d'affaires  at  St.  Petersburg, 
198. 

Bourqueney,  Baron  Adolf,  French 
charge  d'affaires  at  London,  on  Rus- 
sian policy  at  London  (1839),  100- 
10 1 ;  on  attitude  of  Palmerston 
towards  France  (1841),  211;  on 
diplomatic  situation  at  London,  213- 
214;  discouraged  by  diplomatic  sit- 
uation, 222  n;  favored  signing  of 
Straits  Convention  in  March,  1841, 
223. 

Bourse,  Paris  exchange,  166,  178,  186- 
187,  233. 

Boutenieff,  Russian  Ambassador  to 
Turkey,  17,  19,  28,  52. 

Bowring,  Sir  John,  English  diplomatic 
agent,  report  of  on  Egypt,  etc. 
(1838),  61-62,  61  n. 

Bresson,  Count  Charles,  French  Min- 
ister to  Prussia,  representations  of 
to  Prussian  government  (1840),  253. 

Broglie,  Due  Achille  Charles  de 
French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
20,  28,  64;  on  policy  of  France  in 
Turkey  (1833),  37-38. 

Broughton,  John  Cam  Hobhouse,  Lord, 
President  of  the  Board  of  Commis- 
sioners for  the  Affairs  of  India,  on 
policy  of  Mehemet  Ali  (1838),  58 
n;  on  obstacles  to  steam  communi- 
cation with  India,  59. 

Brown,  U.  S.  Dragoman  at  Constan- 
tinople, on  dismissal  of  Reschid 
Pasha  (1841),  226  n. 


265 


266 


THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,  1832-184! 


[592 


Brunnow,  Baron  Philip  de,  Russian 
diplomatist,  mission  of  to  England 
announced  (1839),  118;  instructions 
to  on  first  mission  to  London,  120; 
negotiates  with  Palmerston,  120- 
121,  1 20  n,  123;  reports  to  Russian 
government  results  of  mission,  129; 
wins  support  of  Metternich,  129  n; 
ordered  to  return  to  England,  130; 
plan  of  for  settlement  of  Turco- 
Egyptian  question  (1840),  132-133; 
attitude  of  towards  France  and  Near 
Eastern  settlement,  152-153,  152  n; 
threatens  Russian  withdrawal  from 
London  conference,  154  n;  opposed 
to  modification  of  treaty  of  July  15, 
1840,  185-186;  favors  return  of 
Fance  to  Concert  of  Europe,  212; 
opposed  to  proposal  made  by  Guizot 
(1841),  222. 

Billow,  Freiherr  Heinrich  von,  Prus- 
sian Minister  to  England,  instruc- 
tions sent  to  (1840),  142;  advances 
of  to  Guizot,  144,  144  n,  151-152; 
attitude  of  during  crisis  of  1840,  172. 

Bulwer,  Sir  Henry,  English  diplomatic 
agent  at  Constantinople  and  later  at 
Paris,  68;  on  Anglo-French  rivalry  in 
Egypt  (1838),  70;  reports  of  on  atti- 
tude of  French  government  (1839), 
115-116,  123-124;  negotiations  of 
with  Thiers  (1840),  165,  165  n,  179- 
180,  180  n. 

Caille,  Captain,  French  diplomatic 
agent,  84,  86,  104. 

Cambreling,  C.  C.,  U.  S.  diplomatic 
representative  at  St.  Petersburg,  on 
Austro-Russian  relations  (1841), 
212  n. 

Campbell,  Colonel  Colin,  English  Con- 
sul-General  at  Alexandria,  22  n,  38, 
86-87  n,  127  n. 

Canning,  Sir  Stratford,  English  Am- 
bassador to  Turkey,  14,  14  n,  41. 

Came,  Count  de,  French  deputy,  96, 
96  n. 

Chamber  of  Deputies,  sentiments  ex- 
pressed in  favorable  to  Mehemet  AH 
(1833),  37-38;  debates  in  (1839), 
95  ff;  (1840),  189  n. 

Chateau  d'Eu,  conference  of  (1840), 
171. 

Chekib  Effendi,  Turkish  Minister  to 
England,  147,  150,  227;  delays  sig- 
nature of  protocol  de  cloture  (1841), 

222,    223-224. 

Chesney,  Lieut-Colonel  Francis  Ra\v- 
don,  English  officer,  39;  Euphrates 
expedition  of  (i835-'36),  49-50. 


Chrzanowski,  General  Adalbert,  Polish 
officer  in  English  employ  in  Turkey, 

63- 

Churchill,  English  resident  of  Constan- 
tinople, 248. 

Clanricarde,  Marquis  of,  English  Am- 
bassador to  Russia,  on  attitude  of 
Russia  relative  to  Turco-Egyptian 
question  (1839),  116  ff,  118  n. 

Clarendon,  George  William  Frederick 
Villiers,  Earl  of,  English  Lord  Privy 
Seal,  opposition  of  to  Palmerston's 
Near  Eastern  policy  (1840),  157  n, 
159,  182  n. 

Clay,  John  Randolph,  U.  S.  diplomatic 
representative  at  St.  Petersburg  and 
later  at  Vienna,  on  situation  in 
southern  Russia  (1833),  34-35  n;  on 
situation  in  Near  East  (1834),  242- 
244;  on  character  and  policy  of  Tsar 
(1836),  247-248;  on  policies  of  Pow- 
ers relative  to  the  Near  East  (1839), 

25I-253- 

Cochelet,  Adrien  Louis,  French  Con- 
sul-General  at  Alexandria,  attempts 
of  to  prevent  war  in  Near  East 
(1839),  85-86,  86-87  n;  on  attitude 
of  Mehemet  Ali,  112  n;  encourages 
Mehemet  Ali  to  persist  in  his  de- 
mands, 127  n;  urges  Mehemet  Ali 
to  stir  up  holy  war  (1840),  175  n;  in- 
fluence of  with  Mehemet  Ali,  200  n. 

Collective  note  of  July  27,  1839,  108- 
109. 

Commerce  and  navigation,  Anglo-Tur- 
kish treaty  of  (1838),  67-68;  Franco- 
Turkish  treaty  of,  68  n. 

Constantine,  Bey  of,  64. 

Constantinople,  question  of,  79  ff. 

Constitutionnel,  Paris  journal,  167. 

Courrier  Franqais,  Paris  journal,   167. 

D'Abbadie,  on  prospect  for  a  canal 
across  Isthmus  of  Suez  (1839),  62  n. 

Damascus,  government  of  granted  to 
Mehemet  Ali  (1833),  23. 

Darmes,  regicide,  192. 

Dolgorouki,  Prince,  Russian  nobleman, 
34-35  n. 

Don  Carlos,  Spanish  pretender,  66. 

Duchatel,  Count  Charles  Marie  Tan- 
neguy,  French  Minister  of  the  Inte- 
rior, 82. 

Duperre,  French  Minister  of  Marine, 
87,  95- 

Durham,  John  George  Lambton,  Earl 
of,  English  Ambassador  to  Russia, 
47,  245-246,  247;  on  Russia's  Near 
Eastern  policy  (1836),  48;  handi- 
capped in  efforts  to  improve  Anglo- 


593] 


INDEX 


267 


Russian  relations,  53,  53  n;  success 
of  at  St.  Petersburg,  53  n,  56-57, 
248;  on  Anglo-Russian  relations,  56. 

East  India  Company,  59. 

Ellice,  Edward,  English  politician, 
182  n. 

England,  France,  Russia,  and  Turkey, 
English  pamphlet,  on  Russian  pol- 
icy (1834),  55. 

England,  general  policy  of  in  Near 
East,  ion;  Turco-Egyptian  policy 
of  in  1833,  32-33,  41-42;  suspicion  of 
French  relations  with  Egypt  in,  41; 
attitude  of  to  Russian  policy  in  Near 
East,  239-240,  241;  suspicion  of  Me- 
hemet  Ali's  policies  in  (i833-'38), 
38,  57-58,  58  n;  hostility  to  Russia 
in  (i834-'36),  53  ff,  54  n,  56  n;  in- 
terest of  in  Egypt  (1835),  245;  gains 
influence  at  Constantinople  ( 1836- 
'38),  66-67;  Near  Eastern  policy  of 
(1838),  249-250;  (1839),  252-253; 
opinion  in  on  Turco-Egyptian  ques- 
tion, 93-94;  rejects  proposals  of 
Brunnow,  1221-123;  public  opinion  in 
during  crisis  of  1840,  170,  170  n, 
181-182,  181  n,  182  n;  prestige  of  in 
1841,  231;  views  on  Near  Eastern 
policy  of,  232  n,  234-235,  236. 

Euphrates  route  to  India,  39-40,  213, 
213  n.  See  also  Chesney,  and  Steam 
communication  with  India. 

expedition.    See  Chesney. 

The  Examiner,  London  Sunday  paper, 
on  Anglo-French  rivalry  over  route 
to  India  (1840),  139  n,  234-235. 

Fanshawe,  Captain,  English  naval  of- 
ficer, mission  of  to  Alexandria  and 
Constantinople  (1840),  202-203, 
202  n. 

Ferdinand  I,  Emperor  of  Austria,  73  n. 

Ferdinand  II,  King  of  Naples,  147-148. 

Ficquelmont,  Count  Ludwig,  Austrian 
statesman,  32  n. 

Firman  of  investiture,  Feb.  13,  1841, 
218-219,  219  n;  modified  by  firmans 
of  May-June,  1841,  228  n. 

Foltz,  French  diplomatic  agent,  84. 

France,  general  policy  of  in  Near  East, 
9,  n;  Near  Eastern  policy  of  (1833), 
36-37,  36-37  n,  41-42,  41  n,  42  n, 
239-240,  241;  speculations  on  the 
Near  Eastern  policy  of  (1834),  242; 
policy  of  in  Egypt  (1835),  245;  loses 
influence  at  Constantinople  (1836), 
66-67,  67  n;  favoritism  for  Mehemet 
Ali  in  (1838),  68-69,  69  n;  Near 
Eastern  policy  of  (1839),  80  ff,  80  n, 
119;  opposition  of  to  Vienna  confer- 


ence plan,  115;  opposed  to  coercion  of 
Mehemet  Ali,  115-116,  124;  plan  of 
for  settlement  of  Turco-Egyptian 
question,  124-125,  124  n,  125  n;  press 
opinion  in  favorable  to  Mehemet  Ali, 

126  n;  government  of  disclaims  fa- 
voritism for  Mehemet  Ali,   127-128, 

127  n;   naval   preparations   of,    132; 
(1840),  139;  government  of  surprised 
by  treaty  of  July  15,  1840,  165;  in- 
dignation  in  against  same,    166-167, 
166  n;   policy  of  during  crisis  of  1840, 
167-168,   171,  187;  revival  of  excite- 
ment in,  178,  186-187,  192  n;  reaction 
in    favoring    peace,     192    n;    public 
opinion  in  when  Guizot  became  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs,    194  n;   de- 
cline  of  warlike   sentiment   in,    205- 
206,    206   n;    move    for    building   of 
fortifications  in    (1841),  214  n;   for- 
eign policy  of  influenced  by  Turco- 
Egyptian   question,   229;    accused  of 
having  imperialist  ambitions  in  Med- 
iterranean,   234-235;    interest    of    in 
steam     communication     with     East, 
236  n. 

Francis  II,  Emperor  of  Austria,  73  n. 
Frederick  William  III,  King  of  Prussia, 

32  n;   on   policy  of   Louis  Philippe, 

65  n. 
Frederick  William  IV,  King  of  Prussia, 

170. 

Galloway,  English  railway  projector  in 
Egypt,  59  n. 

Gentleman's  Magazine,  English  month- 
ly publication,  on  development  of 
steam  communication  with  East 
(1838),  60. 

Germany,  reaction  in  against  France 
during  crisis  of  1840,  184  n. 

Gliddon,  U.  S.  consular  agent  at  Alex- 
andria, on  diplomatic  affairs  at  Alex- 
andria (1833),  22  n. 

Granville,  Granville  George  Leveson- 
Gower,  Earl  of,  English  Ambassador 
to  France,  on  attitude  of  French 
Ministers  relative  to  Turco-Egyptian 
question  (1839),  82,  89-90,  106-107; 
reports  French  arguments  against 
coercion  of  Mehemet  Ali,  127-128, 

128  n;   on   views  of  Thiers   relative 
to  Turco-Egyptian  question   (1840), 
138  n;  reports  suggestion  of  Thiers, 
173    n;    on    Thiers'    attitude   during 
crisis  of  1840,  189-190;  fears  French 
attempt  to  seize  Balearic  Isles,   190 
n;   reports   desire   of  Guizot  to  end 
isolation  of  France   (1841),  211. 


268 


THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,  1832-184! 


[594 


Greigh,  Admiral,  commander  of  Rus- 
sian Black  Sea  fleet,  16. 

Greville,  Charles,  English  politician  and 
writer,  182  n;  on  triumph  of  Palm- 
erston  in  English  Cabinet  (1840), 
1 88;  on  outcome  of  crisis  of  1840, 
206. 

Guizot,  Frangois  Pierre  Guillaume, 
French  statesman,  on  Anglo-French 
relations  (1833),  41!  speech  of  on 
Levantine  policy  of  French  govern- 
ment (1839),  97-98,  98  n;  appointed 
Ambassador  to  England  (1840), 
I35"I36;  conferences  of  with  Palm- 
erston,  140,  140  n;  on  diplomatic 
situation  at  London,  140-141,  142, 
150-151,  152,  154-155,  160;  com- 
ments of  on  views  of  Palmerston, 
146-147;  on  opposition  to  Palmerston's 
policies  in  British  Cabinet,  157  n; 
objects  to  Palmerston's  defense  of 
treaty  of  July  15,  1840,  164;  nego- 
tiations of  for  modification  of  July 
treaty,  171-172,  173  n,  182  n;  com- 
municates casus  belli  note  to  Palm- 
erston, 188;  appointed  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  in  France,  193;  plan 
of  for  modification  of  July  treaty, 
195;  disappointed  by  attitude  of 
Palmerston,  196-197,  197  n;  advice 
of  for  Mehemet  Ali,  202  n;  eager  for 
France  to  escape  from  isolated  posi- 
tion, 207  ff,  208  n;  abandons  hope  of 
securing  modification  of  July  treaty, 
207-208,  proposal  of  to  secure  return  of 
France  to  Concert  of  Europe  (1841), 
212-213,  2I3  n;  delays  signing  of 
Straits  Convention,  222-223;  author- 
izes Bourqueney  to  "initial"  same, 
223;  comment  of  on  outcome  of 
Turco-Egyptian  question,  229-230. 

Hafiz  Pasha,  Commander  of  Turkish 
forces  in  Asia  Minor,  75,  75  n,  83. 

Haines,  Captain,  English  naval  officer, 
60  n;  on  strategic  position  of  Aden, 
60-61. 

Halil  Pasha,  Turkish  statesman,  17, 
149. 

Hamid  Bey,  Egyptian  officer,  216. 

Hodges,  Colonel,  English  Consul-Gen- 
eral  at  Alexandria,  127  n,  149  n,  158- 
159,  176  n. 

Hodgson,  W.  H.,  U.  S.  diplomatic 
agent,  on  policies  of  great  Powers  in 
Near  East  (1835),  44  n. 

Holland,  Henry  Richard  Fox,  Lord, 
English  Chancellor  of  the  Duchy  of 


Lancaster,  opposition  of  to  Palmer- 
ston's Near  Eastern  policy  (1840), 
157  n,  159,  182  n. 

Hugon,  Admiral,  French  naval  com- 
mander in  Mediterranean,  65. 

Ibrahim  Pasha,  Egyptian  commander, 
13,  13  n,  18,  19,  49,  104,  243,  244. 

India.  See  steam  communication  with, 
Suez  route  to,  and  Euphrates  route 
to. 

Isabella  II,  Queen  of  Spain,  66. 

Itcheli,  Turkish  pachalic,  22,  23. 

Jochmus,  General,  Baron  August  von, 
German  officer  in  Turkish  employ, 
instructions  for  (1841),  214. 

Journal  de  Saint  Petersbourg,  French 
language  journal  of  St.  Petersburg, 
on  diplomatic  affairs  at  Constanti- 
nople (1833),  20. 

Journal  des  Debats,  Paris  daily  paper, 
on  situation  in  Near  East  (1833), 
15,  20,  21 ;  on  French  interest  in 
Mediterranean  (1838),  69;  on  Tur- 
co-Egyptian question  (1839),  94- 
95,  94  n;  bellicose  statements  in 
(1840),  167. 

Kisseleff,  Count  Nicholai  von,  Russian 
charge  d'affaires  at  London,  101. 

Koenigsmarck,  Count  Hans  Carl,  Prus- 
sian Ambassador  to  Turkey,  215, 

221. 

Kolowrat,  Count  Franz  Anton,  Austrian 
Minister  of  the  Interior,  183  n. 

Koniah,  battle  of   (1832),   16. 

Konigsmarck,  (spelling  copied  in  notes 
from  some  of  the  sources).  See 
Koenigsmarck. 

Kosrew,  Pasha,  Turkish  Grand  Vizier, 
104,  104  n;  dismissal  of  (1840),  148- 
149;  dismissal  of  announced  at  Lon- 
don, 154. 

Kourchid  Bey,  Egyptian  governor  of 
Jeddah,  57-58. 

Kutayah,  occupied  by  Egyptians 
(1833),  19;  preliminaries  of,  24,  24 n. 

Lagrene,  French  charge  d'affaires  at 
St.  Petersburg,  34. 

Lalande,  Admiral,  French  naval  com- 
mander in  Levant,  105,  105  n. 

Lamartine,  Alphonse  de,  French  dep- 
uty, favors  partition  of  Turkey 
(1839),  96-97,  97  n;  (1840),  137  n. 

Lazareff,  Rear  Admiral,  commander  of 
Russian  fleet  sent  to  Constantino- 
ple (1833),  21. 

Leopold  I,  King  of  the  Belgians, 
alarmed  by  crisis  of  1840,  172;  ef- 


595] 


INDEX 


269 


forts  of  to  secure  compromise  set- 
tlement of  Turco-Egyptian  question, 
172;  fears  revolution  in  Europe, 
193  n. 

Lieven,  Christophe  Andreievich,  Prince, 
238. 

Princes  (Countess),  160  n. 

Livingston,  Edward,  U.  S.  Minister  to 
France,  on  the  relations  of  England, 
France,  and  Russia  (1833),  239- 
240. 

London,  Treaty  of,  July  15,  1840,  161- 
162,  162-163  n. 

Loring,  Lieutenant,  English  naval  of- 
ficer, 216. 

Louis  Philippe,  King  of  the  French, 
141  n;  favors  Habsburg  marriage 
alliance,  (1836),  65,  65  n;  favors 
preparations  for  war  (1840),  167, 
167  n,  178  n;  eager  to  preserve 
peace,  171,  191  ff,  193  n,  195  n;  ap- 
peal of  to  King  Leopold  of  Belgium, 
172;  forces  Thiers  to  resign,  192-193. 

Mahmoud  II,  Sultan,  general  policy  of, 
13;  warlike  policy  of  (1834),  44, 
243;  grants  permission  for  Euphrates 
expedition  (1835),  49;  issues  firman 
to  Mehemet  Ali,  51-52;  preparations 
of  for  war,  244;  desire  of  to  renew 
war  with  Egypt  (1836),  67;  hostile 
to  Mehemet  Ali  (1838),  68;  pre- 
pares to  renew  war  with  Mehemet 
Ali  (i838-'39),  75-76,  79,  82-83; 
death  of,  104. 

Maison,  Marshal  Marquis,  French 
Minister  to  Russia,  on  French  policy 
in  Near  East  (1834),  242-243. 

Malcolm,  Admiral,  Sir  Pulteney,  com- 
mander of  English  fleet  in  Mediter- 
ranean, 27,  33. 

Malmesbury,  James  Howard  Harris, 
Earl  of,  English  politician,  on  French 
opinion  (1837),  66  n. 

Maltzan,  Count  Mortimer,  Prussian 
Ambassador  to  Austria,  108  n. 

Mandeville,  English  charge  d'affaires  at 
Constantinople,  17,  41;  peace  en- 
deavors at  Constantinople  (1833), 
18-19. 

Maurojeni.  Turkish  charge  d'affaires  at 
Vienna  and  diplomatic  agent  to 
London,  14,  239. 

Mazloum  Bey,  Turkish  diplomatic 
agent,  205,  214,  216. 

Mehemet  Ali,  Pasha  of  Egypt,  foreign 
experts  in  the  employ  of,  10  n;  pre- 
pares for  war  with  Sultan  (1831- 
'32),  13,  13  n;  rejects  Roussin's  peace 
proposal  (1833),  22,  22  n;  designs  of, 


38;  policy  of  (1834),  43;  French 
sympathy  for,  44  n;  sends  troops  to 
Syria,  243;  policy  of  in  Arabia 
(i834-'35),  57-58;  policy  of  relative  to 
Euphrates  expedition  (1835),  49; 
discontent  in  the  territories  of,  244; 
aids  development  of  Suez  route  to 
India,  62-63,  63  n;  moves  to  gain 
independence  (1838),  64;  promises 
of  to  ConsulsXjeneral  at  Alexan- 
dria (1839),  83;  orders  of  to  Ibra- 
him Pasha,  84,  84  n,  86,  104;  defiant 
attitude  of,  112  n,  127  n;  (1840), 
148-149,  149  n,  152  n,  175-176,  253; 
attempts  of  at  direct  negotiations 
with  Turkish  Ministers,  149-150, 
155;  revolts  against  the  authority  of, 
X59>  IS9  n;  follows  advice  of  French, 
176,  176  n,  179;  abandons  defiant  atti- 
tude and  agrees  to  evacuate  Syria, 
200  ff,  200  n;  final  submission  of  to 
Porte  (1841),  216-217;  objections  of 
to  firman  of  investiture,  219-220, 
220  n. 

Melbourne,  William  Lamb,  Viscount, 
English  Prime  Minister,  attitude  of 
during  crisis  of  1840,  170-171,  172, 
184,  193  n;  on  services  of  Morning 
Chronicle  to  Palmerston,  185  n;  on 
disagreement  within  British  Cabinet, 
190  n. 

Memorandum  of  Nov.  14,  1840,  198. 

Mesange,  French  warship,  25. 

Metternich-Winneburg,  Clement  W.  N. 
L.,  Prince  of,  Austrian  Chancellor, 
31,  32,  32  n;  on  French  and  English 
interests  in  Egypt  (1833),  40-41; 
eager  to  preserve  peace  in  Near  East 
(T839),  78,  250;  claims  Ponsonby 
responsible  for  Sultan's  policy,  86; 
opposes  formal  conference  at  Vienna, 
92,  92  n;  attitude  of  towards  Russia, 
100  n;  promotes  informal  discussions 
on  Turco-Egyptian  question,  107, 
107  n;  initiates  collective  note  of 
July  27,  1839,  108,  108  n;  effect  of 
his  departure  from  Vienna,  251;  opin- 
ion of  relative  to  France  (1840), 
132  n;  attitude  of  on  Turco-Egyp- 
tian question,  134  n,  145,  145  n; 
proposal  of  for  settlement  of  Turco- 
Egyptian  question,  146;  alarmed  by 
bellicose  French  attitude,  170,  170 
n,  183  n;  suggests  plan  for  reunion 
of  France  and  four  Powers,  183; 
favors  leaving  Egypt  to  Mehemet 
Ali,  198,  209;  irritated  by  Ponson- 
by's  conduct,  2IO,  210  n;  threatens 
to  withdraw  Austrian  support  from 


270 


THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,  1832-184! 


[596 


Porte  (1841),  217,  225;  complains 
about  English  policy,  217;  opposed 
to  guaranteeing  independence  and 
integrity  of  Turkey,  227  n. 

Meyendorff,  Baron  Peter,  Russian  Am- 
bassador to  Prussia,  no. 

Miniaut,  French  Consul-General  at 
Alexandria,  22  n,  37. 

Minto,  Gilbert  Elliot,  Lord,  English 
First  Lord  of  Admiralty,  157  n. 

Mole,  Count  Louis  Mathieu,  French 
statesman,  66,  66  n,  68;  admits 
"shades  of  difference"  between  Eng- 
lish and  French  policies  in  Near 
East  (1839),  81-82,  82  n. 

Moltke,  Major  Helmuth  von,  Prussian 
officer  in  Turkish  employ,  76. 

Monthly  Review,  London  Magazine, 
on  Russia  (1835),  55;  on  steam 
communication  with  India  (1839), 
62  n. 

Morning  Chronicle,  London  journal,  on 
Turco-Egyptian  question  (1839), 
94;  on  establishment  of  steam  com- 
munication with  India  (1840),  158 
n;  article  in  hostile  to  France,  185; 
service  of  to  Palmerston  in  "Syrian 
affair,"  185  n. 

Mounier,  Baron,  French  diplomatic 
agent,  unofficial  mission  of  to  Lon- 
don (1840),  207. 

Miinchengratz,  conference  of  (1833), 
31-32,  32  n;  apprehensions  aroused 
by  in  England  and  France,  33. 

Muravieff,  Lieut.-General,  Russian 
diplomatist,  on  mission  in  Near  East 
(i832-'33),  15,  17,  18,  19,  19  n,  238. 

Muhlenberg,  H.  A.,  U.  S.  diplomatic 
representative  at  Vienna,  on  situa- 
tion in  Austria  (1840),  134  n. 

Namic  Pasha,  Turkish  major-general, 
14,  237,  238. 

Napier,  Commodore,  Sir  Charles,  Eng- 
lish naval  officer  in  Levant,  177, 
177  n;  on  allied  military  and  naval 
operations  in  Levant  (1840),  199; 
negotiates  convention  of  Nov.  27, 
1840,  with  Mehemet  Ali,  200-201, 
200  n;  arranges  with  Mehemet  Ali 
for  evacuation  of  Syria,  etc.  (1841) 
216,  216  n;  on  attitude  of  Mehemet 
Ali  regarding  firman  of  investiture, 
219-220,  220  n;  ideas  of  on  English 
Near  Eastern  policy,  232  n,  236. 

Naples,  Kingdom  of,  in  dispute  with 
England  (1840),  147. 

National,  Paris  journal,  on  French 
policy  (1838),  69-70;  (1839),  94; 


threatening      comment      in      against 
Louis  Philippe    (1840),   192. 
Near  East  question  of  denned,  9. 

Nesselrode,  Count  Charles  Robert  von, 
Russian  Chancellor,  on  Tsar's  Near 
Eastern  policy  (1833),  JS-1^;  pro- 
poses treaty  of  alliance  with  Tur- 
key, 28;  mission  of  to  Berlin,  32  n; 
reply  of  to  English  and  French  pro- 
tests, 34;  negotiates  with  Achmet 
Pasha  (1834),  42;  demands  explana- 
tions relative  to  French  policy,  242- 
243;  opposition  of  to  English 
Euphrates  expedition  (i835-'36), 
52;  friendly  to  England  (1838), 
72-73;  opposes  European  conference 
on  Egyptian  question,  249;  on  Rus- 
sian policy  and  Turco-Egyptian 
question  (1839),  99-100,  99  n,  101- 
102,  109,  109  n;  favors  agreement 
with  England,  116  ff,  116  n, 
118  n;  protests  vigorously  against 
French  policy  in  Near  East,  117; 
on  results  of  first  Brunnow  mission 
to  London,  129;  claims  of  regarding 
Brunnow  missions,  130  n;  pleased 
with  treaty  of  July  15,  1840;  169, 
169  n;  uneasy  about  attitude  of 
Austria,  186  n;  favors  leaving  Me- 
hemet Ali  in  control  of  Egypt,  198; 
favors  return  of  France  to  Concert 
of  Europe,  212;  eager  to  prevent  re- 
storation of  Anglo-French  alliance, 
212  n;  approved  attitude  of  Palmer- 
ston (1841),  225;  comment  of  on 
outcome  of  Turco-Egyptian  question, 

230  n. 

Dimitri   de,   son   of   Russian 

Chancellor,    on    outcome    of    Turco- 
Egyptian     question      (1841),     230- 

231  n. 

Neumann,  Baron  Philip,  Austrian  Min- 
ister to  England,  proposals  of  for 
settlement  of  Turco-Egyptian  ques- 
tion (1840),  144-145,  151-152;  ne- 
gotiations of  with  Guizot  and  Palm- 
erston, 146;  attitude  of  during  crisis 
of  1840,  172;  without  instructions, 
1 86. 

Nezib,  battle  of   (1839),  104. 

Nicholas  I,  Ts*ar  of  Russia,  sends  Or- 
loff  to  Constantinople  (1833),  24; 
hostile  to  France,  27  n;  character 
and  policy  of  defended  (1836),  247- 
248;  on  Anglo-French  rivalry  in 
Egypt  (1839),  71;  views  of  regard- 
ing Treaty  of  Unkiar  Skelessi,  98; 
Near  Eastern  policy  of,  77  n,  118; 


597] 


INDEX 


27I 


pleased  with  results  of  first  Brun- 
now  mission  to  London,  129-130; 
pleased  with  treaty  of  July  15,  1840, 
169,  169  n;  opposed  to  concessions  to 
France,  185. 

Nouri  Effendi,  Turkish  diplomatist  and 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  77,  86, 
104,  250-251;  mission  of  to  London 
(1840),  141-142. 

Odilon  Barrot,   French  deputy,   196  n. 

Olivier,  French  diplomatic  agent,  22. 

Orleans,  Ferdinand  Philippe  Louis, 
Due  d',  eldest  son  of  Louis  Philippe, 
178  n. 

Orloff,  Count  Alexis,  Russian  diplomat- 
ist, mission  of  to  Constantinople 
(1833),  24-25,  28;  attitude  of  in 
London  (1839),  100. 

Osman  Bey,  Turkish  naval  officer,  105. 

Palmerston,  Henry  John  Temple,  Vis- 
count, English  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  on  English  policy  in  Near 
East  (1833),  14  n,  15,  26-27,  26  n, 
31;  opposition  of  to  Russian  policy 
in  Near  East,  31,  33;  on  Near  East- 
ern situation,  35;  on  designs  of  Me- 
hemet Ali,  38;  interested  in  Eu- 
phrates expedition  project,  39;  on 
Anglo-Russian  relations  (1834),  43; 
did  not  fear  Russia  (1835),  57  n;  on 
Russian  policy  (1836),  53,  53  n;  on 
improvement  in  Anglo-Russian  rela- 
tions, 57;  eager  to  strengthen  Tur- 
key, 63;  dislikes  French  policy,  66; 
(1837),  66  n;  position  of  on  Vixen 
affair,  54;  on  Durham's  success  in 
Russia,  56;  determined  to  defend 
Turkey  against  Egyptian  attack 
(1838),  63-64,  63  n,  70;  on  Anglo- 
Turkish  commercial  treaty,  68;  pro- 
poses Anglo-French  treaty  to  sup- 
port Turkey,  71,  72  n;  fears  Franco- 
Russian  combination  in  Near  East, 
71-72;  protests  against  Russian  in- 
trigues in  Persia  and  India,  72;  ac- 
cepts Russian  explanations,  73;  fa- 
vors Turkish  reforms,  76;  opposed 
to  independence  of  Mehemet  Ali, 
80;  proposal  of  for  European  con- 
ference on  Egyptian  questions,  249; 
eager  to  preserve  peace  in  Near 
East  (i838-'39),  77,  79;  Near  East- 
ern policy  of  (1839),  87  ff;  on  An- 
glo-French entente,  88,  93,  93  n; 
instructions  of  for  English  Levan- 
tine fleet,  89-90,  103-104,  113;  fa- 
vors return  of  Syria  to  Turkey,  92- 
93;  uncertain  about  Russian  ad- 
vances to  England,  103;  proposes 


plan  for  naval  cooperation  against 
Egypt,  in;  becomes  more  hostile  to 
Mehemet  Ali,  112;  favors  coercion, 
114-115;  receives  Brunnow's  propos- 
als favorably,  121,  122  n;  makes 
counter-proposals,  123;  criticizes 
French  position  on  Turco-Egyptian 
question,  125;  proposal  of  relative 
to  Pashalic  of  Acre,  125,  127;  not 
influenced  by  French  contentions, 
128-129;  announces  Russian  accept- 
ance of  English  counter-proposals  to 
Brunnow,  130;  on  outlook  for  set- 
tlement of  Turco-Egyptian  question 
(1840),  133;  on  sympathies  of  Se- 
bastiani  and  Guizot,  135  n;  expecta- 
tions of  relative  to  Thiers,  137-138; 
hostile  to  Louis  Philippe  and  French 
naval  preparations,  139-140,  139  n; 
plans  of  for  settlement  of  Turco- 
Egyptian  question,  146-147;  favora- 
ble to  return  of  Napoleon's  body  to 
France,  148,  148  n;  requests  answer 
of  France  to  Neumann's  proposal, 
153;  conferences  at  the  home  of,  156; 
on  reasons  for  keeping  negotiations 
secret,  156  n,  160-161  n;  threatens 
to  resign,  157-158;  wins  support  of 
English  Cabinet,  159  n;  defends 
treaty  of  July  15,  1840,  164-165; 
unmoved  by  threatening  French  at- 
titude, 168-169,  J74.  J8o;  opposed  to 
modification  of  July  treaty,  172  ff, 
173  n,  185,  195-196;  comments  of 
on  opposition  in  English  Cabinet, 
182  n;  attitude  of  on  deposition  of 
Mehemet  Ali,  186-187  n,  190,  190  n; 
quiets  opposition  in  English  Cabinet, 
1 88;  answer  of  to  Thiers'  casus  belli 
note,  196,  197  n;  orders  negotiations 
to  be  opened  with  Mehemet  Ali, 
198,  198-199  n;  comments  of  on 
French  policy,  206-207  n;  favors  re- 
turn of  France  to  Concert  of  Europe, 
21 1;  opinion  of  on  Napier's  conven- 
tion with  Mehemet  Ali,  211  n; 
moves  to  influence  policy  of  Porte 
relative  to  Mehemet  Ali,  210-211; 
(1841),  217-218;  reply  of  to  Metter- 
nich's  criticism,  217;  opposed  to  pro- 
posals made  by  Guizot,  221-222; 
supports  Chekib  in  refusal  to  sign 
protocol  de  cloture,  223-224;  agrees 
to  formal  communication  to  Chekib, 
224;  views  of  relative  to  final  set- 
tlement of  Turco-Egyptian  question, 
224,  224  n,  225  n;  estimates  on  Near 
Eastern  policy  of  from  1839  to  1841, 
231-232,  231-232  n. 


2/2 


THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,  1832-184! 


[598 


Parliament,  resolutions  of,  relative  to 
steam  communication  with  India 
(1834),  39-40;  committee  action  in 
on  same  (1837),  58-59  n. 

Peel,  Sir  Robert,  English  statesman, 
45-46. 

Pisani,  English  Dragoman  at  Constan- 
tinople, 150  n. 

Ponsonby,  Viscount  John,  English  Am- 
bassador to  Turkey,  25,  30;  attitude 
of  on  Turco-Egyptian  relations 
(1834),  243;  hostile  to  Russian  in- 
fluence in  Turkey  (i835-'36),  51, 
51  n,  248;  influence  of  at  Constan- 
tinople, 66-67;  hostile  to  Mehemet 
AH,  51;  (1839),  85-86,  86  n;  on 
French  policy  at  Constantinople,  84- 
85;  on  collective  note  of  July  27, 
1839,  108  n;  reports  unrest  in  do- 
mains of  Mehemet  AH,  128  n; 
alarmed  by  situation  in  Near  East 
(1840),  150  n;  accuses  Pontois  of 
attempting  to  intimidate  Porte,  168 
n;  advice  of  to  Porte  relative  to  Me- 
hemet Ali's  reinstatement  in  Egypt, 
204;  (1841),  215,  218  n,  220-221; 
conduct  of  criticized,  86  n,  210  n. 

Pontois,  Admiral  Edward,  French  Am- 
bassador to  Turkey,  127  n;  repre- 
sentations of  to  Porte  against  treaty 
of  July  15,  1840,  168,  168  n. 

Porter,  David,  U.  S.  Minister  to  Tur- 
key, on  situation  in  Near  East 
(1833),  17  n,  19  n;  (1834),  242, 
244-245;  on  Turkish  character 
(1836),  76  n. 

Pozzo  di  Borgo,  Count,  Russian  Am- 
bassador to  France  and  later  to  Eng- 
land, 27,  28,  56,  237,  249;  on  Anglo- 
Russian  relations  (1833),  46,  46  n; 
views  of  on  Durham  mission  to  Rus- 
sia (1835),  245-246. 

Press,  of  Europe  hostile  to  Russia 
(i835-'36),  55-56,  56  n. 

Protocol  de  cloture,  of  July  10,  1841, 
228-229. 

of  Sept.  17,  1840,  187  n. 

Prussia,  supports  Russian  protests  to 
France  (1833),  27;  Near  Eastern 
policy  of  (1839),  80,  118-119,  118' 
n;  (1840),  254;  London  representa- 
tive of  without  instructions,  134; 
preparations  of  for  war  during  crisis 
of  1840,  184  n;  eager  to  secure  Turco- 
Egyptian  settlement  (1841),  222- 
223,  228  n. 

Raikes,  Thomas,  English  politician,  46, 
46  n;  on  danger  of  revolution  in 


France  (1840),  192  n;  on  attitude 
of  Louis  Philippe,  195  n;  on  public 
opinion  in  France,  197  n. 

Rechid  Pasha,  (spelling  copied  in  notes 
from  some  of  the  sources).  See 
Reschid. 

Red  Sea  route  to  India.  See  Suez 
route  to  India. 

Reeve,  Henry,  English  politician  and 
newspaper  correspondent,  184;  on 
danger  of  revolution  in  France 
(1840),  205  n;  on  outcome  of  crisis 
of  1840,  206. 

Reouf  Pasha,  Turkish  statesman,  104. 

Reschid,  Mustafa,  Pasha,  Turkish  dip- 
lomatist and  Minister  of  Foreign  Af-  - 
fairs,  17,  44,  149;  mission  of  to  Lon- 
don (1839),  75-76;  negotiates  relative 
to  fate  of  Mehemet  AH  (i84O-'4i), 
203-204,  220-221;  announces  willing- 
ness to  reinstate  Mehemet  Ali  in 
Egypt,  204-205,  215;  resignation  of 
(1841),  225-226,  226  n. 

Rifaat,  Bey  and  later  Pasha,  Turkish 
diplomatist  and  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  mission  of  to  Alexandria 
(1840),  174  ff;  appointed  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs  (1841),  226. 

Roussin,  Admiral,  Baron  Albin,  French 
Ambassador  to  Turkey  and  later 
Minister  of  Marine,  opposes  Russian 
policy  in  Turkey  (1833),  20-21,  21 
n,  25;  moves  to  end  Turco-Egyptian 
struggle,  21-22,  22  n,  23,  238;  friendly 
to  Mehemet  Ali,  36-37,  36-37  n; 
(1834),  243;  (1838),  67;  attempts 
to  prevent  war  in  Near  East  (1839), 
85-86;  complains  of  Ponsonby's  be- 
havior, 85  n;  (1840),  210  n. 

Ruckmann,  Baron,  Russian  charge 
d'affaires  at  Constantinople,  protests 
against  Turkish  threat  to  renew  war 
with  Egypt  (1834),  45,  243. 

Russell,  Lord  John,  English  Secretary 
of  State  for  the  Colonies,  157  n, 
159  n;  favored  concessions  to  France 
in  crisis  of  1840,  170,  182,  188,  188 
n,  190  n. 

Russia,  general  policy  of  in  Near  East, 
9,  n;  influence  of  supreme  in  Turkey 
(1833),  25;  famine  in  southern  pro- 
vinces of,  34,  34-35  n;  Near  Eastern 
policy  of  (i832-'33),  16,  237-238, 
240-241;  (1834),  42,  45;  (1835), 
245,  246-247;  (1836),  57;  not  pre- 
pared for  war  (1835),  47;  alarmed 
at  English  interest  in  Near  East 
(i835-'36),  52,  52  n;  eager  to  pre- 


599] 


INDEX 


273 


vent  war  in  Near  East  (1839),  77- 
78,  77  n;  difficulties  confronting  the 
government  of,  78  n;  policy  of  rela- 
tive to  Turco-Egyptian  question, 
98  ff,  118-119;  opposes  conference 
of  Powers  to  settle  same,  109-110; 
not  anxious  to  intervene  in  Turkey, 
116  ff;  views  on  the  aims  and  policy 
of,  252;  favorable  to  ending  isola- 
tion of  France  (1840),  212;  condi- 
tions in,  253;  triumphant  in  1841, 
230. 

Sami  Bey,  confidential  secretary  to 
Mehemet  AH,  150,  155. 

Sauzet,  President  of  French  Chamber 
of  Deputies,  196  n. 

Schleinitz,  Freiherr  von,  Prussian 
charge  d'affaires  at  London,  186. 

Schneckenburger,  German  poet,  184  n. 

Schneider,  General,  French  Minister  of 
War,  82. 

Sebastiani,  Count  Horace  Frangois, 
French  Ambassador  to  England,  on 
reception  of  Brunnow's  proposals  by 
English  Ministers  (1839),  121-122, 
122  n;  explains  French  opposition 
to  coercion  of  Mehemet  AH,  124; 
presents  plans  for  settlement  of  Tur- 
co-Egyptian question,  124-125,  124 
n;  unable  to  announce  attitude  of 
France  (1840),  134;  recall  of  from 
London,  135,  135  n. 

Simonitch,  Count,  Russian  envoy  to 
Persia,  72. 

Soult,  Marshal  Victor,  Due  de  Dal- 
matie,  French  statesman,  Near 
Eastern  policy  of  (1839),  82,  84- 
85,  87  ff,  106-107,  106  n,  in  ff;  on 
Near  Eastern  policies  of  Powers,  88; 
proposes  conference  at  Vienna,  91- 
92;  on  Russian  opposition  to  Vienna 
conference,  iio-m;  criticizes  Rus- 
sian proposals,  122;  rejects  proposals 
for  division  of  Syria,  124  n,  126; 
argues  against  employment  of  force  in 
settlement  of  Turco-Egyptian  ques- 
tion, 128,  128  n,  134  n;  attitude  of 
after  Russian  acceptance  of  English 
counter-proposals,  130  ff;  pleased  by 
delay  (1840),  134-135;  instructions 
of  to  Guizot,  136;  withdraws  from 
office,  136;  return  of  to  office,  193. 

Steam  communication  with  India,  38 
ff,  44  n,  50  n,  58-59  n,  61-62,  61  n, 
62  n,  82  n,  139  n,  158  n,  165  n,  232 
n,  236. 

Stopford,  Admiral,  Sir  Robert,  English 
naval  commander  in  Levant,  naval 
operations  of  (1840),  177;  attack  of 


on  Acre,  199;  disapproves  of  Na- 
pier's convention  with  Mehemet  AH, 
201. 

Straits  Convention  of  1841,  222-223, 
229,  229  n. 

Sturmer,  Baron  Bartholomaus.  Austrian 
Internuncio  at  Constantinople,  ac- 
cuses Pontois  of  attempting  to  in- 
timidate Porte  (1840),  168  n;  ad- 
vice of  to  Turkish  Ministers,  204; 
urges  Reschid  Pasha  to  concede 
hereditary  title  to  Mehemet  Ali 
(1841),  214-215;  unable  to  reply  to 
Turkish  note,  221. 

Suez  route  to  India,  39-40,  40  n,  59  ff, 
59-63  ns,  213,  213  n.  See  also  Steam 
communication  with  India. 

Suleiman  Pasha  (Colonel  Seves), 
French  officer  in  employ  of  Mehemet 
AH,  177. 

Syria,  revolts  in  (1834),  43-44,  243; 
(1840),  174  n,  177  n;  reports  con- 
cerning revolts  in  reach  London, 
TS9)  TS9  n>  J6o  n;  naval  operations 
on  coast  of,  177-178,  178  n,  199. 

Talleyrand-Perigord,  Chajes  Maurice 
de,  Prince  of  Benevento,  French 
statesman,  239. 

Teplitz,  meeting  at   (1833),  31. 

Thiers,  Louis  Adolphe,  French  states- 
man, on  French  policy  in  Near  East 
(J833),  38  n;  Near  Eastern  policy 
of  (1836),  64-65;  resignation  of,  66; 
forms  ministry  (1840),  136;  speech 
of  defending  Anglo-French  alliance, 
136-137,  136  n,  137  n;  instructions 
of  to  Guizot,  138;  Turco-Egyptian 
policy  of,  138-139  n,  140  n,  143- 
144,  144  n,  151  ff,  152  n;  opposed 
to  formal  conference  of  Powers,  142- 
143;  request  of  for  return  of  Na- 
poleon's body,  148;  rejects  Neu- 
mann's proposal  for  Turco-Egyptian 
settlement,  153;  favors  delay,  155- 
156;  aroused  by  treaty  of  July  15, 
1840,  165-166;  questions  England's 
policy,  165  n;  policy  of  during  crisis 
of  1840,  167-168,  171,  175  n;  threat- 
ening attitude  of,  179-180,  179  n, 
183  n;  casus  belli  note  of,  187-188, 
189  n;  plan  of  for  additional  mili- 
tary preparations,  189-190,  192-193; 
resignation  of  in  Oct.  1840,  193; 
comments  of  on  French  policy 
(1841),  234  n. 

The  Times,  London  daily  paper,  on 
French  and  English  policies  in  Near 
East  (1833),  15  n;  hostile  to  Treaty 
of  Unkiar  Skelessi,  30-31;  on  Russia 


274 


THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION,  1832-1841 


[600 


(1836),  55-56;  on  Turco-Egyptian 
question  (1839),  93-94;  on  spirit  of 
English  and  French  journals  during 
crisis  of  1840,  170  n,  205  n;  favors 
modification  of  treaty  of  July  15, 
1840,  181-182,  181  n;  on  meaning 
of  Thiers  casus  belli  note,  189;  crit- 
icizes Palmerston  for  being  uncom- 
promising, 197. 

Titow,  Wladimir,  Russian  charge 
d'affaires  at  Constantinople,  215,221. 

Tunis,  French  fleet  sent  to  (1836),  65. 

Turkey,  public  opinion  in  (i832-'33), 
16,  17  n,  19  n;  negotiations  of  with 
Russia  for  military  aid  (1833),  18- 
19;  opposition  in  to  alliance  with 
Russia  quieted,  28;  authorities  of 
refuse  to  suspend  hostilities  (1839), 
86,  86  n;  same  encouraged  to  refuse 
negotiations  with  Mehemet  Ali,  127 
n;  Ministers  of  unwilling  to  pardon 
Mehemet  Ali  (1840),  203;  views 
upon  conditions  in,  253;  settlement 
of  Turco-Egyptian  question  an- 
nounced in  (1841),  219;  request  of 
for  support  of  Powers,  219  n;  gov- 
ernment of  agrees  to  modify  firman 
of  investiture,  226-227,  227-228, 
228  n. 

Unkiar  Skelessi,  Treaty  of  (1833),  29; 
English  and  French  opposition  to, 
3°;  33-34;  Nesselrode's  defense  of, 
34- 

Urquhart,  David,  English  political 
writer,  55,  55  n. 

Vail,  Aaron,  U.  S.  diplomatic  repre- 
sentative at  London,  on  interna- 
tional situation  in  Europe  (1833), 
237-239»  240-242;  on  effect  of  im- 
provement of  navigation  on  Danube 
(J835),  74  n;  on  situation  in  Near 
East,  244;  on  Durham's  mission  to 


Russia,  245-246;  on  Russian  policy 
in  Near  East,  246-247;  on  hostility 
of  European  press  to  Russia  (1836), 
56  n. 

Valmy,  French  deputy,  95,  95  n,  96  n. 

Varennes,  French  charge  d'affaires  at 
Constantinople,  17;  peace  endeavors 
of  at  Constantinople  (1833),  18-19; 
mission  of  to  Kutayah,  23-24. 

Vienna  conference  plan  (1839),  91- 
92,  92  n,  107-108,  108  n,  251. 

Villemain,  Abel  Francois,  French  Min- 
ister of  Public  Instruction,  135  n. 

Vixen,  affair  of   (i836-'37),  54. 

Walewski,  Count  Alexander,  French 
diplomatic  agent,  mission  of  to 
Egypt  (1840),  1 68,  174,  176,  176  n, 
179,  200  n. 

Wellington,  Arthur  Wellesley,  Duke 
of,  English  statesman,  172  n;  sug- 
gests closure  of  Straits  to  all  nations, 
46-47. 

Werther,  Baron  Wilhelm  von,  Prus- 
sian Minister,  Near  Eastern  policy 
of  (1839),  79;  (1840),  183-184, 
210;  (1841),  225. 

Wheaton,  Henry,  U.  S.  Diplomatic 
representative  at  Berlin,  on  Turco- 
Egyptian  question  in  relations  of 
Powers  (1838),  248-250;  (1839), 
250-251;  on  difficulties  confronting 
Russia,  78  n;  on  situation  in  Near 
East  (1840),  253;  on  Franco-Prus- 
sian relations,  253-254;  on  views  of 
three  eastern  Powers  relative  to 
Turco-Egyptian  question  (1841), 
210  n;  on  Austrian  influence  at  Con- 
stantinople, 226  n. 

William  IV,  King  of  England,  39  n. 

Yaver  Pasha  (Admiral  Walker),  Eng- 
lish naval  officer  in  Turkish  em- 
ploy, 205,  214,  216. 


15 
L 


UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS  STUDIES 

IN  THE 

SOCIAL  SCIENCES 

Vol.  XI  DECEMBER,  1923  No.  4 

THE  TURCO-EGYPTIAN  QUESTION 

IN  THE  RELATIONS  OF  ENGLAND, 

FRANCE,  AND  RUSSIA,  1832-1841 


325 

PART  II 


BY 
FREDERICK  STANLEY  RODKEY 

A.B.,  University  of  Kansas,  1917 
A.M.,  University  of  Kansas,  1918 


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